Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 137

Citation: Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 137
Appeal from: Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1
Parties: TIMOTHY VISSCHER v TEEKAY SHIPPING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD
File number: NSD 12 of 2011
Judges: GREENWOOD, RARES AND FOSTER JJ
Date of judgment: 4 November 2011
Catchwords:

ADMIRALTY – seafarer’s wages – relevant principles – obligation of shipowner to pay seafarer’s wages before or at the time of discharge under s 75 of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) – whether shipowner had defence based on a reasonable dispute as to its liability for wages within the meaning of s 78 of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) – whether seafarer, when obtaining his discharge, accepted as repudiation shipowner’s insistence of his holding lower rank, after earlier promotion to chief officer withdrawn – shipowner failing to pay wages and accrued leave at time of discharge from ship – whether seafarer entitled to claim extra wages under s 78 during period after his discharge and before final payment under s 75 – whether parties’ later agreement that seafarer serve on a further voyage in higher rank without prejudice to their positions as to his actual rank capable of evidencing reasonable dispute as to shipowner’s liability for wages at earlier time of seafarer’s discharge – no evidence before primary judge that there was reasonable dispute as to shipowner’s liability for wages including accrued leave at time of seafarer’s discharge

Held: primary judge erred by summarily dismissing seafarer’s proceedings for wages under s 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) on the basis that seafarer had no reasonable prospect of success – there was a sufficient likelihood that the shipowner could not establish the defence in s 78 of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth)

Words & phrases: “wages”, “discharge”, “articles of agreement”, “running agreement”
Legislation:

Admiralty Act 1988 (Cth) ss 4(3)(t),15(2)(c)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) O 20 r 5
Maritime Labour Convention 2006
Merchant Shipping (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act 1880 (Imp) s 4
Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (Imp) s 187
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (Imp) s 135, 189(3)
Navigation Act 1912 (Cth) ss 6, 46, 50, 61, 62A, 63, 68, 75, 75A, 76, 77(1), 78, 82, 83
Seamen’s Articles of Agreement Convention 1926
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) s 170CE

Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol 93, 5th ed) (LexisNexis, London, 2008)
J Kay, The Law of Shipmasters and Seamen (2nd ed) (Stevens & Haynes, London 1895)
Lord Tenterden, Law of Merchant Ships and Seamen (11th ed, ed by Sir William Shee) (Shaw & Sons, London, 1867)
Lord Tenterden, Law of Merchant Ships and Seamen (14th ed) (Shaw & Sons, London, 1901)
N Meeson, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice (3rd ed) (Lloyd’s of London Press, London, 2003)
SC Derrington and JM Turner, The Law and Practice of Admiralty…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCAFC 137
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia, the case of Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd was brought before the court to address the dispute over seafarer's wages between Mr Visscher and Teekay Shipping. Mr Visscher, a seafarer, alleged that Teekay Shipping failed to pay his wages and accrued leave upon his discharge from the ship. The legal issues that the court had to decide included whether Teekay Shipping had a valid defence based on a reasonable dispute concerning its liability for Mr Visscher's wages and whether Mr Visscher was entitled to claim additional wages under section 78 of the Navigation Act 1912 after his discharge. Furthermore, the court had to consider whether the subsequent agreement between the parties, in which Mr Visscher agreed to serve on a further voyage in a higher rank, could serve as evidence of a reasonable dispute regarding the shipowner's liability for wages at the time of Mr Visscher's initial discharge.

The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia found that the primary judge had erred in summarily dismissing Mr Visscher's proceedings for wages under section 31A(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976. The Full Court held that there was a sufficient likelihood that Teekay Shipping could not establish the defence provided in section 78 of the Navigation Act 1912. The court held that the evidence did not demonstrate that there was any dispute as to Teekay Shipping's liability for Mr Visscher's wages at the time of his discharge. The Full Court also found that Mr Visscher's entitlement to be paid wages in accordance with sections 75(1) and 78 of the Act overrode any other agreements between the parties, including the certified agreement. As a result, the Full Court allowed the appeal, set aside the orders made by the primary judge, and ordered that the appeal be allowed with costs.

In conclusion, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia ruled in favor of Mr Visscher and found that Teekay Shipping was liable to pay Mr Visscher his wages and accrued leave upon his discharge from the ship. The court held that the primary judge had erred in dismissing Mr Visscher's proceedings for wages, and that there was a sufficient likelihood that Teekay Shipping could not establish the defence provided in section 78 of the Navigation Act 1912. The Full Court set aside the orders made by the primary judge and allowed the appeal with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed with costs.

