FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Pham [2008] FCA 320
MIGRATION – spouse visa – whether statutory declarations in support of a non‑judicially determined claim of domestic violence complied with Div 1.5 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – whether the Migration Review Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by failing to notify the applicant of the deficiencies in statutory declaration – whether Federal Magistrate erred in failing to consider whether to withhold relief in the exercise of discretion where impugned Tribunal decision was supportable on an independent ground
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 359A, 360(1), 425(1)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 1.15A, 1.21, 1.26, subregs 1.21(2), 1.21(2)(a), 1.21(2)(b), 1.23(1A), 1.23(1B), 1.26(a), 1.26(b)SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576
Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510
Re McBain; Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) 209 CLR 372
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82
SZEEU v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 150 FCR 214
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Ejueyitsi (2007) 159 FCR 94MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP v DIEU BAO TRAM PHAM AND MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
WAD 128 OF 2007SIOPIS J
12 MARCH 2008
PERTH
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
WAD 128 OF 2007
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
AppellantAND:
DIEU BAO TRAM PHAM
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
SIOPIS J
DATE OF ORDER:
12 MARCH 2008
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1The appeal is allowed.
2Orders (2) and (3) of the Federal Magistrate made on 31 May 2007, and his order of 19 June 2007, are set aside.
3The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
4The question of costs before the Federal Magistrates Court be reserved to the Federal Magistrates Court.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
WAD 128 OF 2007
ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
AppellantAND:
DIEU BAO TRAM PHAM
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
SIOPIS J
DATE:
12 MARCH 2008
PLACE:
PERTH
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The first respondent is a citizen of Vietnam who arrived in Australia on a temporary visa on 7 December 1997. The first respondent married an Australian citizen and applied for a spouse visa on 5 March 1998.
Initially, the first respondent’s Australian husband, Mr Lee Burton, supported the spouse visa application. In 2000, however, Mr Burton advised the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (the department) that the relationship had ended and that he no longer wished to support the first respondent’s visa application. Nevertheless, the first respondent applied for the spouse visa on the…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 320
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the court were whether the Federal Magistrate erred in concluding that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error in the manner in which it dealt with the issue of Ms de Garcia’s statutory declaration, and whether the statutory declaration complied with the Regulations. The court had to determine if the Tribunal was correct in finding that the statutory declaration did not meet the requirements of reg 1.26(a) and subreg 1.26(b) of the Regulations. Specifically, the court needed to assess whether Ms de Garcia was a “competent person” under reg 1.21 of the Regulations. This required an analysis of whether Ms de Garcia's role and responsibilities satisfied the criteria set out in subreg 1.21(2).
The court held that Ms de Garcia’s statutory declaration did not comply with the Regulations because she did not claim to hold a position with decision-making responsibility for a crisis and counselling service with a collective decision-making structure. Instead, she claimed to have decision-making responsibilities for case management within her employing agency. The court found that Ms de Garcia did not meet the definition of a “competent person” as required by the Regulations, and therefore, her statutory declaration was insufficient to support Ms Pham’s claim for a visa based on non-judicially determined domestic violence.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the Federal Magistrate were set aside. The first respondent was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, and the question of costs before the Federal Magistrates Court was reserved to that court.
Orders
Orders of the court
1 The appeal is allowed.
2 Orders (2) and (3) of the Federal Magistrate made on 31 May 2007, and his order of 19 June 2007, are set aside.
3 The first respondent pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal.
4 The question of costs before the Federal Magistrates Court be reserved to the Federal Magistrates Court.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially came before the Federal Magistrates Court, where Ms Pham's claim for a protection visa was dismissed. Ms Pham appealed this decision to the Full Court of the Federal Court. The appeal was heard and determined by the Full Court, which allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of the Federal Magistrate, and directed that the first respondent pay the appellant's costs of the appeal. The question of costs before the Federal Magistrates Court was reserved to that Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did Ms de Garcia’s statutory declaration comply with the Regulations?
2. Whether the Federal Magistrate erred in concluding that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error in the manner in which it dealt with the issue of Ms de Garcia’s statutory declaration.
Held
1. Ms de Garcia’s statutory declaration did not comply with the Regulations. Consequently, the first respondent's claim based on non-judicially determined domestic violence failed.
2. The Federal Magistrate did not err in concluding that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error in the manner in which it dealt with the issue of Ms de Garcia’s statutory declaration.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: SIOPIS J
There are three main issues in the appeal.Did Ms de Garcia’s statutory declaration comply with the Regulations? The first question is whether the Federal Magistrate erred in concluding that the Tribunal did not fall into jurisdictional error in the manner in which it dealt with the issue of Ms de Garcia’s statutory declaration. This is ground one of the first respondent’s notice of contention. In order for the first respondent to succeed on her claim based on non‑judicially determined domestic violence, it was necessary for her to provide evidence of the domestic violence in a form which complied with reg 1.26 of the Regulations. Subregulation 1.26(a) and subreg 1.26(b) are particularly relevant in the context of this case. Subregulation 1.26(a) requires that the statutory declaration must be made by a “competent person”. Subregulation 1.26(b) provides that the statutory declaration “must set out the basis of the competent person’s claim to be a competent person for the purposes of [Division 1.5]”. The term “competent person” is defined in reg 1.21. It includes medical practitioners and also, relevantly for the purposes of this case, “a person holding a position of the kind described in subregulation (2)”. Subregulation 1.21(2) of the Regulations provides as follows:The positions referred to in subparagraph (a)(vi) of the definition of competent person in subregulation (1) are:(a)manager or coordinator of:(i)a women’s refuge; or(ii)a crisis and counselling service that specialises in domestic violence; or(b)a position with:(i)decision‑making responsibility for:(A) a women’s refuge; or(B) a crisis and counselling service that specialises in domestic violence;that has a collective decision‑making structure; and(ii)responsibility for matters concerning domestic violence within the operations of that refuge or crisis and counselling service. The Tribunal found that the statutory declaration made by Ms de Garcia did not comply with subreg 1.26(a) because the information in the statutory declaration did not show that Ms de Garcia was a competent person within the meaning of subreg 1.21(2). Ms de Garcia completed a statutory declaration in the prescribed Form 1040. She said that her relationship to the first respondent was “welfare worker”. She recorded that the occupational group to which she belonged was “Domestic Violence Specialist Service”. In answer to the question on the prescribed form: “What is the basis of your claim to be a ‘competent person’?”, Ms de Garcia wrote: “I have 13 years experience working with victims of domestic violence. I have decision‑making responsibilities on case management.” In the space on the prescribed form provided for “Occupation”, Ms de Garcia wrote: “Ethnic Resource Supervisor – Women’s Refuges Multicultural Service”. The Tribunal said that Ms de Garcia did not claim to be the manager or coordinator of a crisis and counselling service that specialises in domestic violence. Further, said the Tribunal, Ms de Garcia did not claim to be the holder of a position with decision‑making responsibility for a prescribed crisis and counselling service that has a collective decision‑making structure. Ms de Garcia claimed “solely to have decision‑making responsibilities for case management within her employing agency” (Original emphasis). She did not claim that the agency had a collective decision‑making structure and that she occupied a position which carried decision‑making responsibility within such an agency. Accordingly, Ms de Garcia’s statutory declaration did not comply with the Regulations and, therefore, the first respondent’s claim based on non‑judicially determined domestic violence failed.