Al-Momani v Minister for Immigration

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AL-MOMANI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2011] FMCA 453

MIGRATION – Review of Migration Review Tribunal decision – refusal of a partner residence visa – issue of family violence referred to independent expert, who found the applicant was not a victim of family violence although the relationship was characterised by mutual violence – whether the Tribunal was bound to accept the opinion of the expert and whether the Tribunal should have found that the expert arrived at her opinion unlawfully considered – applicant invited to comment on adverse information in the report of the expert – whether the applicant’s response should have been referred to the expert for reconsideration considered.

LAW REFORM – Observations on the desirability of a definition of family violence in the Migration Regulations that is consistent with that proposed in the Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Bill 2011.

WORDS AND PHRASES – “Family violence”.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s.4
Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Bill 2011 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 29, 31, 41, 357A, 359A, 474
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Alameddine v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2010] FMCA 313
Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration (2005) 225 CLR 88
Gungor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 516
JG & BG (1994) FLC 92-515
Minister for Immigration v Seligman [1999] 85 FCR 115
N & M (2006) FLC 93-296
Sok v Minister for Immigration [2005] FCAFC 56
Applicant: ALA ALI SALEEM AL-MOMANI
First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP
Second Respondent: MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
File Number: SYG 533 of 2011
Judgment of: Driver FM
Hearing date: 15 June 2011
Date of Last Submission: 20 July 2011
Delivered at: Sydney
Delivered on: 31 August 2011

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr L Karp
Solicitors for the Applicant: Parish Patience Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondents: Ms L Clegg, with Mr H Chiu
Solicitors for the Respondents: DLA Piper Australia

ORDERS

  1. A writ of certiorari shall issue removing the record of the Tribunal decision made on 23 February 2011 into this Court for the purpose of quashing it.

  2. A writ of mandamus shall issue remitting the matter to the Migration Review Tribunal for rehearing according to law.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 533 of 2011

ALA ALI SALEEM AL-MOMANI

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & CITIZENSHIP

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction and background

  1. This is an application to review a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 23 February 2011.  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) visa. 

  2. The following statement of background facts is derived from the submissions of the parties.

  3. The applicant is a citizen of Jordan, now 31 years of age (court book “CB” 3).  On 3 June 2008 he applied to migrate to Australia as the…

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Details
Case
[2011] FMCA 453
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Al-Momani v Minister for Immigration involves the applicant, Al-Momani, challenging the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) to refuse his application for a partner residence visa. The dispute also touches on the referral of the issue of family violence to an independent expert who concluded that Al-Momani was not a victim of family violence, despite the relationship being characterised by mutual violence. The court was tasked with deciding whether the Tribunal was bound to accept the expert’s opinion, whether the Tribunal should have found the expert arrived at her opinion unlawfully, and whether the applicant’s response to the adverse information in the expert’s report should have been referred back to the expert for reconsideration.

The court examined whether the Tribunal was obligated to accept the expert’s report and whether there was a breach of procedural fairness in not forwarding the applicant’s response to the expert for reconsideration. The court highlighted that while there was a tension between the obligation to accept the expert’s report and the procedural fairness requirement, the applicant had not demonstrated any breach of procedural fairness as outlined in Division 5 of the Act. The court also considered the notion of legitimate expectation, noting that such expectations do not supplant the obligation of procedural fairness but may give practical content to it. The court found that the Tribunal did not create a legitimate expectation that the applicant’s comments would be passed to the expert for reconsideration.

In addressing the issue of family violence, the court observed the desirability of having a consistent definition of family violence across the Migration Regulations and the Family Law Legislation Amendment (Family Violence and Other Measures) Bill 2011.

The court concluded that the Tribunal did not err in its handling of the expert’s report and the applicant’s response. It found that the Tribunal was not bound to accept the expert’s report, nor was it required to refer the applicant’s response back to the expert for reconsideration.

The court ordered that the Tribunal’s decision be quashed and the matter be remitted to the Tribunal for rehearing according to law.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

A writ of certiorari shall issue removing the record of the Tribunal decision made on 23 February 2011 into this Court for the purpose of quashing it.

