DZU19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DZU19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 300

Appeal from:

DZU19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship,

Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 452

File number: NSD 282 of 2021
Judgment of: RAPER J
Date of judgment: 2 April 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the former Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing the appellant’s application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority which had affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the appellant a protection visa – whether the appellant ought be granted leave to raise new grounds on appeal – whether the primary judge erred by failing to find that the delegate and/or the Authority’s decision was vitiated with jurisdictional error – application for leave to rely on new grounds refused and appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5AA, 5H(1), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 46A(1), 46A(2), 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 473CB, 473BA, 473DB(1)

Cases cited:

BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 169; 253 FCR 448

DKY22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs and Another [2024] FCAFC 24; 302 FCR 25

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 33
Date of hearing: 26 March 2025
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M Gao of HWL Ebsworth
Solicitor for the First Respondent: HWL Ebsworth
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs.

ORDERS

NSD 282 of 2021
BETWEEN:

DZU19

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RAPER J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 APRIL 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The first respondent be renamed “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.

2.The appeal be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RAPER J:

  1. The appellant is a 41-year-old citizen of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, who arrived in Australia by boat in January 2013 as an unauthorised maritime arrival within the meaning of s 5AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). In February 2013, the appellant participated in an entry interview conducted by an officer of the then Department of Immigration and Citizenship. On 20 June 2016, the appellant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise visa (SHEV), and, on 1 August 2019, he attended an interview in relation to that application (SHEV interview). On 28 August 2019, a delegate of the first respondent Minister refused to grant the appellant a SHEV finding that there was not a real chance or real risk he would be harmed should he be returned to Bangladesh. On 2 September 2019, the delegate’s decision was…

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Details
Case
[2025] FCA 300
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of DZU19 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, appealed against the decision of the former Federal Circuit Court of Australia which had dismissed his application for judicial review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The IAA had affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate not to grant the appellant a protection visa. The central dispute was whether the appellant should be granted leave to raise new grounds on appeal and whether the primary judge erred by failing to find that the delegate’s and/or the IAA’s decision was vitiated with jurisdictional error.

The legal issues before the court were primarily concerned with the appellant's eligibility for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant argued that the delegate and the IAA erred in their assessments of his claims for protection and that he had been subjected to threats and harassment in Bangladesh due to his political affiliations. The court had to consider whether these errors were jurisdictional in nature and whether the appellant's claims were credible. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the appellant was entitled to rely on new grounds for appeal that were not presented before the primary judge.

The court found that the primary judge's reasons were sound and that there was no error in the decisions of the delegate and the IAA. The appellant's claims were inconsistent and lacked credible evidence. The court held that the appellant's grounds for appeal lacked merit and did not identify any jurisdictional error. Therefore, the application for leave to rely on new grounds was refused. The court also dismissed the appeal, concluding that the appellant had not demonstrated that the primary judge's decision was erroneous.

Consequently, the court ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs’ costs as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The first respondent be renamed “Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs”.

2. The appeal be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons I can discern no error in the primary judge’s reasons and the appeal must be dismissed.Background The delegate’s reasons summarised the appellant’s claims for protection in his 2016 SHEV application in the following way:•He originates from the village of Chargobindipul, Madaripur District (Dhaka Division) in Bangladesh•In Bangladesh, he was involved with the political party, Islami Shashontantra Andolan.•Members of the Awami League (AL) threatened him and he fears they will kill him.•The authorities failed to protect him in Bangladesh.•He relocated to Naryangong District for safety but he was targeted there as well.•He was safer when the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) was in power in Bangladesh. After 2008, the AL came to power and his life was in danger.•He fears the current AL government. Opposition activists like him are mistreated by the Bangladeshi authorities. The delegate described the additional claims the appellant made three years later in the SHEV interview on 1 August 2019:(a)he had been an active supporter of Islami Shashontantra Andolan since he was 14, and attended political meetings of this party once a month;(b)the majority of people in his village supported Awami League and this created problems as between himself and the people in his village;(c)in approximately 2000, he was attacked by AL members (and was stabbed in the hand) who pressured him to leave ISA and join AL; (d)after he arrived in Australia, he supported the Bangladesh National Party and sometimes attended BNP meetings and was involved in a BNP rally in Sydney in 2018;(e)he fears he will be tortured or killed by AL supporters/members on return to Bangladesh. The delegate made the following findings:•That the applicant was a low-level supporter of Islami Shasontontro Andolan in Bangladesh.•That the applicant’s family members were low-level supporters of Islami Shasontontro Andolan in Bangladesh.•That, in approximately 2000, the applicant may have experienced some low-level harassment by local members/supporters of the AL in his area of origin due to his support for Islami Shashontantra Andolan (and due to his non-support for AL).•That the applicant has not been involved with Islami Shasontontro Andolan since his departure from Bangladesh and he has had minimal contact with party colleagues back in Bangladesh.•That he departed Bangladesh lawfully.•That the applicant has been a low-level supporter of the BNP since his arrival in Australia.•That the applicant would be returned to Bangladesh as a failed asylum seeker. The delegate, thereafter, identified those aspects of the appellant’s claims which she did not accept, being:•That the applicant was an active supporter of Islami Shasontontro Andolan in Bangladesh. •That, in approximately 2000, the applicant was attacked by a group of AL members/supporters in his village - they pressured him to leave Islami Shashontantra Andolan and support the AL and he was attacked with a knife (his hand was stabbed).•Whilst it is possible the applicant may have experienced some low-level pressure from opposition groups such as the AL to support their party, I do not accept that he was seriously harmed by the AL or any other group in attempts to forcibly recruit him.•That the applicant relocated from his home village to Naryangong because he feared harm by AL members/supporters.•That AL members/supporters were searching for him during the period he resided in Naryangong and they were threatening his family in the village so the applicant decided to leave Naryangong (and Bangladesh) due to his fear of harm.•That the applicant would be of adverse interest to the AL or anyone else if returned to Bangladesh due to his political profile (his affiliation with Islami Shasontontro Andolan and the BNP in Australia and consequently, his perceived non-support of AL) or for any other reason…

