EXU17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EXU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1675

Appeal from: EXU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 1093
File number: NSD 819 of 2018
Judge: GRIFFITHS J
Date of judgment: 7 November 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) which refused to extend time under s 477 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) – whether the primary judge fell into jurisdictional error by adopting an unduly narrow approach in applying s 477(2) of the Act – application allowed and matter remitted to the FCCA for determination according to law  
Legislation:

Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth), s 11(1)(c)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 24(1)(d)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 36(2B), 476, 477(2)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 36.03, 36.05

Cases cited:

AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133

BOA15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 214

BVW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1508

CDD15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 65; 250 FCR 587

COZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 46

Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163

DMI16 v Federal Circuit of Australia [2018] FCAFC 95

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34

Hunter Valley Developments Pty Limited v Cohen (1994) 3 FCR 344

Mentink v Minister for Home Affairs [2013] FCAFC 113

Mladenov v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2014] FCA 12

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; 242 FCR 585

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; 242 FCR 585

MZZGC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 842

MZZIV v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCA 1203

NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1

New Acland Coal Pty Ltd v Smith [2018] QSC 88

Seiler v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs [1994] FCA 878; 48 FCR 83

SZNJG v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 334

SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719

SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 158

SZUWX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 77; 238 FCR 456

Date of hearing: 5 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 58
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A J Byrne
Solicitor for the Applicant: D’Ambra Murphy Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B D Kaplan
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 819 of 2018
BETWEEN:

EXU17

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1675
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

EXU17 has brought an application for judicial review of orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA), which refused to extend time for the applicant to appeal against the Independent Assessment Authority’s (IAA) decision to refuse a protection visa. The primary judge of the FCCA refused to extend time for the applicant to appeal, finding that the applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay and the proposed grounds of judicial review did not sufficiently disclose an arguable case on the merits to warrant an extension of time.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge fell into jurisdictional error by adopting an unduly narrow approach in applying s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) in determining whether it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time. The court found that the primary judge committed a jurisdictional error by adopting an approach which simply involved him applying principles which have been developed to guide the exercise of the power to extend time in other legislative contexts which differ from the statutory context here. Unlike those other legislative contexts, s 477(2) expressly requires the Court to be satisfied that “it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice” to extend time. The court found that the primary judge should have considered whether it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time in the context of the applicant’s circumstances, rather than simply applying principles developed in other legislative contexts.

The court allowed the application and set aside the orders of the FCCA, remitting the matter back to the FCCA for determination according to law. The court also ordered that the Minister pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding and the proceeding below, as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended originating application dated 19 September 2018 be allowed.

2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 2 May 2018 be set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for determination according to law.

4. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of this proceeding and the proceeding below, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is important to note the two conditions to the exercise of the FCCA’s discretionary power to extend time under s 477(2). The first is the requirement that there be a written application seeking an extension of time which specifies why the applicant considers that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order. The second condition is that the FCCA must be satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order. The concept of whether it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time is at the heart of both those conditions. Summary of background facts The applicant is a citizen of Afghanistan and is of Shia faith and Hazara ethnicity. He was raised in the Jaghori district of Ghazni province in Afghanistan and began working on the family farm when he was 13 years old. Between 2007 and 2010 he lived in Iran where he worked until he was deported by the Iranian authorities back to Afghanistan. On returning to Afghanistan, he worked as a taxi driver and carried passengers between Jaghori, Ghazni city and Kabul. While plying his trade, the applicant was stopped and threatened by the Taliban on two occasions. He claimed that on one of those occasions, the Taliban took his name and told him that they would harm him if he travelled on the same road again. Shortly thereafter, he left Afghanistan and arrived in Australia as an unauthorised maritime arrival in March 2013. On 4 May 2016, the applicant applied for a safe haven enterprise visa, which is a form of protection visa. It was refused by the Minister’s delegate on 14 November 2016. The matter was automatically referred to the Independent Assessment Authority (IAA) for review under Pt 7AA of the Act. On 9 June 2017, the IAA rejected the applicant’s claims for protection under both the refugee criteria in s 36(2)(a) and the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) of the Act and affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The basis upon which the IAA rejected the applicant’s claims for protection as a refugee may be summarised as follows:(a)The IAA found that the applicant’s claim to have been stopped by the Taliban while he was plying his trade was plausible.(b)The IAA also accepted that the applicant would not resume his occupation as a taxi driver operating on roads around Jaghori because of a fear of persecution and that such fear is well founded. (c)The IAA found that, by reference to country information, the applicant could relocate to either Mazar-e-Sharif or Kabul, which he could safely access by air, and where he did not face a real chance of harm. The reasons why the IAA rejected the applicant’s claims for complementary protection may be summarised as follows:(a)As noted above, the IAA found in the applicant’s favour that he had a well-founded fear of persecution as a Shia Hazara taxi driver on roads around Jaghori, but after referring to s 36(2B) of the Act, it found that it must be taken that the applicant did not face a real risk that he will suffer significant harm in Afghanistan if it was reasonable for him to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that he will suffer significant harm. (b)The IAA was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real risk of significant harm in either Mazar-e-Sharif or Kabul, which he could safely access by air. The FCCA proceeding

