Burgess v Assistant Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Burgess v Assistant Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 34

File number: SAD 105 of 2018
Judge: BESANKO J
Date of judgment: 25 January 2019
Catchwords:

MIGRATION — application for judicial review of a decision made by the Assistant Minister for Home Affairs (Assistant Minister) — where Assistant Minister made a decision to cancel the plaintiff’s class BF Transitional (Permanent) visa under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) — where plaintiff has a substantial criminal record — where no dispute that the plaintiff did not pass the character test — where the Assistant Minister considered the national interest and, in that context, the seriousness of the plaintiff’s conduct, the risk of the plaintiff’s reoffending and the possible harm to the Australian community

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — whether the Assistant Minister’s decision to cancel the plaintiff’s visa was affected by jurisdictional error on the basis that the Assistant Minister failed to identify reasons or considerations as to why he should proceed under s 501(3) rather than s 501(2) of the Migration Act — whether the Assistant Minister made an “anterior decision” or “personal procedural decision” to proceed under s 501(3) rather than s 501(2) of the Migration Act within the principles identified by the High Court of Australia in Minister for Border Protection v SZSSJ [2016] HCA 29; (2016) 259 CLR 180 — whether the Assistant Minister made a “decision” which is subject to judicial review for legal unreasonableness — whether the decision to proceed under s 501(3) rather than s 501(2) of the Migration Act was legally unreasonable

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — whether the Assistant Minister’s decision to cancel the plaintiff’s visa was affected by jurisdictional error on the basis that the Assistant Minister proceeded on an incorrect understanding of ss 501(2) and 501(3) of the Migration Act — whether the Assistant Minister considered that s 501(2) of the Migration Act required that the person who is provided with a notice of intention to consider cancellation be given 28 days in which to respond to the notice — whether the Assistant Minister considered that in exercising the power under s 501(3) of the Migration Act the plaintiff could not be accorded any type of hearing

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — whether the Assistant Minister made an error of finding a fact for which there was no evidence — where a statement made in submissions provided to the Assistant Minister to the effect that the plaintiff was “currently in the community” following a decision to quash the Assistant Minister’s decision cancelling the plaintiff’s visa — where a statement made in submissions provided to the Assistant Minister to the effect that the plaintiff had been “released from immigration detention” on Christmas Island — whether the Assistant Minister acted on either of these statements in reaching the decision to cancel the plaintiff’s visa

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — whether the Assistant Minister’s decision to cancel the plaintiff’s visa was affected by jurisdictional error on the basis that the materials upon which the…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 34
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Burgess v Assistant Minister for Home Affairs was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The plaintiff, Burgess, sought a judicial review of a decision made by the Assistant Minister for Home Affairs to cancel his Class BF Transitional (Permanent) visa under section 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Assistant Minister made this decision due to Burgess’ substantial criminal record, which meant he did not pass the character test. The Assistant Minister considered the national interest, including the seriousness of Burgess’ conduct, the risk of reoffending, and potential harm to the Australian community.

The primary legal issues the court had to decide were whether the Assistant Minister’s decision to cancel Burgess’ visa was affected by jurisdictional error, whether it was legally unreasonable, and if the Assistant Minister had proceeded based on incorrect understandings of sections 501(2) and 501(3) of the Migration Act. Additionally, the court examined whether the Assistant Minister made an error of fact by acting on incorrect statements about Burgess’ status, and if the decision was supported by a reasonable or rational foundation in terms of the national interest.

The court found that the Assistant Minister’s decision was not affected by jurisdictional error. The reasoning included that the Assistant Minister had correctly considered the statutory criteria for cancelling a visa under section 501(3) of the Migration Act. The court noted that there was no requirement for the Assistant Minister to identify reasons or considerations for choosing section 501(3) over section 501(2). The Assistant Minister’s understanding of the sections of the Migration Act was accurate, and there was no evidence that he acted on incorrect statements regarding Burgess’ status. Finally, the court held that the materials upon which the Assistant Minister based his decision provided a reasonable foundation to conclude that the visa cancellation was in the national interest.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review, affirming the Assistant Minister’s decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for judicial review be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case concerns the application for judicial review of a decision made by the Assistant Minister for Home Affairs (Assistant Minister) to cancel the plaintiff's Class BF Transitional (Permanent) visa under section 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The plaintiff has a substantial criminal record and it is undisputed that he did not pass the character test. The Assistant Minister exercised his discretion to cancel the visa on the basis that it was in the national interest, considering the seriousness of the plaintiff's conduct, the risk of reoffending, and the possible harm to the Australian community. The plaintiff's visa was initially cancelled under section 501(3) without natural justice. However, this decision was overturned by the Federal Court of Australia on 12 February 2018. Following this, the plaintiff's visa was reinstated, and he was informed that he was free to leave the Christmas Island Immigration Detention Centre (CI IDC). The plaintiff chose to remain at the detention centre overnight due to the unavailability of a flight until the next day.

