Theunissen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Theunissen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 1097

MIGRATION ‑ application for review of decision of Migration Review Tribunal ‑ Tribunal partly relied upon Cakmak v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs ‑ Cakmak overtaken by Sok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs ‑ jurisdictional error ‑ Tribunal also relied upon deficiencies in statutory declarations alleging domestic violence ‑ Div 1.5 of Part 1 & reg 100.221 of Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) ‑ whether statutory declarations comply ‑ statutory declarations do not comply ‑ no jurisdictional error affecting Tribunal’s exercise of power.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ‑ Div 1.5 of Part 1 & reg 100.221 of Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) ‑ whether unconstitutional or otherwise invalid ‑ misconceived and devoid of merit.

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Div 1.5 of Pt 1 & reg 100.221.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 474.

Theunissen, Terrence John [2004] MRTA 798 cited.
Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476 applied.
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 cited.
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 cited.
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82 cited.
Cakmak v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 257 cited.
Sok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 56 cited.
Du v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1115 cited.
Meroka v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 482 distinguished.
Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1279 cited.
Theunissen v The Principal Member of the Migration Review Tribunal [2003] FCA 1417 cited.

TERRENCE JOHN THEUNISSEN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

VID 332 OF 2004

TERRENCE JOHN THEUNISSEN v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA and MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

VID 819 OF 2004

SUNDBERG J
11 AUGUST 2005
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 332 OF 2004

BETWEEN:

TERRENCE JOHN THEUNISSEN
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 AUGUST 2005

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.          The Migration Review Tribunal be added as a respondent.

2.          The application for review filed on 15 March 2004 be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 819 OF 2004

ON REMITTAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

TERRENCE JOHN THEUNISSEN
APPLICANT

AND:

THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
FIRST RESPONDENT

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SUNDBERG J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 AUGUST 2005

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.          The remitted proceeding be dismissed.

2.          The applicant pay the respondents’…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCA 1097
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Theunissen v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, the applicant, Theunissen, sought a permanent spouse visa under the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The central issue was whether Theunissen met the criteria for a permanent spouse visa, specifically under regulation 100.221(4), which provides an exception to the general rule in regulation 100.221(2). The primary focus was on whether Theunissen had suffered domestic violence from the sponsoring spouse and if the statutory declarations provided by Dr Mobilia and Mr Williams met the evidentiary requirements set out in Division 1.5 of the Regulations.

The court had to determine whether the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the application for review was correct. One aspect of this was whether the Tribunal erred by applying the law as it stood prior to the decision in Sok, which had changed the interpretation of certain provisions. However, the court noted that the decision could rest on alternative, independent grounds that were unaffected by any jurisdictional error. Specifically, the court examined whether the statutory declarations by Dr Mobilia and Mr Williams met the requirements of the proof regulations.

The court found that the statutory declarations did not sufficiently distinguish between the acts of domestic violence allegedly committed by different individuals. Furthermore, they did not refer to specific instances of domestic violence, nor did they assess Theunissen's mental state in relation to the alleged violence. Based on these deficiencies, the Tribunal's decision that the statutory declarations did not meet the proof requirements was upheld.

In light of the findings, the court dismissed the application for review and ordered that the Migration Review Tribunal be added as a respondent. Additionally, the applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the application and the remitted proceeding.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Migration Review Tribunal be added as a respondent.

2. The application for review filed on 15 March 2004 be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the application.

1. The remitted proceeding be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the proceeding.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

