Kumar v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kumar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs  [2004] FCA 201

MIGRATION – application for General (Residence) (Class AS), subclass 801 visa (spouse) – application on basis that appellant suffered domestic violence – visa refused on ground that statutory declarations did not comply with reg 1.26 of Migration Regulations 1994 – requirements of reg 1.26 – whether statutory declaration of social worker set out opinion that appellant experienced fear or apprehension.

NATURAL JUSTICE – denial of procedural fairness – whether Tribunal misled appellant – whether appellant’s migration agent was led to believe by the Tribunal’s conduct that the statutory declarations complied with the Regulations – whether such belief was reasonable.

PROCEDURE – raising new ground of appeal.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 25(1A)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B(1)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474(1)
Statutory Declarations Act 1959 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 1.22 –1.26, Schedule 2, cl 801, sub-cl 801.221

Alin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 979 applied
Cakmak v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 257 followed
Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1 followed
Dagli v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 298 cited
Du v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1115 applied
H v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 63 ALD 43; [2000] FCA 1348 followed
Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1279 referred to
Meroka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 117 FCR 251; (2002) 70 ALD 298; [2002] FCA 482 discussed
NAAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 123 FCR 298; (2002) 193 ALR 449; (2002) 69 ALD 1; (2002) FCAFC 228 cited
O’Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310 followed
ReMinister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60 applied
VAAC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 74 followed

RAJESH KUMAR V MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

V68 OF 2003

NORTH J
10 MARCH 2004
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V68 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

RAJESH KUMAR
APPELLANT

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

10 MARCH 2004

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V68 OF 2003

BETWEEN:

RAJESH KUMAR
APPELLANT

AND:

THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE:

10 MARCH 2004

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This appeal is brought by Mr Rajesh Kumar, the appellant, against a judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court. That judgment was delivered on 24 January 2003, and…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 201
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Rajesh Kumar, a national of Fiji, appealed against the decision of the Federal Magistrates Court, which dismissed his application for writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari against the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. Kumar had applied for a spouse visa, subclass 801, on the grounds of domestic violence, as defined by the Migration Regulations 1994. His application was rejected by the Migration Review Tribunal, which held that Kumar had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he had suffered domestic violence committed by his spouse, as required by the Regulations.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Migration Review Tribunal had correctly assessed the evidence submitted by Kumar to determine if he had suffered domestic violence committed by his spouse, and if so, whether the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of the relevant Regulations. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the statutory declarations provided by Kumar and two competent persons were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Regulations.

The court found that the statutory declarations did not meet the requirements set out in the Regulations. The Tribunal had correctly found that the declarations did not provide evidence of relevant domestic violence as defined and committed by the nominator. Moreover, the court noted that the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence, including the oral testimony, was consistent with its findings. The court held that the appeal was without merit as the Tribunal's decision was in accordance with the law.

The appeal was dismissed, and Kumar was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

This appeal is brought by Mr Rajesh Kumar, the appellant, against a judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court. That judgment was delivered on 24 January 2003, and it dismissed an application under s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) for writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari in respect of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 31 May 2002. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the respondent, that the appellant was not entitled to the grant of a General (Residence), (Class AS), subclass 801, visa (spouse visa).BACKGROUND The appellant is a national of Fiji. He arrived in Australia in 1997 on a short-term visitor’s visa. On 29 March 1998, he married Sumila Wati, a permanent resident of Australia. On 12 January 1999, he applied for permanent residence on spouse grounds, and was granted a temporary visa on that basis. By the time the delegate came to consider the application for the spouse visa, difficulties had developed in the relationship between the appellant and his wife. She wrote to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs to advise that she was withdrawing her nomination of the appellant’s visa application. The delegate consequently rejected the application on the basis that a nomination by an eligible person in a spousal relationship with the appellant was a critical requirement, and was not fulfilled in this case. On 29 May 2001, the appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the rejection of his application. He did not rely on the continuation of the spousal relationship, or the nomination of his wife. Rather, he claimed to be entitled to the grant of a spouse visa, subclass 801, as a result of domestic violence under subclause 801.221 (6)(c)(i)(A). It is convenient to set out the relevant regulations at this juncture.RELEVANT REGULATIONS The relevant criteria that must be met for the grant of a spouse visa, are set out in clause 801 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (‘the Regulations’). It was necessary in this case for the appellant to meet the requirements of sub-clause 801.221 (6), which relevantly provided: ‘(6) An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:-(a)the applicant is the holder of a subclass 820 visa; and(b)the applicant would meet the requirements of subclause (2) except that the relationship between the applicant and the nominating spouse has ceased; and (c)either or both of the following circumstances applies:(i)either or both of the following:(A)the applicant;…has suffered domestic violence committed by the nominating spouse;’ A deeming provision in relation to domestic violence was contained in reg 1.22: ‘1.22 References to person having suffered or committed domestic violence(1)A reference in these Regulations to a person having suffered domestic violence is a reference to a person being taken, under regulation 1.23, to have suffered domestic violence.’

