SZTAN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZTAN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 705

Appeal from: SZTAN v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No.2) [2015] FCCA 3442
File number: NSD 167 of 2016
Judge: BROMWICH J
Date of judgment: 24 June 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – scope of obligation under s 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 425(1)
Cases cited:

Cabell v Markham 148 F.2d 737 (1945)

Fox v Percy [2003] HCA 22; (2003) 214 CLR 118

Kumar v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 201

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611

Re Coldham; Ex parte Municipal Officers Association of Australia [1989] HCA 13; (1989) 84 ALR 208

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam [2003] HCA 6; (2003) 214 CLR 1

Re Ruddock; Ex parte Applicant S154/2002 [2003] HCA 60; (2003) 201 ALR 437

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZRMQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 142; (2013) 219 FCR 212

Warren v Coombes (1949) 142 CLR 531

Wati v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1997] FCA 1052; (1997) 78 FCR 543

Date of hearing: 16 May 2016
Date of last submissions: 31 May 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 93
Counsel for the Appellant: Ms R Francois with Ms A Rao
Solicitor for the Appellant: SBA Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper Australia
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 167 of 2016
BETWEEN:

SZTAN

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

BROMWICH J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 JUNE 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as taxed or agreed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

BROMWICH J

  1. This is an appeal from orders made by a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia by which an application to review a decision of the former Refugee Review Tribunal, now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, was dismissed.  The Tribunal affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister not to grant the appellant a protection visa. 

    Before the delegate

  2. The appellant is a 27 year old male citizen of Bangladesh.  On 16 November 2011,…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 705
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of SZTAN v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved the appellant, SZTAN, challenging a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The dispute centred on the scope of the obligations under section 425(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the tribunal's handling of the appellant's claims and evidence during the review process. The matter was heard by the Federal Court of Australia, where the appellant sought to overturn the primary decision through an appeal.

The legal issues in the case included whether the appellant had been misled into believing that certain issues were no longer relevant, thus depriving him of the opportunity to address them. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the tribunal's treatment of the appellant's evidence and claims demonstrated legal unreasonableness. The appellant argued that the tribunal's handling of the so-called Coincidence Issue and other evidence constituted an internal contradiction that was arbitrary, capricious, or lacking in common sense.

The court found that the appellant had not been misled regarding the relevance of the Coincidence Issue, and thus, there was no breach of the obligations under section 425(1). The court also determined that the tribunal's reasoning, while perhaps not perfect, was not so flawed as to be considered arbitrary, capricious, or without common sense. Consequently, the court held that the primary judge did not err in failing to find the tribunal's actions legally unreasonable. As all grounds of appeal were unsuccessful, the appeal was dismissed.

The court's final orders were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs, as taxed or agreed, in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs as taxed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

That evidence from the appellant does not suggest that he thought that the Coincidence Issue was no longer an issue arising on the review. On a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons, the Coincidence Issue was not of itself decisive, but rather formed a part of a matrix of evidence by which the appellant’s claim of having a relevantly higher profile was not believed. In that sense, the Coincidence Issue was arguably not of itself all that important. The third appeal issue – erroneous rejection of the appellant’s unchallenged evidence as to reliance (ground 5) As indicated above, it was common ground between the parties that, if I did not accept that the appellant had been misled, then I did not need to address the primary judge’s rejection of the appellant’s evidence, which was not the subject of cross-examination. In that regard it is important to note that the primary judge himself did not consider he needed to take that step, but did so as a matter of completeness. It was common ground that cross-examination of the appellant before the primary judge was not required in order for his evidence to be rejected in whole or in part. Given the joint view of the parties, I do not need to deal with the third appeal issue. However, there are some aspects of it which would have been troubling if there had in fact been a misrepresentation to the effect that the Coincidence Issue was not an issue arising in relation to the decision under review. In my view it was open to the primary judge to conclude that the evidence of the appellant was improbable, even without cross-examination, such that there was no proper basis to find error in that regard. It was also reasonable, if not essential, to refer to the context of the first Tribunal hearing day, so that it could be seen that the Coincidence Issue had been squarely raised, and then, having been raised again at the end of the second day, had not gone away. However, as the Minister conceded, it was not necessary or appropriate, at least in this case, for the primary judge to attempt to predict whether or not the Tribunal would have acceded to any request to adduce evidence from the other monk (assuming that could have been made relevant). Nor was it necessary, if the misrepresentation was otherwise made out, for the appellant to articulate with precision, if at all, what his actual evidence might have been to the Tribunal: see SZRMQ at 215-6 [10]. It would have been sufficient to establish a breach of s 425(1) in this case if the appellant had been misled into thinking that an issue no longer arose in relation to the decision under review, depriving him of the opportunity to address that issue, even if the content of that lost opportunity was not spelt out. The fourth appeal issue – legal unreasonableness (ground 6) The appellant’s counsel faintly advanced an argument that the Tribunal’s treatment of the Coincidence Issue, and what was said to be the contradictory indications within its reasons about the relevance of what occurred at the Chinese Embassy in Dhaka and the circumstances of the appellant’s travel to Australia via China, demonstrated an internal contradiction that did not have any logical or rational explanation. This was said to be “arbitrary”, “capricious” and/or without “common sense”, relying upon Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 445-6 [44] and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1, citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at 350-1 [27]-[28], 365-6 [72]; and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 644-648 [121]-[131].

Decision

Reasons for decision

As the parties seemed largely to agree, if the misrepresentation point did not succeed, there was little content left for a legal unreasonableness point. In my view that is the correct conclusion to reach in this case and this ground should not succeed. For completeness, I am of the view that the Tribunal’s treatment of the Coincidence Issue was no more than credibility reasoning of a kind that was open to it. I do not consider it comes close to being arbitrary, capricious or without common sense. Accordingly, the primary judge did not err in failing to make such a finding. Conclusion As each of the operative grounds of appeal have failed, the appeal must be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established