Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Ejueyitsi

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Ejueyitsi [2007] FCAFC 89

MIGRATION – spouse visa – domestic violence exception – statutory declarations by competent persons – whether statement that, in the competent person’s opinion, relevant domestic violence has been suffered can be implicit – whether sufficient to state that presentation consistent with domestic violence

WORDS AND PHRASES – “state”

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.15A, 1.21, 1.22, 1.23, 1.24, 1.25, 1.26

Alin v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 979 approved
Cakmak v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 135 FCR 183 considered
Du v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1115 approved
Ejueyitsi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 328 considered
Ibrahim v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1279 discussed
Meroka v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 117 FCR 251 approved

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v VINCENT BABATUNDE EJUEYITSI
WAD 21 OF 2007

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v VINCENT BABATUNDE EJUEYITSI
WAD 83 OF 2007

TAMBERLIN, STONE & SIOPIS JJ
8 JUNE 2007
PERTH


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 21 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Appellant

AND:

VINCENT BABATUNDE EJUEYITSI
Respondent

JUDGES:

TAMBERLIN, STONE & SIOPIS JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JUNE 2007

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of this appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 83 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Appellant

AND:

VINCENT BABATUNDE EJUEYITSI
Respondent

JUDGES:

TAMBERLIN, STONE & SIOPIS JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 JUNE 2007

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Leave to appeal is granted.

2.The appeal is allowed in part.

3.Order 2 made on 19 April 2007 by McInnis FM in proceeding MLG 477 of 2006 be upheld.

4.Order 3 made on 19 April 2007 by McInnis FM in proceeding MLG 477 of 2006 be vacated.

5.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings in MLG 477 which were the subject of orders made by McInnis FM on 20 December 2006.

6.Order 4 made on 19 April 2007 by McInnis FM in proceeding MLG 477 of 2006 be vacated.

7.Each party to bear their own costs of the proceedings in MLG 477 which were the subject of orders made by McInnis FM on 19 April 2007.

8.There be no order as to the costs of the application for leave to appeal or of this appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 21 OF 2007

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL…
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Details
Case
[2007] FCAFC 89
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Ejueyitsi, the central issue revolved around the interpretation of regulation 1.26 of the Migration Regulations 1994 concerning statutory declarations by competent persons in domestic violence cases. The dispute originated when the Federal Magistrate, directed by Weinberg J, reviewed the Tribunal's decision regarding the domestic violence exception. The Magistrate found jurisdictional error, set aside the Tribunal's decision, and remitted the matter for reconsideration. The Minister then appealed this decision, raising two primary grounds: the interpretation of regulation 1.26 and the consideration of whether relief should be refused due to the Tribunal's error.

The court's analysis focused on whether the statutory declarations made by Dr Van Dort and Ms Fraser met the requirements of regulation 1.26. The regulation specifies that the declaration must include an opinion from a competent person regarding the alleged victim's experience of relevant domestic violence, along with the evidence supporting this opinion. The court considered past cases, such as Cakmak v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and Du v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, which emphasized the necessity for a competent person to explicitly express an opinion on whether relevant domestic violence has occurred.

Ultimately, the court determined that if either of the declarations by Dr Van Dort or Ms Fraser met the regulation's requirements, the appeal should be dismissed, and the Federal Magistrate's order would stand. If not, the court would need to decide whether the Tribunal's error warranted remittal. The appeal was allowed in part, and the respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs of the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of this appeal.

1. Leave to appeal is granted.

2. The appeal is allowed in part.

3. Order 2 made on 19 April 2007 by McInnis FM in proceeding MLG 477 of 2006 be upheld.

4. Order 3 made on 19 April 2007 by McInnis FM in proceeding MLG 477 of 2006 be vacated.

5. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the proceedings in MLG 477 which were the subject of orders made by McInnis FM on 20 December 2006.

6. Order 4 made on 19 April 2007 by McInnis FM in proceeding MLG 477 of 2006 be vacated.

7. Each party to bear their own costs of the proceedings in MLG 477 which were the subject of orders made by McInnis FM on 19 April 2007.

