Bukvic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Bukvic v The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 517

MIGRATION - review of Minister's decision to cancel visa - whether direction made under s 499 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) binds Minister.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 499, 501

Damanik v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 771 followed
Baulch v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 139 followed

GEORGE BUKVIC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
S124 of 2000

FINN J
4 MAY 2001
ADELAIDE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S124 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

GEORGE BUKVIC
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 MAY 2001

WHERE MADE:

ADELAIDE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

The application be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

S124 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

GEORGE BUKVIC
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

FINN J

DATE:

4 MAY 2001

PLACE:

ADELAIDE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The issues raised in this application for an order for review under Part 8 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ("the Act") fall within a narrow compass. The applicant, George Bukvic, who was born in Yugoslavia on 6 May 1970, arrived in Australia as a migrant on 27 December 1986. On 11 October 2000 the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs ("the Minister") personally decided to cancel Mr Bukvic's visa under s 501(2) of the Act. The Minister had concluded that Mr Bukvic did not pass the character test as defined in s 501(6), as Mr Bukvic was unable to satisfy the Minister that he did pass that test as required by s 501(2).

  2. The challenges as brought to the Minister's decision are premised upon the Minister being bound to apply directions he had given under s 499(1) of the Act ("Direction No 17"). It is alleged that the Minister did not comply with Direction No 17 and by so doing (a) failed to observe a procedure that was required by the Act to be observed in the making of the decision; and (b) erred in law in making his decision. The error of law complained of was that the Minister did not have regard to all of the considerations that Direction No 17 stipulated as was required of him, but rather the Minister selected "smorgasbord" style from among them in such a fashion as to breach, and hence misapply, the direction.

  3. A distinct secondary challenge to the decision based on the no evidence ground of s 476(1)(g) of the Act will be referred to later in these reasons.

    Was the Minister Bound by Direction No 17
    The Statutory Setting

  4. Section 499 of the Act, insofar as presently relevant, provides:

    "(1)The Minister may give written directions to a person or body having functions or powers under this Act if the directions…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 517
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Bukvic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the applicant, Mr Bukvic, challenging the Minister's decision to cancel his visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the Minister's decision was lawful and whether it adhered to the statutory requirements and natural justice principles.

The central legal issue was whether the Minister was bound by the s 499 directions when making a decision under s 501(2) of the Act, or if he could exercise discretion in accordance with the policy considerations outlined in Direction No 17. The applicant argued that the Minister should have strictly followed the Direction as if he were a delegate, citing s 499(2A) and the Direction's references to its binding nature on "all decision-makers". However, the court referenced previous decisions which held that the Minister is not bound by such directions but should consider them when exercising discretion.

The court found that the Minister's Statement of Reasons demonstrated that he had appropriately considered Direction No 17, fulfilling any expectation set by the Direction for procedural fairness. The court also rejected the applicant's argument that the Minister's finding on the expectations of the Australian community was based on a non-existent fact, determining that the finding was not necessarily dependent on a specific fact but rather on the nature of the offences and the standard of conduct expected of non-citizens.

The court ultimately dismissed the application, upholding the Minister's decision to cancel Mr Bukvic's visa. The decision affirmed that while the Minister should consider policy directions, he is not bound by them and retains the discretion to make decisions in the national interest under s 501(3) of the Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves a legal challenge by Mr Bukvic against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs regarding the cancellation of his visa. The Minister's decision to cancel the visa was based on a balancing process that took into account the protection of the Australian community, the expectations of the Australian community, and the best interests of the children. The Minister indicated in his Statement of Reasons that he considered the Australian community would expect that Mr Bukvic's visa would be cancelled. This was based on Mr Bukvic's criminal history and the Direction No 17, which outlines the expectations of the Australian community regarding non-citizens' obedience to Australian laws. Mr Bukvic contests the Minister's finding that the Australian community would expect his visa to be cancelled, arguing that the finding was based on a non-existent fact.

