JLW24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
JLW24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 1319
File number(s):
NSD 1573 of 2024 NSD 1574 of 2024
Judgment of:
PERRY J
Date of judgment:
15 November 2024
Catchwords:
MIGRATION – judicial review application of adverse security assessment made by the Director-General of Security for the purposes of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to cancel the applicant’s visa under s 128 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – content of the Director-General’s duty to afford the applicant procedural fairness – where applicant had been located in Gaza – where the applicant was not afforded an opportunity to be heard on the adverse security assessment – consequences of public interest immunity for the principle in Blatch v Archer and evidential onus – whether the Director-General had a duty to invite the applicant for an interview in the Australian Embassy in Cairo or in Australia
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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In the case of JLW24 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a Palestinian citizen residing in Gaza, contested the decision of the Director-General of Security to provide an adverse security assessment (ASA) that led to the cancellation of his Australian visitor visa. The applicant argued that the Director-General had failed to afford him procedural fairness by not providing an opportunity to respond to the ASA. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the Director-General had a duty to invite the applicant for an interview, either in the Australian Embassy in Cairo or in Australia, and whether any breach of procedural fairness had occurred.
The court found that the Director-General had no duty to invite the applicant for an interview, considering the applicant's location in an active war zone and the urgency of the situation. The court also concluded that the principle of Blatch v Archer, which mandates procedural fairness, did not apply in this case because the disclosure of the adverse material would have significantly compromised the Director-General’s operations. The evidential onus on the applicant to establish a breach of procedural fairness was not met. The court held that the complexities arising from the applicant’s location in an active war zone at the time of the ASA, and the nature of the security-sensitive information, precluded a hearing.
Consequently, the court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness. The court ruled that the Director-General’s decision-making process was meticulous, and the need to maintain the secrecy of ASIO's operations and sources outweighed any procedural fairness considerations in this instance. The urgency and the nature of the security concerns, compounded by the applicant’s location in a conflict zone, justified the Director-General's decision not to hold a hearing. The court further noted that the applicant had not challenged the claims of public interest immunity, reinforcing the validity of the Director-General’s decision. The final orders of the court dismissed the application and made no order as to costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. There be no order as to costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
For the reasons set out below, no breach of procedural fairness has been established and the application must be dismissed. This is a case where disclosure of the adverse material would have frustrated the purpose of the exercise of the power, and the urgency of the situation and the complexities arising from the applicant’s location in an active war zone at the time of the ASA, among other factors, precluded a hearing.2. EVIDENCE The applicant relied upon the affidavits of Mr Angus James Francis, solicitor, affirmed on 2 August 2024 and 9 October 2024 which were read without objection and tendered the exhibits thereto and a copy of the notification to the applicant of the cancellation of his visa. The Director-General relied upon the affidavits of Mr Oscar Hopkins, a First Assistant Director-General of ASIO, sworn on 17 October 2024 and 31 October 2024 (the first and second Hopkins affidavits respectively). Those affidavits were read subject to certain parts of the affidavits being subject to limitations as to the uses to which the evidence could be put under s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and one ruling on admissibility which I deferred and consider later in these reasons. Mr Hopkins was also cross-examined in closed court. Mr Hopkins gave evidence in the name of his assumed identity which was issued under Part IAC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Mr Hopkins is a senior officer of ASIO with nearly 20 years’ experience in delivering and managing production of ASIO analytical assessments and advice. That experience has included responsibility for ensuring that all security assessments produced by the Security Assessments Branch (SA Branch) and progressed for consideration by the Director-General meet required standards of analytical excellence, procedural fairness, integrity, and accountability. In his current role, which he has held since mid-2023, Mr Hopkins has responsibility for the Intelligence Division which embraces the SA Branch. His duties in that role include responsibility for reviewing all security assessments produced by ASIO and approving their progression to the Director-General. Mr Hopkins was responsible for preparing the security assessment of the applicant which was submitted to the Director-General for consideration and for giving instructions on behalf of the Director-General regarding the