Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1

Citation: Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1
Parties: TIMOTHY VISSCHER v TEEKAY SHIPPING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD
File number: NSD 308 of 2007
Judge: KATZMANN J
Date of judgment: 4 January 2011
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – motion for summary judgment – circumstances when power to give summary judgment under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) may be exercised – whether applicant has no reasonable prospect of success in proceedings under s 78 of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) – whether reasonable dispute as to liability for wages within meaning of s 78 of the Navigation Act
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 20 r 5
Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) ss 6, 75, 76, 78
Cases cited: Dey v Victorian Railway Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125
Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd [2008] FCAFC 60, 167 FCR 372
Kowalski v MMAL Staff Superannuation Fund Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 117, 178 FCR 401
Spencer v Commonwealth [2009] FCAFC 38
Spencer v Commonwealth [2010] HCA 28
Visscher v The Honourable President Justice Giudice [2009] HCA 34, 239 CLR 361
Date of hearing: 30 August - 1 September 2010
Date of last submissions: 2 September 2010
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 75
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr G Hatcher SC with Mr B Cross
Solicitor for the Respondent: Norton Rose Australia

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 308 of 2007

BETWEEN:

TIMOTHY VISSCHER
Applicant

AND:

TEEKAY SHIPPING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD
ACN 079 641 580
Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 JANUARY 2011

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules 1979.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 308 of 2007

BETWEEN:

TIMOTHY VISSCHER
Applicant

AND:

TEEKAY SHIPPING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD
ACN 079 641 580
Respondent

JUDGE:

KATZMANN J

DATE:

4 JANUARY 2011

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. The respondent is a shipping company which owns and operates a fleet of ships mainly used to transport oil for oil companies, refiners and traders.  The applicant is a merchant seaman.  Between 2001 and 2004 he was employed by the respondent on two ships, the Samar Spirit and the Broadwater, both of which at the relevant time were chartered or leased to Caltex.  In a statement of claim filed on 2 March 2007 and amended twice since,…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 1
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd involved a motion for summary judgment brought by the respondent against the applicant, a seaman, after both parties had filed their evidence and just before the hearing of the proceeding was due to commence. The applicant claimed that he was entitled to unpaid wages under section 78 of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) as his employment with the respondent had been terminated and he had not been paid his wages at the time of his discharge from the ship. The respondent argued that there was a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages, which under the Act meant that the wages did not need to be paid.

The court was required to decide whether the applicant had no reasonable prospect of success in the proceedings under section 78 of the Navigation Act. This hinged on whether there was a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages, which would negate the obligation to pay them under the Act. The court also had to consider whether the respondent had shown that there was no reasonable prospect the applicant would succeed in the proceedings, based on the applicant's own evidence.

The court concluded that the evidence provided by the applicant demonstrated that there was indeed a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages. This was because the respondent had rescinded the applicant's promotion to Chief Officer based on a recommendation from the Australian Industrial Relations Commission and had treated the applicant as a Second Mate since 2002. The court found that the respondent reasonably believed that the employment relationship had not been terminated, and therefore, it was not liable to pay the wages claimed by the applicant. The court held that the respondent's defence was likely to prevail, and there was no reasonable prospect that the applicant would succeed in the proceedings. Consequently, the application for summary judgment was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