8. There be no order as to the costs of the application for leave to appeal or of this appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In remitting the matter to the Federal Magistrates Court Weinberg J said, at [96], that he would not do so if he were satisfied that Mr Ejueyitsi “could not conceivably bring himself within the domestic violence exception”. The submissions put to Weinberg J and his Honour’s comments on the domestic violence issue are discussed below at [27]-[28].The second decision in the Federal Magistrates Court As directed by Weinberg J, the Federal Magistrate reviewed the Tribunal’s decision in relation to the domestic violence exception. For reasons that are discussed below, the Federal Magistrate found that the decision was tainted by jurisdictional error, ordered that it be set aside and remitted the matter to the Tribunal to be determined according to law; [2006] FMCA 1900.This appeal The Minister now appeals from the Federal Magistrate’s decision. The Notice of Appeal filed on 30 January 2007 sets out two grounds of appeal:1.The learned Federal Magistrate erred in law in the construction of regulation 1.26 of the Migration Regulations 1994 in holding that a statutory declaration of a competent person under that regulation need not show whether the competent person rejects or accepts the claimed incidents of domestic violence, when, by that regulation, the statutory declaration:1.1must state that in the competent person’s opinion, relevant domestic violence has been suffered by a person; and1.2 must set out the evidence on which that opinion is based.2.As a result of the error in ground 1, the learned Federal Magistrate failed to consider whether, in the exercise of his discretion, the First Respondent should be refused relief in relation to the decision of the Tribunal, on the basis that such relief would be futile. As can be seen the appeal does not raise any issues in relation to the Tribunal’s decision about the nature of the married relationship of Mr Ejueyitsi and Ms Khan. It is concerned only with the domestic violence issue. It is therefore necessary to understand the regulatory framework of the domestic violence exception. At the relevant time the provisions relating to domestic violence were contained in Division 1.5 of the Regulations which included the following:Interpretation 1.21(1) In this Division: competent person means: (a)in relation to domestic violence committed against an adult: (i)a person registered as a medical practitioner under a law of a State or Territory providing for the registration of medical practitioners; or (ii)a person registered as a psychologist under a law of a State or Territory providing for the registration of psychologists; or(iii)a person who: (A)is a registered nurse within the meaning of section 3 of the Health Insurance Act 1973; and (B)is performing the duties of a registered nurse; or (iv)a person who: (A)is a member of the Australian Association of Social Workers or is recognised by that Association as a person who is eligible to be a member of that Association; and (B)is performing the duties of a social worker; or (v) … (vi)… statutory declaration means a statutory declaration under the Statutory Declarations Act 1959. violence includes a threat of violence. References to person having suffered or committed domestic violence 1.22 (1) A reference in these Regulations to a person having suffered domestic violence is a reference to a person being taken, under regulation 1.23, to have suffered domestic violence. (2) A reference in these Regulations to a person having committed domestic violence in relation to a person is a reference to a person being taken, under regulation 1.23, to have committed domestic violence in relation to that person. When is a person taken to have suffered or committed domestic violence? 1.23(1) For the purposes of these Regulations: (a) a person (the alleged victim) is taken to have suffered domestic violence; and(b) another person (the alleged perpetrator) is taken to have committed domestic violence in relation to the alleged victim; if: (c) … ; or… (g) if the alleged victim is a person referred to in subregulation (2) — the alleged victim or another person on the alleged victim's behalf presents evidence in accordance with regulation 1.24 that: (i)the alleged victim has suffered relevant domestic violence; and (ii)the alleged perpetrator has committed that relevant domestic violence. (2) In paragraph (1) (g): (a) the persons referred to are the following: (i) a spouse of the alleged perpetrator; …. (b) a reference to relevant domestic violence is a reference to violence against the alleged victim or his or her property that causes the alleged victim, or a member of the alleged victim's family, to fear for, or to be apprehensive about, the alleged victim's personal well-being or safety. Evidence 1.24(1)The evidence referred to in paragraph 1.23 (1) (g) is: (a) a statutory declaration under regulation 1.25 (which deals with statutory declarations by or on behalf of alleged victims) together with: (i) a statutory declaration under regulation 1.26 (which deals with statutory declarations by competent persons); and(ii)a copy of a record of an assault on the alleged victim allegedly committed by the alleged perpetrator, being a record kept by a police service of a State or Territory; or (b) a statutory declaration under regulation 1.25, together with 2 statutory declarations under regulation 1.26. (2) A person must not submit, for