Vunisa v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Vunisa v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCA 333    

File number: NSD 1270 of 2020
Judgment of: THAWLEY J
Date of judgment: 8 April 2022
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision of the Minister for Home Affairs not to revoke a visa cancellation decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – insufficient merit to warrant a grant of leave – application dismissed
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A(1), 501(3A), 501CA(3), 501CA(4)
Cases cited:

Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203

Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo (2018) 267 FCR 320

Minister for Home Affairs v Omar [2019] FCAFC 188

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; 264 CLR 541; 357 ALR 408

Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane [2021] HCA 41; 395 ALR 403

Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3; 267 FCR 200

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 23
Date of hearing: 4 April 2022
Counsel for the Applicant:  The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr GJ Johnson
Solicitor for the Respondent Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 1270 of 2020
BETWEEN:

EMORI VUNISA

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

THAWLEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

8 APRIL 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THAWLEY J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. Mr Vunisa applies for an extension of time in which to seek judicial review of a decision of the then Minister for Home Affairs, made on 13 October 2020 under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), not to revoke the cancellation of his visa.

  2. Mr Vunisa is a citizen of Fiji, who first arrived in Australia on 29 October 1987 at the age of 27.  Between 1994 and 2012 he was convicted of various offences including destroy or damage property, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, contravene apprehended domestic violence order and common assault.  On 28 January 2014 the applicant was convicted in the District Court of New South Wales for cause grievous bodily harm with intent for which he received a nine year custodial sentence, and wound person with intent to cause grievous bodily harm for which he received a six year custodial sentence.  The incident in respect of which these convictions were recorded occurred on 3 May 2012, on which occasion the applicant, who was intoxicated at the time, stabbed his partner Ms Latu with a knife 11 times, before pursuing one Mr Kumar, stabbing him once.

  3. Before the cancellation of his visa, Mr…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 333
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Vunisa v Minister for Home Affairs, the applicant sought an extension of time to seek judicial review of a decision of the Minister for Home Affairs not to revoke a visa cancellation decision under section 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant's visa had been cancelled due to concerns about his character, and he requested the Minister to revoke the cancellation decision. The Minister considered the applicant's representations but ultimately decided not to revoke the cancellation, finding that there was not "another reason" to do so.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Minister's decision was unreasonable, whether the Minister failed to properly apply the relevant sections of the Act, whether the Minister failed to take relevant considerations into account, whether there was insufficient evidence to support the Minister's findings, whether the Minister failed to properly exercise the discretion under the Act, whether the Minister's decision involved an error of law, and whether the Minister did not comply with the rules of natural justice or denied procedural fairness. The court examined the Minister's reasons for the decision and considered whether there was any jurisdictional error or procedural unfairness.

The court found that the Minister had considered the applicant's representations and took into account various factors, including the best interests of the applicant's grandchildren and the extent of impediments if the applicant were to be removed to Fiji. The court held that the Minister's evaluation of the material was reasonable and not affected by jurisdictional error. The court also found that there was no reasonable argument that the Minister exceeded the decision-making authority conferred on him by the Migration Act. The court concluded that there was insufficient prospect that the applicant could establish that the Minister's decision was affected by jurisdictional error to warrant an extension of time in which to bring a judicial review application.

The court dismissed the application for an extension of time and ordered that the applicant pay the Minister's costs. The court held that the Minister's decision was not unreasonable and that the applicant had not identified any specific error shown to affect the decision. The court also found that the Minister had properly applied the relevant sections of the Act and had taken into account all relevant considerations. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the Minister's findings and that the Minister had properly exercised the discretion under the Act. The court further found that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in the Minister's decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time be dismissed with costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