2.

A writ of mandamus shall issue remitting the matter to the Migration Review Tribunal for rehearing according to law.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In Gungor v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2011] FMCA 516 this Court considered this ground of review in a case involving the same IE and a report in similar terms. Raphael FM dealt with that issue in the following terms at [14]-[18]:The second part of this ground, being the failure to refer the applicant’s response to the s.359A letter back to the expert for consideration, raises interesting questions. There is obviously tension between the obligation on the Tribunal to accept an IE’s report and that articulation of the natural justice hearing rule found in s.357A and Division 5 of the Act. Mr Karp, for the applicant, suggested that the wording of the 359A letter constituted a representation which would have given the applicant a legitimate expectation that any comments which he did make would be forwarded to the IE. A similar suggestion was made to me in Alameddine v Minister for Immigration [2010] FMCA 313. In this regard I said:“[16]Although the applicant could not point to any statutory obligation to do so, the Court considered whether the expert’s statement that, upon receipt of new information the opinion could be reconsidered, combined with the Tribunal’s action in inviting comment on the opinion, could give rise to a legitimate expectation that the Tribunal would pass on the information. I considered this ground of review in SZEUI & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 2134 at [11]:“[T]here must be some doubt now as to the extent of any legitimate expectation doctrine following the views expressed by the High Court in Re Minister for Immigration; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1 and the views of Gummow J concerning estoppel in administrative law found in Minister for Immigration v Kurtovic (1990) 21 FCR 193. There is also s.422B of the Act to be taken into account which makes s.424A part of a code and an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule.”In that case it was not necessary to decide the issue since the material which the applicant alleged should have been put to him on the basis of legitimate expectation was excluded by s.424A(3)(b). [17]In Re Minister for Immigration; Ex Parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1 (“Ex Parte Lam”) (a case which was decided before s.422B was inserted into the Act) Gleeson CJ commented at [34]:“…it is clear that the content of the requirements of fairness may be affected by what is said or done during the process of decision-making, and by developments in the course of that process, including representations made as to the procedure to be followed. So, for example, if a decision-maker informs a person affected that he or she will hear further argument upon a certain point, and then delivers a decision without doing so, it may be easy to demonstrate that unfairness is involved. But what must be demonstrated is unfairness, not merely departure from a representation. Not every departure from a stated intention necessarily involves unfairness, even if it defeats an expectation. In some contexts, the existence of a legitimate expectation may enliven an obligation to extend procedural fairness. In a context such as the present, where there is already an obligation to extend procedural fairness, the creation of an expectation may bear upon the practical content of that obligation. But it does not supplant the obligation. The ultimate question remains whether there has been unfairness; not whether an expectation has been disappointed.”[18]On this basis, legitimate expectation may still be a useful way of characterising some procedural unfairness which falls outside the ambit of Division 5 or, at least, giving practical content to procedural obligations prescribed by the legislation. However, the applicant has not pointed to any failure of the Tribunal to comply with the procedural code set out in Division 5, nor has he shown any other basis for finding a breach of procedural fairness. Even if there was some other basis on which to find that the failure to pass on the information was a breach of procedural fairness, the applicant would still be required to show that he had suffered some detriment in reliance on the expectation. In Ex Parte Lam at [36] Gleeson CJ noted:“The more fundamental problem facing the applicant, however, relates to the matter of unfairness. A statement of intention, made in the course of decision-making, as to a procedural step to be taken, is said to give rise to an expectation of such a kind that the decision-maker, in fairness, must either take that step or give notice of a change in intention. Yet no attempt is made to show that the applicant held any subjective expectation in consequence of which he did, or omitted to do, anything. Nor is it shown that he lost an opportunity to put any information or argument to the decision-maker, or otherwise suffered any detriment.”In the instant case, it is not clear that the applicant suffered any detriment in relying on the expectation. He has not said what more favourable course he might have taken had it not been for his expectation that the Tribunal would pass on the information. It may also be argued from a reading of the s.424A letter [in fact s.359A letter] and the particulars outlined therein that the Tribunal was not inviting comment