Kopa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kopa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 524

File number: QUD 778 of 2024
Judgment of: DERRINGTON J
Date of judgment: 23 May 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – exercise of power under s 501BA(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – cancellation of visa following decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to set aside initial cancellation of visa – application for extension of time to lodge an application for review under s 477A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – consideration of what is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice – whether Minister erred – no jurisdictional error shown – extension of time not necessary in the interests of the administration of justice – application refused
Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Ali v Minister for Home Affairs (2020) 278 FCR 627

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223

Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1

Avon Downs Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1949) 78 CLR 353

AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 266 FCR 83

BBU15 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1324

BHL19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2020) 277 FCR 420

Burgess v Assistant Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 271 FCR 181

Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 3 All ER 141

CKL21 v Minister for Home Affairs (2022) 293 FCR 634

CZQL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1610

DCP16 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 91

DHX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2020) 278 FCR 475

Elsharkawi v Minister For Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 293

ENT19 v Minister for Home Affairs (2023) 278 CLR 75

GBM18 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2025] FEDCFAMC2G 552

Ibrahim v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 270 FCR 12

King v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 152

LJTZ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 1209

Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 118 FCR 326

Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594

Minister forImmigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559

Morgan v Minister For Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 266

MZZGC v Minister For Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 842

Nkani v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1410

Nuuamoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 587

Palmer v Minister For Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) FCR 156

Plaintiff M87/2023 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 99 ALJR 387

Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 524
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kopa v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the applicant, Mr. Kopa, seeking an extension of time to lodge an application for review of the Minister's decision to cancel his visa. The decision to cancel the visa was made under section 501BA(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) after the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had set aside an initial cancellation. The primary legal issues before the court were whether the Minister had erred in cancelling Mr. Kopa's visa and, if not, whether extending the time for Mr. Kopa to apply for review was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice.

The court examined the statutory framework, particularly the provisions of sections 501BA(2) and 477A of the Migration Act, and the jurisprudence from the High Court as articulated in Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs. The court considered the Minister's satisfaction that Mr. Kopa did not pass the character test due to his criminal history and that cancelling his visa was in the national interest. The court found no jurisdictional error in the Minister's decision and concluded that the interests of justice did not require extending the time for Mr. Kopa to apply for review. The court noted that while the interests of justice might often be advanced by granting an extension of time to an application with some merit, other factors such as the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, and the prospects of the application succeeding were also relevant.

Consequently, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time and ordered that Mr. Kopa pay the respondent's costs of the application. The decision underscored the importance of balancing the interests of justice with the legislative intent to impose time limits on judicial review applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time (lodged 22 December 2024) is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs of the application to be taxed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The 2024 Decision was made pursuant to the statutory power conferred by s 501BA(2) of the Act on 23 September 2024. At that time, s 501BA was drafted in the following terms:501BA Cancellation of visa—setting aside and substitution of non-adverse decision under section 501CA(1) This section applies if:(a) a delegate of the Minister; or(b) the Administrative Appeals Tribunal;makes a decision under section 501CA (the original decision) to revoke a decision under subsection 501(3A) to cancel a visa that has been granted to a person.Action by Minister—natural justice does not apply(2)The Minister may set aside the original decision and cancel a visa that has been granted to the person if: (a)the Minister is satisfied that the person does not pass the character test because of the operation of:(i)paragraph 501(6)(a), on the basis of paragraph 501(7)(a), (b) or (c); or (ii) paragraph 501(6)(e); and (b)the Minister is satisfied that the cancellation is in the national interest. (3)The rules of natural justice do not apply to a decision under subsection (2).Minister’s exercise of power (4)The power under subsection (2) may only be exercised by the Minister personally.Decision not reviewable under Part 5 or 7(5) A decision under subsection (2) is not reviewable under Part 5 or 7.Note: For notification of decisions under subsection (2), see section 501G. On the evidence before the Assistant Minister for Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (being the decision-maker of the 2024 Decision) (henceforth, the Assistant Minister), it was not in dispute that Mr Kopa (a) had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 15 months in October 2022 (for “serious assault police officer by biting spitting etc”); and, therefore, (b) did not pass the Act’s so-called “character test”: see ss 501BA(2)(a), 501(6)(a) and 501(7)(c) of the Act. The Assistant Minister was also satisfied that cancellation of Mr Kopa’s visa was in the national interest (as that phrase was characterised in Plaintiff S156/2013 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 254 CLR 28, 46 [40] (Plaintiff S156/2013)). As canvassed in greater detail below, in arriving at that state of satisfaction, the Assistant Minister considered the need to protect the Australian community and, in so doing, addressed the seriousness of Mr Kopa’s history of criminal offending and the likelihood that he might re-offend in the future (and the attendant risks to the community if such a likelihood were to eventuate). Due consideration was also afforded to the expectations held by the Australian community of non-citizens and particularly those with “serious character concerns”. Ultimately, it was concluded that: In the specific case of Mr Kopa, I consider that the physical harm to government representatives and members of the public and the expectations of the Australian community are sufficient basis to consider cancellation of his visa in the National interest.Having regard to all of the above, I conclude that the use of my discretionary power to cancel Mr Kopa’s Class TY Subclass 444 (Special Category) visa is in the National interest.The proposed grounds of review