This case came before the court as an application for judicial review of the Minister's decision to cancel Mr Bukvic's visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The primary issue raised by the applicant was whether the Minister was bound to consider the Direction No 17 when exercising his discretion under section 501(2) of the Act. The applicant argued that the Minister should have been bound by the Direction as if he were a delegate making the decision. Prior decisions by other courts had already ruled that the Minister is not bound by such directions, but rather, he may consider them as relevant factors in exercising his discretion.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I nonetheless refer to the natural justice issue simply for the purpose of indicating that if the Minister created the expectation that he would "have regard to" Direction No 17, his Statement of Reasons in express terms and in the considerations to which it refers indicates, in my view, that he did have such regard to the Direction as would be sufficient to satisfy that expectation for procedural fairness purposes. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon this given that it can have no actual bearing on the disposition of this application.The No Evidence Ground In his Statement of Reasons of February 2001, the Minister indicated that he:"adopted a balancing process which took all relevant considerations into account whilst having due regard to the importance placed by the Government on the three primary considerations, namely the protection of the Australian community, the expectations of the Australian community and the best interests of the children."Those "primary considerations" were designated to be such in Direction No 17. In relation to the "expectations of the Australian community", the Statement of Reasons indicated that the Minister "noted paragraph 2.12 of the Direction, and found that the Australian community would expect that Mr Bukvic's visa would be cancelled". It is the applicant's contention that that finding was of a "fact … critical to the making of the decision": Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212 at 221; but that the "fact" so found did not exist. Before considering this submission I should refer to para 2.12 of the Direction. It states:"The Australian community expects non-citizens to obey Australian laws while in Australia. Where a non-citizen has breached, or where there is a significant risk that they will breach this trust or where the non-citizen has been convicted of offences in Australia or elsewhere, it may be appropriate to refuse the visa application or cancel the visa held by such a person. Visa refusal or cancellation and removal of the non-citizen may be appropriate simply because the nature of the character concerns or offences are such that that the Australian community would expect that the person would not be granted a visa or should be removed from Australia. Decision-makers should have due regard to the Government's view in this respect." The applicant has sought to tender evidence suggesting that a range of persons who know him in professional capacities would not have the expectation attributed by the Minister to the Australian community. I do not regard that evidence relevant to the issue raised by the "no evidence" ground. For my own part, I have difficulty in regarding the Minister's finding in this respect as being based on "the existence of a particular fact" (being what the Australian community would expect in relation to the cancellation of Mr Bukvic's visa). The reason for my difficulty relates to the burden and purpose of para 2.12 itself. That provision, for present purposes, postulates (i) a standard of conduct to which a non-citizen is expected to subscribe, the standard itself being ascribed to the expectation of the Australian community; (ii) a non-citizen having been convicted of serious offences; and (iii) a judgment to be made by the decision maker as to the appropriateness of visa cancellation because the nature of the offences were such that the "Australian community would expect that the person … should be removed from Australia".

Decision

Reasons for decision

FINN J
For its part, s 501 insofar as presently relevant, provides:"Decision of Minister or delegate - natural justice applies501 (1) The Minister may refuse to grant a visa to a person if the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test.(2) The Minister may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if:(a)the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test; and(b)the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test.Decision of Minister - natural justice does not apply(3) The Minister may: (a) refuse to grant a visa to a person; or (b) cancel a visa that has been granted to a person;if:(c)the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test; and(d)the Minister is satisfied that the refusal or cancellation is in the national interest.(4) The power under subsection (3) may only be exercised by the Minister personally.(5) The rules of natural justice, and the code of procedure set out in Subdivision AB of Division 3 of Part 2, do not apply to a decision under subsection (3).Character Test(6) For the purposes of this section, a person does not pass the character test if:(a)the person has a substantial criminal record (as defined by subsection (7)); or…(c) having regard to either or both of the following:(i) the person's past and present criminal conduct;(ii) the person's past and present general conduct;the person is not of good character; or…Otherwise, the person passes the character test.Substantial criminal record(7) For the purposes of the character test, a person has a substantial criminal record if: (a) the person has been sentenced to death; or (b) the person has been sentenced to imprisonment for life; or(c)the person has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more; or(d)the person has been sentenced to 2 or more terms of imprisonment (whether on one or more occasions), where the total of those terms is 2 years or more."The Minister's decision in the instant case was taken under s 501(2) of the Act.Applicant's Contention It is the applicant's submission that, at least where the Minister acts under s 501(2), he is bound by such s 499 directions as would bind a delegate if that delegate, and not the Minister, was making the s 501(2) decision. This submission is based (i) on the provisions of s 499(2A) of the Act (which require the person to whom directions are given to comply with them) and (ii) on the references in the Direction itself to its being binding on "all decision-makers" and to its objective of ensuring "a consistency of approach". Decisions of this Court are at variance with the applicant's submission. In Damanik v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 771 at [10] French J commented:"[a]s a matter of syntax s 499 does not bind the Minister himself. No doubt, however, he is entitled to take account of and apply the policy considerations reflected in any direction as factors relevant to the exercise by him of any discretion to which that direction applies."This view was followed by Drummond J in Baulch v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 139 at [21] where his Honour contrasted the Minister's position with that of his delegate, the latter but not the former being bound by Direction 17.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FINN J

The court examined the statutory framework of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the relevant provisions, particularly section 501(2) and Direction No 17. The court noted that Direction No 17 provided policy guidance and set out considerations for decision-makers but did not bind the Minister personally. This interpretation was supported by previous case law, including Damanik v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Baulch v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, which established that the Minister could consider policy directions but was not required to follow them strictly.

Regarding the second issue, the court assessed whether the Minister's finding about the Australian community's expectations constituted a critical fact. The court found that the Minister's decision was grounded in the applicant's criminal record and general conduct, rather than merely on the expectation of the community. This interpretation was consistent with the statutory language and the court's understanding of the purpose of the character test under the Act. The court held that the Minister's finding was not a critical fact because it did not form the basis of the decision to cancel the visa. Instead, the decision was driven by the applicant's criminal history and conduct, which aligned with the statutory criteria for visa cancellation.