WZAUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WZAUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1599

File number: VID 1453 of 2016
Judge: KENNY J
Date of judgment: 24 October 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) alleging jurisdictional error by Federal Circuit Court in refusing an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether Federal Circuit Court denied the applicant procedural fairness in not responding to a post-hearing development by giving the applicant an opportunity to make submissions – whether Federal Circuit Court wrongly applied a higher threshold to the merits of the proposed grounds of review beyond a reasonably impressionistic analysis – whether Federal Circuit Court applied the wrong test in determining what constituted jurisdictional error – whether Federal Circuit Court wrongly found that the Minister would suffer prejudice if extension of time granted – application dismissed
Legislation:

Judiciary Act1903 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 438, 476, 477, 476A

Cases cited:

BVW17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 1508

Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163

DMI16 v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2018] FCAFC 95

Francuziak v Minister for Justice [2015] FCAFC 162; 238 FCR 332

Guo v Miniser for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 34

Hamod v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375

Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v MZYTS [2013] FCA 114; 230 FCR 431

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; 212 FCR 99

MZAFZ v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCA 1081; 243 FCR 1

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1391; 242 FCR 585

MZABP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 110

MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392; 238 FCR 158

Shrestha v Migration Review Tribunal [2015] FCAFC 87; 229 FCR 301

SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 158

Tang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 139; 217 FCR 55

Tomasevic v Travaglini [2007] VSC 337; 17 VR 100

WZAUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2640

Date of hearing: 18 October 2017
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 69
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S Zeleznikow
Solicitor for the Applicant: Asylum Seeker Resource Centre
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr L Brown
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs.

ORDERS

VID 1453 of 2016
BETWEEN:

WZAUA

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT

Third Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 OCTOBER 2018

THE COURT…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1599
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of WZAUA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves the applicant, a citizen of Zimbabwe, who applied for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 27 May 2011. The delegate of the respondent Minister refused this application on 2 July 2013, and the applicant subsequently applied to the Tribunal for review of this decision on 1 August 2013. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision on 16 December 2013. The applicant then applied to the Federal Circuit Court for an extension of time to seek judicial review, as the application was filed 68 days late, beyond the 35-day period stipulated in the Migration Act. The primary legal issues the Court was required to decide included whether the Federal Circuit Court denied the applicant procedural fairness by not responding to a post-hearing development by giving the applicant an opportunity to make submissions, and whether the Federal Circuit Court wrongly applied a higher threshold to the merits of the proposed grounds of review beyond a reasonably impressionistic analysis.

The Court determined that the Federal Circuit Court did not deny the applicant procedural fairness as the applicant, with the benefit of legal representation, could not complain that she was denied an opportunity that she did not seek or that no account was taken of an argument that she did not raise. Additionally, the Court found that the facts disclosed to the primary judge were not sufficient to show that the applicant might well have available to her a judicial review ground with some prospects of success, based on the decision in MZAFZ. Therefore, fairness required that the applicant should be given an opportunity to make submissions about that ground. The Court also concluded that the Federal Circuit Court did not wrongly apply a higher threshold to the merits of the proposed grounds of review beyond a reasonably impressionistic analysis. The Court found that the Federal Circuit Court applied the correct test in determining what constituted jurisdictional error and that the Court did not wrongly find that the Minister would suffer prejudice if an extension of time was granted.

