Sok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Sok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 56

MIGRATION – application for spouse visa – where relationship between appellant and sponsoring spouse has ceased – where appellant claims to have suffered domestic violence –meaning of phrase ‘domestic violence’ in Migration Regulations – whether ‘violence’ as used in regulation 1.23(2)(b) of the Migration Regulations 1994 requires the application or threat of application of physical force – whether ‘violence’ can encompass psychological or emotional violence

PRECEDENTS – appellate jurisdiction of Federal Court – where previous Full Court decision on matters arising for determination are obiter – stare decisis – circumstances in which appropriate for Full Court to decline to follow previous decision of the same Court

WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘domestic violence’

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 16A
Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987 (Vic) s 4(1)(c)
Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 1959 (Qld) s 3A and s 11(1)(c)
Domestic Violence Act 1992 (NT) s 4
Domestic Violence Act 1994 (SA) s 4(2)
Family Law Act 1975 s 60D, s 114 and s 114AA
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 29, s 31, s 41, s 504
Protection Orders Act 2001 (ACT) s 9

Migration Regulations 1994 Sch 1 Item 1129, Sch 2 Item 100.221, regulations 1.21, 1.22, 1.23 and 1.24
Migration Regulations (Amendment) 1995 No 117

Macquarie Dictionary (3rd Ed)
New Oxford Dictionary of English
Oxford English Dictionary (2nd Ed)

Access Economics Pty Ltd, The Cost of Domestic Violence to the Australian Economy, Australian Government’s Office of the Status of Women, Commonwealth of Australia, 2004.

Cakmak v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 135 FCR 183 not followed
Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1981) 147 CLR 297 cited
Doan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) FCA 909 considered
Du v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1115 distinguished
Foster v Northern Territory of Australia [1999] FCA 1235 (FC) referred to
Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1279 cited
In the marriage ofKemsley J C and Kemsley W G (1984) FLC 491-567 considered
Kozel v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 658 referred to
Kumar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 201 referred to
Malik v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 98 FCR 291 cited
Meroka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 117 FCR 251 cited
NATB & Others v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 506 considered
NSW Associated Blue Metal Quarries Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1955-1956) 94 CLR 509 cited
Project Blue Sky Inc & Ors v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 cited
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Treloar (2000) 102 FCR 595 considered
Woodward v Repatriation Commission [2003] 200 ALR 332 cited

RITH SOK v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS AND…

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Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Sok v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs, the appellant, a Cambodian national, sought to remain in Australia on the basis of an exceptional circumstance relating to domestic violence. The primary issue before the court was the proper interpretation of regulation 1.23 of the Migration Regulations 1994, which pertains to evidence of domestic violence required for an application for a permanent visa. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the statutory declarations provided by the appellant met the regulatory requirements, particularly in terms of the definitions and context of "domestic violence."

The court, in allowing the appeal, found that the appellant had provided sufficient evidence to meet the regulatory requirements. The statutory declarations, including those from the appellant, a social worker, and a psychologist, were deemed to comply with the regulations. The court emphasised the need to interpret the regulations in their proper context, particularly noting the broad understanding of "domestic violence" as encompassing not only physical harm but also emotional abuse and economic deprivation. The court concluded that the appellant's evidence adequately demonstrated his victimisation and thus his eligibility for a permanent visa under the exceptional circumstance of domestic violence.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the decision of the primary judge was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Migration Review Tribunal for further consideration in accordance with the court's findings. Additionally, the Minister was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the appeal and the proceeding before the primary judge. The court's decision underscored the importance of a contextual interpretation of the regulatory provisions concerning domestic violence, ensuring that the applicant's rights were protected within the legal framework.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The decision of the primary judge be set aside.

