FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EXU17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1675
ORDERS
NSD 819 of 2018 BETWEEN: EXU17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1675
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge fell into jurisdictional error by adopting an unduly narrow approach in applying s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) in determining whether it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time. The court found that the primary judge committed a jurisdictional error by adopting an approach which simply involved him applying principles which have been developed to guide the exercise of the power to extend time in other legislative contexts which differ from the statutory context here. Unlike those other legislative contexts, s 477(2) expressly requires the Court to be satisfied that “it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice” to extend time. The court found that the primary judge should have considered whether it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time in the context of the applicant’s circumstances, rather than simply applying principles developed in other legislative contexts.
The court allowed the application and set aside the orders of the FCCA, remitting the matter back to the FCCA for determination according to law. The court also ordered that the Minister pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding and the proceeding below, as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The amended originating application dated 19 September 2018 be allowed.
2. The orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia made on 2 May 2018 be set aside.
3. The matter be remitted to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia for determination according to law.
4. The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs of this proceeding and the proceeding below, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the applicant stated that grounds 3, 4 and 6 were not pressed. Consideration and determination As the Minister emphasised, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that the proceeding involves judicial review of a decision of an inferior court. It is well established that the jurisdiction of an inferior court to decide matters is broader than that of an administrative decision-maker (see, for example, Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163 (Craig) at 177-180; SZUWX v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 77; 238 FCR 456 (SZUWX) at [9] per Bromwich J, at [16] per Flick J and at [20] per Allsop CJ; and DMI16 v Federal Circuit of Australia [2018] FCAFC 95 (DMI16) at [39]-[41] per Collier, Logan and Perry JJ). As the plurality stated in Craig at [177]-[179], an inferior court commits jurisdictional error if it misconstrues the relevant statute and thereby misconceives the nature of the function which it is performing or the extent of its powers in the circumstances of the particular case. For the following reasons, I consider that the primary judge committed a jurisdictional error by applying an unduly narrow approach in applying s 477(2) of the Act. In particular, his Honour erred by adopting an approach which simply involved him applying principles which have been developed to guide the exercise of the power to extend time in other legislative contexts which differ from the statutory context here. Unlike those other legislative contexts, s 477(2) expressly requires the Court to be satisfied that “it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice” to extend time. I will now expand upon those core matters. As noted above, the primary judge determined the issue of whether or not time should be extended by reference to the three matters identified by Markovic J in SZNJG. In doing so, the primary judge proceeded on the basis that matters which guide the exercise of discretion under s 477(2) are the same as those which apply to the power of the Federal Court to extend time to enable an appeal to be brought in that Court from the FCCA under s 24(1)(d) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act), which was the context in which SZNJG was decided. Under r 36.03 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (2011 FCRs), a notice of appeal to this Court from a judgment or order of the FCCA has to be filed within 21 days from the date on which the judgment appealed from was pronounced or the order was made. The procedural requirements relating to an application to extend the 21 day time period in r 36.03 are set out in r 36.05 of the 2011 FCRs. In SZNJG, Markovic J found that the principles guiding the exercise of the discretion to extend time under these parts of the 2011 FCRs are the same as those identified by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Limited v Cohen (1994) 3 FCR 344 (Hunter Valley) at 348-349. In Hunter Valley, the Court addressed the question whether time should be extended under s 11(1)(c) of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJR Act).