The final orders of the Court were that the application be dismissed, and unless a party notified the Court in writing by 4.00 pm on Thursday, 25 October 2018, indicating opposition to this order as to costs, the applicant would pay the first respondent’s costs of the application, as agreed or assessed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. Unless a party notifies the Court in writing by 4.00 pm on Thursday 25 October 2018, indicating opposition to this order as to costs, the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In addition to the Court Book filed in this matter, the Court also received a copy of the written submissions filed by the parties in the Federal Circuit Court proceeding.BACKGROUND The applicant, a citizen of Zimbabwe, made an application for a Protection (Class XA) visa on 27 May 2011. A delegate of the respondent Minister refused that application on 2 July 2013. The applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision on 1 August 2013. The Tribunal affirmed that delegate’s decision on 16 December 2013. The Tribunal made its decision on the basis that it was not satisfied that the applicant had a well-founded fear of being persecuted in Zimbabwe for any reason set out in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as amended by the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and did not satisfy the requirements of s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant met the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. The applicant applied to the Federal Circuit Court on 31 March 2014, for an extension of time in which to seek judicial review, in circumstances where s 477(1) of the Migration Act fixed a 35-day period in which a judicial review application could be made under s 476 to the Federal Circuit Court and the applicant’s application was filed 68 days late. Section 477(2) confers a discretion on the Federal Circuit Court to extend the 35-day period as the Court considers appropriate in certain circumstances, including that the Court “is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make the order”: see s 477(2)(b). The applicant therefore made an application for an extension of time pursuant to s 477(2), which was accompanied by her proposed judicial review application. There was a hearing in the Federal Circuit Court on 15 September 2014, and the primary judge reserved his decision on that date. The applicant’s submissions to the Federal Circuit Court were set out by the primary judge (at [27] of his reasons) as follows:The applicant submitted that:a)the 35 day time limit for filing the Proposed Judicial Review Application expired on 20 January 2014;b)she was detained on 13 February 2014, preceding which arrangements had been made by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection … for her departure from Australia on 10 February 2014 … ;c)she lacked the financial capacity to source legal advice: see the Departmental email of 4 February 2014 … ;d)the Applicant’s September 2014 Affidavit refers to the applicant's initial lack of understanding that she could represent herself before the Court, which was dispelled on speaking to fellow detainees after 13 February 2014;e)she signed the Extension of Time and Proposed Judicial Review Application on 21 February 2014. It appears, from the facsimile machine imprints on the Extension of Time and Proposed Judicial Review Application, that the process of filing the Extension of Time and Proposed Judicial Review Application in the Registry commenced on 24 March 2014 and the Extension of Time and Proposed Judicial Review Application was marked by the Registry as filed on 31 March 2014. The … Extension of Time and Proposed Judicial Review Application were therefore between 62 and 69 days out of time;f)there is a reasonable explanation for the applicant's delay, and in the circumstances the extent of the delay is far from substantial and unacceptable; andg)the Proposed Judicial Review Application has merit: a reviewable error is identified and there is sufficient doubt that the Tribunal Decision is affected by jurisdictional error. For that reason an extension of time to seek review ought to be granted: Deighton v Telstra Corporation Ltd (Unreported, Full Court Federal Court of Australia, WAG 74 of 1997, 17 October 1997); Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 655; (1991) 33 FCR 397; (1991)104 ALR 621; FCR at 398-400.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submitted that the applicant’s submissions proceeded from a misconception of the material before the primary judge at the time of judgment. In particular, the primary judge was not informed by the 27 October 2016 letter that the Tribunal had before it “dob-in information that was subject to a certificate under s 438 of the Act”. According to the Minister, the most his Honour “could have known [was] that there was a certificate and it may raise a MZAFZ-type issue”. The Minister submitted that, when considering the content of the procedural fairness obligations, it should be kept in mind that the applicant was represented by “competent and experienced solicitors”, and that they did not inform the Court about the nature of the potential issue, or whether they needed further time to consider whether it was an “actual issue”, with “a sufficiently arguable prospect of success” to justify an extension of time. There was, so the Minister submitted, no argument for the primary judge to address in the discharge of his jurisdiction.Consideration – Ground 1 It is important to recall that, although the letter of 27 October 2016 notified the Court that a s 438 certificate had been issued to the Tribunal in respect of a document on the applicant’s file and that this “may raise a potential issue” in light of Beach J’s decision in MZAFZ, the letter expressly advised the Court that the parties did not want to make submissions “on this issue” unless the Court required them to do so. It is also important to bear in mind that the primary judge was not told whether or not the certificate had been disclosed to the applicant at the Tribunal or more recently. Nor was his Honour informed about the nature of the document that attracted the certificate. Nor did the applicant, by her lawyer, outline the nature of any argument that Beach J’s decision “may raise” in her case. The applicant’s legal representative did not make any application to amend the applicant’s proposed judicial review application, and nor did her legal representative intimate that the applicant might wish to apply for leave to amend her proposed judicial review application and needed time to consider whether such an amendment should be made and what form it should take. Furthermore, although there was a copy of the certificate included in the Court Book filed in this Court, the certificate was not placed, or sought to be placed, before the primary judge. In the circumstances of this case, there can be no denial of procedural fairness. An applicant, with the benefit of legal representation, cannot complain that she was denied an opportunity that she told the decision-maker she did not seek, or that no account was taken of an argument that she did not raise: compare Francuziak v Minister for Justice [2015] FCAFC 162; 238 FCR 332 at [41]. Further, I accept that, as the Minister submitted, the facts disclosed to his Honour were not enough to show that the applicant might well have available to her a judicial review ground with some prospects of success, based on Beach J’s decision in MZAFZ; and that on this basis fairness required that the applicant should be given an opportunity to make submissions about that ground.