FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WZAUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1599
File number: VID 1453 of 2016 Judge: KENNY J Date of judgment: 24 October 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) alleging jurisdictional error by Federal Circuit Court in refusing an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Federal Circuit Court denied the applicant procedural fairness in not responding to a post-hearing development by giving the applicant an opportunity to make submissions – whether Federal Circuit Court wrongly applied a higher threshold to the merits of the proposed grounds of review beyond a reasonably impressionistic analysis – whether Federal Circuit Court applied the wrong test in determining what constituted jurisdictional error – whether Federal Circuit Court wrongly found that the Minister would suffer prejudice if extension of time granted – application dismissed Legislation: Judiciary Act1903 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 438, 476, 477, 476A
Cases cited: BVW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1508
Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163
DMI16 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2018] FCAFC 95
Francuziak v Minister for Justice [2015] FCAFC 162; 238 FCR 332
Guo v Miniser for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 34
Hamod v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375
Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCA 114; 230 FCR 431
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99
MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCA 1081; 243 FCR 1
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; 242 FCR 585
MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; 238 FCR 158
Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87; 229 FCR 301
SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 158
Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 139; 217 FCR 55
Tomasevic v Travaglini [2007] VSC 337; 17 VR 100
WZAUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2640
Date of hearing: 18 October 2017 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 69 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S Zeleznikow Solicitor for the Applicant: Asylum Seeker Resource Centre Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr L Brown Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs. ORDERS
VID 1453 of 2016 BETWEEN: WZAUA
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
KENNY J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 OCTOBER 2018
THE COURT…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1599
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court determined that the Federal Circuit Court did not deny the applicant procedural fairness as the applicant, with the benefit of legal representation, could not complain that she was denied an opportunity that she did not seek or that no account was taken of an argument that she did not raise. Additionally, the Court found that the facts disclosed to the primary judge were not sufficient to show that the applicant might well have available to her a judicial review ground with some prospects of success, based on the decision in MZAFZ. Therefore, fairness required that the applicant should be given an opportunity to make submissions about that ground. The Court also concluded that the Federal Circuit Court did not wrongly apply a higher threshold to the merits of the proposed grounds of review beyond a reasonably impressionistic analysis. The Court found that the Federal Circuit Court applied the correct test in determining what constituted jurisdictional error and that the Court did not wrongly find that the Minister would suffer prejudice if an extension of time was granted.
The final orders of the Court were that the application be dismissed, and unless a party notified the Court in writing by 4.00 pm on Thursday, 25 October 2018, indicating opposition to this order as to costs, the applicant would pay the first respondent’s costs of the application, as agreed or assessed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. Unless a party notifies the Court in writing by 4.00 pm on Thursday 25 October 2018, indicating opposition to this order as to costs, the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that the applicant’s submissions proceeded from a misconception of the material before the primary judge at the time of judgment. In particular, the primary judge was not informed by the 27 October 2016 letter that the Tribunal had before it “dob-in information that was subject to a certificate under s 438 of the Act”. According to the Minister, the most his Honour “could have known [was] that there was a certificate and it may raise a MZAFZ-type issue”. The Minister submitted that, when considering the content of the procedural fairness obligations, it should be kept in mind that the applicant was represented by “competent and experienced solicitors”, and that they did not inform the Court about the nature of the potential issue, or whether they needed further time to consider whether it was an “actual issue”, with “a sufficiently arguable prospect of success” to justify an extension of time. There was, so the Minister submitted, no argument for the primary judge to address in the discharge of his jurisdiction.Consideration – Ground 1 It is important to recall that, although the letter of 27 October 2016 notified the Court that a s 438 certificate had been issued to the Tribunal in respect of a document on the applicant’s file and that this “may raise a potential issue” in light of Beach J’s decision in MZAFZ, the letter expressly advised the Court that the parties did not want to make submissions “on this issue” unless the Court required them to do so. It is also important to bear in mind that the primary judge was not told whether or not the certificate had been disclosed to the applicant at the Tribunal or more recently. Nor was his Honour informed about the nature of the document that attracted the certificate. Nor did the applicant, by her lawyer, outline the nature of any argument that Beach J’s decision “may raise” in her case. The applicant’s legal representative did not make any application to amend the applicant’s proposed judicial review application, and nor did her legal representative intimate that the applicant might wish to apply for leave to amend her proposed judicial review application and needed time to consider whether such an amendment should be made and what form it should take. Furthermore, although there was a copy of the certificate included in the Court Book filed in this Court, the certificate was not placed, or sought to be placed, before the primary judge. In the circumstances of this case, there can be no denial of procedural fairness. An applicant, with the benefit of legal representation, cannot complain that she was denied an opportunity that she told the decision-maker she did not seek, or that no account was taken of an argument that she did not raise: compare Francuziak v Minister for Justice [2015] FCAFC 162; 238 FCR 332 at [41]. Further, I accept that, as the Minister submitted, the facts disclosed to his Honour were not enough to show that the applicant might well have available to her a judicial review ground with some prospects of success, based on Beach J’s decision in MZAFZ; and that on this basis fairness required that the applicant should be given an opportunity to make submissions about that ground.