Du v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Du v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1115

THI LAN DU v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 571 OF 2000

MATHEWS J
2 AUGUST 2000
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 571 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

THI LAN DU
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MATHEWS J

DATE OF ORDER:

2 AUGUST 2000

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The application be dismissed.

2.   The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 571 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

THI LAN DU
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MATHEWS J

DATE:

2 AUGUST 2000

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The applicant Thi Lan Du seeks judicial review of a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) dated 10 May 2000 which affirmed a decision of the respondent's delegate refusing to grant the applicant a spouse visa. The issues involved in this case are in a relatively small compass and I shall confine my description of the background to matters which are presently relevant.

  2. The applicant is a Vietnamese national who arrived in Australia using a student visa on 29 September 1994.  On 30 June 1995 she married an Australian citizen, Wayne Fotheringham, who was described by the Tribunal in its decision as “the nominator”.  On 5 July 1995 she applied for a spouse visa.  This was refused by the Minister's delegate whose decision was upheld by MIRO.

  3. The applicant then sought review by the Tribunal. By the time the matter came for decision by the Tribunal the marriage between the applicant and Mr Fotheringham had broken down and Mr Fotheringham could not be located. 

  4. One of the criteria to be satisfied by the applicant for a spouse visa is that, at the time of decision, the applicant and the nominator remain living together in a genuine and committed relationship.  This requirement was clearly unmeetable by the applicant when the Tribunal gave its decision.

  5. An exception to this criterion is provided in the Migration Regulations 1994 (“the Regulations”) if the visa applicant has suffered domestic violence committed by the nominating spouse. In order to prove this matter, reg 1.23, as relevant here, requires the applicant to present evidence in accordance with reg 1.24 that the alleged victim (here the applicant) has suffered “relevant domestic violence” and, secondly, that the nominating husband has committed that violence. “Relevant domestic violence” is defined in reg 1.23 as:

    “violence against the alleged victim or his or her property that causes the alleged victim, or a member of the alleged victim's family, to fear for, or to be apprehensive about, the alleged victim's personal well-being or safety.”

  6. Regulation 1.24 requires, as relevant here, that the evidence of domestic violence consist of a statutory declaration…

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Details
Case
[2000] FCA 1115
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Du v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant sought to challenge a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, which was reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The central issue was whether the Tribunal had failed to observe procedures required by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in reviewing the applicant's case. Specifically, the applicant argued that the Tribunal should have notified her of defects in the documentary material supporting her application, which she claimed could have been rectified at a Tribunal hearing.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had a duty to raise concerns about the applicant's evidence and if there was any obligation to notify the applicant of defects in the documentary material. The court examined the relevant provisions of the Migration Act, particularly sections 425 and 360, and considered whether these sections imposed an obligation on the Tribunal to invite the applicant to address any issues with her evidence. The court found that the amendments to these sections did not impose such an obligation and that the applicant's case did not fall within the category of issues that could be rectified at a Tribunal hearing.

The court held that there was no requirement for the Tribunal to notify the applicant of defects in the documentary material. The court further determined that even if such a requirement existed, the flaws in the applicant's case were not rectifiable at a Tribunal hearing. Therefore, the Tribunal did not fail to observe procedures required by the Act. The court dismissed the applicant's grounds of review and rejected her application. In accordance with the court's decision, the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

ORDERS:
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MATHEWS J
As already mentioned, ss 425 and 360 have been amended since Cho. Both sections now require that the Tribunal invite the applicant to appear before it “to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review”. The addition of the highlighted words might arguably be taken as imposing upon the Tribunal an obligation to raise with applicants any concerns held by the Tribunal about their evidence in relation to the decision under review, thus giving them an opportunity to meet those concerns. But it is not necessary to reach a concluded view on this matter, as the present case does not fall within this category. The flaws in the applicant’s case here were not such as were capable of being rectified by any evidence or answers given by the applicant to the Tribunal. To put it another way, the defect in her case did not relate to a matter which was rectifiable at a Tribunal hearing. In my view no requirement can be read into s 360 that the Tribunal should notify applicants of defects in the documentary material provided in support of their application. Accordingly, there has been no failure by the Tribunal to observe procedures required by the Act. The sequence of events which took place here would, absent s 476(2), have raised a serious natural justice issue. But that is not a ground of review to this Court. The applicant's grounds of review have not been made out, with the result that the application must be dismissed. I dismiss the application. The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MATHEWS J

Full text does not contain this section.