FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2)
[2014] FCAFC 19
Citation: Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 19 Parties: TIMOTHY VISSCHER v TEEKAY SHIPPING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD ACN 079 641 580 File number: NSD 1929 of 2012 Judges RARES, JAGOT AND BROMBERG JJ Date of judgment: 7 March 2014 Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 25.14
Navigation Act 1912 (Cth)Cases cited: Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 applied
Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Aust) Pty Ltd (2011) 198 FCR 575 referred to
Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] FCA 28 referred to
Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 5 referred toDate of hearing: On written submissions Date of last submissions: 27 February 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No catchwords Number of paragraphs: 11 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Brereton SC with Mr B Cross Solicitor for the Respondent: Norton Rose Fulbright
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1929 of 2012
BETWEEN: TIMOTHY VISSCHER
AppellantAND: TEEKAY SHIPPING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD ACN 079 641 580
Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, JAGOT AND BROMBERG JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
7 MARCH 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The respondent pay the appellant’s costs.
2.The security provided by the appellant for the costs of the appeal be returned to him.
3.The respondent may set off its liability in the proceedings below to pay the judgment sum and interest the subject of Order 2 made by the Full Court on 13 February 2014 and its liability under Order 1 made today against the amount found to be due to it by the appellant pursuant to Order 1 made by the primary judge on 29 January 2013.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1929 of 2012
BETWEEN: TIMOTHY VISSCHER
AppellantAND: TEEKAY SHIPPING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD ACN 079 641 580
Respondent
JUDGES:
RARES, JAGOT AND BROMBERG JJ
DATE:
7 MARCH 2014
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT
On 13 February 2014, the Court delivered reasons for allowing Mr Visscher’s appeal and awarding him $16,149.53 (or $10,116.93 exclusive of interest) under s 78 of the Navigation Act 1912 (Cth): Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 5 (the principal reasons). It ordered the parties to file written submissions as to costs in respect of both the trial and appeal.
Background
The primary judge had dismissed Mr Visscher’s application and, on 29 January 2013, ordered him to pay Teekay’s costs (other than those in respect of its unsuccessful motion for summary judgment) on a party and party basis up to 11.00 am on 9 March 2012 and thereafter on an indemnity basis: Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2014] FCAFC 19
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether Mr Visscher's rejection of the offer was unreasonable and whether the costs orders made by the primary judge should be upheld. Teekay argued that Mr Visscher's limited success on appeal meant he should be seen as the unsuccessful party. It contended that the primary judge's order should be upheld, and Mr Visscher should pay the costs of the appeal on an indemnity basis. Conversely, Mr Visscher argued that he had succeeded on appeal and that the costs orders should be set aside in his favour. He contended that the offer of compromise was made before Teekay's complete case was disclosed, and he should be awarded costs for both the proceedings below and the appeal.
The court found that Mr Visscher's rejection of the offer was unreasonable and that the primary judge's costs order was appropriate. The court noted that Mr Visscher's limited recovery on appeal meant he had not achieved a significant improvement over the terms of the offer. The court held that the offer of compromise was a genuine attempt to resolve the proceedings and that Mr Visscher's failure to accept it was unreasonable. Consequently, the court upheld the primary judge's costs order, allowing Teekay to set off its liability for the judgment sum and interest against the amount Mr Visscher owed for costs.
ORDERS:
1. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs.
2. The security provided by the appellant for the costs of the appeal be returned to him.
3. The respondent may set off its liability in the proceedings below to pay the judgment sum and interest the subject of Order 2 made by the Full Court on 13 February 2014 and its liability under Order 1 made today against the amount found to be due to it by the appellant pursuant to Order 1 made by the primary judge on 29 January 2013.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The respondent pay the appellant’s costs.
2. The security provided by the appellant for the costs of the appeal be returned to him.
3. The respondent may set off its liability in the proceedings below to pay the judgment sum and interest the subject of Order 2 made by the Full Court on 13 February 2014 and its liability under Order 1 made today against the amount found to be due to it by the appellant pursuant to Order 1 made by the primary judge on 29 January 2013.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Visscher pointed out that he had succeeded on appeal and that all of Teekay’s grounds in its notice of contention had failed. He argued that the March 2012 offer had been made before Teekay’s complete case had been disclosed below. He contended that her Honour’s costs order be set aside and that Teekay be ordered to pay the costs of both the proceedings below and this appeal.Consideration Her Honour’s costs order was made under r 25.14(2). Relevantly, r 25.14 provides:“25.14 Costs where offer not accepted(1)If an offer is made by a respondent and not accepted by an applicant, and the applicant obtains a judgment that is less favourable than the terms of the offer:(a)the applicant is not entitled to any costs after 11.00 am on the second business day after the offer was served; and(b)the respondent is entitled to an order that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs after that time on an indemnity basis.(2)If an offer is made by a respondent and an applicant unreasonably fails to accept the offer and the applicant’s proceeding is dismissed, the respondent is entitled to an order that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs:(a)before 11.00 am on the second business day after the offer was served – on a party and party basis; and(b)after the time mentioned in paragraph (a) – on an indemnity basis.” There is no reason to disturb the costs orders made by the primary judge. Had her Honour made the order that Mr Visscher obtained on this appeal, the operation of r 25.14 would have resulted in the existing costs order that her Honour made. Mr Visscher recovered even less on the present appeal than her Honour had in mind as the value of his claim. As the primary judge noted, r 25.14 operates on an offer of compromise at all stages of the proceedings, whatever the state of the evidence when it is served. Mr Visscher’s own conduct in the two year period following 4 June 2004 when Teekay made its final payment to him suggested that it would be very difficult for him to argue that Teekay’s delay in any payment in that period attracted an entitlement to double wages under s 78 for that period or, in light of that conduct, for any later period. Teekay’s offer of $200,000 was a genuine attempt to compromise the proceedings. It represented a generous sum that, after all, was not in the nature of compensatory damages, but more in the nature of penalty. Mr Visscher never suffered any pecuniary loss. He was seeking a punitive award in a context where, by 4 June 2004, Teekay had sought to pay him what it thought, erroneously but genuinely, was all that was due to him. He had accepted that payment without complaint for two years. Mr Visscher’s failure to accept the March 2012 offer was unreasonable in all of the circumstances. While her Honour’s decision was made in the context of dismissing Mr Visscher’s claim, the considerations to which she adverted remain relevant and apposite, having regard to the outcome of the appeal, to the issue of the orders that should have been made below.