H v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1348

APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – nature of appeal from a judge of the Court to the Full Court – appeal power for correction of errors – issue not argued at first instance – whether expedient in the interests of justice that issue be argued on appeal

MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 476 – actual bias

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Dynasty Pty Ltd v Coombs (FC) (1995) 59 FCR 122, cited
White v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 232, cited
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v The Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47, cited
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1, followed
O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310, cited
Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corporation (1997) 47 NSWLR 631, cited
Jones v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (FC) (1995) 63 FCR 32, cited
Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531, cited
Annand & Thompson Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1979) 25 ALR 91, cited
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Hamsher (1992) 35 FCR 359, followed
Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71, cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Asif [2000] FCA 228, cited
Antonio v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1210, cited
Jia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 93 FCR 556, cited
Broussard v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 21 FCR 472, cited

H v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 231 of 2000

BRANSON, MARSHALL & KATZ JJ
SYDNEY
22 SEPTEMBER 2000

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 231 of 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

H
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON, MARSHALL & KATZ JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

22 SEPTEMBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal be dismissed.

2.        The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 231 of 2000

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

H
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

BRANSON, MARSHALL & KATZ JJ

DATE:

22 SEPTEMBER 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BRANSON & KATZ JJ:

  1. We have had the advantage of reading the draft reasons for judgment of Marshall J in this matter.  We gratefully adopt his Honour’s summary of the background to the appeal including the findings of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) and the decision of the learned primary judge (Hely J).

  2. Before Hely J, the appellant, who was…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1348
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a Sri Lankan citizen, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) to affirm the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs' refusal of the appellant's application for a protection visa. The application was made on behalf of the appellant and his wife. The RRT held that while the appellant and his wife may have suffered harm due to the wife's ethnic background, the harm was not severe enough to constitute persecution. The appellant argued that the RRT was affected by actual bias, which led to an improper evaluation of his evidence.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the RRT was affected by actual bias in making its decision. The appellant's counsel contended that the RRT prematurely concluded that the appellant was untruthful and failed to properly evaluate evidence from sources other than the appellant himself. The appellant's counsel also argued that the RRT's findings about the credibility of the appellant and his wife were incorrect.

The court examined the concept of actual bias and distinguished it from a reasonable apprehension of bias. It noted that actual bias involves a dysfunctional decision-making process where the decision-maker is precluded from properly addressing the issues before them due to preconceived views or attitudes. The court found that the RRT member had not come to the hearing with a closed mind or prejudgments that prevented him from being open to persuasion. The court held that there was no evidence of actual bias in the RRT's decision-making process.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the respondent. The court found that the RRT's decision was not affected by actual bias and that the RRT properly evaluated the evidence presented by the appellant and his wife. The court also noted that the appellant's claims of harm were not severe enough to constitute persecution.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a judgment of a single Judge of the Court (“the primary Judge”) given on 28 February 2000. The primary Judge ordered that the appellant’s application for an order of review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“RRT”) be dismissed.Background The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka. His application for a protection visa was made on his wife’s behalf as well as on his own behalf. The appellant and his wife entered Australia on 8 October 1997. An application for a protection visa was lodged with the respondent on 29 October 1997. On 9 December 1997, a delegate of the respondent refused the application. Review of that decision was sought before the RRT. The RRT conducted hearings on 21 September and 19 October 1999. On 16 November 1999, the RRT decided to affirm the decision of the delegate.The findings of the RRT The RRT made the following findings of fact:· The appellant is Singhalese.· The appellant’s wife is part Singhalese and part Tamil.· The mother of the appellant’s wife is Tamil.· The appellant and his wife may have suffered some harm because the appellant’s wife is part-Tamil.· On two occasions in 1996, the appellant’s house was stoned.· The harm suffered was not “such serious or significant harm as to amount to persecution”.· The position of the appellant and his wife is not unusual.· Letters claimed to have been sent by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“the LTTE”) to the appellant making arrangements for the accommodation of LTTE operatives at the appellant’s abode were not genuine.· The appellant was not questioned by police about a terrorist attack on his employer, Air Lanka, or about the poisoning of Air Lanka’s water supply.· There is no (valid) reason for anyone to impute a pro-LTTE political opinion to the appellant or his wife.Credibility assessments The RRT did not find the appellant and his wife to be “convincing witnesses”. It found the appellant’s claims that he was suspected of poisoning the water supply of Air Lanka and stealing one of Air Lanka’s computers to be incredible. That finding was due to the fact that Air Lanka subsequently gave the appellant an employment reference.The reasoning of the primary Judge The major ground relied upon by the appellant before the primary Judge was his allegation that the RRT was affected by actual bias. The primary Judge reviewed the transcript of the hearing in the RRT and formed the view that the RRT was not affected by actual bias. At [17] of his reasons for judgment, the primary Judge said:“It would have been better if some of the statements made by the member had been left unsaid. But I am not satisfied that the member came to the hearing with his mind made up such that he was not open to persuasion. Rather, having heard the applicant, he indicated from time to time and in quite forceful, perhaps even rude, terms that having regard to the objective circumstances, he did not believe what he was being told.”Actual bias – submissions on appeal