the purposes of an application that relies on this Division, 2 statutory declarations by competent persons who both have a qualification specified in: (a) the same subparagraph of paragraph (a) of the definition of competent person ; or (b) subparagraph (b) (ii) of that definition. Statutory declaration by alleged victim etc 1.25(1) A statutory declaration under this regulation must be made by: (a) the spouse of the alleged perpetrator; or (b) if the alleged perpetrator is in an interdependent relationship with a person — that person. (2) A statutory declaration under this regulation that is made by a person who alleges that he or she is the victim of relevant domestic violence (within the meaning of paragraph 1.23 (2) (b)) must: (a) set out the allegation; and (b) name the person alleged to have committed the relevant domestic violence. (3) A statutory declaration under this regulation that is made by a person who alleges that another person is the victim of relevant domestic violence (within the meaning of paragraph 1.23 (2) (b)) must: (a) name that other person; and (b) set out the allegation; and (c) identify the relationship of the maker of the statutory declaration to that other person; and (d) name the person alleged to have committed the relevant domestic violence; and (e) set out the evidence on which the allegation is based. Statutory declaration by competent person1.26A statutory declaration under this regulation: (a) must be made by a competent person; and (b) must set out the basis of the competent person's claim to be a competent person for the purposes of this Division; and (c) must state that, in the competent person's opinion, relevant domestic violence (within the meaning of paragraph 1.23 (2)(b)) has been suffered by a person; and (d) must name the person who, in the opinion of the competent person, has suffered that relevant domestic violence; and (e) must name the person who, in the opinion of the competent person, committed that relevant domestic violence; and (f) must set out the evidence on which the competent person's opinion is based.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It follows that if this Court were to be satisfied that either of the declarations made by Dr Van Dort or Ms Fraser meets the requirements of reg 1.26 then the appeal should be dismissed and the Federal Magistrate’s order that the matter be remitted to the Tribunal should stand. If, however, we uphold the appellant’s claim that the declarations do not comply with reg 1.26, we will need to decide if, as a matter of discretion, the Tribunal’s admitted error in relation to Mr Ejueyitsi’s marital relationship warrants the remittal. This issue is discussed in detail below.The statutory declarations The relevant meaning of the verb, “state” given in the Macquarie Concise Dictionary includes:to set forth formally in speech or writing…to set forth in proper or definite form There is nothing in this definition, and no authority of which the Court is aware, that requires competent persons, in order to conform to reg 1.26 in stating their opinion, to use the word “opinion” as distinct from expressing an “opinion”. There are, however, a number of cases in which this Court has considered what is required for a statutory declaration to comply with reg 1.26. In Cakmak v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 135 FCR 183, the Full Court referred to the requirement in reg 1.23(1)(g) that the alleged victim of domestic violence (or another person on his or her behalf) must present evidence of domestic violence in accordance with reg 1.24. The Court said that the correct question for the Tribunal to ask itself was whether the evidence called for by the regulations had been presented. If it has not, then the domestic violence is not “taken” to have occurred and the exception does not apply. The Court placed some stress on the fact that reg 1.26 is very specific in its requirement for the competent person to “state” that in his or her opinion relevant domestic violence has been suffered. In Du v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1115 at [18] Mathews J emphasised the need for an expression of opinion and observed that it was not sufficient for a competent person “simply to note the consistency between a person’s presentation and their account of domestic violence”. It was necessary for that person to “express an opinion in very specific terms … as to whether relevant domestic violence as defined in reg 1.23 has been suffered by a person”. Her Honour added that this required the competent person to assess the alleged victim’s state of mind as well as to form an opinion as to whether past acts of violence have occurred. Sundberg J agreed with Mathews J’s observations in Alin v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 979 at [13]. In that case there was a live issue (which does not arise here) as to whether the conduct of which the visa applicant complained was domestic violence, as that term is defined in the regulations. His Honour also observed that the declarations in Alin did not contain the necessary expression of opinion and distinguished the circumstances before him from those considered by Ryan J in Meroka v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2002) 117 FCR 251. In Meroka, Ryan J arguably took a more flexible approach to the requirement in reg 1.26 that the competent person state his or her opinion when he said at [34] that a statement of opinion might be conveyed by implication.