Rodchompoo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Rodchompoo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 965

File number: WAD 12 of 2017
Judge: MCKERRACHER  J
Date of judgment: 28 June 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – visa cancellation under s 501 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on character grounds – where the Minister’s delegate refused to revoke the mandatory cancellation under s 501CA – where leave was granted for the applicant to amend his grounds of review – whether the Tribunal’s adoption of the Minister’s Statement of Facts and Contentions constituted jurisdictional error – whether the Tribunal erred by not making inquiries – whether the Tribunal failed to consider mandatory relevant considerations in its assessment of the considerations in Ministerial Direction No. 65 – whether the Tribunal erred in its assessment of the impact on victims based on the evidence, or lack thereof, before it – whether the Tribunal’s decision was manifestly unreasonable or irrational – whether greater duties were imposed upon the Tribunal as the applicant was unrepresented – held: grounds dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501, 501(3A), 501(7), 501CA, 501CA(4)
Cases cited:

AMF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 30

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 236 FCR 593

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Bat Advocacy NSW Inc v Minister for Environment Protection, Heritage & the Arts (2011) 180 LGERA 99

Beaman v Bond [2017] FCAFC 142

Copperwaite v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 224

DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784

Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 2

Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375

Haritos v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 233 FCR 315

Huluba v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1995) 59 FCR 518

Juneja v Tax Practitioners Board (2017) 72 AAR 407

LVR (WA) Pty Ltd v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2012) 203 FCR 166

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Le (2007) 164 FCR 151

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 83 ALJR 1123

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

MZZZW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 234 FCR 154

Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476

Rodchompoo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] AATA 872

SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 1

SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2013) 216 FCR 445

Toura v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1405

Wittensleger v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] FCA 41

YNQY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1466

Dates of hearing: 30 May 2017, 22…
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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 965
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, Mr Rodchompoo appealed against the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to affirm the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of his visa under s 501CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appeal was brought in the Federal Court of Australia and the court was required to determine whether the AAT’s decision involved jurisdictional error.

The court considered several grounds of review, including whether the AAT’s adoption of the Minister’s Statement of Facts and Contentions constituted jurisdictional error, whether the AAT erred by not making inquiries, whether the AAT failed to consider mandatory relevant considerations in its assessment of the considerations in Ministerial Direction No. 65, and whether the AAT erred in its assessment of the impact on victims based on the evidence, or lack thereof, before it. The court also considered whether the AAT’s decision was manifestly unreasonable or irrational, and whether greater duties were imposed upon the AAT as the applicant was unrepresented.

The court found that the AAT’s decision did not involve jurisdictional error. The AAT had correctly adopted the Minister’s Statement of Facts and Contentions, and had not erred in failing to make inquiries or to consider mandatory relevant considerations. The AAT had also properly assessed the impact on victims, based on the evidence before it. The court found that the AAT’s decision was not manifestly unreasonable or irrational, and that there were no greater duties imposed upon the AAT as the applicant was unrepresented.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed. The decision of the AAT was upheld, and the Minister’s delegate’s decision not to revoke the mandatory cancellation of Mr Rodchompoo’s visa was affirmed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, to be assessed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