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

That provision, and the authority to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by ss 476A(1)(b)–(c) of the Act, was the subject of recent scrutiny by the High Court of Australia in Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 276 CLR 579 (Tu’uta Katoa). The observations of Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ (at 588 – 589 [11] – [12] and 591 [17]) are of much assistance in the present context:11At a high level of generality, it may be accepted that the purpose of a power to extend time is “to eliminate the injustice a prospective [applicant] might suffer by reason of the imposition of a rigid time limit within which an action was to be commenced”. However, what amounts to injustice in this context is not obvious. The text of s 477A reveals a legislative intention to restrict the Federal Court’s exercise of its original jurisdiction under s 476A(1)(b) and (c) by a 35 day time limit on applications, and to ameliorate injustice that might result from that time limit by allowing that time to be extended only in cases where a judge has reached the state of satisfaction in s 477A(2)(b).12On its face, the power conferred by s 477A(2) is unfettered except by the requirements of a written application in conformity with s 477A(2)(a) and the Court’s satisfaction that an order extending time “is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice”. Other than the “interests of the administration of justice”, there are no mandatory relevant considerations, whether express or to be implied from the “subject-matter, scope and purpose” of the Act. The focus of s 477A(2)(b) is not on the interests of the applicant, but the broader interests of the administration of justice. So framed, the paragraph allows the Court to look at a myriad of facts and circumstances, including the length of the applicant’s delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the respondent, prejudice to third parties and the merits of the underlying application. The level of satisfaction for the Court to reach is not low: the Court must be satisfied not just that an extension of time is desirable, but that it is needed in the interests of the administration of justice.…17… [I]t may be accepted that, in determining what is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice for the purposes of s 477A(2) …, it will often be appropriate to assess the merits of the proposed grounds of review at a “reasonably impressionistic level”. That is because the interests of justice are likely to be advanced by granting an extension of time to an application with some merit, depending, of course, on other relevant factors. …(Emphasis added). So too are those of Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ (at 599 – 600 [40]):40… It is, in each case, for the judge hearing the extension of time application to determine which of a range of potentially relevant factors are to be taken into account in evaluating whether the interests of the administration of justice make it necessary for an extension of time to be granted in that particular case. Factors that are commonly regarded as relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion to grant an extension of time include: the length of the delay; the explanation for the delay; any prejudice to the administration of justice as a result of the delay; and the prospects of the applicant succeeding in the application or the “strength or weakness of the case … sought to be advanced and the utility of advancing that case”.