FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
2
BVB18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC2G 71
ORDERS
MLG 939 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BVB18
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE FORBES
DATE OF ORDER:
7 FEBRUARY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant’s application for judicial review filed on 11 April 2018 be dismissed.
2.The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs which, in default of agreement, shall be in accordance with the scale prescribed in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 as at 6 March 2023.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may…
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- Case
- [2024] FedCFamC2G 71
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the IAA's findings to determine if they were irrational or inconsistent. The applicant argued that the IAA's findings were contradictory in stating he was not being pursued but was being looked for by unidentified persons. The court found that the IAA's reasoning, though not perfectly clear, was logically connected to the evidence. The court distinguished between being "subsequently pursued" and being "looked for," concluding that the IAA's findings were rational and reconcilable. The applicant's submission that the IAA failed to exercise its discretion was also rejected, as the court found that the IAA's findings were reasonably open on the evidence. The court emphasized that true irrationality must be demonstrated, not mere disagreement with the decision. The applicant failed to show that the IAA's findings were not rationally open, and the application for judicial review was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
True irrationality must be shown. It is not sufficient that the court disagrees with the basis of the fact finding or associated reasoning, or even strongly or emphatically disagrees. It must be shown that the findings were not rationally open to be made[20].[20] Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 73 ALD 1 at [9] per Gleeson CJ and at [34]-[37] per McHugh and Gummow JJ; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALD 224 at [35]-[38] per Gummow and Hayne JJ; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [119] and [135] per Crennan and Bell JJConsideration I do not accept the applicant’s submission that the propositions in [22] and [23] of the Authority’s reasons are opposites. When the reasons are read fairly and as a whole, it seems to me that the Authority is dealing with two separate scenarios and that the conclusions reached in relation to each were reasonably open to it on the evidence. It may well be that the pathway of reasoning is not as clear as it could be, but the conclusions were reasonably open to the Authority and there is, in my view, a logical connection between the evidence received and the conclusions reached. I agree with the thrust of the Minister’s submission that the applicant conflates rather than distinguishes the concepts of being “pursued” on the one hand and “looked for” on the other. The finding at [22] that the applicant was not being “subsequently pursued” is clearly referrable to the taxi incident described at [18]-[20] and the applicant’s subjective fear of retribution arising from the applicant’s report of the passengers to the police and their imprisonment. Those claimed fears are framed by the applicant’s belief that the passengers were members of the Taliban and the Authority’s finding that they were more likely insurgents or members of an armed group. The discussion at [22] should be read as referrable to the applicant’s fear that he will be pursued by persons seeking reprisal and wanting to do him harm. Further support for this reading can be found at [67] of the reasons where the Authority found (in relation to complementary protection) that it did not accept that the applicant “was pursued by any individual or groups in retaliation for the report he made to the police in 2012”. The reasons at [23] appear to accept that some people had been looking for the applicant. However, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that those “people” were Taliban, insurgents or an armed group intending to do him harm. The Authority accepted that the applicant was suspicious about strangers and in his heightened sense of fear believed they might present a threat to him. However, the Authority found no evidence that anyone who had asked after him in Jaghori or Mazar-e-Sharif intended to do him harm. Counsel for the Minister submitted, and I accept, that being “subsequently pursued” carries a different connotation to being “looked for” by unidentified persons. In my view, the evidence permits these two rational and reconcilable findings. The applicant has failed to demonstrate jurisdictional error and ground one should be dismissed.Ground two