These are not victimless crimes whether or not the crimes pertain to drug sales. For example in an appeal by an accomplice of Mr Rodchompoo, the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia recorded in Copperwaite v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 224 per Mazza JA (Buss JA agreeing):The facts of the offending 7At about 10.30 pm on 20 May 2011, the appellant and Mr Rodchompoo were walking through the grounds of the Fremantle Primary School when they came across the victim who was affected by alcohol and was being sick. They had a short conversation with the victim and then the appellant punched him in the face and knocked him to the ground. The learned sentencing judge described the blow as ‘significant’. A demand was made for money. At the time the victim only had $3.50 on him. A ‘soft’ kick was delivered to the victim by one or other of the appellant and Mr Rodchompoo . Further demands for money were made. Out of fear, the victim said he would go to an automatic teller machine to get more money.8The appellant, Mr Rodchompoo and the victim all walked towards Fremantle. As they did so, the victim was struck in the head but the victim was unable to say who hit him. As the group walked past the entrance to the Fremantle Hospital, the victim ran into the emergency department and reported what had happened. The police acted quickly and apprehended the appellant and Mr Rodchompoo . Both men declined to participate in a record of interview.9As a result of the attack, the victim received multiple cuts and abrasions to his face and neck and a bruise to his left eye to the extent that it closed over (ts 13). The Tribunal’s statement was open on the evidence before it and Mr Rodchompoo was on notice of the nature of the evidence. Ground 1(c) cannot succeed. Ground 1(d) - the Tribunal’s decision was so manifestly unreasonable or irrational that no sensible Tribunal acting reasonably could have made it This ground really wraps up the submissions made in support of the previous grounds. For Mr Rodchompoo, it is accepted that it is necessary for a decision to be vitiated for jurisdictional error based on an illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning that ‘extreme’ illogicality or irrationality must be shown ‘measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable mind may come to different conclusions’: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99 per Robertson J (at [148]). A decision cannot be said to by a reviewing court to be illogical, irrational or unreasonable simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion: SZOOR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 1 per McKerracher J (with whom Rares J agreed and Reeves J agreed on this point) (at [84]) citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 per Crennan and Bell JJ (at [131] and [135]). It is true that more recently in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, the High Court, referring to the decision of Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, recognised an implied legislative intention that a statutory power or discretion must be exercised reasonably and that a disproportionate response could cause the exercise of a discretion to be found to be unreasonable. Different expressions were used by the High Court such as ‘an obviously disproportionate response’ (per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ at [74]) or ‘taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut’ (per French CJ at [30]).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In my view, ground 1(b) cannot succeed.Ground 1(c) - the Tribunal did not comply with the terms of the Direction when it purported to consider the impact of its decision on victims, despite there being no evidence to support its finding Non-compliance with the terms of the Direction is capable of resulting in jurisdictional error: see, for example, the passage of Mortimer J’s judgment in YNQY extracted above. Clause 14.4(1) of the Direction requires consideration of the impact of a decision not to revoke on members of the Australian community, ‘including victims of the non-citizen’s criminal behaviour, and the family members of the victim or victims where that information is available and the non-citizen being considered for revocation has been afforded procedural fairness’. Emphasis is placed on behalf of Mr Rodchompoo on the latter half of the sentence in cl 14.4(1) of the Direction concerning the availability of the information and procedural fairness. At [60], the Tribunal stated:There is no evidence before the Tribunal of the impact on any victims. However, given that Mr Rodchompoo has a history of convictions for supplying drugs in Australia his removal from Australia would diminish the harm which flows from such conduct. Having acknowledged there was no evidence on this topic before the Tribunal, it was not open to the Tribunal, it is contended, to base its decision on the assertion that Mr Rodchompoo’s removal from Australia would diminish the harm flowing from his conduct. This is coupled with the earlier submission that it was inaccurate to say that there was a ‘history’ of convictions of supplying drugs on the evidence before the Tribunal. It is also argued that Mr Rodchompoo was not afforded procedural fairness, being denied the opportunity to respond to the asserted impact of the conduct on alleged victims. Reliance is placed again on YNQY (per Mortimer J at [35] and [39] quoted above). This argument requires going behind the criminal conviction once again. It is true that there was no specific victim evidence, but the general finding made by the Tribunal (at [60]) was certainly a topic on which Mr Rodchompoo was squarely given notice. It is not true to say that there was no history of possession of drugs with intent to sell. There was a plea of guilty in relation to such an offence and there was, accordingly, ‘history’. The general observation that the community would be better off without people selling drugs to it can hardly be the topic of complaint. Not only was that view open to the Tribunal, but it was also available on the evidence in the form of sentencing remarks. For example, Magistrate Langdon noted that the Mr Rodchompoo was ‘living a drug dealing lifestyle’ and continued:People who deal in drugs in the community really ought to expect to go to jail. It’s a fact that you have no idea about the misery that you have caused for other people in the community when you’re prepared to deal in drugs, particularly methamphetamine, where the side effects and other offences that are the result of people using drugs is something that you’ve got to take responsibility for.