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is well to set out [4] to [13] of the affidavit which explains why the applicant considered that it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time (without alteration, and noting that there was no [5]):4.Sometime between 9 June 2017 and 4 July 2017, a man called Raza Nahoori called me, by phone, and said words to the effect that the IAA had affirmed the decision. Raza worked with my migration agent, Edith Kaufoou Tapueluelu, and speaks Hazaragi. I am not sure whether he is a migration agent though. He might be an interpreter. My current Solicitor has done a search of the name “Nahoori” on the Office of the Migration Agents Registration Authority, but has been unable to find a migration agent with that name. Attached and marked as annexure “A” are print outs from that search. 6.Raza Nahoori told me words to the effect that my case had to go to the Federal Circuit Court. I do not remember Raza telling me about 35 days to apply to the Federal Circuit Court, although he might have told me. I was really upset and a bit angry when I found out that my application had been refused and, because of my emotional state, I was unable to process what he was saying.7.From the phone call with Raza, I interpreted what he said as meaning that my case would automatically go to the Federal Circuit Court. That understanding was also based on my previous experience of my application being automatically referred to the IAA after the Department of Immigration and Border Protection refused my application. 8.My migration agent, Edith Kaufoou Tapueluelu, did not talk with me after the IAA affirmed my decision.9.On 4 July 2017, Raza Nahoori emailed me the decision and notification by the IAA. Attached and marked as annexure “B” is a photograph of that email. I did not read the attachments in the email because I am not able to read very much English. 10.I was under a lot of pressure and I did not tell any of my friends in my community about my refusal.11.I remained under the belief that my application had been automatically referred to the Federal Circuit Court.12.In about mid-October 2017, I received a phone call from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. The caller said words to the effect that my application had been refused and my Bridging visa had expired. The Department said words to the effect that I could be removed from Australia. The Department said words to the effect that they would call me back to enquire about my migration status.13.I was worried and I called a friend and community leader, Salim Jafari, who referred me to my current Solicitor. My Solicitor advised me to get an opinion from a Barrister and after the opinion was received, we prepared this application. The FCCA’s reasons for judgment summarised The primary judge refused to extend time. Essentially, this was because his Honour found that the applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay and the proposed three grounds of judicial review did not sufficiently disclose an arguable case on the merits to warrant an extension of time. Those matters will now be elaborated upon.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the applicant stated that grounds 3, 4 and 6 were not pressed. Consideration and determination As the Minister emphasised, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the proceeding involves judicial review of a decision of an inferior court. It is well established that the jurisdiction of an inferior court to decide matters is broader than that of an administrative decision-maker (see, for example, Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163 (Craig) at 177-180; SZUWX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 77; 238 FCR 456 (SZUWX) at [9] per Bromwich J, at [16] per Flick J and at [20] per Allsop CJ; and DMI16 v Federal Circuit of Australia [2018] FCAFC 95 (DMI16) at [39]-[41] per Collier, Logan and Perry JJ). As the plurality stated in Craig at [177]-[179], an inferior court commits jurisdictional error if it misconstrues the relevant statute and thereby misconceives the nature of the function which it is performing or the extent of its powers in the circumstances of the particular case. For the following reasons, I consider that the primary judge committed a jurisdictional error by applying an unduly narrow approach in applying s 477(2) of the Act. In particular, his Honour erred by adopting an approach which simply involved him applying principles which have been developed to guide the exercise of the power to extend time in other legislative contexts which differ from the statutory context here. Unlike those other legislative contexts, s 477(2) expressly requires the Court to be satisfied that “it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice” to extend time. I will now expand upon those core matters. As noted above, the primary judge determined the issue of whether or not time should be extended by reference to the three matters identified by Markovic J in SZNJG. In doing so, the primary judge proceeded on the basis that matters which guide the exercise of discretion under s 477(2) are the same as those which apply to the power of the Federal Court to extend time to enable an appeal to be brought in that Court from the FCCA under s 24(1)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act), which was the context in which SZNJG was decided. Under r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (2011 FCRs), a notice of appeal to this Court from a judgment or order of the FCCA has to be filed within 21 days from the date on which the judgment appealed from was pronounced or the order was made. The procedural requirements relating to an application to extend the 21 day time period in r 36.03 are set out in r 36.05 of the 2011 FCRs. In SZNJG, Markovic J found that the principles guiding the exercise of the discretion to extend time under these parts of the 2011 FCRs are the same as those identified by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Limited v Cohen (1994) 3 FCR 344 (Hunter Valley) at 348-349. In Hunter Valley, the Court addressed the question whether time should be extended under s 11(1)(c) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act).