claims for public interest immunity made in these proceedings. Mr Hopkins’ affidavit evidence explained, insofar as he considered that he could do so in open and unclassified form, why the applicant had not been afforded an opportunity to respond to the matters underpinning the ASA signed by the Director-General on 8 March 2024. In his oral evidence, he presented as an impressive witness of truth, and as a committed, highly experienced and responsible ASIO officer. While his evidence in certain respects was challenged in cross-examination, I accept his evidence as truthful. This includes his evidence as to the careful way in which he balanced the different factors in determining whether, and the extent to which, public interest immunity attached to: the Director-General Decision Brief (DGDB); and to the Classified Statement of Grounds (CSOG) in order to produce the Truncated Statement of Grounds (TSOG), including his reassessment of the extent to which public interest immunity attached to these documents as the precise nature of the applicant’s contentions in these proceedings emerged. I do not accept any suggestion in cross-examination (to the extent that it was ultimately pressed) that Mr Hopkins made judgments on whether to assert a claim of public interest immunity having regard to any perceived forensic advantage to the Director-General in this proceeding and note that any such suggestion is incompatible with the fact that the applicant did not challenge the claim of public interest immunity (as the Director-General submitted). Rather, Mr Hopkins’ evidence established that he properly took into account the importance of the material in question to the applicant’s case as it had emerged in balancing the interests in the administration of justice, on the one hand, against the risks of disclosing the material, on the other hand, in determining whether public interest immunity attached in accordance with well-established principles: see Part 3.3 below. 3. THE SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND CANCELLATION OF THE APPLICANT’S VISITOR VISA3.1 The grant of the visitor visa
Decision
Reasons for decision
In short, it is apparent that the Determination lays down a careful and thorough process for the making of an ASA. 3.5 The Director-General’s decision on 8 March 2024 On 8 March 2024, the Director-General:(1)approved the recommendation to provide the ASA pursuant to ss 17(1)(c) and 37(1) of the ASIO Act recommending that the applicant’s visitor visa be cancelled on the basis of his agreement with the recommendations in the DGDB; and (2)signed and dated the ASA. In so doing, the Director-General indicated his agreement with, and adopted, the CSOG as his reasons for the decision to make the ASA. The ASA identified the “Head of Security” pursuant to s 4 of the ASIO Act as “the protection of, and of the people of, the Commonwealth and the several States and Territories from politically motivated violence.” The ASA further advised that:ASIO assesses [the applicant] to be directly or indirectly a risk to security (within the meaning of section 4 of the ASIO Act) and that the requirements of security make it necessary or desirable for [the applicant’s] temporary visitor visa (subclass 600) to be cancelled. In line with Mr Hopkins’ evidence as to the need to protect ASIO’s collection and analysis methods and human sources, including ASIO officers, so as not to compromise current or future activities or operations or place human sources at risk, as is apparent below, the TSOG redacts all references to the sources of reported information, as well as some of the information about the applicant and the risk he poses to national security. In addition to disclosing information that the applicant was not allowed to leave Gaza as I have already explained, the TSOG relevantly stated that:ASIO assesses [the applicant]:a.is likely to have […]; andb.presents an unacceptable risk to Australia’s security which would be mitigated by the cancellation of his Australian temporary visitor Visa (subclass 600).Recommendations3. ASIO assesses [that the applicant] to be directly or indirectly a threat to security (within the meaning of section 4 of the [ASIO Act]) and that the requirements of security make it necessary or desirable for [the applicant’s] temporarily Visitor visa (subclass 600) to be cancelled.4. Accordingly, ASIO recommends [the applicant’s] temporary Visitor visa (subclass 600) be cancelled.…AssessmentBackground9. [The applicant] is a Palestinian citizen, likely to be currently located in Gaza, Occupied Palestinian Territories, who holds a valid Australian temporary Visitor visa – Tourist Stream (subclass 600). … [The applicant] intends to travel to Australia to visit [a relative] who is an Australian citizen.10. Home Affairs records show [the applicant] has not previously held an Australian Visa or travelled to Australia.11. [The applicant] first came to ASIO attention in December 2023 […] …[The applicant] is likely to have […]14. ASIO assesses [the applicant] is likely to have […]….15. ASIO assesses [the applicant] is likely to have direct links to […]…16. […]. […], ASIO assesses [the applicant’s] affiliation with […] is likely to be of security concern, were he to travel to Australia.17. As per ASIO’s Security Assessment Determination No. 4 (SAD No. 4), ASIO has considered the credibility, nature and authenticity of […] reporting […].a. Nonetheless ASIO’s assessments regarding [the applicant], […], are weighted heavily on the consistency of […] reporting and […] reporting.b. Additionally, ASIO’s assessments regarding [the applicant’s] links to […] are weighted heavily on […] reporting, which we assess to be plausible. […]18. We have