3. The matter be remitted to the Migration Review Tribunal for further consideration according to law.

4. The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceeding before the primary judge.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Regulation 1.24 provides:‘1.24 Evidence (1) The evidence referred to in paragraph 1.23 (1) (g) is: (a)a statutory declaration under regulation 1.25 (which deals with statutory declarations by or on behalf of alleged victims) together with: (i)a statutory declaration under regulation 1.26 (which deals with statutory declarations by competent persons); and (ii)a copy of a record of an assault on the alleged victim allegedly committed by the alleged perpetrator, being a record kept by a police service of a State or Territory; or (b)a statutory declaration under regulation 1.25, together with 2 statutory declarations under regulation 1.26. (2)A person must not submit, for the purposes of an application that relies on this Division, 2 statutory declarations by competent persons who both have a qualification specified in: (a)the same subparagraph of paragraph (a) of the definition of competent person; or (b)subparagraph (b) (ii) of that definition.’ It is important also to note the terms of regulation 1.21, the interpretation provision for Division 1.5 of Part 1 of the Regulations. Regulation 1.21 defines ‘violence’ to include a threat of violence. It also defines ‘competent person’ in relation to domestic violence committed against an adult to mean, in effect, a registered medical practitioner, a registered psychologist, a registered and practising nurse, a qualified and practising social worker, a court counsellor under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) or a person holding a position of responsibility in a women’s refuge or a crisis and counselling service that specialises in domestic violence. It is now settled law that, in construing statutory provisions, a court must have regard to the context in which the relevant provision is found to ensure that the meaning of the provision is determined ‘by reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole’ (see Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (1981) 147 CLR 297 at 320 per Mason and Wilson JJ, cited in Project Blue Sky Inc & Ors v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69]). It is plain that the context in which the word ‘violence’ is used in par (2)(b) of regulation 1.23 is a context concerned with domestic violence. As Hely J has pointed out at [58]-[59] below, the expression ‘domestic violence’ has for some time in Australia been understood to encompass a wide range of behaviours only some of which involve actual or threatened physical harm (see also Malik v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 562; 98 FCR 291 at [12]‑[15]; Meroka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 482; 117 FCR 251; but to the contrary effect, see Doan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) FCA 909 at [42]). Further, it is clear that the executive branches of Australian governments use the expression ‘domestic violence’ to encompass an abuse of power within a domestic relationship such that the less powerful partner in the relationship experiences fear of psychological or physical harm. In addition to the material referred to by Hely J at [58]-[59], reference may be made to the various definitions of ‘domestic violence’contained in the Domestic Violence Interagency Guidelines (see In my view, material that illustrates the meaning attributed to the expression ‘domestic violence’ by the executive branch of the Australian government has particular significance in the circumstance of regulation 1.23. Regulation 1.23 is found in an instrument of delegated legislation made by the Governor‑General acting with the advice of the Executive Council (see s 504 of the Act and s 16A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth)).

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view the interests of justice require that the appellant in this case should not be disadvantaged in a matter potentially as significant as his right to remain lawfully in Australia by reason of an obiter conclusion of an earlier Full Court reached without relevant material being drawn to that Full Court’s attention. That is, this being the first case in which the proper construction of regulation 1.23(2)(b) has been argued before a Full Court, I consider that the appellant is entitled to have his appeal determined on the basis of the construction of the regulation that this Full Court, or a majority of its members, considers to be its proper construction.CONCLUSION I would allow the appeal, set aside the decision of the primary judge and in lieu thereof order that the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal be set aside and the matter be remitted to the Migration Review Tribunal for further consideration according to law. I would order the first respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal and of the proceeding before the primary judge. I have had the benefit of reading, in draft form, each of the judgments of Branson J and Hely J. I respectfully agree with the reasoning of Branson J. I only wish to add one observation. Regulation 1.23(1)(c) of the Migration Regulations 1994 refers to injunctions granted under s 114(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Such injunctions may be granted as a consequence of domestic violence as that term is understood in its modern day context, that is, including emotional abuse and/or economic deprivation. So much is evident from s 114AA of the Family Law Act, which in sub-section (1)(b)(ii) thereof contemplates that such an injunction may be breached by behaviour which does not cause bodily harm but which involves “harassing, molesting or stalking” of a person. I agree with Branson J that the orders which her Honour proposes are appropriate ones to be made in the circumstances. The appellant is a national of Cambodia. He married an Australian citizen, also of Cambodian origin. The marriage took place on 18 May 2001 in Cambodia. On 7 June 2001 the appellant applied for a Partner (Migrant) (Class BC) (subclass 100) visa, with his wife as sponsor. On 14 December 2001 a subclass 309 Spouse (Provisional) visa was granted to the appellant, and shortly afterwards he came to Australia. In the ordinary course, the appellant would have become eligible for the grant of a permanent visa two years after his visa application was made: Migration Regulations (1994) Schedule 2, par 100.221(2)(c) (‘the Regulations’). However, the appellant’s wife withdrew her sponsorship of the appellant’s application for a permanent visa. The relationship between the appellant and his wife broke down, and they separated. Where, as here, the relationship between the appellant and his sponsoring wife has ceased prior to the grant of a permanent visa, the appellant will only be entitled to a permanent visa in specified circumstances, which are an exception to the general proposition that the spousal relationship must subsist at the time of the grant of the visa. The only circumstance potentially applicable in the present case is if the appellant ‘has suffered domestic violence committed by the sponsoring spouse’: Sch 2, par 100.221(4)(c).Domestic violence

