FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Chandra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
[2018] FCAFC 152
Appeal from: Chandra v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 281 File number: NSD 423 of 2018 Judges: RARES, STEWARD AND THAWLEY JJ Date of judgment: 14 August 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether Minister's decision not to revoke cancellation decision pursuant to Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501CA(4) affected by jurisdictional error by failing to take into account relevant considerations Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 501CA Cases cited: Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1
Boschenski v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 250 FCR 209
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR
Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 351 ALR 61
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Date of hearing: 14 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 43 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Solicitor for the Respondent: Mr A Markus of Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 423 of 2018 BETWEEN: RAVIND CHANDRA
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, STEWARD AND THAWLEY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
14 AUGUST 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM THE TRANSCIPT)THE COURT:
This is an appeal against the decision of the primary judge who refused the appellant leave to further amend his application for review of the decision of the Assistant Minister made on 30 August 2017 to not be satisfied that the appellant, having failed to pass the character test, to revoke the decision of the Minister’s delegate to cancel the appellant’s visa under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). That left the appellant’s class WB subclass 020 bridging B visa cancelled.
The primary judge dismissed the sole ground in the amended application for review. That ground had been based on the argument in the then reserved and now published decision of the High Court in Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 351 ALR 61.
Background
The Minister’s reasons
The Minister’s reasons for his decision explained in detail the appellant’s circumstances. He is a 49 year old citizen of Fiji whose visa was cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Act on 3 August 2016. He had resided in Australia since April 2001 and had departed from the country 10 times since then.
Following the cancellation decision the appellant made representations to the Minister about revoking the original decision under s 501CA. The Minister noted the substantial criminal history of the appellant, that involved offences committed not only in Australia, but in his native Fiji and in the United States of America, where he had also lived.…
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 152
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issue before the Full Court was whether the grounds in the proposed further amended application could be considered alongside the newly formulated grounds in the notice of appeal. The court emphasised that an appeal is not a rehearing and that the issues and evidence to be considered are ordinarily settled at the trial. Furthermore, the court underscored the importance of the separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches, such that the merits of administrative action are for the executive alone, subject to political control.
The Full Court held that the appellant's grounds of appeal amounted to an attack on the merits of the Minister's decision, rather than a jurisdictional error. The court noted that the proposed amended grounds below had no juridical foundation, and the grounds of appeal did not identify any jurisdictional error by the Minister. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with costs.
In conclusion, the Full Court dismissed Chandra's appeal and held that the Minister's decision not to revoke the visa cancellation was lawful. The court emphasised that an appeal is not a rehearing and that the merits of administrative action are for the executive branch of government. The Full Court's decision reinforces the importance of the separation of powers and the limited role of the courts in reviewing administrative decisions.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The appellant sought to tender a letter from the victim of his stabbing offences to suggest that he was still on good terms with that victim. However, the Full Court refused leave to tender that document, as it was not relevant to the assessment of whether the Minister had made any jurisdictional error or the primary judge had erred; that letter not even being before his Honour.Consideration In our opinion, it is necessary to consider whether the grounds in the proposed further amended application below might have been arguable together with the newly formulated grounds in the notice of appeal, in order to determine whether we should allow the appellant to rely on them. It is important in the administration of justice to approach, with caution, whether to allow new grounds to challenge an administrative decision on appeal that were not put below. Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ held in Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 at 7:To say that an appeal is by way of rehearing does not mean that the issues and the evidence to be considered are at large. It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish. The powers of an appellate court with respect to amendment are ordinarily to be exercised within the general framework of the issues so determined and not otherwise. Secondly, it is fundamental to the consideration of a challenge by way of judicial review to have regard to the separation of powers between the executive branch of government and the judicial one, identified by Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272, where their Honours cited with approval the often quoted statement of Brennan J in Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 35 - 36, namely:The duty and jurisdiction of the court to review administrative action do not go beyond the declaration and enforcing of the law which determines the limits and governs the exercise of the repository's power. If, in so doing, the court avoids administrative injustice or error, so be it; but the court has no jurisdiction simply to cure administrative injustice or error. The merits of administrative action, to the extent that they can be distinguished from legality, are for the repository of the relevant power and, subject to political control, for the repository alone. In substance the appellant sought to challenge before his Honour the merits of the Minister’s decision once the Falzon ground had been dismissed. His Honour correctly refused to allow any of the proposed amended grounds below because they had no juridical foundation. The grounds of appeal similarly amount, in substance, to an attack on the way in which the Minister weighed the merits of the circumstances. Those grounds do not identify any failure of the Minister to consider a relevant consideration; or assert that he took into account an irrelevant one; or failed to ask the right question or to identify the legal issues or claims on which the appellant relied or otherwise assert a jurisdictional error.