2. The orders made by the primary judge on 4 January 2011 be set aside.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

However, it was a defence if payment on the due date was impracticable and it was made as soon as practicable thereafter or, as in ss 75(3) and 78, the delay was due to the seaman’s act or default, a reasonable dispute as to liability for the wages or to any other cause not attributable to the wrongful act or default of the owner or master (s 77(5)). And, s 82(1) provided that a seaman’s right to wages began at the earlier of the time he commenced work or when the articles of agreement specified he would commence work or be present on board. In addition, if the seaman was re-engaged to serve on a ship on the same day as his earlier service on her terminated, he was not entitled to double pay for that day, but if his new engagement was at a higher rate of wages, he was entitled to wages for that day at the higher rate (s 82(2)). Importantly, s 83(1)(a) and (d) provided:“83 Recovery of wages(1)No seaman shall, by any agreement:(a)be deprived of any remedy for the recovery of his or her wages;…(3)Every stipulation in any agreement, inconsistent with any provision of this Act, shall be void.” BACKGROUND In late March 2001, Mr Visscher accepted an offer of permanent employment with Teekay as a third mate. Very soon afterwards, Teekay offered him a temporary position on its tanker, the MV Samar Spirit, as Chief Officer (or first mate) which Mr Visscher accepted. On 21 August 2001, while he was at sea, Teekay wrote to Mr Visscher offering him a permanent promotion as a Chief Officer, which he accepted by letter dated 7 September 2001. Around this time, the Australian Maritime Officers Union threatened to take industrial action against Teekay in respect of their negotiations for a new enterprise bargaining agreement. One issue that was significant during those negotiations concerned permanent promotions of some deck officers that Teekay had made. On 11 September 2001, the Union and Teekay appeared at a hearing in the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (the Commission) at which the Commissioner recommended, among other steps, that Teekay rescind its recent promotions. On 20 September 2001, Teekay wrote to Mr Visscher saying that it had:“… decided to capitulate and rescind the promotions. This is extremely unfortunate as the promotions were made in good faith by the company and accepted in good faith by the individuals.What this will mean for you at this present time is still a little unclear.” (emphasis added) Mr Visscher replied on 26 September 2001 refusing to accept rescission of his promotion and asking if his employment had been terminated. He met with Teekay’s marine operations manager, Capt Mark Board on 3 October 2001 and they discussed the letter of 20 September. According to Mr Visscher’s evidence, Capt Board told him that the matters were out of his hands but that “[a]s far as I am concerned you’ll stay on the Samar Spirit as Mate”, meaning his current position as Chief Officer. And that is just what happened for over two years. From then, Teekay paid Mr Visscher at the rate of Chief Officer and he performed the duties of that rank on Samar Spirit until he had a personal disagreement with her master in November 2003.THE 2001 CERTIFIED AGREEMENT

