MIGRATION – appeal from decision of single judge - cancellation of visa on character grounds by the Minister acting personally under s 501(2) of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) – whether Minister erred in failing to make a specific finding as to the likelihood that the applicant would reoffend – whether the Minister had regard to an irrelevant consideration, namely that Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to remain in Australia – whether Minister had regard to an irrelevant consideration, namely the punitive effect of visa cancellation – Minister taken to have admitted that in every visa refusal and cancellation decision he has made from his appointment until 17 March 2016, his draft reasons for decision were prepared by somebody else and he signed them without change - whether the Minister made a personal decision to cancel the applicant’s visa when he adopted the draft reasons prepared by the Minister’s department, without change – whether the Minister proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the applicant’s case - appeal dismissed
Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category:
Catchwords
Number of paragraphs:
93
Counsel for the Appellant:
Mr J Forsaith
Solicitor for the Appellant:
Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent:
Mr P Gray QC with Mr T Goodwin
Solicitor for the Respondent:
Australian Government Solicitor
ORDERS
VID 1216 of 2016
BETWEEN:
MOSES LANCE FOLAU
Appellant
AND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGES:
COLLIER, MURPHY…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Moses Folau, a New Zealand citizen with a lengthy history of violent criminal conduct, sought judicial review of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection’s decision to cancel his visa on character grounds. The Federal Court of Australia considered four grounds of appeal, all of which were dismissed. The court found that the Minister did not err by failing to make a specific finding as to the likelihood that Mr Folau would reoffend. It was held that the Minister was not bound to consider factors personal to Mr Folau regarding his past offences, nor conduct an evaluation in any particular manner of the likelihood of him engaging in future conduct. The extent of the risk of reoffending was a matter for the Minister. The court also held that Australia’s sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to remain in Australia was not an irrelevant consideration. The court held that the Minister had not adopted the draft reasons prepared by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection without change. Rather, the Minister had engaged in an active intellectual process and had given proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of Mr Folau’s case. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the Minister’s admitted practice of adopting draft reasons prepared by others, without amendment, was a cause for concern. However, it did not establish that the Minister had not made a personal decision to cancel Mr Folau’s visa. The court dismissed the appeal with costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Before turning to consideration of Mr Folau’s grounds of appeal, it is useful to examine the background facts and his Honour’s decision.Background Mr Folau was born on 29 October 1984 and is a New Zealand citizen. He arrived in Australia in 1990. As a New Zealand citizen Mr Folau was granted a Class TY, Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa on arrival. He has spent most of his life in Australia, with intermittent travel overseas. In 2013, the appellant was convicted in the County Court of Victoria of “intentionally cause injury”. The sentencing judge characterised the attack upon the complainant in that case as being “as ferocious as it was cowardly.” The appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for 25 months and 15 days, with a non-parole period of 14 and a half months. The offence occurred while Mr Folau was already serving a suspended sentence of imprisonment relating to earlier convictions for assault in 2010. Mr Folau had previously received convictions between 2007 and 2010 for violent offences including common law assault on a minor, unlawful assault and damaging property. On 7 August 2015, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department) sent Mr Folau a Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation of his visa under s 501(2) of the Act. Section 501(2) of the Act relevantly provides:(2)The Minister may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if: (a)the Minister reasonably suspects that the person does not pass the character test; and (b)the person does not satisfy the Minister that the person passes the character test. In subsequent letters to Mr Folau dated 12 August 2015 and 25 September 2015, the Department provided further information relating to possible cancellation of Mr Folau’s