FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Theunissen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1097
MIGRATION ‑ application for review of decision of Migration Review Tribunal ‑ Tribunal partly relied upon Cakmak v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs ‑ Cakmak overtaken by Sok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs ‑ jurisdictional error ‑ Tribunal also relied upon deficiencies in statutory declarations alleging domestic violence ‑ Div 1.5 of Part 1 & reg 100.221 of Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) ‑ whether statutory declarations comply ‑ statutory declarations do not comply ‑ no jurisdictional error affecting Tribunal’s exercise of power.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ‑ Div 1.5 of Part 1 & reg 100.221 of Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) ‑ whether unconstitutional or otherwise invalid ‑ misconceived and devoid of merit.
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Div 1.5 of Pt 1 & reg 100.221.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474.Theunissen, Terrence John [2004] MRTA 798 cited.
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 applied.
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 cited.
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 cited.
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 cited.
Cakmak v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 257 cited.
Sok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 56 cited.
Du v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1115 cited.
Meroka v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 482 distinguished.
Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1279 cited.
Theunissen v The Principal Member of the Migration Review Tribunal [2003] FCA 1417 cited.TERRENCE JOHN THEUNISSEN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
VID 332 OF 2004
TERRENCE JOHN THEUNISSEN v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA and MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
VID 819 OF 2004
SUNDBERG J
11 AUGUST 2005
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 332 OF 2004
BETWEEN:
TERRENCE JOHN THEUNISSEN
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENTMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
SUNDBERG J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 AUGUST 2005
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The Migration Review Tribunal be added as a respondent.
2. The application for review filed on 15 March 2004 be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 819 OF 2004
ON REMITTAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
TERRENCE JOHN THEUNISSEN
APPLICANTAND:
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
FIRST RESPONDENTMINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
SUNDBERG J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 AUGUST 2005
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The remitted proceeding be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondents’…
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- Case
- [2005] FCA 1097
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the application for review was correct. One aspect of this was whether the Tribunal erred by applying the law as it stood prior to the decision in Sok, which had changed the interpretation of certain provisions. However, the court noted that the decision could rest on alternative, independent grounds that were unaffected by any jurisdictional error. Specifically, the court examined whether the statutory declarations by Dr Mobilia and Mr Williams met the requirements of the proof regulations.
The court found that the statutory declarations did not sufficiently distinguish between the acts of domestic violence allegedly committed by different individuals. Furthermore, they did not refer to specific instances of domestic violence, nor did they assess Theunissen's mental state in relation to the alleged violence. Based on these deficiencies, the Tribunal's decision that the statutory declarations did not meet the proof requirements was upheld.
In light of the findings, the court dismissed the application for review and ordered that the Migration Review Tribunal be added as a respondent. Additionally, the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the application and the remitted proceeding.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Migration Review Tribunal be added as a respondent.
2. The application for review filed on 15 March 2004 be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.
1. The remitted proceeding be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: SUNDBERG J
There is a question whether the Tribunal can be said to have fallen into jurisdictional error by applying the law as it stood when it handed down its decision, though later “changed” by Sok. However, it may not need to be resolved. The respondent submits that the decision also rests upon alternative and independent bases ‑ in relation to the statutory declarations of Dr Mobilia and Mr Williams ‑ that are sufficient to sustain the decision and are, importantly, unaffected by jurisdictional error. If that is correct, any error that may have arisen from the Tribunal’s reliance upon Cakmak did not, in the words emphasised in the extract from Yusuf at [25], affect the exercise of the power conferred on the Tribunal by the Act (ie to affirm the refusal).Other bases for the decision in relation to the statutory declarations of Dr Mobilia and Mr Williams At [112] of the reasons the Tribunal determined that the statutory declaration of Dr Mobilia failed to meet the requirements of the proof regulations. At [114] of the reasons the Tribunal determined that “for the same reasons” the statutory declaration of Mr Williams failed to meet the requirements of the proof regulations. Apart from its reliance upon Cakmak, [112] of the reasons demonstrates that the Tribunal relied upon three deficiencies in the statutory declarations of Dr Mobilia and Mr Williams as bases for determining that they failed to meet the requirements of the proof regulations. First, they did not refer to specific instances of alleged domestic violence. Rather, they referred to general categories of alleged domestic violence. Second, they lacked an assessment of the applicant’s mental state. That is, whether the alleged domestic violence caused him to “fear for, or to be apprehensive about, [his] personal well‑being or safety”. Third, they failed to distinguish between domestic violence that was allegedly committed by each of Ms Weiley, Christopher Weiley and Richard Weiley. I will deal with them in reverse order.No distinguishing between named perpetrators The Tribunal’s reasoning on this point ‑ which involves an aspect of Cakmak that was not disapproved in Sok ‑ is exposed by the reasons as follows:“103.The Federal Court in Cakmak considered only briefly who might constitute the victims and the perpetrator of domestic violence:[70]We think the regulations are directed to acts of the spouse. The meaning of ‘commit’ and ‘perpetrate’ direct one to the personal acts of the spouse of the victim. This accords with the intended subject matter of the regulations: the infliction or threat of infliction of violence on a spouse or family members in a domestic context.104.This does not appear to preclude the possibility that if the spouse were to instigate a third party to commit violence on her or his behalf against the victim, such instigation would be an act of the spouse and the resulting violence or threat of violence might qualify, if the other conditions are met, as relevant domestic violence. However, if another person, whether family member of the sponsor or not, were to commit or threaten violence against the victim on his own initiative, such an act would not be an act of the spouse and therefore unlikely to qualify as relevant domestic violence. It follows that when people other than the spouse are alleged to have perpetrated domestic violence, the evidentiary regime requires, at the very least, a distinction between which person committed what acts of violence or threat of violence against the victim.”