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Reg 1.24, relevantly, provided:‘1.24 Evidence(1)The evidence referred to in paragraph 1.23 (1)(g) is:…(b)a statutory declaration under regulation 1.25, together with 2 statutory declarations under regulation 1.26.’ Reg 1.25 provided for the statutory declaration by an alleged victim as follows:‘(2)A statutory declaration under this regulation that is made by a person who alleges that he or she is the victim of relevant domestic violence (within the meaning of paragraph 1.23 (2)(b)) must:(a)set out the allegation; and(b)name the person alleged to have committed the relevant domestic violence.’ “Competent person” was relevantly defined in reg 1.21 as follows:‘(ii)a person registered as a psychologist under a law of a State or Territory providing for the registration of psychologists; or … (iv) a person who:(A)is a member of the Australian Association of Social Workers or is recognised by that Association as a person who is eligible to be a member of that Association; and(B)is performing the duties of a social worker; or’ Reg 1.26 dealt with the statutory declaration by competent persons as follows:‘1.26 Statutory declaration by competent personA statutory declaration under this regulation:(a)must be made by a competent person; and(b)must set out the basis of the competent person’s claim to be a competent person for the purposes of this Division; and(c)must state that, in the competent person’s opinion, relevant domestic violence (within the meaning of paragraph 1.23 (2)(b)) has been suffered by a person; and(d)must name the person who, in the opinion of the competent person, has suffered that relevant domestic violence; and(e)must name the person who, in the opinion of the competent person, committed that relevant domestic violence; and (f)must set out the evidence on which the competent person’s opinion is based.’THE TRIBUNAL DECISION In support of his claim to have suffered domestic violence, the appellant submitted a statutory declaration made by himself on 22 November 2001, a statutory declaration made by a psychologist, Edwin Kleynhans, on 25 July 2001, and a statutory declaration made on 27 November 2001 by a social worker, Helen Cleak. The appellant was represented before the Tribunal by a migration agent, Mr Young. Mr Young submitted to the Tribunal that, on receipt of the statutory declarations from the appellant and the competent persons, the Tribunal was bound to find that the appellant had suffered domestic violence. In other words, the role of the Tribunal was to assess the statutory declarations, and not to conduct an independent enquiry into the existence of domestic violence. At the hearing, the appellant, his aunt and his daughter gave evidence, including evidence about the alleged domestic violence. The reasoning of the Tribunal commenced with an assessment of the oral evidence given at the hearing. The Tribunal found the evidence of the incidents of domestic violence unconvincing. The Tribunal then dealt with the statutory declarations as follows:‘39. The evidence under subregulation 1.23(1)(g)(i) must be evidence that the alleged victim has suffered relevant domestic violence which is then defined under subregulation 1.23(2)(b) as “violence against the alleged victim or his or her property that causes the alleged victim, or a member of the alleged victim’s family, to fear for, or to be apprehensive about, the alleged victim’s personal well-being or safety”. Subclause 801.221(6) requires that the domestic violence to have been committed by the nominating spouse. The form in which the evidence is to be presented is set out in reg 1.24. The Tribunal finds that evidence presented in the statutory declaration does not provide evidence of relevant domestic violence as defined and committed by the nominator. Further, having heard the evidence of the visa applicant and his daughter of the circumstances surrounding the alleged pressing of the neck incident the Tribunal finds that the visa applicant would not now be able truthfully to make such a declaration that he has been a victim of violence in respect to that incident to the extent that it caused him or his family to fear for or to be apprehensive about his personal well-being or safety. The other evidence presented in the visa applicant’s statutory declaration rather refers to alleged acts by persons other than the nominator and so is not evidence in accordance with subregulation 1.23(1)(g)(ii).40. The lack of credibility of the evidence of the visa applicant and his daughter diminishes the reliability of the evidence upon which the opinion of the psychologist was said to be based, as well as the reliability of the evidence upon which the opinion of the social worker was based who stated that her sources of information were the report of the psychologist and the interview with the visa applicant and his daughter, Poonam. The information relied upon is also contradictory in part with the visa applicant’s own statutory declaration. The statutory declaration of the social worker is also found not to satisfy subregulation 1.26(c) in that she fails to “state that in the competent person’s opinion, relevant domestic violence (within the meaning of paragraph (2)(b)) has been suffered by a person”. She simply concluded that “there is some evidence that [the visa applicant] suffered from domestic violence…”. Similarly, the statutory declaration of the psychologist fails to specifically state what must be included in the statutory declaration under subregulation 1.26(c) but rather states that he is “of the opinion that [the visa applicant] suffers from PTSD because of the domestic violence at the hands of [the nominator]”.41. The Tribunal finds, therefore, that the statutory declarations do not satisfy the Regulations, that the visa applicant cannot be taken pursuant to regulation 1.23 to have suffered domestic violence committed by the nominator. He, therefore, fails to satisfy subclause 801.221 (6) in respect to domestic violence and consequently fails to satisfy clause 801.221.’THE JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT