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Godwin contended that the RRT prematurely concluded that the appellant was untruthful. It was also put that the evidence of the appellant and his wife was not grossly exaggerated. Reliance was placed, in this context, on the judgment of the Full Court in Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Asif [2000] FCA 228. In Asif, it was observed (at [32]) that the relevant decision maker had refused to:“… evaluate the probative force of any of the evidence from sources other than the respondent (visa applicant) himself … .”In the instant case, at the time that the RRT expressed severe misgivings about the appellant’s evidence, the RRT member had not begun to question the appellant’s wife. There was no “steadfast refusal to evaluate the probative force of any of the evidence from (other) sources”.Conclusion on actual bias As Burchett J said in Sun (at 127) a finding of actual bias is:“… a grave matter, different in kind from a finding of mere error, or even wrong - headedness, whether in law, logic, or approach.”In Antonio v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1210, sitting as a member of a Full Court, French J said (at [2]) that:“To establish actual bias requires demonstration of a dysfunctional decision-making process, so that by reason of preconceived views or attitudes, the decision - maker is precluded from properly addressing the issues which are before him or her.” At [31] in Antonio, Tamberlin J (with whom French and Sackville JJ agreed) said that for an allegation of actual bias to be made out:“There must be shown to be an actual prejudgment, hostility, prejudice or predisposition to decide the question in a particular way. There are very few reported cases on actual bias. No doubt this is because of the inherent difficulty in proving an actually bias(ed) state of mind in the decision-maker at the relevant time.” Noting the difference between “actual bias” and a reasonable apprehension of bias by an impartial bystander, his Honour said (at [32]) that:“The expression “actual bias” is often used in contrast to an apprehended bias, where there may, in fact, be no bias but a reasonable perception or apprehension of bias. By reason of the restricted provisions in s 476 (of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)), the court cannot have regard to apprehended bias in judicial review of a decision of the RRT.” In Jia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 93 FCR 556, [1999] FCA 951 at [158], R D Nicholson J (sitting as a member of a Full Court) said, after referring to the judgments of the members of the Court in Sun, that:“It will be observed from this that for actual bias to be established there must be evidence of “a closed mind to the issues raised”, “preliminary views incapable of alteration”, prejudgment of the case at least in some respect, real although not necessarily intentional.” In Jia at [82], Cooper J said that:“The fact that a decision - maker has formed a conclusion about an issue involved in the inquiry does not constitute bias on the part of the decision - maker… It must be shown that the decision - maker is unwilling or unable to be persuaded out of any express or implied view before actual bias will be found. As a finding of actual bias requires a factual finding of a state of mind, it may be proved from the statements or conduct of the decision - maker or as a matter of inference from such statements or conduct. Such statements and conduct, however, must be viewed in the context of the decision - making process as a whole … .”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined the appellant's claim that the RRT was affected by actual bias. The primary judge had reviewed the transcript of the RRT hearing and concluded that the RRT member had not come to the hearing with a closed mind, despite some forceful or rude statements. The court agreed with this assessment, stating that a finding of actual bias requires evidence of a closed mind to the issues raised, a prejudgment of the case, and an unwillingness or inability to be persuaded out of any express or implied view. The court found that the RRT member's statements and conduct, viewed in the context of the decision-making process as a whole, did not meet this threshold.

Regarding the second issue, the court considered whether the RRT had prematurely concluded that the appellant was untruthful without adequately evaluating the probative force of all evidence presented. The court found that the RRT had not begun questioning the appellant's wife when it expressed misgivings about the appellant's evidence, and there was no steadfast refusal to evaluate evidence from other sources. The court concluded that the RRT had adequately evaluated the evidence and did not err in its assessment of the appellant's credibility.

The binding legal principle established by this decision is that for a finding of actual bias, there must be evidence of a closed mind to the issues raised, prejudgment of the case, and an unwillingness or inability to be persuaded out of any express or implied view. Additionally, the court must ensure that decision-makers adequately evaluate the probative force of all evidence presented before concluding on the credibility of the applicant.