DPB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DPB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 121

Appeal from: DPB16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2018] FCCA 2455
File number: NSD 1641 of 2018
Judge: ROBERTSON J
Date of judgment: 13 February 2019
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited: Iyer v Minister for Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs [2000] FCA 1788
Date of hearing: 13 February 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 44
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the aid of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms B Rayment of Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted to any order of the Court, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1641 of 2018
BETWEEN:

DPB16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

ROBERTSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

13 FEBRUARY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs in the agreed amount of $3,000.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ROBERTSON J:

Introduction

  1. The appellant is a citizen of Nepal who arrived in Australia on a business visitor visa on 11 August 2014.  On 10 September 2014, he lodged an application for a protection visa.

  2. On 23 April 2015, the delegate refused the grant of a protection visa.

  3. On 13 May 2015, the appellant applied to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision and, on 13 October 2016, appeared before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments.

  4. In summary, the appellant’s claims were that he was a successful businessman in Nepal.  As such, he received threats and demands for donations from gangsters associated with political parties, including daily phone threats that he would be abducted and killed.  He was at risk of being tortured and killed.  The situation ruined his business.  The Nepalese State would not protect him because it was weaker than the gangsters.  The appellant also claimed that his factory was broken into and his records stolen; he continued to receive threats from gangsters through his wife and father and his family’s life was at risk.

    The Tribunal

  5. On 27 October 2016, the Tribunal affirmed the decision to refuse the grant of the protection visa.

  6. The Tribunal, at [24], did not consider the appellant to be a truthful witness in relation to the extent of the donation requests and threats to the appellant and his family by gangsters, and his claim that his business was ruined as a result.

  7. The Tribunal considered, at [22]-[34], that the claims indicating that donation requests and threats ruined his established business was inconsistent with his oral evidence that his business was operating and thriving.

  8. The appellant’s claim that there was a real chance of serious or significant harm from gangsters as…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 121
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of DPB16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an appeal against a decision by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection regarding the appellant's visa application. The appellant, DPB16, is seeking to challenge the Minister's decision to cancel his visa on the grounds that he poses a risk to Australia's national security. The case was heard in the High Court of Australia, which dismissed the special leave application in May 2019.

The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had erred in its decision-making process, particularly in relation to the appellant's potential risk to national security. The court was also required to determine whether the Minister's decision to cancel the appellant's visa was lawful and whether the appellant had a right to enter and reside in India, as found by the Tribunal. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the proposed new grounds for appeal had merit.

In dismissing the appeal, the court found that there was no basis for the appellant's contention that the Tribunal was biased or that it failed to consider relevant evidence. The court also rejected the appellant's ground that the Tribunal made a procedural error. Furthermore, the court found that the proposed new grounds for appeal did not have merit, and therefore, it refused leave to the appellant to rely on them. The court concluded that the Tribunal's alternative basis for decision was not challenged in the Federal Circuit Court, and the Minister's submission regarding this alternative was accepted by the primary judge.

In summary, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the first respondent's costs in the agreed amount of $3,000. The court's decision was based on its finding that the Tribunal's decision was lawful and that the proposed new grounds for appeal did not have merit. The case highlights the importance of properly challenging a decision in the appropriate court and the need for parties to provide sufficient evidence to support their claims.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs in the agreed amount of $3,000.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There also remains the Tribunal’s alternative basis for decision at [73]-[89], described at [15] above, based on the Tribunal’s finding that the appellant had a right to enter and reside in India and its lack of satisfaction that the appellant had taken all possible steps to avail himself of the right to enter and reside in India, or that gangsters would have the resources or ability to track him and his family down in India to harm them. The Tribunal was therefore not satisfied that the appellant faced a real chance of serious or significant harm in India. This alternative as found by the Tribunal was not challenged in the Federal Circuit Court, although I note the Minister’s submission in this respect was accepted by the primary judge at [70]-[71]. This alternative was not challenged in the appeal to this Court.Conclusion and orders The appeal should be dismissed, with costs. The parties are agreed that the appropriate costs order is in the amount of $3,000.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to the proposed new ground that “[t]he Tribunal failed to advise whether there is any section 438 Certificate in the file and the applicant is not aware of that, if there is any”, being the ground numbered Ground 3 in paragraph [2] of the grounds of appeal to this Court, the Minister submitted that no such certificate was issued in relation to the appellant. The Minister submitted that this ground did not have any prospect of success.Consideration I reject the appellant’s ground that, in effect, the primary judge erred in not concluding that the Tribunal was biased. In my opinion no basis has been shown for that contention and no error has been shown in the rejection by the primary judge of that ground at [54]-[56]. I reject the appellant’s ground that, in effect, the primary judge erred in not concluding that the Tribunal failed to take into consideration relevant evidence and refused to give weight to evidence provided by the appellant. Again, no basis has been shown for that contention and no error has been shown in the rejection by the primary judge of that ground at [57] by reference to the consideration by the primary judge at [45]-[47] of the documents and the evidence that the Tribunal did consider. I reject the appellant’s ground that the Tribunal made a procedural error. In my opinion no error on the part of the primary judge has been made out in respect of her Honour’s conclusions at [58] and following that the ground appeared to be misconceived as the Tribunal had not rejected any of the appellant’s evidence on the basis that it was not provided in the proper way or not in accordance with some sort of procedure. As to the remaining grounds, I do not regard it as being in the interests of justice to grant leave to the appellant to raise grounds of judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in this Court which were not put to the primary judge. In this respect I refer to the decision of the Full Court in Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1788; 192 ALR 71 at [23]-[25]. The fact that the appellant appeared in person before the primary judge is not of itself a sufficient reason. No explanation has been given for the failure to raise those grounds before the primary judge. Another important consideration is that this Court’s jurisdiction is to hear an appeal. In the circumstances, the most important consideration is whether or not the proposed new grounds have merit. In my opinion they do not. For the reasons articulated in the Minister’s submissions on these grounds I refuse leave to the appellant to rely on his proposed new grounds: see [34]-[37] above. For completeness, I add in relation to proposed Ground 3 regarding certificates issued under s 438 that, since there is no evidence that such a certificate was issued, I did not consider it necessary for the Minister, at the hearing of this appeal, to read and rely on the affidavit of Ms Mia Donald, affirmed on 22 October 2018, in order to prove the absence of such a certificate.