visa. By a lengthy letter to the Department dated 2 September 2015, Mr Folau’s lawyers responded to the Notice of Intention to Consider Cancellation. The letter detailed Mr Folau’s troubled personal history, alcohol and drug abuse, criminal record, remorse and his attempts to rehabilitate. In conclusion, Mr Folau put to the Department that while he was unable to pass the character test prescribed by s 501 of the Act due to his criminal record, there were compelling reasons for the Minister not to cancel his visa. These reasons were:·The extremely negative impact which cancellation of his visa would have on Mr Folau’s de facto partner Ms Harvey, his family members and his son, all of whom were Australian citizens or residents;·The fact that Mr Folau did not present an ongoing risk to the Australian community, as was apparent from letters of support from his family, friends and work associates;·Mr Folau’s commitment to his sobriety, family, relationship with Ms Harvey and his future; and·Mr Folau’s desire to be involved in community groups to help mentor youth and guide them along better paths than those he had chosen to follow. The Minister’s decision, dated 17 March 2016, was as follows:I reasonably suspect that Mr FOLAU does not pass the character test and Mr FOLAU has not satisfied me that he passes the character test. I have decided to exercise my discretion under s501(2) of the Migration Act to cancel Mr FOLAU’S visa. I hereby cancel Mr FOLAU’S Class TY, Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa. My reasons for this decision are set out in the attached Statement of Reasons.The Minister’s reasons
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
In our view it is open to distinguish Navarrete and Maxwell from the present case because, in both cases, the Court said that there was no evidence pointing to a contrary inference. In Navarrete Allsop J said (at [40]):If the Minister gave no consideration to the terms of the draft, for instance because the author was known to be reliable and she was prepared to sign a memorandum from that person without giving it consideration, it might be said that there was jurisdictional error for the failure by the Minister to make the decision personally. However, there was no evidence here upon which I could conclude otherwise than that the draft reasons were adopted by the Minister as her own reasons after due consideration and that she made the decision for herself and adopted the draft reasons therefor.(Emphasis added.) In Maxwell Perry J said (at [32]) that there was “no evidence establishing otherwise than that the Minister made the decision personally in an independent exercise of her discretion.” See also Wozniak v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 44 at [74] – [76] (Burley J). However, because of the admitted facts, in the present case there is some evidence pointing the other way. In Lek v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1993) 43 FCR 100 at 122 Wilcox J said, and we agree, that:…the use by decision makers of reasons devised by others is a matter that should excite concern about the possibility that individual decisions were taken in accordance with an overriding rule or policy or at the direction or behest of others. Such concerns are likely to be deepened by the Minister’s apparent practice of adopting draft reasons prepared by others in every visa cancellation and refusal decision he makes, without amendment. One might reasonably ask why Parliament would provide the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection with a personal power to cancel a visa (as an alternative to having the decision made by a delegate), and oblige the Minister to give reasons for doing so, if Parliament understood or intended that in every case the Minister would adopt, without change, the draft reasons prepared by departmental officers. Such a practice has a tendency to undercut Parliament’s intention to provide a right to merits review where a visa cancellation decision is made by a delegate rather than by the Minister personally. The power for the Minister to personally decide to cancel a visa pursuant to s 501(2), coupled with his obligation to provide reasons for the decision pursuant to s 501G, cannot mean that it is permissible to merely rubber stamp reasons prepared by the Department, and the Minister is required to do more than just review reasons prepared by somebody else. The Minister must engage in an active intellectual process (Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107 at [46] (Griffiths, White and Bromwich JJ)) and he must give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of the particular case: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZJSS (2010) 243 CLR 164; [2010] HCA 48 at [29] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ). Before adopting any draft reasons as his own the Minister must decide that they accurately reflect his own reasons: W157/00A at [39].