SUNDBERG J
Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) contains regulations governing the grant of visas. Of these, reg 100.221 is relevant to the instant proceedings as it prescribes the criteria that an applicant for a permanent spouse visa must satisfy in order to be granted that visa. So far as it is relevant to the instant proceedings, it is as follows:“100.22 Criteria to be satisfied at time of decision100.221(1) The applicant meets the requirements of subclause (2), (2A), (3), (4) or (4A).(2)The applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:(a)the applicant:(i)is the holder of a [temporary spouse visa]; [and]…(b)the applicant is the spouse of the sponsoring spouse; and(c)subject to subclauses (5), (6) and (7), at least 2 years have passed since the application [for a permanent spouse visa] was made.…(4) The applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:(a)the applicant first entered Australia as the holder of a [temporary spouse visa] and …:(i)continues to be the holder of that visa; [and]…(b)the applicant would meet the requirements of subclause (2) or (2A) except that the relationship between the applicant and the sponsoring spouse has ceased; and(c)after the applicant first entered Australia as the holder of the visa mentioned in paragraph (a) - either or both of the following circumstances applies:(i)either or both of the following:(A)the applicant;(B)a member of the family unit of the sponsoring spouse or of the applicant or of both of them;has suffered domestic violence committed by the sponsoring spouse[.]…(7)Nothing in paragraphs (2)(c) and (2A)(c) prevents the Minister, less than 2 years after the application is made, from:(a)refusing to grant a [permanent spouse visa]; or(b)granting a [permanent spouse visa] to an applicant who meets the requirements of subclause (3) or (4).” The instant proceedings turn upon the applicant’s attempt to avail himself of the benefit of the exception in sub‑reg 100.221(4) ‑ in so far as it relates to domestic violence - to the general rule in sub‑reg 100.221(2). Division 1.5 of Part 1 of the Regulations contains regulations governing the proof of domestic violence for the purposes of the Regulations (“the proof regulations”). So far as they are relevant to the instant proceedings, they are as follows:“1.21 Interpretation(1)In this Division:competent person means:(a) in relation to domestic violence committed against an adult:(i)a person registered as a medical practitioner under a law of a State or Territory providing for the registration of medical practitioners; or…(iii)a person who:(A)is a registered nurse within the meaning of section 3 of the Health Insurance Act 1973; and(B)is performing the duties of a registered nurse ….1.22References to person having suffered or committed domestic violence(1)A reference in these Regulations to a person having suffered domestic violence is a reference to a person being taken, under regulation 1.23, to have suffered domestic violence.(2)A reference in these Regulations to a person having committed domestic violence is a reference to a person being taken, under regulation 1.23, to have committed domestic violence.1.23When is a person taken to have suffered or committed domestic violence?(1)For the purposes of these Regulations:(a)a person (the alleged victim) is taken to have suffered domestic violence; and(b)another person (the alleged perpetrator) is taken to have committed domestic violence in relation to the alleged victim:if:…(g)if the alleged victim is a person referred to in subregulation (2) – the alleged victim or another person on the alleged victim’s behalf presents evidence in accordance with regulation 1.24 that:(i)the alleged victim has suffered relevant domestic violence; and(ii)the alleged perpetrator has committed that relevant domestic violence.(2)In paragraph (1)(g):(a)the persons referred to are the following:(i)a spouse of the alleged perpetrator;… and(b)a reference to relevant domestic violence is a reference to violence against the alleged victim or his or her property that causes the alleged victim … to fear for, or to be apprehensive about, the alleged victim’s personal well‑being or safety.1.24Evidence(1) The evidence referred to in paragraph 1.23(1)(g) is: …(b)a statutory declaration under regulation 1.25, together with 2 statutory declarations under regulation 1.26.…1.25Statutory declaration by alleged victim etc…(2)A statutory declaration under this regulation that is made by a person who alleges that he or she is the victim of relevant domestic violence (within the meaning of paragraph 1.23(2)(b)) must:(a)set out the allegation; and(b)name the person alleged to have committed the relevant domestic violence.…1.26Statutory declaration by competent personA statutory declaration under this regulation:(a)must be made by a competent person; and(b)must set out the basis of the competent person’s claim to be a competent person for the purposes of this Division; and(c)must state that, in the competent person’s opinion, relevant domestic violence (within the meaning of paragraph 1.23(2)(b)) has been suffered by a person; and(d)must name the person who, in the opinion of the competent person, has suffered that domestic violence; and(e)must name the person who, in the opinion of the competent person, has committed that relevant domestic violence; and(f)must set out the evidence on which the competent person’s opinion is based.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SUNDBERG J

There is a question whether the Tribunal can be said to have fallen into jurisdictional error by applying the law as it stood when it handed down its decision, though later “changed” by Sok. However, it may not need to be resolved. The respondent submits that the decision also rests upon alternative and independent bases ‑ in relation to the statutory declarations of Dr Mobilia and Mr Williams ‑ that are sufficient to sustain the decision and are, importantly, unaffected by jurisdictional error. If that is correct, any error that may have arisen from the Tribunal’s reliance upon Cakmak did not, in the words emphasised in the extract from Yusuf at [25], affect the exercise of the power conferred on the Tribunal by the Act (ie to affirm the refusal).Other bases for the decision in relation to the statutory declarations of Dr Mobilia and Mr Williams At [112] of the reasons the Tribunal determined that the statutory declaration of Dr Mobilia failed to meet the requirements of the proof regulations. At [114] of the reasons the Tribunal determined that “for the same reasons” the statutory declaration of Mr Williams failed to meet the requirements of the proof regulations. Apart from its reliance upon Cakmak, [112] of the reasons demonstrates that the Tribunal relied upon three deficiencies in the statutory declarations of Dr Mobilia and Mr Williams as bases for determining that they failed to meet the requirements of the proof regulations. First, they did not refer to specific instances of alleged domestic violence. Rather, they referred to general categories of alleged domestic violence. Second, they lacked an assessment of the applicant’s mental state. That is, whether the alleged domestic violence caused him to “fear for, or to be apprehensive about, [his] personal well‑being or safety”. Third, they failed to distinguish between domestic violence that was allegedly committed by each of Ms Weiley, Christopher Weiley and Richard Weiley. I will deal with them in reverse order.No distinguishing between named perpetrators The Tribunal’s reasoning on this point ‑ which involves an aspect of Cakmak that was not disapproved in Sok ‑ is exposed by the reasons as follows:“103.The Federal Court in Cakmak considered only briefly who might constitute the victims and the perpetrator of domestic violence:[70]We think the regulations are directed to acts of the spouse. The meaning of ‘commit’ and ‘perpetrate’ direct one to the personal acts of the spouse of the victim. This accords with the intended subject matter of the regulations: the infliction or threat of infliction of violence on a spouse or family members in a domestic context.104.This does not appear to preclude the possibility that if the spouse were to instigate a third party to commit violence on her or his behalf against the victim, such instigation would be an act of the spouse and the resulting violence or threat of violence might qualify, if the other conditions are met, as relevant domestic violence. However, if another person, whether family member of the sponsor or not, were to commit or threaten violence against the victim on his own initiative, such an act would not be an act of the spouse and therefore unlikely to qualify as relevant domestic violence. It follows that when people other than the spouse are alleged to have perpetrated domestic violence, the evidentiary regime requires, at the very least, a distinction between which person committed what acts of violence or threat of violence against the victim.”