This proceeding is a motion for summary judgment. Unusually, it was brought after both parties had filed their evidence and within days of the date upon which the hearing of the proceeding was due to start. Legislative background The magnitude of the claim may be explained by the terms of s 78 of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) upon which it is founded. Section 78 provides:78 Wages to run on in certain casesIf a seaman’s wages are not paid in accordance with section 75 before or at the time the seaman is given his or her discharge from a ship, the seaman’s wages shall continue to run until the time of the final settlement of his or her wages (and shall be payable at double rates for any period after the time the seaman is given his or her discharge from the ship) unless the delay is due to the seaman’s act or default, to a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages or to any other cause not attributable to the wrongful act or default of the owner or master of the ship. Section 75(1) requires that before or at the time of discharge a seaman be paid all wages that are due less any deductions specified in the account of wages, which s 76(1) obliges the master to deliver to him or her. In the case of breach the section imposes on both the owner and the master of the ship a penalty of a $1,000 fine. The failure to deliver an account is also an offence punishable by a $1,000 fine. Section 75(3) creates defences to a prosecution under subsection (1) in similar, but not identical terms, to the circumstances in s 78 under which the liability to pay unpaid wages at double rates is avoided. “Discharge” is defined in s 6 of the Navigation Act to mean “the certificate of discharge given to a seaman upon his or her discharge from a ship”. The Act does not define “wages” except to say that it includes “emoluments”. The claim in the principal proceeding The applicant’s claim relates to a time when he sailed on or “belonged to” the Broadwater. It covers two periods: from 13 January 2004 until 3 March 2004 (“the first voyage”) and from 8 April 2004 until 26 May 2004 (“the second voyage”). With respect to the first voyage, the applicant alleges that at all material times he was employed as Chief Mate, Grade 1 (a rank also known as Chief Officer) but that in January 2004, before joining the ship, the respondent “evinced an intention no longer to be bound by the C/O [Chief Officer] contract of service thus repudiating it by anticipatory breach”. The repudiatory conduct is said to consist of informing him that after the first voyage on the Broadwater he would be required to sail as Second Mate. He further alleges that in February 2004 he accepted the repudiation, thus terminating the contract. Although his claim is not pleaded in precisely this way, the applicant submitted that, upon his discharge from the Broadwater on 3 March 2004, his contract of employment was terminated, his employment relationship with the respondent came to an end, and, he alleged, the respondent was then bound to pay him “wages” within the meaning of the Navigation Act, including paying out his accrued leave entitlements.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant submitted that there were issues of fact to be determined requiring evidence and findings as to those facts and how they relate to the law and that the motion should therefore be dismissed. But the respondent is content to have the motion determined on the basis that there is no issue of fact, that is, on the basis of the applicant’s evidence, unchallenged. For the motion to be upheld the respondent must show that there is no reasonable prospect the applicant will succeed because the only conclusion reasonably open on his own evidence is that the respondent’s defence will prevail.Evidence as to entitlements There is no reference in the Navigation Act to payment for accrued leave or a casual loading. But the motion was fought on the assumption in the applicant’s favour that “wages” in s 78 extends to the payment of such benefits. Beginning with the entitlement to payment for accrued leave, the respondent pointed out that the Navigation Act is not the source of any such entitlement and neither is the 2001 Certified Agreement. Nor is it to be found in the applicant’s contract of employment as a permanent employee entered into in March 2001 (“the contract of employment”). The offer of permanent employment, which the applicant accepted on 30 March 2001, provided that the terms and conditions of his employment were contained in the Teekay Australia/AMOU (Deck Officers) Agreement 1998 and the Maritime Industry Seagoing Award 1998 as varied. It is common ground that this certified agreement was replaced by the 2001 Certified Agreement which came into force on 5 May 2002 and was in force at the relevant time. Part 5 of the 2001 Certified Agreement deals with leave and clause 26 with “accrued leave”. Nothing in clause 26 creates a right to payment of money for accrued leave on discharge from a ship. Indeed, the opening words of clause 26.1 are that the “swing arrangements” (where officers “swing” on and off a ship on a six week cycle) are designed to provide the officer with a “regular duty and leave cycle”. Subclauses 26.2 and 26.3, which are concerned with leave balances, also do not contemplate a right to payment where an officer has unused leave at the time of discharge. Clause 28 is entitled “leave accrual” but is silent as to payment of monies. Clause 13 relates to salaries but makes no provision for payment of accrued leave. Unlike long service leave (see clause 29.3), there is no provision in the 2001 Certified Agreement for accrued leave to be paid out when an officer leaves the respondent’s employment. As the respondent submitted, the 2001 Certified Agreement envisages that there will be periods of leave, and that leave will accrue, but that the roster will be arranged in such a way that the leave is taken when the officer swings off the ship. It does not deal with the situation where there is unused leave at the time an officer leaves the respondent’s employment. I am therefore satisfied that on no reasonable interpretation of the 2001 Certified Agreement can it be said that there is a provision in it for an officer to become entitled to payment for accrued leave.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondent submitted that the facts pleaded by the applicant disclosed the reasonableness of the dispute. Those facts were not clearly identified in argument and I am unable to discern them from the statement of claim. But the evidence certainly does. The correspondence the applicant tendered shows that he was originally appointed as Third Mate and was promoted to Chief Officer in August 2001 but that, by letter dated 20 September 2001, the respondent rescinded (or purported to rescind) the promotion on the recommendation of the AIRC made on 11 September 2001. It also shows that the respondent promoted (or purported to promote) him to Second Mate on 5 July 2002, an appointment backdated to 1 July 2002, and there is no evidence of any further promotion, although he acted in the higher position of Chief Officer, presumably paid as such by the supplementing of his ordinary wage by a higher duties allowance as all the wages slips the applicant tendered for periods after 2001 seem to indicate and, according to the High Court judgment in Visscher, as the evidence tendered before the Commissioner also showed. It appears too, from the High Court judgment that, after the applicant was offered the permanent position of Second Mate in 2002, he rejected the offer as unnecessary (because he was already employed as Chief Officer). Nevertheless, the evidence establishes that the respondent treated him continuously as a Second Mate who was carrying out the duties of a Chief Officer. So when Mr Parmeter wrote to him on 5 April 2004 he was asserting the position (as far as the respondent understood it, at least) that had obtained since 2002. The High Court accepted in Visscher (at [81]) that the respondent repudiated the contract of employment by notifying the applicant in 2001 that his promotion was rescinded but held that his contract remained on foot until the applicant accepted the repudiation, a question yet to be determined in the AIRC. In all the circumstances, whatever the rights or wrongs of the dispute about termination by constructive dismissal in February-March 2004, on the material available thus far, it could not sensibly be suggested that the dispute was not reasonable. The applicant’s assertion that he had been “wrongfully demoted without good reason or explanation” in his fax to Mr Parmeter of 5 April 2004 is no answer. The evidence shows that the respondent rescinded the promotion because of a recommendation from the AIRC, and not peremptorily, and that its justification for reserving the right to require him to sail in the lower position of Second Mate, was that it considered that to be his permanent position. The respondent’s position (as Mr Parmenter put it in his letter of the same date) was that there had been no interruption in the employment. As the respondent was reasonably of the view that the employment was continuing, one would not reasonably expect it to accede to a demand for “wages” that the applicant claims were payable on termination or to pay a loading that was due only if the employment had been terminated and a new, casual contract entered into. I am satisfied that there was a reasonable dispute as to liability for “wages” payable on termination because there was a reasonable dispute as to whether the applicant had been terminated in the first place.Conclusion

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.