Decision

Reasons for decision

As a consequence, the appellant was not granted a SHEV because the delegate was not satisfied he was a “refugee” within the meaning of s 5H(1) of the Act nor fell within the criteria for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.The Authority’s decision As has previously been observed by this Court, the form of review undertaken by the Authority is a “limited form of review” (s 473BA of the Act) and is “sui generis”, which is not equivalent to the merits review undertaken by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal: BMB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 169; 253 FCR 448 at [85] per Charlesworth J. At the beginning of the Authority’s reasons, it summarised his claims for protection, which included an additional claim (not previously raised at the entry or SHEV interview) that over an eight-year period between 2000 and 2008, the AL went to his family home seeking his whereabouts, threatening his family and claiming they would find him and take action against him. Like that of the delegate, the Authority did not accept the appellant’s claims regarding what he had said had occurred when he lived in Bangladesh and as to his fears of harm if returned. The Authority formed the view that his description of events regarding him being targeted and threatened by the AL had changed dramatically over time, that his claims as to alleged continued attempts by the AL to seek him out and threaten him were problematic and were ultimately not accepted: IAA[11]–[12]. The Authority did not accept the voracity of letters of support and ultimately did not accept the truthfulness of the appellant’s claims regarding his past experiences involving the AL: IAA[14]–[15]. As a consequence, the Authority rejected his claims that he was of interest to the Bangladeshi authorities or any other groups or individuals: IAA[16]. In relation to the appellant’s claimed involvement with the BNP, the Authority was not satisfied that he had been a truthful witness and was unwilling to accept that the appellant had had any involvement with or support for the BNP following his arrival in Australia, (at IAA[17]–[19]):17. At the protection visa interview, the applicant claimed that after his arrival in Australia he has become a supporter of the BNP. He attends meetings, party programs and listens to discussions. He has also attended a protest rally against when the Prime Minister of Bangladesh visited Sydney.18. The applicant made no mention of these claims in his protection visa application. At the protection visa interview he stated that he could provide a video of his attendance at the protest rally. The delegate advised him that he had seven days after the protection visa interview to provide this evidence to the Department. No evidence to corroborate these claims was apparently provided to the delegate, and none has been forthcoming since the delegate’s decision.19.In light of the delay in their provision and absence of any substantiating evidence, I am not satisfied the applicant has been a truthful witness in regards to these aspects of his claims. I do not accept that the applicant has supported or had any involvement with the BNP since his arrival in Australia. I am not satisfied that he has attended any BNP meetings and/or activities including any protests/rallies since his arrival in Australia. Nor am I satisfied that the applicant is a supporter of the BNP as claimed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Otherwise, the appellant chose not to expand on the appeal grounds and relied upon the grounds themselves and this short, written submission. Given this, the Court asked that the Minister make submissions with respect to each of the grounds after the interpreter had read each of the appellant’s grounds to the appellant. The Court informed the appellant that he would be given a further opportunity to make submissions with respect to the Minister’s submissions addressing each of his grounds. The appellant thereafter made a generalised submission that he will be persecuted in his country and this was the reason why he is still in Australia, twelve years after his arrival and has not returned to his country. ConsiderationLeave is refused for the appellant to rely on grounds one and two By grounds one and two, the appellant contends the following:1. The applicant was detained for a prolonged period of time and he was barred under Section 46A(1) to apply for any kind of visa onshore is definitely beyond the Jurisdiction of the Department-2. The applicant's bar to make an application was lifted on 12 May 2015 which was 2 and a half years after his arrival and detention, which is a huge a procedural unfairness by the Department- These grounds bear no resemblance to any of the arguments raised before the primary judge. The appellant requires leave of the Court to raise grounds not raised below. As stated by the Full Court in DKY22 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs and Another [2024] FCAFC 24; 302 FCR 25 (at [28]–[32]), the exercise of the Court’s discretion to grant leave in these circumstances is informed by s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), where the predominant consideration is the interests of justice and that the merits of the proposed new grounds are an important consideration. The appellant made no submission with respect to these grounds (save for the generalised submission referred to above). They appear to suggest some denial of procedural fairness arising by operation of s 46A(1) which precluded him from applying for a protection visa. There was no evidence before the Court below or on appeal as to the length of his detention. By operation of s 46A(1), any application for a visa made by an unauthorised maritime arrival is invalid. The Minister thereafter decided, as it was open to him, pursuant to s 46A(2), to lift that bar and invited the appellant to make a protection visa application. As submitted by Mr Gao, for the Minister, as to whether a person’s detention is justified, needs to be assessed by reference to whether the person held a visa at the relevant time. The Act authorises lawful detention in a number of circumstances. These two grounds do not identify any jurisdictional error in the Authority's decision nor error in the primary judge’s reasons. In any event, the fact remains that the appellant was invited to, and subsequently applied for, a SHEV. For these reasons, leave to raise grounds one and two is refused. The other grounds of appeal lack merit