Decision

Reasons for decision

By letter dated 28 June 2016, Mr Rodchompoo was notified that the delegate was not satisfied that he passed the character test or that there was any other reason why the original decision should be revoked. Accordingly, the delegate decided not to revoke the decision to cancel the visa. The delegate’s decision included a statement of reasons, dated 24 June 2016. On 4 July 2016, Mr Rodchompoo lodged an application with the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. IN THE TRIBUNAL On 4 November 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision: Rodchompoo v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] AATA 872. The Tribunal referred to Direction No. 65 - Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501CA, issued by the Minister on 22 December 2014. The Tribunal also referred to the relevant principles and detailed the required primary and other considerations to be had in exercising the discretion in s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act (at [18]­[22]). The Tribunal concluded (at [33]) that, taking into account the nature, frequency and seriousness of Mr Rodchompoo’s offences, all of the comments of the sentencing magistrates and judges, Mr Rodchompoo’s deception of the Department and disregard of formal warnings, together with the ‘General Guidance’ and ‘Principles’ set out in the Direction, the offences committed by Mr Rodchompoo weighed, to a significant degree, in favour of the cancellation of the visa. The Tribunal found (at [25]) that Mr Rodchompoo’s offending had clearly been serious, as demonstrated by the sentencing remarks of the courts. As to the risk to the Australian community of Mr Rodchompoo engaging in further offences or other serious conduct, the Tribunal considered (at [35]) that this was a risk that the Australian community should not be expected to tolerate. The Tribunal noted the pessimism of the courts (at [38]) and the Prisoners Review Board of Western Australia (at [40]) with respect to Mr Rodchompoo’s unmet treatment needs and commitment to rehabilitation, Mr Rodchompoo’s numerous breaches of court orders (at [41]) and disregard of formal warnings from the Department (at [42]) and Mr Rodchompoo’s attempts to minimise his involvement in the offending in evidence before the Tribunal (at [43]). The Tribunal concluded (at [44]-[45]) that Mr Rodchompoo’s risk of re-offending was very high and weighed in favour of non-revocation of the cancellation of Mr Rodchompoo’s visa. In relation to the expectations of the Australian community, the Tribunal found (at [50]), that having regard to the principles in cl 13.3 of the Direction, whilst the Australian community may have a greater tolerance for a person who had lived in Australia for 23 years, such tolerance would have been exhausted in light of the extensive number of convictions, the frequency of offending, the blatant disregard of warnings, the pessimistic assessment of rehabilitation and the significantly high risk of re-offending. The Tribunal concluded (at [50]) that the Australian community would expect that his visa be cancelled.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The grounds pressed by Mr Rodchompoo in his application, originally filed in the Federal Court of Australia, were in the following terms:1 I HAVE NO FAMILY IN THAILAND2 I HAVE NO SUPPORT WHATSOEVER3I HAVE BEEN IN AUSTRALIA 23 YEARS ALL OF MY FAMILY ARE IN AUSTRALIA AND ALL OF MY LOVED ONESConsideration of the first grounds of application Speaking to his grounds at the hearing on 30 May 2017, Mr Rodchompoo effectively advanced a plea in mitigation, but was unable to advance any grounds of jurisdictional error. The Court is only able to grant relief in relation to a decision of the Tribunal where that decision involves jurisdictional error: see Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ (at [76]­[78]). The grounds were not particularised with detail; they did not specify the nature of any alleged jurisdictional error. Failure to particularise a ground of review may be a sufficient basis for it to be dismissed: see, for example, DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 per Colvin J (at [4]‑[8] and the cases therein cited). However, it would be rare for a court not to explain with a litigant in person the true nature of the complaint in relation to the decision, the subject of appeal or review. In my view there is no doubt, in any event, that the Tribunal had regard to the matters raised by Mr Rodchompoo in his grounds. This is apparent from the Tribunal reasons at [50], [54], [57] and [62]-[64].Constitutional validity of s 501(3A) of the Migration Act Delivery of judgment, following the hearing of this application on 30 May 2017, was postponed until the outcome of an application by one Mr Falzon in the High Court of Australia in which Mr Falzon sought relief on the basis that s 501(3A) of the Migration Act is invalid. Mr Falzon asserted that s 501(3A) of the Migration Act is invalid because it purports to confer the judicial power of the Commonwealth on the Minister in a manner contrary to Ch III of the Constitution. The application was filed in the High Court on 14 February 2017. That argument was rejected by the High Court in a decision published on 7 February 2018: Falzonv Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 2. Mr Rodchompoo had been informed by the Court that delivery of judgment in this matter would await the decision of the High Court in Falzon.Deferral of delivery of judgment Judgment in this matter was scheduled for delivery on 15 February 2018, after delivery of Falzon. On the morning of that day the Court was notified that freshly appointed solicitors for Mr Rodchompoo sought a deferral of delivery so that they could make submissions to the Court in relation to possible further arguments for Mr Rodchompoo. I agreed to defer delivery for seven days. On 21 February 2018, an application for deferral of the delivery of judgment until 21 March 2018 was filed with a detailed supporting affidavit. The affidavit explained that Mr Rodchompoo had understood from earlier exchanges with the Court at the initial hearing that he would have the opportunity to take advice from solicitors after delivery of Falzon. The affidavit in support gave detailed evidence as to difficulties in communication with Mr Rodchompoo, detained on Christmas Island. It also detailed a further avenue of possible argument, which was being explored by his pro bono legal advisors.