FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Bochenski v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 68
Appeal from: Bochenski v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 989 File number: VID 1073 of 2016 Judges: BROMBERG, BROMWICH AND CHARLESWORTH JJ Date of judgment: 27 April 2017 Catchwords: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – whether Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection is a “person” within the meaning of s 499(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection is bound by a direction made by the Minister under s 499(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – principles on fettering the discretion of a Minister of State
MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Court decision dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision not to revoke a visa cancellation under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where decision not to revoke visa cancellation was made by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection – where appellant asserted Parliamentary Secretary erred by not considering himself bound by Direction No. 65 given by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and not applying the requirements of Direction No. 65 – proper construction of ss 499(1) and 499(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Legislation: Constitution, ss 62, 64, 65, 78B
Acts and Instruments (Framework Reform) Act 2015 (Cth)
Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), ss 2, 19(1), 20
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 198AHA(1), 496, 499, 501(3A), 501(6)(a), 501(7)(c), 501CA(4), 501L(7)
Ministers of State Act 1952 (Cth), s 4
Cases cited: Aksu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 514; (2001) 65 ALD 667
Bukvic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 517; (2001) 110 FCR 554
Damanik v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 771
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577
Howells v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 327; (2004) 139 FCR 580
Minister for Immigration Multicultural Affairs v Jia Legeng [2001] HCA 17; (2001) 205 CLR 507
NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38; (2014) 220 FCR 1
Neat Domestic Trading Pty Limited v AWB Limited [2003] HCA 35; (2003) 216 CLR 277
Ongel v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 525
R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Venables [1998] AC 407
Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor [2001] HCA 51; (2001) 207 CLR 391
Date of hearing: 17 February 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 81 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr M Albert (pro bono) Solicitor for the Appellant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr R Knowles Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 1073 of 2016 BETWEEN: ZBIGNIEW BOCHENSKI
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Bochenski v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCAFC 68
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the Parliamentary Secretary was bound by a direction issued by the Minister under section 499(1) of the Migration Act, and whether the Parliamentary Secretary was a "person" within the meaning of section 499(2A). The court examined two asserted rules of statutory construction and two fundamental principles concerning the exercise of public power, which the appellant argued should lead to the conclusion that the Parliamentary Secretary was bound by the Minister's direction. The court was required to determine if these rules and principles supported the appellant's position.
The court concluded that while the asserted rules of statutory construction were uncontroversial in the abstract, their application in this case produced an inconsistency with the established authority that a Minister cannot bind themselves or a hierarchically superior officeholder by their own direction. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the Parliamentary Secretary should be bound by the Minister's direction, finding that it did not resolve the identified inconsistency. Consequently, the court held that the Parliamentary Secretary was not bound by the Minister's direction, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed. Additionally, the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Counsel for the appellant based his argument for the existence of a status hierarchy between Ministers of State responsible for administering the Migration Act on the application of what he described as two rules of statutory construction, followed by two fundamental principles about the exercise of public power. The application of these rules and principles was advanced as the means to explain why the Minister issuing a direction did not bind himself nor a successor in that same position, in accordance with existing authority, but did bind the Parliamentary Secretary. Those rules and principles were stated to be as follows: (1)The first asserted rule was a “natural meaning rule” going to the question of whether the Parliamentary Secretary was a “person” within the meaning of that word in s 499 of the Migration Act. Counsel for the appellant posited that on such a natural meaning, the answer had to be “yes”. (2)The second asserted rule was that terms used in one Act should ordinarily be given an interpretation consistent with their use elsewhere in the same Act. It was argued that because the phrase “person or body” as used in ss 198AHA and 501L of the Migration Act applied to a member of the relevant executive council (albeit not of the Federal Executive Council, but rather non-federal domestic or overseas ministers), consistent usage demanded that the phrase “person or body” be given the same meaning in s 499 of the Migration Act. Therefore, it was contended, “person” as it appears in the phrase “person or body” in s 499 was capable of, and in the situation in this case did, refer to a Minster of State responsible for administering the Migration Act apart from the Minister who gave the direction. (3)The first asserted fundamental principle about the exercise of public power was that the holder of a public office cannot direct or bind him or herself in the exercise of the powers of that office. (4)The second asserted fundamental principle about the exercise of public power was that the holder of a public office cannot direct or bind a public officeholder who is hierarchically superior, but can direct or bind a public office holder who is hierarchically subordinate, even if the two officeholders have equivalent power. Consideration Turning first to the rules of statutory construction advanced by the appellant, it is accepted that each of the two asserted rules of statutory construction is uncontroversial in the abstract. The controversy arises from the way in which they are sought to be used. The argument as developed by counsel for the appellant was that their application leads to the conclusion that a “person” within the phrase “person or body” includes the Minister, either on a natural meaning because the Minister is in fact a person, or because in ss 198AHA and 501L “person” in the same phrase includes Ministers. That is the appellant’s starting point. However, taken alone that conclusion produces an inconsistency between that outcome whereby the Minister would be bound to follow Direction 65 and the line of authority that holds that a Minister is not bound by his own directions and cannot fetter his own discretion. The appellant’s argument that follows about status hierarchy is then intended to resolve that inconsistency.