The case came before the court as an application for judicial review of the Assistant Minister's decision to cancel the plaintiff's visa. The plaintiff had initially lodged an application containing six grounds of judicial review. During the proceedings, the plaintiff dismissed Ground 1, and the court addressed the remaining grounds, particularly focusing on Grounds 2, 3, and 4, which pertain to the Assistant Minister's decision to proceed under section 501(3) rather than section 501(2) of the Migration Act. The plaintiff did not address Ground 5 in his oral submissions but relied on his written submissions. Ground 5 concerns the accuracy of a statement of fact in the submissions provided to the Assistant Minister. The plaintiff formally pressed Ground 6, challenging the Assistant Minister's decision as to the national interest, though he acknowledged that this ground could not succeed under the current state of the law.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

At the time it was issued, the application contained six grounds of judicial review. Ground 1 has been dismissed. I will address the grounds of review by reference to their original numbering. The bulk of the oral submissions were directed to Grounds 2, 3 and 4 which, broadly speaking, relate to the Assistant Minister’s “decision” to proceed under s 501(3) rather than s 501(2) of the Act. With respect to Ground 5, the plaintiff did not address the matter in his oral submissions, but relied on his written submissions. That ground relates to the accuracy of a statement of fact which appeared in the submission provided to the Assistant Minister. The plaintiff formally pressed Ground 6. That ground involves a challenge to the Assistant Minister’s decision as to the national interest. The plaintiff accepts that, as the law presently stands, this ground cannot succeed.THE EVIDENCE The evidence on the application consists of a court book comprising three volumes, an affidavit sworn by the plaintiff on 28 August 2018, and an affidavit of Ms Jennifer Anne Green affirmed on 20 September 2018. I will deal with the evidence first. Ground 5 of the application is that the Assistant Minister’s decision to cancel the plaintiff’s visa was affected by jurisdictional error because the decision was unreasonable or, in the alternative, one in respect of which the decision-maker had failed to take into account a relevant consideration. These matters were said to result from the fact that the Assistant Minister had acted on incorrect statements to the effect that the plaintiff was “currently in the community” following the decision of the Federal Court of Australia on 12 February 2018, and that he was “released from immigration detention” on Christmas Island. As developed in the plaintiff’s written submissions, the complaint seemed to be more along the lines that the Assistant Minister had made an error of finding a fact for which there was no evidence. The incorrect statements were said to have been made in the submission provided to the Assistant Minister. The evidence of the plaintiff was designed to show that the statements in the submission were incorrect. The evidence of Ms Green, who at the relevant time was the superintendent for the Christmas Island Immigration Detention Centre (CI IDC), was adduced by the Minister in order to establish that the statements were not incorrect. Neither witness was cross-examined. The plaintiff states that he was detained at the CI IDC from 21 April 2017 to 1 August 2018. On 12 February 2018, he received a telephone call from his fiancée who advised him that the second visa cancellation had been overturned by the Court. The plaintiff was then called into a meeting by officers at the CI IDC. He was advised that his visa had been reinstated and that he was free to leave the detention centre. He was advised that there was no departing flight off Christmas Island until the following day at around 2 pm. The plaintiff knew that flights only departed Christmas Island on Tuesdays and Thursdays as these were the days that other detainees would leave the detention centre. The plaintiff was advised that he could stay at a hotel overnight, but that he would not be given a telephone or any money. The plaintiff did not have any money in the detention centre. He did not understand that the Department for Home Affairs (the Department) would be paying for hotel accommodation. The plaintiff was advised that the other option was for him to agree to remain at the detention centre overnight on a voluntary basis. The plaintiff said that he wanted to talk to his family so he told the person to whom he was speaking that he wished to remain at the detention centre. The plaintiff states that he had no other way of arranging a flight to the mainland from Christmas Island. He was provided with a form to sign, but he was not given a copy of the form at the time. The form which the plaintiff signed contained an acknowledgement by the plaintiff that his visa had been reinstated and that from that point he had ceased to be in immigration detention. The plaintiff also acknowledged that he continued to reside in the detention centre in order to facilitate transportation logistics. The form also contained the following acknowledgements:1.my continued residence at NWPIDC, which is an immigration detention facility, is for the above reasons and I am consenting to this continued residence.2.while I reside at NWPIDC, I will not be in immigration detention.3.I am free to leave and re-enter NWPIDC at any time subject to arrangements necessary to ensure my safety and the safety of others.…7.I can withdraw this consent at any time, recognising however, that if I do so, I must make alternative arrangements for my accommodation and care in the community.…9.DIPB consents to my remaining at NWPIC until 13 February 2018 after which I must make alternative arrangements for my accommodation and care in the community.