FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
ECA17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 659
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- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 659
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court found that the applicant's delay of 404 days was significant and more than eleven times the existing limitation period. According to the High Court's decisions in Marks and Brisbane South Regional Health Authority, a limitation period is the general rule, and extensions are the exception. The Court also noted that the delay in this case was not exceptional, as the applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for it. Furthermore, the Court's preliminary examination of the proposed grounds of review did not reveal any reasonably arguable jurisdictional error. The Court concluded that the balance of factors weighed heavily against granting the extension of time application.
In light of these findings, the Court dismissed the application for an extension of time. The Court also considered the impact of the dismissal on the proposed judicial review application, concluding that it was unnecessary to address the competency of the proposed application. The Court will hear the parties regarding costs. The decision underscores the importance of timely judicial review applications and the stringent application of limitation periods, especially in cases involving substantial delays without adequate justification.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Extension of Time Application has been made in writing specifying why it is that ECA17 says it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time, and so the Court need only consider whether it is satisfied that an extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice.Whether in the interests of the administration of justiceLaw In considering the law with respect to extending time in which to make an application for judicial review under the Migration Act regard must be had to the judgments of the High Court in Re Commonwealth; Ex parte Marks[2000] HCA 67; (2000) 75 ALJR 470; (2000) 177 ALR 491 (“Marks”) and Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541; (1996) 70 ALJR 866; (1996) 139 ALR 1 (“Brisbane South Regional Health Authority”), which, in summary, provide as follows:(a)a limitation period is the general rule, and an extension provision is the exception to it: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority CLR at 553 per McHugh J;(b)the limitation period represents Parliament’s judgment as to how the welfare of society is best served by causes of action being litigated within a limitation period: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority CLR at 553 per McHugh J; (c)where a significant period of time has elapsed, and in all but very exceptional cases, the limitation period should be “rigidly applied”: Marks at [16] per McHugh J; and(d)the effect of the limitation period is such that it “may often result in a good cause of action being defeated”: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority CLR at 553 per McHugh J. With the statements of principle above in mind, the factors the Court generally takes into account when determining whether to grant an extension of time pursuant to s 477(2) of the Migration Act are well established, but not closed, and can be summarised as follows:(a)the extent of the delay;(b)the explanation for the delay;(c)any prejudice that may be suffered; and(d)the merits of the Proposed Judicial Review Application,see Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344; (1984) 58 ALR 305; (1984) 7 ALD 315 (“Hunter Valley Developments”); SZTRY v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6] per Flick, Griffiths and Perry JJ; AZAFX v Federal Circuit Court of Australia and Others [2016] FCA 1139; (2016) 244 FCR 401 at [9]-[10] per Charlesworth J.Extent of delay In this case there is a very substantial delay of 404 days. The delay itself is more than eleven times the existing limitation period. As was stated in Marks at [16] per McHugh J where a significant period of time has elapsed, and “[i]n all but very exceptional cases”, the limitation period should be “rigidly applied”: see too BJM15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCA 786 (“BJM15”) at [41] per Colvin J; WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736 (“WQRJ”) at [30] per Derrington J. In the Court’s view, for reasons set out below in relation to both the explanation for the delay (at [10]-[18] below) and the merits of the Proposed Judicial Review Application (at [21]-[51]) there is nothing “exceptional”, or obviously exceptional, in the circumstances of ECA17’s case.