City of Armadale v Merrick

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   CITY OF ARMADALE -v- MERRICK [2014] WASCA 125

CORAM:   PULLIN JA

NEWNES JA
MAZZA JA

HEARD:   12 MARCH 2014

DELIVERED          :   19 JUNE 2014

FILE NO/S:   CACR 161 of 2013

BETWEEN:   CITY OF ARMADALE

Appellant

AND

GEOFFREY MERRICK
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :JENKINS J

Citation  :MERRICK -v- CITY OF ARMADALE [2013] WASC 175

File No  :SJA 1123 of 2012

Catchwords:

Statutory construction - Litter Act 1979 (WA), s 23 - Meaning of 'appointed area' - Whether area where respondent deposited litter was 'appointed area'

Legislation:

Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), pt 2 div 2
Criminal Code (WA), s 24
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 78(3)
Litter Act 1979 (WA), s 23, s 30

Result:

Appeal allowed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr P G McGowan

Respondent:     No appearance

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Cornerstone Legal

Respondent:     No appearance

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Kelly v The Queen [2004] HCA 12; (2004) 218 CLR 216

Merrick v City of Armadale [2013] WASC 175

  1. PULLIN & NEWNES JJA: This is an appeal from a decision of Jenkins J, who allowed an appeal by the respondent (Mr Merrick) against his conviction in the Magistrates Court for an offence under s 23 of the Litter Act 1979 (WA). The appeal turns on whether the area of land on which Mr Merrick deposited a load of rubbish was 'an appointed area' under the Act.

  2. Mr Merrick chose not to take part in the appeal to this court.

Background

  1. On 21 July 2011, Mr Merrick took a load of rubbish, consisting of wood, plastic, fabric and piping, in his utility to a waste disposal facility operated by the appellant (the City) in Hopkinson Road, Hilbert.  The whole of the facility was on land owned by and under the control of the City.

  2. A weighbridge operator was located at the entrance to the facility.  The duties of the weighbridge operator included checking whether visitors to the facility were prepared to sort the rubbish they wished to deposit, in order to deposit different categories of material in the different areas in the facility set aside for that material.  Whether or not they were prepared to do so determined the amount payable to deposit the litter, a higher charge being imposed to deposit unsorted litter (ts 38).  Mr Merrick was asked by the weighbridge operator if he would sort his rubbish.  It was accepted at first instance that Mr Merrick may not have heard what the weighbridge operator said, but the weighbridge operator obviously understood him to say that he would do so.  She gave him a ticket which referred to sorted rubbish, but again it was accepted that Mr Merrick may not have read it.

  3. Mr Merrick then entered the facility.  He passed a large sign which read, 'Before unloading the vehicle, please see the landfill attendant'.  It was accepted…

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Details
Case
[2014] WASCA 125
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of City of Armadale v Merrick involves the City of Armadale, appellant, and Merrick, respondent. The dispute revolves around the interpretation of the term 'appointed area' under section 23 of the Litter Act 1979 (WA) and whether the area where the respondent deposited litter qualified as such. The matter was heard by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The appellant had originally convicted the respondent for depositing litter in an area set aside for unwanted steel only, leading to a conviction under the Litter Act for depositing rubbish in a place not designated as an 'appointed area'.

The legal issues before the court included the precise definition and scope of the term 'appointed area' under the Litter Act 1979 (WA), and whether the specific area in question met the statutory criteria. The primary judge had ruled in favour of the respondent, finding that the area was indeed an 'appointed area' for depositing any kind of rubbish. This court, however, disagreed, holding that the area was not an 'appointed area' under the Act because it was not set aside for the deposit of all kinds of rubbish, nor specifically for the deposit of the type of rubbish the respondent had deposited.

In its reasoning, the court closely examined the statutory language and the legislative intent behind the Litter Act 1979 (WA). The court noted that the definition of 'appointed area' explicitly required an area set aside by a public authority for the deposit of litter. Given that the area in question was designated for the deposit of unwanted steel only, it did not meet the statutory requirement for being an 'appointed area' for general rubbish. Therefore, the court overturned the primary judge's decision and reinstated the respondent's conviction. The court also addressed the issue of costs, finding that the appellant, being ultimately successful in the appeal, should be awarded its costs of both the appeal before the primary judge and this court.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: On 19 June 2014, this court allowed an appeal by the appellant against a decision of Jenkins J in which her Honour had set aside the respondent's conviction for an offence under the Litter Act 1979 (WA) (the Act): City of Armadale v Merrick [2014] WASCA 125. The respondent had been convicted in the Magistrates Court of depositing litter on land, being land which was not an 'appointed area' within the meaning of s 23 of the Act. The respondent was convicted as a result of depositing general household rubbish in an area of the appellant's waste disposal facility that had been set aside for the deposit of unwanted steel only. The case turned on whether that area was an 'appointed area'. The Act defined an 'appointed area' to mean 'an area set aside by a public authority on land under its control for the deposit of litter'. In the Act, 'litter' included 'all kinds of rubbish, refuse, junk, garbage or scrap': s 5. The primary judge set aside the respondent's conviction on the ground, in substance, that as the area in question was set aside for one sort of rubbish ‑ steel or light steel ‑ it constituted an 'appointed area' in which rubbish of any sort may be deposited. This court overturned her Honour's decision, finding that the area was not an 'appointed area', being neither an area set aside for the deposit of all kinds of rubbish nor an area set aside for the deposit of the kind of rubbish the respondent had deposited there. The appellant seeks an order for its costs of the appeal to the primary judge and the appeal to this court. That is opposed by the respondent. Written submissions have been filed and served by each party and the question of costs is to be determined on the papers. It was not in issue that the court has the power to make an order for costs of both the appeal before the primary judge and the costs in this court: Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 14(1)(h), s 18. It was also accepted by the parties that in criminal matters there is no general rule that costs follow the event; rather, save that the discretion must be exercised judicially, the court has a general and unconstrained discretion with respect to costs, except in certain limited cases which are irrelevant for present purposes: see Wilson v McDonald [2009] WASCA 39 (S) [5]. In exercising the discretion as to costs, a relevant circumstance may be whether there is any relevant element of public interest involved in the case: Wilson v McDonald [10]. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that there was no public interest element in this case. While the decision of this court clarified the meaning of 'appointed area' in s 23(b) of the Act, the facts and law were of a 'regulatory character' and were analogous to civil proceedings where ordinarily costs follow the event. The appellant was a public authority responsible for enforcing the Act and it had been ultimately successful in the proceedings. There was no reason that costs should not follow the event.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established