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ms Green states that in her experience as a departmental officer on Christmas Island, in cases where a person’s status changes from being an unlawful non-citizen to a lawful non-citizen as a result of a court decision, the person needs to agree to abide by the rules and procedures at the CI IDC while he or she elects to remain there. Otherwise, the person would need to leave the detention centre. Any change in the status of a person as a result of a court decision quashing a cancellation decision would be recorded as such on one of the Department’s record management systems. Ms Green has made inquiries about the alleged conversation the plaintiff had with the Serco officer during the morning of 13 February 2018. She has not been able to identify the person with whom the plaintiff is alleged to have had the conversation. Ms Green states that the CI IDC is located near the far west coast of Christmas Island and is surrounded by many acres of uninhabited scrub and the ocean. The town centre, Flying Fish Cove, is located approximately 13 km from the CI IDC. There is no town between the CI IDC and Flying Fish Cove. Ms Green states that given the location of the CI IDC on Christmas Island, transport would have been required for the plaintiff to travel to any shops or facilities on Christmas Island. Ms Green states that there is no van that passes the detention centre on a regular basis. She states that Serco vehicles are used for pre-planned escorts, such as taking a detainee to a hospital appointment, or to transport detainees for excursions, or to the airport for transfers to the mainland. These transport activities are planned in advance and are facilitated by Serco transport and escort staff. They are not like a “bus service” or something similar. Ms Green said that notification of flight details usually takes place on the day of departure and that, in the usual course, the person will be taken to the property area at the appropriate time prior to being transported to the airport for his or her flight.THE ASSISTANT MINISTER’S DECISION As I have said, the Assistant Minister was given a submission which contained a number of attachments. The decision itself was in the following terms:(d)I reasonably suspect that Paul William BURGESS does not pass the character test and I am satisfied that cancellation of Paul William BURGESS’ Class BF Transitional (Permanent) visa is in the national interest. I have decided to exercise my discretion under s501(3) of the Act to cancel Paul William BURGESS’ visa. I hereby cancel Paul William BURGESS’ Class BF Transitional (Permanent) visa. My reasons for this decision are set out in the attached Statement of Reasons. Paragraphs 4 to 10 in the Assistant Minister’s statement of reasons are as follows:4.Section 501(3)(b) of the Act enables me to, without natural justice, cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if:- I reasonably suspect that the person does not pass the character test (as defined by s501(6)); and- I am satisfied that the cancellation is in the national interest.5.Under s501(5), the rules of natural justice, and the code of procedure set out in Subdivision AB of Division 3 of Part 2, do not apply to a decision under s501(3).6.Pursuant to s501C(3), following a decision under s501(3) to refuse or cancel a visa, the person who is the subject of the decision is to be notified of the decision and given information relevant to it (other than “non-disclosable information”) and, except in a case where the person is not entitled to make representations, invited to make representations about possible revocation of the decision. Under s501C(4), if, and only if, the person makes representations in accordance with the invitation and satisfies me that they pass the character test, may I revoke the cancellation decision.7.I note that any representations made by Mr BURGESS in response to an invitation under s50lC at the revocation stage can bear only on the question of whether or not he passes the character test not on the exercise of my residual discretion under s501(3).8.I am cognisant of the fact that because Mr BURGESS has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more and therefore objectively fails the character test by virtue of s501(6)(a) and s501(7)(c), it would be futile for him to seek revocation under s501C(4) as he cannot satisfy me that he passes the character test.9.I note that I could have instead elected to consider Mr BURGESS’ visa cancellation under s501(2) of the Act, with natural justice, and that under that provision the person is provided with a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation and given 28 days in which to respond to the notice. Under that process the person is afforded an opportunity to provide the Department with information pertaining to their circumstances and to respond to any adverse information, before a decision is made.10.However, I decided to proceed to make a decision in Mr BURGESS’ case under s501(3), without natural justice.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court found that the Assistant Minister's decision to cancel the plaintiff's visa was not affected by jurisdictional error as the Assistant Minister had provided sufficient reasons for his decision. The Assistant Minister had considered the plaintiff's criminal record, the seriousness of his conduct, the risk of reoffending, and the possible harm to the Australian community. The court also held that the Assistant Minister's decision to proceed under section 501(3) rather than section 501(2) of the Migration Act was not legally unreasonable as it was based on the plaintiff's criminal history and the potential risk he posed to the national interest. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the Assistant Minister had acted on incorrect statements in the submissions provided to him. The court found that the Assistant Minister had not made an error of finding a fact for which there was no evidence and that the materials upon which he based his decision provided a reasonable or rational foundation for a conclusion that cancellation of the plaintiff's visa was in the national interest. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that a decision to cancel a visa under section 501(3) of the Migration Act is not legally unreasonable if it is based on the person's criminal history and the potential risk they pose to the national interest, and if the decision-maker has provided sufficient reasons for their decision.