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

This regulatory regime was described by Wilcox J in Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1279 at [40] as a triumph of form over substance. That is because the decision-maker’s role is not to decide whether the visa applicant has in fact been the victim of domestic violence committed by the sponsoring spouse, but rather to determine whether statutory declarations in conformity with regulations 1.25 and 1.26 of the Regulations have been presented.The statutory declarations provided In the present case the appellant provided statutory declarations made by himself, by a social worker and by a psychologist, they being two of the categories of ‘competent persons’ specified in the Regulations. In the appellant’s statutory declaration he said that he was the fifth of seven children. His father and all his siblings were killed during the Pol Pot regime, he and his mother being the only survivors. He described his marriage, his honeymoon and his arrival in Australia on 28 December 2001. He continued:‘Later she got me a job to work in a strawberry farm where I was picked up at five o’clock in the morning and dropped off back at home at six or seven pm everyday. When I got home, I was asked to cook, wash dishes and clean the house. She kept all the money that I earned and after 3 months we went to buy a car. She asked me to pay three thousand in advance with the money that I brought with me from Cambodia and we financed the rest. However, the car was purchased in her name only and so I was not allowed to drive the car. If I needed to go places I had no choice but to be driven by my wife or her brother. I was not allowed to go out by myself, I had to work and stay home. She and her brother threatened me that if I defied them then they would report to the Department of Immigration, so that I would be deported. This made me feel very worried and frightened. I often wondered why she treated me this way in comparison to how she treated me before.She went out everyday and frequently to Crown Casino to gamble. When she lost money, she expressed her anger out on me by swearing and scorning my mother.I tried desperately to convince her to stop gambling but to no avail. She told me that my business was to work and apart from that it wasn’t any of my business.When my friend helped me to get a job in the pack point factory, she was so angry and agitated. She kept warning me that I broke the family principles by seeking outside help and therefore I would pay the price.She withdrew all the money in our bank account and lost it when gambling. She then demanded fifteen thousand dollars from me or else she said she would call my mother and squeeze it from her, if she did not receive the money from me in a week’s time. I did not have fifteen thousand dollars on standby for her so she rang my mother for the money. My mum explained to her that this amount of money was beyond her reach when she only makes very little profit from selling eggs.My estranged wife then told my mother that she would report to the Department of Immigration to send me back to Cambodia as a punishment. My mother was fearful and worried and as a result she ended up in hospital.I am a law-abiding citizen, I have not been doing anything that would breach the Immigration law nor the Australian family law. In fact I am the victim of domestic violence and other types of abuse through my two-year marriage.I, therefore ask that the decision maker at the Department of Immigration takes into account all of the circumstances surrounding the various forms of violence inflicted on me by my estranged wife and make a decision that will allow me to stay in Australia.I believe I meet the requirements of the domestic violence regulations.’