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

At the end of his second tour of duty on Broadwater, Mr Visscher asked for his discharge and received it from the Master on 26 May 2004. On the next day, he told Teekay of his discharge and asked for his entitlements to be paid. What followed is not in issue in this appeal and it is not necessary to describe those matters. Mr Visscher has remained in dispute with Teekay ever since.THE DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE The primary judge had fixed the proceedings for a final hearing to commence on 30 August 2010. However, six days before then, Teekay filed a notice of motion seeking that the proceedings be dismissed summarily under O 20 r 5 of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) (the old Rules). That rule provided that the Court could dismiss or stay proceedings, or claims for relief in them, that it was satisfied were frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the process of the Court. Teekay’s solicitors unhelpfully asserted, without elaboration, that the basis of its application was that Mr Visscher’s evidence and the pleadings “reasonably exclude the possibility that facts essential to the success of the claim will be able to be established”. Her Honour began hearing the motion on the day originally fixed for the final hearing of the proceedings. Before the primary judge and on this appeal, Teekay was represented by senior and junior counsel and Mr Visscher represented himself. On the second day of the hearing before the primary judge, Teekay applied by consent to amend its motion to seek summary judgment under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act as well as, or in the alternative to, O 20 r 5 of the old Rules. Teekay contended that the facts in Mr Visscher’s evidence demonstrated that it had an unassailable defence for the purposes of s 78 of the Act. This was that there was no reasonable prospect that Mr Visscher could negate Teekay’s position that there was a reasonable dispute as to his entitlement to be paid his wages immediately after his discharges from Broadwater on 3 March 2004 and 26 May 2004. Since the appeal has been confined to the position at the time of the first of those occasions, it is not necessary to consider the second. Suffice to say, that having regard to the conclusion we have reached that neither the primary judge nor this Court was given adequate assistance by Teekay as to the law, we would be disposed to grant Mr Visscher leave, if he is so advised, to make a fresh application for leave to appeal in respect of the balance of his proceedings. The primary judge reasoned, as Teekay had urged, that at the conclusion of his first tour on Broadwater, it had refused to accept either that Mr Visscher’s employment had terminated or that he was entitled to termination pay, including for accrued leave. Her Honour accepted Teekay’s argument that the parties were in a dispute about whether Mr Visscher’s employment had been terminated at the end of that voyage. Teekay also argued that the evidence and pleadings showed the reasonableness of that dispute. The primary judge found that Teekay continuously treated Mr Visscher as a second mate who was carrying out the duties of a Chief Officer. The primary judge recorded that the majority in Giudice 239 CLR at 388 [81] had accepted that Teekay’s 20 September 2001 notice of rescission of Mr Visscher’s promotion to Chief Officer had not automatically brought his contract of employment to an end. The majority held that for this to occur, it was necessary that Mr Visscher accept this rescission as a repudiation before the contract could be terminated and the question whether it had been was yet to be decided by the Commission. Her Honour found:“In all the circumstances, whatever the rights or wrongs of the dispute about termination by constructive dismissal in February-March 2004, on the material available thus far, it could not sensibly be suggested that the dispute was not reasonable. The applicant’s assertion that he had been “wrongfully demoted without good reason or explanation” in his fax to Mr Parmeter of 5 April 2004 is no answer. The evidence shows that the respondent rescinded the promotion because of a recommendation from the AIRC, and not peremptorily, and that its justification for reserving the right to require him to sail in the lower position of Second Mate, was that it considered that to be his permanent position. The respondent’s position (as Mr Parmenter put it in his letter of the same date) was that there had been no interruption in the employment. As the respondent was reasonably of the view that the employment was continuing, one would not reasonably expect it to accede to a demand for “wages” that the applicant claims were payable on termination or to pay a loading that was due only if the employment had been terminated and a new, casual contract entered into. I am satisfied that there was a reasonable dispute as to liability for “wages” payable on termination because there was a reasonable dispute as to whether the applicant had been terminated in the first place.” (emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In other words, their Lordships held that there was no reasonable dispute as to liability because the wages were undoubtedly due. Rather, they held that the wrongful act or default of the owner requiring the crew to sail further on a voyage on which they were not bound to go and for which they had not agreed to sail, concerned a different dispute that did not involve liability for the wages at the time of discharge: Palace Shipping [1907] AC at 392, 393, 397; St Enoch Shipping Company 1908 SC 103.CONSIDERATION Teekay confused the issues before the primary judge. We are of opinion that there was no sufficient basis on which Teekay could argue that it was entitled to have the proceedings against it dismissed summarily under s 31A or O 20 r 5 in respect of Mr Visscher’s claim to be paid wages under s 78 of the Act upon his discharge on 3 March 2004. First, on the only evidence before the primary judge and the Full Court, Mr Visscher and Capt McLellan agreed that he would be discharged and his employment would be at an end when he left the ship at Kurnell on 3 March 2004. Secondly, Mr Visscher’s entitlement to be paid wages in accordance with ss 75(1) and 78 of the Act overrode any other agreements between the parties including the certified agreement: s 83(1)(a) and (3); see too Liosatos 111 CLR at 286 per Barwick CJ, 300 per Taylor J, 300-301 per Menzies J, see too at 294-295 per Kitto J in dissent. The evidence before the primary judge did not demonstrate that there was any dispute as to Teekay’s liability for Mr Visscher’s wages at the time. According to him, he made his request to the Master for his discharge in late February or early March 2004. On the evidence, they both agreed that Mr Visscher’s employment by Teekay would be at an end, on the basis of Teekay’s letter of 24 February 2004, when he left Broadwater at Kurnell. There was no evidence of any dispute concerning Mr Visscher’s claim that his employment was at an end after his discussion with Capt McLellan relating to his discharge, until 26 March 2004. That triggered Teekay’s obligation under s 75(1) to pay Mr Visscher his wages, at or before the time of his discharge, including emoluments such as accrued leave. On the evidence, Teekay ignored the consequence of Capt McLellan agreeing that Mr Visscher’s employment was at an end when he signed his discharge on 3 March 2004. It asserted that somehow a dispute had arisen that it had not communicated to Mr Visscher. It was not apparent that there was any dispute about Mr Visscher’s entitlements to wages up to 3 March 2004, whether or not he had resigned or his employment was terminated, in either case effective at the time of his discharge. Any dispute, such as it was, involved Teekay’s assertion that if, after 3 March 2004, Mr Visscher continued in its employ, he would be paid and hold rank as second mate. That was not a dispute about Teekay’s liability to pay him the wages and entitlements he had asked the master to pay him at 3 March 2004 on his discharge based on the common position that up to then he was entitled to a Chief Officer’s wages. Rather, it was a dispute about the terms and conditions on which he might continue thereafter to be employed.