Meroka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Meroka v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 482

MIGRATION - Application for spouse visa where marital relationship has ceased - Applicant claiming in reliance on statutory declarations of competent persons to be taken to have suffered domestic violence - Extent to which declarations conclusive of the requisite opinions - Whether Tribunal can make its own assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence described by the competent persons - Whether requisite opinion can be implied by statements in Standard Form 1040 - Whether evidence supported opinion that applicant feared for, or was apprehensive about, his safety or well-being - Whether fear for, or apprehensiveness about psychological well-being sufficient.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 65(1)

Migration Regulations1994, Regs 1.21, 1.23. 1.24. 1.26; Sch 2 cl 801.221(6).

Malik v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 98 FCR 290
Doan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 909
Du v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1115
Thi Lan Du v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1115
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Commissioner of Taxation v Emmakell Pty Ltd (1990) 22 FCR 157

SIMEON MEROKA  -v -  MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

V 733 of 2000

RYAN J
19 APRIL 2002
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 733 of 2000

BETWEEN:

SIMEON MEROKA
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 APRIL 2002

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS:

1.        THAT the decision of the Migration Review Tribunal of 30 August 2000 be set aside.

2.THAT the application for review of the decision of the delegate of the respondent Minister be remitted to the Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law.

3.THAT the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application to this Court, such costs to be taxed in default of agreement.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 733 of 2000

BETWEEN:

SIMEON MEROKA
Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE:

19 APRIL 2002

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application to review a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) made on 30 August 2000 to affirm a decision of a delegate of the respondent, the Minister For Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, refusing to grant the applicant a spouse visa or, more particularly, a General (Residence) (Class AS) Subclass 801 visa.

  2. The criteria for a spouse visa are to be found in Clause 801 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (“the Regulations”) made pursuant to the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”). Paragraph 801.221(6) of the Regulations relevantly provides as follows:-

    (6)An applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:-

    (a)the applicant is a holder of…

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 482
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Meroka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, Mr Meroka, sought a visa on the basis that he had suffered domestic violence in his relationship with his former partner, Suzane. The central issue before the court was whether the declarations provided by two "competent persons" met the statutory requirements for evidence of domestic violence under the Migration Regulations. The declarations, submitted on Form 1040, were intended to establish that Mr Meroka had experienced domestic violence as defined by the regulations. The first declaration, by Ms Sainovic, detailed instances of verbal and emotional abuse, while the second, by Ndungi Wa Mungai, a social worker, described psychological abuse and isolation experienced by Mr Meroka.

The court examined the Tribunal's decision that the declarations did not comply with Regulation 1.26, which requires a "competent person" to provide a statutory declaration stating their opinion and the evidence on which it is based. The court noted that the Tribunal had not merely assessed the sufficiency of the evidence but had made its own judgment on whether the declarations showed sufficient evidence of domestic violence. This approach was inconsistent with the legal framework, which delegates the task of determining whether relevant facts have been established to the competent persons, not the Tribunal.

