Chandra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Chandra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2018] FCAFC 152

Appeal from: Chandra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 281
File number: NSD 423 of 2018
Judges: RARES, STEWARD AND THAWLEY JJ
Date of judgment: 14 August 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether Minister's decision not to revoke cancellation decision pursuant to Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501CA(4) affected by jurisdictional error by failing to take into account relevant considerations
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501CA
Cases cited:

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

Boschenski v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 250 FCR 209

Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR

Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 351 ALR 61

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Date of hearing: 14 August 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 43
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr A Markus of Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 423 of 2018
BETWEEN:

RAVIND CHANDRA

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGES:

RARES, STEWARD AND THAWLEY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

14 AUGUST 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCIPT)

THE COURT:

  1. This is an appeal against the decision of the primary judge who refused the appellant leave to further amend his application for review of the decision of the Assistant Minister made on 30 August 2017 to not be satisfied that the appellant, having failed to pass the character test, to revoke the decision of the Minister’s delegate to cancel the appellant’s visa under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).  That left the appellant’s class WB subclass 020 bridging B visa cancelled.

  2. The primary judge dismissed the sole ground in the amended application for review. That ground had been based on the argument in the then reserved and now published decision of the High Court in Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 351 ALR 61.

    Background

    The Minister’s reasons

  3. The Minister’s reasons for his decision explained in detail the appellant’s circumstances. He is a 49 year old citizen of Fiji whose visa was cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Act on 3 August 2016. He had resided in Australia since April 2001 and had departed from the country 10 times since then.

  4. Following the cancellation decision the appellant made representations to the Minister about revoking the original decision under s 501CA. The Minister noted the substantial criminal history of the appellant, that involved offences committed not only in Australia, but in his native Fiji and in the United States of America, where he had also lived.…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCAFC 152
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Chandra, sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection not to revoke a cancellation of his visa under section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appeal arose from a dismissal by the primary judge of the sole ground in the amended application for review, which had been predicated on the decision in Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The Minister had cancelled Chandra's visa due to his substantial criminal history, which included offences in Australia, Fiji, and the United States. Chandra had made representations to the Minister, but these were unsuccessful. The Full Court of the Federal Court considered whether the appellant could rely on new grounds to challenge the Minister's decision on appeal that were not raised before the primary judge.

The key legal issue before the Full Court was whether the grounds in the proposed further amended application could be considered alongside the newly formulated grounds in the notice of appeal. The court emphasised that an appeal is not a rehearing and that the issues and evidence to be considered are ordinarily settled at the trial. Furthermore, the court underscored the importance of the separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches, such that the merits of administrative action are for the executive alone, subject to political control.

The Full Court held that the appellant's grounds of appeal amounted to an attack on the merits of the Minister's decision, rather than a jurisdictional error. The court noted that the proposed amended grounds below had no juridical foundation, and the grounds of appeal did not identify any jurisdictional error by the Minister. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

In conclusion, the Full Court dismissed Chandra's appeal and held that the Minister's decision not to revoke the visa cancellation was lawful. The court emphasised that an appeal is not a rehearing and that the merits of administrative action are for the executive branch of government. The Full Court's decision reinforces the importance of the separation of powers and the limited role of the courts in reviewing administrative decisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The primary judge dismissed the sole ground in the amended application for review. That ground had been based on the argument in the then reserved and now published decision of the High Court in Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 351 ALR 61.BackgroundThe Minister’s reasons The Minister’s reasons for his decision explained in detail the appellant’s circumstances. He is a 49 year old citizen of Fiji whose visa was cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Act on 3 August 2016. He had resided in Australia since April 2001 and had departed from the country 10 times since then. Following the cancellation decision the appellant made representations to the Minister about revoking the original decision under s 501CA. The Minister noted the substantial criminal history of the appellant, that involved offences committed not only in Australia, but in his native Fiji and in the United States of America, where he had also lived. The Minister noted that the appellant had been convicted of a drink driving offence and fined in 2002, but that all his other offending in Australia had occurred since 2009, with a considerable number of matters relating to his domestic circumstances, including assaults and multiple breaches of apprehended domestic violence orders. The appellant had had two separate convictions in 2016, one in June 2016, and the other in October 2016. In June 2016, he had been convicted and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment with a six month non-parole period for slapping, pushing and grappling with his domestic partner in circumstances where the sentencing magistrate had noted that, since 2011, the appellant had been convicted on at least eight occasions of common assault and of multiple contraventions of apprehended domestic violence orders and other offences in a domestic situation. The October 2016 convictions attracted a sentence of 18 months imprisonment with a nine month non-parole period in circumstances where the appellant had stabbed his victim four times with a 20 centimetre knife in the left arm, back of his neck and his back while they were travelling in a car with two other men. The sentencing judge noted that the appellant had believed that the victim had stolen goods from his business and referred to the community’s expectations that for such an offence a custodial sentence was something the community would expect. In addition, in 2013, the appellant had been convicted and sentenced for common assault in a domestic violence context, 15 counts of contravening a prohibition or restriction in an apprehended violence order and the use of a carriage service to menace, harass or offend. He received sentences for those offences ranging from four to 12 months imprisonment and good behaviour bonds, albeit that, as the Minister noted, the sentencing judge considered that his offending behaviour was largely not violent, but was persistent and at times distressing for the victim. The Minister noted that the appellant had been convicted in Fiji of obtaining credit by false pretences, fined and sentenced to 100 days imprisonment and six months imprisonment that had both been suspended for 12 months. The Minister also noted that in six years between 1992 and 1998 the appellant had been convicted in the United States of America on a range of offences, including providing false information to police, burglary, obstructing and resisting police, grand theft, reckless driving and a domestic violence related offence of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabiter.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

It follows that there is no substance in any matter which the appellant seeks to raise to challenge either the reasoning of the primary judge or otherwise to attack the validity of the Minister’s decision. Conclusion For those reasons the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant sought to tender a letter from the victim of his stabbing offences to suggest that he was still on good terms with that victim. However, the Full Court refused leave to tender that document, as it was not relevant to the assessment of whether the Minister had made any jurisdictional error or the primary judge had erred; that letter not even being before his Honour.Consideration In our opinion, it is necessary to consider whether the grounds in the proposed further amended application below might have been arguable together with the newly formulated grounds in the notice of appeal, in order to determine whether we should allow the appellant to rely on them. It is important in the administration of justice to approach, with caution, whether to allow new grounds to challenge an administrative decision on appeal that were not put below. Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ held in Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7:To say that an appeal is by way of rehearing does not mean that the issues and the evidence to be considered are at large. It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish. The powers of an appellate court with respect to amendment are ordinarily to be exercised within the general framework of the issues so determined and not otherwise. Secondly, it is fundamental to the consideration of a challenge by way of judicial review to have regard to the separation of powers between the executive branch of government and the judicial one, identified by Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272, where their Honours cited with approval the often quoted statement of Brennan J in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35 - 36, namely:The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository's power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone. In substance the appellant sought to challenge before his Honour the merits of the Minister’s decision once the Falzon ground had been dismissed. His Honour correctly refused to allow any of the proposed amended grounds below because they had no juridical foundation. The grounds of appeal similarly amount, in substance, to an attack on the way in which the Minister weighed the merits of the circumstances. Those grounds do not identify any failure of the Minister to consider a relevant consideration; or assert that he took into account an irrelevant one; or failed to ask the right question or to identify the legal issues or claims on which the appellant relied or otherwise assert a jurisdictional error.