also considered section 8.4 of the SAD No. 4, specifically, taking into account a subject’s associations in a security assessment. The SAD No. 4 notes associations which reflect adversely on the subject can be included where the subject is in an active association (such as an alliance, link, connection, support for and/or membership) with any person who is involved in, or is reasonably suspected of being involved in activities prejudicial to security.a. Based on the wording of […] Reporting which indicated [the applicant] had […], ASIO assesses [the applicant’s] association with […] is more likely to be an active and direct […] association. Therefore, ASIO assesses the Association is relevant to security and can be considered to reflect adversely on [the applicant].b. Section 8.4.2 of the SAD No. 4 notes a passive association which is limited to family ties is not sufficient to warrant treating the ‘association’ as adverse. However, in this instance, ASIO assesses [the applicant’s] associations with […] are relevant to security and can be considered to reflect adversely on [the applicant].…[The applicant] presents an unacceptable risk to Australia’s security which would be mitigated by the cancellation of his Australian temporary Visitor visa (subclass 600)20. While ASIO has not identified reporting to indicate [the applicant’s] travel to Australia is specifically for reasons of security concern, ASIO assesses his presence in Australia presents an unacceptable risk to Australia’s security. […]. […]. ASIO assesses [the applicant] likely still presents a risk of undertaking terrorist support or facilitation activities in Australia.21. ASIO assesses [the applicant’s] presence in Australia would present an unacceptable risk to Australia’s security. This risk would be effectively mitigated by cancelling [the applicant’s] Australian temporary Visitor visa (subclass 600). In making this assessment, ASIO has placed weight on […] and […] Reporting which indicates [the applicant] is likely to have […].…Consequences to security and risk mitigation23. Based on [the applicant’s] […], ASIO assesses [the applicant] to be directly or indirectly a risk to security (within the meaning of section 4 of the ASIO Act), and that the requirements of security make it necessary or desirable for [the applicant’s] temporary Visitor visa (subclass 600) to be cancelled.24. If [the applicant] were to continue to hold an Australian temporary Visitor visa (subclass 600), ASIO considers he would be able to travel onshore and might promote, and/or conduct acts in support of, PMV […]. By cancelling his Visa, the risk to security which would be likely to exist if he were to come onshore will be mitigated.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The conduct of its operations in the strictest possible secrecy is essential to ASIO’s capacity to perform its functions. In this regard, it was Mr Hopkins’ unchallenged evidence that:It is fundamental to the effective operation of an organisation such as ASIO that its activities be conducted in the strictest possible secrecy. This secrecy can extend to neither confirming nor denying if certain activities have occurred, as to do so could compromise current or future activities or operations, expose ASIO’s collection and analysis methods, and place ASIO officers or other persons including human sources at risk. Disclosing information which reveals ASIO’s areas of interest, the identity of subjects of security interest, the degree of its ability to obtain intelligence in relation to those subjects, its sources (including human sources), its investigative techniques, its technical capabilities (and limitations) and work methods (modus operandi), its successes and the information derived from its successes, would cause very significant harm to ASIO’s ability to perform its functions. Put another way, secrecy is essential to ASIO’s ability to fulfil its mission to protect the security of Australia and Australians.Further, information relayed by ASIO internally and to domestic partners may have been provided by domestic and foreign partners, intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Such information is generally shared by partner agencies on the basis that ASIO has agreed to strict information-sharing arrangements, often requiring that the intelligence not be disclosed, including use or disclosure in any legal proceedings, at all or without the consent of the partner.It is also fundamental to ASIO’s effective operation that any “intelligence gaps” in ASIO’s coverage of persons of security concern (for example, gaps in ASIO’s knowledge of some of their activities or associates of security concern) be protected from disclosure. These ‘gaps’ could otherwise be exploited to carry out activities prejudicial to Australia’s security, with or without ASIO detection.3.3 The documents provided to the Director-General for his consideration on 8 March 2024 and claim of public interest immunity over parts of those documents On 8 March 2024, seven days after referral of the applicant’s visitor visa to ASIO, the Director-General was provided with documents to enable him to consider whether to make the security assessment pursuant to Part IV of the ASIO Act, namely:(1)the DGDB recommending that he provide an ASA to the Department of Home Affairs and recommend cancellation of the applicant’s visitor visa;(2)the proposed security assessment prepared by Mr Hopkins which assessed the applicant “to be directly or indirectly a risk to security” and identified the relevant part of the definition of “security” in s 4 of the ASIO Act as the protection of, and of the people of, Australia, “from politically motivated violence”; and (3)a CSOG.