The court held that the Tribunal erred in its legal approach by substituting its own opinion for that of the competent persons. This error required the matter to be remitted to the Tribunal for reconsideration. The court also ordered that the respondent, the Minister, pay the applicant's costs of the application for review. This decision underscores the importance of adhering to the statutory framework and the role of competent persons in making factual findings in such cases.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Question 7 provides the last space on Form 1040 for a declarant to express an opinion in his or her own words and is headed;“Briefly describe the evidence on which you base your professional opinion that the people named in question 1 have experienced domestic violence.”Under that heading, in parenthesis, is the injunction noted at [19] above;“(Please refer to the definition of domestic violence on the front of this form).”In the space below the heading just quoted, Ms Sainovic wrote;“In my opinion this gentleman has been verbally & emotionally abused. There has been a pattern of behaviour toward Mr Simeon Meroka whereby self development & sense of worth has been questioned also excessive or unreasonable demands that placed expectation of Mr S. Meroka beyond his capacity & constant criticizing, insulting, rejecting behaviour.” The second declaration from a “competent person” relied on by the applicant was also on a standard Form 1040 and was by Ndungi Wa Mungai, a social worker and member of the Australian Association of Social Workers. In answer to Question 3 that declarant said;“I have known Mr Meroka from the time he arrived in Australia in 1993 as a member of the Kenyan community. I have been aware of the complaints he had against Suzane but I don’t have first hand experience as she did not encourage his friends to visit. The DV issues in regard to Mr Meroka are primarily psychological. Being isolated from his community and being made to feel inadequate. This was done by denying him to visit or have his friends visit. Negative comments that Mr Meroka reported her making were calculated to hurt his feelings as a male and as a member of a racial group. My opinion is that Mr Meroka has suffered psychologically and the abuse has led to the break up of the relationship.” In answer to Question 7 Mr Wa Mungai declared;“Even before the relationship finally broke down Mr Meroka had complained of the psychological put downs. At first he assumed it was just differences in culture and it would go away as they got to know each other better. In the end it has proved to be more than a passing phase. He talked to members of his community about it and that is how I knew about it.” In relation to the declarations purportedly by two “competent persons” the Tribunal referred, in the course of its reasons, to the judgments of Wilcox J in Malik v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 98 FCR 290 and of Lindgren J in Doan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 909, and continued, at [36];“Division 1.5 of the Regulations is clear in its requirements of evidence sufficient to show that domestic violence is to be taken to have been suffered by a visa applicant such that he or she comes within paragraph 801.221(6)(c) of the regulations. In the Tribunal's view, not only must a statutory declaration provided under regulation 1.26 be completed by a competent person as defined in regulation 1.21, it must also state that, in the competent person's opinion, relevant domestic violence (within the meaning of paragraph 1.23 (2)(b)) has been suffered by a person and set out the evidence on which the competent person's opinion is based.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

RYAN J
I have been conscious, in undertaking this necessarily detailed dissection of the Tribunal’s reasons, of the injunction of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, where it was said in the joint judgment of Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ, at 272;“... ... ... a court should not be “concerned with looseness in the language ... nor with unhappy phrasing” of the reasons of an administrative decision-maker [Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287]. The Court continued [Pozzolanic (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287]: “The reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.”These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed [See McAuliffe v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 28 ALD 609 at 616]. In the present context, any court reviewing a decision upon refugee status must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision.”However, this is not a case where the Tribunal was called upon to apply a particular statutory test to facts which it was required to find. Rather, the Tribunal had to decide, as a matter of law, whether a condition had been satisfied which entrusted to the competent persons a conclusive finding of the relevant facts. An inquiry into the correctness of a decision of that kind does not turn on the language used by the decision-maker. In such a context, therefore, the Court is not bound to accord the decision under review the benevolence mandated in Wu Shan Liang. Indeed, as noted at [41] above, Counsel for the Minister conceded that, if the Court were to conclude, as I have done, that the Tribunal had essayed its own opinion of whether relevant domestic violence was disclosed by the evidence recounted in the statutory declarations, as distinct from whether such an opinion was open on that evidence, the matter must be remitted to the Tribunal.Conclusion For the reasons which I have endeavoured to explain, I have concluded that the Tribunal erred in deciding that the declarations of the competent persons did not comply with Reg 1.26 so as to achieve, through Reg 1.24, the result provided for in Reg 1.23. It might be thought that this conclusion compels the grant of a visa of the requisite class so as to make remitter to the Tribunal unnecessary; see eg Commissioner of Taxation v Emmakell Pty Ltd (1990) 22 FCR 157 at 165-166. However, the Court was not invited to take that approach and, in case there are other facts open to be found which would prevent the attainment of the satisfaction indicated in s 65(1)(a) of the Act, I shall remit the matter to the Tribunal to be heard and determined according to law. The respondent must pay the applicant’s costs of the application for review.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: RYAN J