FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1348
APPEAL – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – nature of appeal from a judge of the Court to the Full Court – appeal power for correction of errors – issue not argued at first instance – whether expedient in the interests of justice that issue be argued on appeal
MIGRATION – Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 476 – actual bias
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Dynasty Pty Ltd v Coombs (FC) (1995) 59 FCR 122, cited
White v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 232, cited
Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v The Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission [2000] HCA 47, cited
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1, followed
O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310, cited
Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corporation (1997) 47 NSWLR 631, cited
Jones v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (FC) (1995) 63 FCR 32, cited
Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531, cited
Annand & Thompson Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1979) 25 ALR 91, cited
Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Hamsher (1992) 35 FCR 359, followed
Sun v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71, cited
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Asif [2000] FCA 228, cited
Antonio v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1210, cited
Jia v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 93 FCR 556, cited
Broussard v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 21 FCR 472, citedH v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 231 of 2000BRANSON, MARSHALL & KATZ JJ
SYDNEY
22 SEPTEMBER 2000
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 231 of 2000
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
H
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
BRANSON, MARSHALL & KATZ JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
22 SEPTEMBER 2000
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 231 of 2000
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
H
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
BRANSON, MARSHALL & KATZ JJ
DATE:
22 SEPTEMBER 2000
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BRANSON & KATZ JJ:
We have had the advantage of reading the draft reasons for judgment of Marshall J in this matter. We gratefully adopt his Honour’s summary of the background to the appeal including the findings of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) and the decision of the learned primary judge (Hely J).
Before Hely J, the appellant, who was…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 1348
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the RRT was affected by actual bias in making its decision. The appellant's counsel contended that the RRT prematurely concluded that the appellant was untruthful and failed to properly evaluate evidence from sources other than the appellant himself. The appellant's counsel also argued that the RRT's findings about the credibility of the appellant and his wife were incorrect.
The court examined the concept of actual bias and distinguished it from a reasonable apprehension of bias. It noted that actual bias involves a dysfunctional decision-making process where the decision-maker is precluded from properly addressing the issues before them due to preconceived views or attitudes. The court found that the RRT member had not come to the hearing with a closed mind or prejudgments that prevented him from being open to persuasion. The court held that there was no evidence of actual bias in the RRT's decision-making process.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the costs of the respondent. The court found that the RRT's decision was not affected by actual bias and that the RRT properly evaluated the evidence presented by the appellant and his wife. The court also noted that the appellant's claims of harm were not severe enough to constitute persecution.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the appellant's claim that the RRT was affected by actual bias. The primary judge had reviewed the transcript of the RRT hearing and concluded that the RRT member had not come to the hearing with a closed mind, despite some forceful or rude statements. The court agreed with this assessment, stating that a finding of actual bias requires evidence of a closed mind to the issues raised, a prejudgment of the case, and an unwillingness or inability to be persuaded out of any express or implied view. The court found that the RRT member's statements and conduct, viewed in the context of the decision-making process as a whole, did not meet this threshold.
Regarding the second issue, the court considered whether the RRT had prematurely concluded that the appellant was untruthful without adequately evaluating the probative force of all evidence presented. The court found that the RRT had not begun questioning the appellant's wife when it expressed misgivings about the appellant's evidence, and there was no steadfast refusal to evaluate evidence from other sources. The court concluded that the RRT had adequately evaluated the evidence and did not err in its assessment of the appellant's credibility.
The binding legal principle established by this decision is that for a finding of actual bias, there must be evidence of a closed mind to the issues raised, prejudgment of the case, and an unwillingness or inability to be persuaded out of any express or implied view. Additionally, the court must ensure that decision-makers adequately evaluate the probative force of all evidence presented before concluding on the credibility of the applicant.