Decision

Reasons for decision

NORTH J
The reasoning of the Tribunal commenced with an assessment of the oral evidence given at the hearing. The Tribunal found the evidence of the incidents of domestic violence unconvincing. The Tribunal then dealt with the statutory declarations as follows:‘39. The evidence under subregulation 1.23(1)(g)(i) must be evidence that the alleged victim has suffered relevant domestic violence which is then defined under subregulation 1.23(2)(b) as “violence against the alleged victim or his or her property that causes the alleged victim, or a member of the alleged victim’s family, to fear for, or to be apprehensive about, the alleged victim’s personal well-being or safety”. Subclause 801.221(6) requires that the domestic violence to have been committed by the nominating spouse. The form in which the evidence is to be presented is set out in reg 1.24. The Tribunal finds that evidence presented in the statutory declaration does not provide evidence of relevant domestic violence as defined and committed by the nominator. Further, having heard the evidence of the visa applicant and his daughter of the circumstances surrounding the alleged pressing of the neck incident the Tribunal finds that the visa applicant would not now be able truthfully to make such a declaration that he has been a victim of violence in respect to that incident to the extent that it caused him or his family to fear for or to be apprehensive about his personal well-being or safety. The other evidence presented in the visa applicant’s statutory declaration rather refers to alleged acts by persons other than the nominator and so is not evidence in accordance with subregulation 1.23(1)(g)(ii).40. The lack of credibility of the evidence of the visa applicant and his daughter diminishes the reliability of the evidence upon which the opinion of the psychologist was said to be based, as well as the reliability of the evidence upon which the opinion of the social worker was based who stated that her sources of information were the report of the psychologist and the interview with the visa applicant and his daughter, Poonam. The information relied upon is also contradictory in part with the visa applicant’s own statutory declaration. The statutory declaration of the social worker is also found not to satisfy subregulation 1.26(c) in that she fails to “state that in the competent person’s opinion, relevant domestic violence (within the meaning of paragraph (2)(b)) has been suffered by a person”. She simply concluded that “there is some evidence that [the visa applicant] suffered from domestic violence…”. Similarly, the statutory declaration of the psychologist fails to specifically state what must be included in the statutory declaration under subregulation 1.26(c) but rather states that he is “of the opinion that [the visa applicant] suffers from PTSD because of the domestic violence at the hands of [the nominator]”.41. The Tribunal finds, therefore, that the statutory declarations do not satisfy the Regulations, that the visa applicant cannot be taken pursuant to regulation 1.23 to have suffered domestic violence committed by the nominator. He, therefore, fails to satisfy subclause 801.221 (6) in respect to domestic violence and consequently fails to satisfy clause 801.221.’THE JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NORTH J

