AAH15 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AAH15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 104

Appeal from: AAH15 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 2359
File number: NSD 1122 of 2015
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 18 February 2016
Catchwords:

MIGRATION — alleged jurisdictional error — where Tribunal allegedly failed to consider all claims or all component integers of a claim — where certain findings of the Tribunal allegedly irrational — where Tribunal allegedly erred in characterising appellant’s social group — whether Tribunal erred by failing to consider whether circumstances of appellant’s likely detention upon return to his country of nationality as a failed asylum seeker might involve intentional harm

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE — appeals — failure to identify error by primary judge — new ground not raised below — whether leave should be granted to argue the point

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2A), 65, 499

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24

Cases cited:

Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Limited (2001) 117 FCR 424

Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 77 ALJR 1088; [2003] HCA 26

H v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 63 ALD 43; [2000] FCA 1348

Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 233 FCR 136

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v WZAPN (2015) 320 ALR 467; [2015] HCA 22

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQPA [2012] FCA 1025

Minister for Immigration v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

SLMB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 129

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609; [2007] HCA 26

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 64

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158

Date of hearing: 11 February 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 85
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr A Kumar
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Graycar
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

NSD 1122 of 2015
BETWEEN:

AAH15

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 FEBRUARY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. The appellant is a young Tamil fisherman from Jaffna in the northern province of Sri Lanka, a former stronghold of the LTTE (the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).  He arrived by boat at the Cocos Islands, an Australian territory to the southwest of Christmas Island, on 1…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 104
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, AAH15 brought an appeal against a decision of the Tribunal, which had rejected his application for a protection visa. The central issue in the appeal was whether the Tribunal had correctly assessed the appellant's claims of persecution based on his membership in a particular social group, as well as whether the Tribunal had adequately considered the risks of intentional harm he might face if returned to Sri Lanka.

The Tribunal had examined the appellant's claims, including those related to his family's alleged persecution by the Sri Lankan military and his own potential for persecution upon return. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider all aspects of his claims and that some of its findings were irrational. Specifically, he challenged the Tribunal's handling of his uncle's death, the rejection of his brother's alleged arrest and interrogation, and the characterisation of his social group.

The court found that the Tribunal's reasoning and findings were rational and based on the evidence presented. Regarding the uncle's death, the court noted that the Tribunal had considered the evidence and found no real chance of the appellant being harmed if he returned to Sri Lanka. As for the brother's alleged arrest, the court held that the Tribunal's rejection of this claim was logical given the inconsistencies in the appellant's evidence. The characterisation of the social group was also deemed appropriate by the court, as the Tribunal had adequately addressed the appellant's claims within the scope of his definition. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

After the submission was lodged, the appellant’s migration agent forwarded to the Tribunal a copy of a newspaper article together with a translation of it containing an account of a collision in Jaffna in 2012 between a man on a bicycle and “the bowser of the armed forces” (apparently an army truck), killing the cyclist instantly. According to the covering email from the migration agent, the cyclist was the appellant’s uncle. The appellant claimed that this was an example of the harassment of, and harm visited upon, Tamils in his area. The Tribunal’s decision The Tribunal considered first whether the appellant satisfied the criterion in s 36(2)(a), that is, whether he met the definition of “refugee” in the Convention. The Tribunal accepted (at [14]) that the appellant’s father was killed by the Sri Lankan army in 1993 along with 70 other Sri Lankan fishermen because they were accused of being involved with the LTTE. It also accepted that the appellant’s uncle had been killed by a truck (sometime between 2000 and 2008). But the Tribunal noted that the appellant had said at the hearing that neither he nor anyone in the family had been involved with the LTTE and that there was no evidence to suggest that the family had been imputed with “a pro-LTTE profile” because of his father. Moreover, it was not satisfied that the father’s or uncle’s death meant that there was a real chance that the appellant would be harmed if he were to return to Sri Lanka now or in the reasonably foreseeable future. While the appellant had initially told the Tribunal at the hearing that his brother had not had any difficulties as a fisherman in Sri Lanka and that no member of the family had had any difficulties since he had left the country, later in the hearing he raised a new claim that his brother had been taken to Colombo in 2013 and interrogated. But the Tribunal noted inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence on this matter and a number of other difficulties with the later version, with the result that not only was it not persuaded by it but it found that the appellant had fabricated this claim in an attempt to strengthen his visa application. The Tribunal then observed that the ability of the appellant’s brother, uncles and brother-in law to work as fishermen in Jaffna without difficulty supports the view that the Sri Lankan authorities do not deny Tamil fishermen the ability to support themselves as fishermen. The Tribunal also accepted the appellant’s statement given at the hearing that he had never been physically harmed in Sri Lanka, although it contradicted the account he had given at his entry interview. The Tribunal accepted country information suggesting that there was increasing militarisation of the Northern Province and that the Sri Lankan Navy continues to conduct security checks on fishing boats. Nevertheless, it said that there was no evidence to suggest that the navy was preventing Tamils from earning a livelihood as fishermen or was regularly preventing boats from fishing.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ground 1 must therefore be dismissed.Ground 2: Were the Tribunal’s findings concerning the circumstances of the appellant’s brother irrational? Ground 2 relates to the rejection by the Tribunal of the appellant’s claim concerning his brother’s arrest and interrogation. The appellant argued that the Tribunal’s findings in this respect were irrational in view of the fact that the appellant had only recently learned of his brother’s plight. The other bases for impugning the Tribunal’s decision raised in the notice of appeal were not pressed during argument. It may be accepted that a determination which is not based on findings or inferences of fact supported by logical grounds may be set aside for jurisdictional error (see, for example, Minister for Immigration v SZMDS(2010) 240 CLR 611), but this ground is without merit. For the reasons given by the primary judge (at [27]–[28]), there is nothing illogical or irrational about the Tribunal’s conclusion in this respect or its reasoning process. Certainly it could not be said that this was a conclusion which no rational or logical decision maker could reach on the same evidence (see SZMDS at [130] per Crennan and Bell JJ). True it is, as the primary judge also observed, the Tribunal might have come to a different conclusion, but, as Crennan and Bell JJ went on to say in SZMDS at [131]:If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion. Although the appellant initially identified [29] of the primary judge’s reasons as a source of error, he did not advance any argument to support the submission that the primary judge erred in concluding, for the reasons given, that the appellant had not been denied procedural fairness by not being given an opportunity to address the Tribunal’s concerns about his evidence. The Minister inferred (correctly in my view) that the submission was not maintained. In any case, there is no substance to it. As the Minister submitted, it is well established that the Tribunal was not required to put to an applicant “each step in its prospective reasoning process” (SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 235 ALR 609; [2007] HCA 26 at [18]) or provide a running commentary on its thoughts about the evidence (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [48]). Ground 2 must be dismissed.Ground 3: Did the Tribunal err in its characterisation of the social group to which the appellant belonged? This ground concerns the Tribunal’s approach to the appellant’s claim to fear persecution by reason of his membership of a particular social group. As I have already indicated, the social group was defined for the Tribunal by the appellant’s migration agent as “failed asylum seekers” and the Tribunal undoubtedly dealt with this claim. On the appeal, however, the classification of the social group was a moveable feast. At one point in his written submissions, the appellant’s counsel, Mr Kumar described it as “a young wealthy Hindu Sri Lankan of Tamil ethnicity from East” (despite the evidence put before the Tribunal that he was a poor Catholic Tamil from the north of Sri Lanka). Two paragraphs later he described it as a social group consisting of the following attributes: Sri Lankan, young males, from the North/East, of Tamil ethnicity, “likely to be perceived or are suspected of having some allegiance to LTTE or other groups; [and] possibly holding views opposed to their treatment of by the government of Sri Lanka” (sic).