Decision
Reasons for decision
The fourth ground of appeal is not substantiated.Conclusion The appropriate order is to dismiss the appeal with costs. In this matter the appellant, Moses Folau, appeals from a decision of a judge of this Court (Folau v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1149) dismissing his application for review of a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister). On 17 March 2016 the Minister, acting personally, cancelled Mr Folau’s Class TY, Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa on the basis that he did not pass the “character test” under s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) (the visa cancellation decision). It is uncontroversial that Mr Folau does not pass the character test because, on 30 August 2013, he was convicted of intentionally causing injury and sentenced to 25 ½ months imprisonment. In sentencing Mr Folau, Judge Ryan of the County Court of Victoria said that he initiated a violent assault on 16 April 2011 by setting upon a man and causing him serious physical and psychological injuries. His Honour described Mr Folau’s offending as a serious example of intentionally causing injury and said that the violence was “wanton and sustained”. At the time he committed the offence Mr Folau was serving a suspended sentence of eight months imprisonment on two counts of Common Law Assault. Judge Ryan noted that Mr Folau had 11 findings of guilt or prior convictions from five court appearances between May 2006 and November 2010, four of which concerned crimes of violence. We have had the benefit of reading the draft reasons for judgment of Collier J. We adopt her Honour’s summary of the background facts and of the Minister’s reasons for the visa cancellation decision. We generally agree with her Honour’s reasons for refusing grounds one, two and three of the appeal. We also agree with Collier J that ground four of the appeal should be dismissed, but we consider that it is appropriate to say something further in that regard. In relation to this ground of the appeal, by operation of a notice to admit served by Mr Folau’s lawyers, the Minister is taken to have admitted that in every visa refusal and cancellation decision he has made, acting personally, between his appointment on 23 December 2014 and the date of the decision in the present case (17 March 2016) the Minister signed, without change, the draft reasons for decision prepared by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the Department). Having regard to the admitted facts Mr Folau contended that the Minister “unthinkingly adopted” the draft reasons prepared by the Department and did not give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of his case. For the reasons we explain, while the Minister’s admitted practice is a cause for concern, Mr Folau did not discharge his onus to establish this ground of appeal.THE PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Prior to 3 March 2016 the Department provided the Minister with a detailed briefing headed “Issues for consideration of possible visa cancellation under s 501(2) of the Migration Act” (the Issues Paper). The Issues Paper summarised the information relevant to the Minister’s decision, doing so by reference to the considerations identified in a ministerial direction under s 499 of the Act titled “Direction No 65 – Visa refusal and cancellation under s 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under s 501CA”. It attached all materials relevant to the Minister’s consideration of whether to cancel Mr Folau’s visa including the submissions and materials Mr Folau put forward. The pro forma decision and draft Statement of Reasons
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that the grounds of appeal did not disclose jurisdictional error in the decision of the Minister, or error in the primary judgment, because in summary:·The Minister was not bound to consider factors personal to the visa-holder regarding the offences, nor conduct an evaluation in any particular manner of the likelihood of Mr Folau engaging in future conduct. The extent of the risk of a visa-holder reoffending is a matter for the Minister. There is no basis in the text of s 501(2) of the Act for the imposition of the logical framework contended by Mr Folau;·In any event, the Minister did consider and assess both the seriousness and likelihood of Mr Folau reoffending;·Australia’s sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concerns are allowed to remain in Australia is not an irrelevant consideration in terms of the object and structure of the Act. The primary Judge was correct to identify this sovereign right as the jurisprudential foundation of s 501 of the Act, and to reason that it was not an impermissible factor for the Minister to consider;·It is clear from a fair reading of the Minister’s reasons that he did not take into account the expectations of the Australian community as a form of punishment; and·There is no basis for the appellant’s allegation that the Minister did not make the decision personally or give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the merits of Mr Folau’s case through the adoption of reasons drafted by an officer of the Department. Consideration I will consider each ground of appeal in turn.Ground 1 To reiterate, in examining the criminal history of Mr Folau and the risk he posed to the Australian community the Minister found:·The County Court Judge sentencing Mr Folau in 2013 considered that Mr Folau had not learned from his past court appearances;·Mr Folau’s conviction in 2013 was for “intentionally cause injury”, an offence characterised by the County Court Judge as wanton and sustained, and a serious example of the offence;·Mr Folau’s conduct in 2013 was very serious, and his conduct in 2010 involving assault of a minor aged 15 was very serious;·Mr Folau’s offending involved a pattern of violent conduct;·Factors influencing Mr Folau’s conduct included alcohol and drug abuse, as well as the emotional effect on him from the tragic deaths of his father and brother;·Mr Folau had made progress in rehabilitation by way of drug and rehabilitation courses, counselling attendance, involvement in reintegration programmes, educational activities in prison and consistent employment history following release from prison; and·However, Mr Folau’s conduct also demonstrated a disrespect for Australian laws – for example, false declarations, past breaches of judicial orders, and commission of offences whilst serving a suspended sentence. In light of this analysis the Minister concluded that Mr Folau represented an ongoing likelihood of reoffending, and that if he did reoffend he could cause serious physical injuries or psychological harm to a member of the Australian community.