Reg 1.26 dealt with the statutory declaration by competent persons as follows:‘1.26 Statutory declaration by competent personA statutory declaration under this regulation:(a)must be made by a competent person; and(b)must set out the basis of the competent person’s claim to be a competent person for the purposes of this Division; and(c)must state that, in the competent person’s opinion, relevant domestic violence (within the meaning of paragraph 1.23 (2)(b)) has been suffered by a person; and(d)must name the person who, in the opinion of the competent person, has suffered that relevant domestic violence; and(e)must name the person who, in the opinion of the competent person, committed that relevant domestic violence; and (f)must set out the evidence on which the competent person’s opinion is based.’THE TRIBUNAL DECISION In support of his claim to have suffered domestic violence, the appellant submitted a statutory declaration made by himself on 22 November 2001, a statutory declaration made by a psychologist, Edwin Kleynhans, on 25 July 2001, and a statutory declaration made on 27 November 2001 by a social worker, Helen Cleak. The appellant was represented before the Tribunal by a migration agent, Mr Young. Mr Young submitted to the Tribunal that, on receipt of the statutory declarations from the appellant and the competent persons, the Tribunal was bound to find that the appellant had suffered domestic violence. In other words, the role of the Tribunal was to assess the statutory declarations, and not to conduct an independent enquiry into the existence of domestic violence. At the hearing, the appellant, his aunt and his daughter gave evidence, including evidence about the alleged domestic violence. The reasoning of the Tribunal commenced with an assessment of the oral evidence given at the hearing. The Tribunal found the evidence of the incidents of domestic violence unconvincing. The Tribunal then dealt with the statutory declarations as follows:‘39. The evidence under subregulation 1.23(1)(g)(i) must be evidence that the alleged victim has suffered relevant domestic violence which is then defined under subregulation 1.23(2)(b) as “violence against the alleged victim or his or her property that causes the alleged victim, or a member of the alleged victim’s family, to fear for, or to be apprehensive about, the alleged victim’s personal well-being or safety”. Subclause 801.221(6) requires that the domestic violence to have been committed by the nominating spouse. The form in which the evidence is to be presented is set out in reg 1.24. The Tribunal finds that evidence presented in the statutory declaration does not provide evidence of relevant domestic violence as defined and committed by the nominator. Further, having heard the evidence of the visa applicant and his daughter of the circumstances surrounding the alleged pressing of the neck incident the Tribunal finds that the visa applicant would not now be able truthfully to make such a declaration that he has been a victim of violence in respect to that incident to the extent that it caused him or his family to fear for or to be apprehensive about his personal well-being or safety. The other evidence presented in the visa applicant’s statutory declaration rather refers to alleged acts by persons other than the nominator and so is not evidence in accordance with subregulation 1.23(1)(g)(ii).40. The lack of credibility of the evidence of the visa applicant and his daughter diminishes the reliability of the evidence upon which the opinion of the psychologist was said to be based, as well as the reliability of the evidence upon which the opinion of the social worker was based who stated that her sources of information were the report of the psychologist and the interview with the visa applicant and his daughter, Poonam. The information relied upon is also contradictory in part with the visa applicant’s own statutory declaration. The statutory declaration of the social worker is also found not to satisfy subregulation 1.26(c) in that she fails to “state that in the competent person’s opinion, relevant domestic violence (within the meaning of paragraph (2)(b)) has been suffered by a person”. She simply concluded that “there is some evidence that [the visa applicant] suffered from domestic violence…”. Similarly, the statutory declaration of the psychologist fails to specifically state what must be included in the statutory declaration under subregulation 1.26(c) but rather states that he is “of the opinion that [the visa applicant] suffers from PTSD because of the domestic violence at the hands of [the nominator]”.41. The Tribunal finds, therefore, that the statutory declarations do not satisfy the Regulations, that the visa applicant cannot be taken pursuant to regulation 1.23 to have suffered domestic violence committed by the nominator. He, therefore, fails to satisfy subclause 801.221 (6) in respect to domestic violence and consequently fails to satisfy clause 801.221.’THE JUDGMENT OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT