FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hooton v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCAFC 142
Appeal from: Hooton v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2018] FCA 274 File number: WAD 96 of 2018 Judges: ROBERTSON, STEWARD AND THAWLEY JJ Date of judgment: 30 August 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from orders of a judge of the Federal Court of Australia – decision by Minister under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) not to revoke original decision under s 501(3A) – appellant convicted of using a carriage service to access child pornography material and possessing child exploitation material for which he was sentenced on each charge to concurrent terms of 20 months imprisonment – where Minister not satisfied that there was another reason why the original decision should be revoked – whether primary judge erred in concluding that the Minister’s failure to take into account the Community Protection (Offender Reporting)Act 2004 (WA) did not involve jurisdictional error Legislation: Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004 (WA) ss 24, 26, 63, 64, 67
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501, 501CA(4)
Cases cited: BSJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 78; 252 FCR 82
Folau v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 214; 158 ALD 394
Foster v Minister for Customs and Justice [2000] HCA 38; 200 CLR 442
Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BHA17 [2018] FCAFC 68
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30; 206 CLR 323
Moana v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 54; 230 FCR 367
Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 200; 255 FCR 81
NBNB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 39; 220 FCR 44
Repatriation Commission v Patterson [2006] FCAFC 165; 94 ALD 66
Viane v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 116
Date of hearing: 21 August 2018 Registry: Western Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 89 Counsel for the Appellant: Dr JL Cameron Counsel for the Respondent: Mr PJ Hannan Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
WAD 96 of 2018 BETWEEN: PAUL REX HOOTON
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Respondent
JUDGES:
ROBERTSON, STEWARD AND THAWLEY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
30 AUGUST 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.Subject to order 3, the appellant pay the costs of the respondent, as agreed or assessed.
3.The respondent bear his own costs of his application to extend time to file the notice of contention and of the notice of contention.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
Introduction
The appellant, Mr Hooton, appeals from orders…
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- Case
- [2018] FCAFC 142
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the Minister was required to take into account the obligations imposed by the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act when assessing the risk posed by Mr Hooton to the Australian community. The appellant argued that the Minister's failure to consider these obligations was a judicially reviewable error. However, the court held that the Minister's decision was not affected by jurisdictional error as the Act was not a mandatory relevant consideration in the Minister's evaluation of the risk posed by Mr Hooton. The court found that the Minister had sufficiently evaluated the risk of Mr Hooton reoffending, considering his personal circumstances and the best interests of minor children, and had not acted illogically or unreasonably in doing so.
In dismissing the appeal, the court held that the Minister's decision not to revoke the visa cancellation was lawful. The court emphasised that the Act did not impose a mandatory requirement on the Minister to consider it in every case, and that the Minister's evaluation of the risk posed by Mr Hooton was not affected by the oversight. The court also noted that the appellant could have, but did not, bring to the Minister's attention the notices served on him under the Act. The orders of the court were that the appeal be dismissed, that the appellant pay the costs of the respondent, and that the respondent bear his own costs in relation to the application to extend time to file the notice of contention and the notice of contention itself.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. Subject to order 3, the appellant pay the costs of the respondent, as agreed or assessed.
3. The respondent bear his own costs of his application to extend time to file the notice of contention and of the notice of contention.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister drew to the attention of the Court what was said in Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 200; 255 FCR 81 at [30] per Charlesworth J, Flick and Perry JJ agreeing, as follows:… Whether or not it was mandatory for the Minister to consider the risk of harm to the Australian community posed by Mr Muggeridge’s continued presence in Australia is not to the point in the present case. The Minister in fact performed, or at least purported to perform, an evaluation of the likelihood of Mr Muggeridge re-offending, having particular regard to Mr Muggeridge’s personal circumstances. If illogicality or unreasonableness in the legal sense affects the Minister’s evaluation of the likelihood of Mr Muggeridge re-offending, the decision could not be saved from invalidity merely because a similar evaluation is not mandated by the Act in every case in the sense explained by Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24.Consideration It is common ground that, at the level of fact, the Minister was not aware of Mr Hooton being a reportable offender within the meaning of the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act. Under that Act, reportable offences are defined in s 9 and Class 2 is dealt with in s 11 by reference to Schedule 2. “Reportable offender” is defined in s 6 as a person whom a court sentences for a reportable offence. The term “reporting obligations” means those imposed on the reportable offender by Part 3. It is to be recalled that what the Minister said at [46] was that Mr Hooton’s rehabilitation was untested in the community, where he would not be subject to the supervision of the parole service. The Minister also said at [56] that he could not rule out the possibility of further offending by Mr Hooton. It seems therefore that the first complaint on judicial review is that the Minister did not take into account Mr Hooton’s obligations to report and register his personal details within seven days of not being in custody and, having become registered, effective from 15 June 2015, to continue to comply with the reporting obligations under Part 3 for 15 years. It appears that this information was first put before the Minister by means of Mr Hooton’s affidavit in the Federal Circuit Court affirmed 17 August 2016 at [9]. It will be recalled that the Minister’s decision was dated 22 July 2016. Counsel for Mr Hooton ultimately accepted that whether, and when, the notices were given under the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act were not relevant issues. It remains to note that Mr Hooton could have, but did not, bring to the attention of the Minister in his April 2016 submissions the notices served on him under that Act. The ultimate issue to be determined is whether it was a judicially reviewable error for the Minister to proceed on the basis that Mr Hooton’s rehabilitation was untested in the community, where he would not be subject to the supervision of the parole service, when in fact Mr Hooton was the subject of obligations under the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act. There is also a logically anterior question as to whether s 26 of that legislation, as it applied to Mr Hooton, was a mandatory relevant consideration in the Minister’s conclusion as to the lack of supervision of Mr Hooton in the community as an aspect of the Minister’s assessment of risk to the Australian community.