That is not to say that there can be no mandatory relevant considerations pertaining to an exercise of power under s 501CA(4). It has been recognised that the visa applicant’s representations as a whole must be taken into account: Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203 at [55], [56] (Robertson J); Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo (2018) 267 FCR 320 at [41] (Besanko, Barker and Bromwich JJ); Minister for Home Affairs v Omar [2019] FCAFC 188; (2019) 272 FCR 589 at [34(e)]. The Minister took into account Mr Vunisa’s representations, summarising the main points in them at [12] of his reasons and addressing them in detail in the way previously mentioned. This proposed ground has insufficient merit to warrant an extension of time.Ground 4: No evidence This ground was not explained by Mr Vunisa. No specific conclusion was identified as one which could only lawfully be reached on the basis of the existence of some probative material – see: Viane at [17]. The Minister took into account the applicant’s representations. The Minister placed predominant weight on what he considered to be the unacceptable risk Mr Vinusa presented to the community. He took into account an “ongoing” risk of reoffending, and the prospect that any future offending would have serious and harmful consequences for the Australian community. The Minister identified the materials upon which these conclusions were drawn. His conclusions constituted an evaluative assessment which was called for under s 501CA(4)(b)(ii). The Minister’s evaluation was based upon a recognition of human behaviour from a modest familiarity with human experience. This ground has insufficient prospect to warrant an extension of time.Ground 6: Error of law Mr Vunisa’s contention that the Minister’s decision was affected by an error of law was unexplained and does not add to the other grounds of challenge in any meaningful way.Ground 7: Denial of procedural fairness Procedural fairness with respect to an exercise of power under s 501CA(4) is prescribed by the particular legislative scheme. Mr Vunisa did not put forward any particular matter which operated to deny an opportunity which was either expressly or implicitly contemplated by the statutory scheme. Nor did Mr Vunisa identify any practical injustice which resulted from the procedures followed for determination of this application for revocation. It follows that this ground has insufficient prospect to warrant an extension of time CONCLUSION Mr Vunisa emphasised in his oral submissions the extent of community service which he had provided. He emphasised his strong connections with his family and with the community. Mr Vunisa expressed genuine remorse and contrition for the harm he had caused in the past. It is desirable to make it clear for Mr Vunisa’s benefit that the role of this Court is confined to the identification and correction of jurisdictional error on the part of the Minister. This Court cannot make a new decision on the merits. The substance of the matters that Mr Vunisa emphasised were taken into account by the Minister in considering the representations which Mr Vunisa had made. The Minister’s evaluation of the material was that, on balance, there was not “another reason” to revoke the visa cancellation. There is no reasonable argument that this evaluation was one which was affected by jurisdictional error. There is no reasonable argument that the Minister exceeded the decision-making authority conferred on him by the Migration Act. There is insufficient prospect that Mr Vunisa can establish that the Minister’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error to warrant an extension of time in which to bring a judicial review application.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Before the cancellation of his visa, Mr Vunisa held a Five Year Resident Return (Class BB)(subclass 155) visa. On 27 November 2018, a delegate of the Minister cancelled Mr Vunisa’s visa under s 501(3A) of the Act. The delegate notified Mr Vunisa of the cancellation decision and invited him to make representations to the Minister about revocation of the cancellation decision, in accordance with s 501CA(3). On 18 December 2018, Mr Vunisa requested revocation of the visa cancellation.THE MINISTER’S DECISION As mentioned, the Minister decided not to revoke the cancellation. The Minister was not satisfied the applicant passed the character test and, accordingly, s 501CA(4)(b)(i) of the Act was not met. The Minister then considered whether, for the purposes of s 501CA(4)(b)(ii), there was “another reason” to revoke the visa cancellation. The Minister took into account a number of matters. First, the Minister took into account the best interests of minor children, specifically the applicant’s five grandchildren, in respect of each of whom the Minister accepted the applicant had a relationship, but not a parental one: [11]-[18]. He referred to the evidence and submissions made by members of Mr Vunisa’s family, ultimately concluding at [18]:I accept that Mr VUNISA has a strong relationship with his grandchildren, despite not being physically available to them (apart from occasional prison visits) for most or all of their lifetimes to date. Accordingly I find that it is in the best interests of Mr VUNISA’s grandchildren that I revoke the original decision to cancel Mr VUNISA’s visa. However, the weight I give this consideration is limited by the fact that the children have their parents and all other family members available to them, so while they would suffer emotional hardship in his absence, they would not be denied the presence of someone who is critically important for their development. Furthermore they could still have telephone or electronic contact with him from Fiji, as they have done from prison. Secondly, the Minister considered the extent of impediments if the applicant were to be removed to Fiji, accepting he would face “serious psychological hardship” if removed there, but that he would be able to access medical facilities and support to the same extent as other Fijian citizens: [19]-[24]. The Minister’s conclusion at [24] was:I accept that Mr VUNISA would face serious psychological hardship if removed to Fiji and thereby being separated permanently from his family, with whom he maintains very close contact. I further accept that his difficulties would be exacerbated by the absence of any personal support network there, his family members having died since he lived there many years ago. I consider that he could access medical facilities and support to the same extent as other citizens of Fiji, but I accept that it would be harder for him to obtain the medical treatment he needs for his permanent conditions of diabetes and high cholesterol, as well as his alcoholism.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The grounds upon which Mr Vunisa relies are set out in his affidavit:(1)the Minister’s decision was unreasonable;(2)the Minister did not properly apply s 501CA and s 501CA(4) of the Act;(3)the Minister failed to take relevant consideration into account;(4)there was insufficient evidence or no evidence to support various findings made by the Minister;(5)the Minister failed to properly exercise its discretion under s 501CA and s 501CA(4) of the Act;(6)the Minister’s decision involved an error of law;(7)in making the decision, the Minister did not comply with the rules of natural justice and/or Mr Vunisa was denied procedural fairness.CONSIDERATIONGround 1: Unreasonableness In Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 3; 267 FCR 200 at [61], the Full Court (Reeves, O’Callaghan and Thawley JJ) stated:The question of whether a decision is legally unreasonable is answered by reference to whether or not the decision is within the scope of the statutory authority conferred on the decision-maker; it involves an assessment of whether the decision was lawful or authorised having regard to the scope, purpose and objects of the statutory source of power: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 357 ALR 408 at [54]-[60] (Gageler J); [78]-[79] (Nettle and Gordon JJ); [135] (Edelman J). Such a conclusion might be drawn, for example, if it:(1)is “illogical”, though an inference of unreasonableness will not be supported merely because a decision appears to be irrational: SZVFW at [10] (Kiefel CJ); [82] (Nettle and Gordon JJ); Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [68] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ);(2)“lacks an evident and intelligible justification”: Li at [76] (Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ); SZVFW at [10] (Kiefel CJ), [82] (Nettle and Gordon JJ);(3)is plainly unjust, arbitrary, capricious or lacking in common-sense: Stretton at [11] per (Allsop CJ, with whom Griffiths and Wigney JJ relevantly agreed at [87], [90]); Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 255 FCR 81 at [35] (Flick, Perry and Charlesworth JJ). Legal unreasonableness may also be found where the “result is so unreasonable that it could not have been reached if proper reasoning had been applied in the exercise of the statutory power in the particular circumstances”: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 357 ALR 408 at [83] (Nettle and Gordon JJ). It is apparent from these examples that a decision might be found to be unreasonable either:(1)after identification of specific error shown to affect the decision; or (2)by reference to the outcome or result of the decision: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1 at [12] (Allsop CJ). The Minister emphasised that the test has been described as “stringent” or “extremely confined” – see: SZVFW at [11] (Kiefel CJ), [52], [70] (Gageler J) and [135] (Edelman J).