on the individual findings of the expert but rather the ultimate decision and whether it was properly made. In this sense the Tribunal’s actions could not be said to give rise to an expectation that submissions of the sort made would be passed onto the independent expert.”Mr Karp was unable to provide me with any authority that went directly to the point in this particular type of case. He relied heavily on what fell from the Full Court; Northrop, Miles and French JJ in Commissioner for ACT Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576:“Where the exercise of a statutory power attracts the requirement for procedural fairness, a person likely to be affected by the decision is entitled to put information and submissions to the decision maker in support of an outcome that supports his or her interests. That entitlement extends to the right to rebut or qualify by further information, and comment by way of submission, upon adverse material from other sources which is put before the decision maker. It also extends to require the decision maker to identify to the person affected any issue critical to the decision which is not apparent from its nature or the terms of the statute under which it is made. The decision maker is required to advise of any adverse conclusion which has been arrived at which would not obviously be open on the known material. Subject to these qualifications however, a decision maker is not obliged to expose his or her mental processes or provisional views to comment before making the decision in question.”An interesting opinion on the nature of legitimate expectations can be found in Canada (Attorney General) v Mavi [2011] SCC 30 where the Supreme Court of Canada (McLachlin CJ; LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Abella, Charron, Rothstain and Cromwell JJ concurred with Binnie J who provided a test for the application of the doctrine of legitimate expectations stating at [68]:“Where a government official makes representations within the scope of his or her authority to an individual about an administrative process that the government will follow, and the presentations said to give rise to the legitimate expectation are clear, unambiguous and unqualified, to the government may be held to its word, provided the representations are procedural in nature and do not conflict with the decision maker’s statutory duty.The test therefore comprises multiple components. Firstly, representations must be made by a government official within the scope of his or her authority. Secondly, the representations must be about an administrative process that the government will follow. Thirdly, the legitimate expectation to which the representation gives rise must be clear, unambiguous and unqualified. Fourthly, it must be procedural in nature and, fifthly, it must not be in conflict with the decision-maker’s statutory duty. If these conditions are met then the government may be held to its word. In such a case, Binnie J held that a failure to abide by the representations in a substantial way would be a breach of the duty of fairness.”I am of the view that the only representation that an applicant in the position of Mr Gungor could properly argue was being made to him by the Tribunal was that it, the Tribunal, would consider any representations that were made. I cannot see that the Tribunal could be held to have made a representation so clear, unambiguous and unqualified that it would provide Mr Gungor with a legitimate expectation that the comments which he made to the Tribunal would be passed to the IE for her consideration and response. I am of the view that there are only two categories of matters upon which the Tribunal would be required to act should they appear in a response to a s.359A letter. The first is the provision of what is truly new evidence and the obligation to consider it arises from the wording found in bold at the completion of the IE report:“If relevant new evidence is submitted before the application is finally determined this opinion can be reconsidered.”The second type of comment which I believe the Tribunal is obliged to take into account would be submissions that the IE’s report was not “properly made”, that is something which would affect the Tribunal’s decision to the extent of invalidating it if the complaint was justified: Minister for Immigration v Seligman [1999] 85 FCR 115; Silver v Minister for Immigration [2007] FMCA 1955; Maman v Minister for Immigration [2011] FMCA 426. I hold to the view which I expressed in Maman that if a response to a 359A letter articulates a matter which would constitute the failure to properly make the report (in that case a failure to provide the applicant with procedural fairness) then the Tribunal is under an obligation to consider the representations and either refer the matter back to the IE or explain in its own reasons why it did not do so. I also remain of the view expressed in Maman that the Tribunal is under no obligation either to refer back to the IE or to comment upon representations that do no more than seek a further merits review of the IE’s decision. This is what the instant applicant’s representations were doing. For these reasons I would not find that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in the manner suggested by Ground 2 of the grounds of the Amended Application. (emphasis added)

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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