FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
McGuinness v Workplace Eye Protection Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 872
File number: NSD 47 of 2020 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 25 June 2020 Catchwords: COSTS – whether refusal by plaintiff to accept settlement offer unreasonable – plaintiff to pay portion of defendant’s costs on indemnity basis Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 25.14, 25.14(2)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317K
Cases cited: Baulderstone Hornibrook Engineering Pty Ltd v Gordian Runoff Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 12
Facton Ltd (formerly known as G-Star Raw Denim KFT) v Seo [2011] FCA 344; (2011) 91 IPR 135
Factory 5 Pty Ltd v Victoria (No 2) [2011] FCA 323
NMFM Property Pty Ltd and Ors v Citibank Ltd (No 2) [2001] FCA 480; (2001) 109 FCR 77
Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 19
Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Date of last submissions: 10 June 2020 (Plaintiff)
3 June 2020 (Defendant)Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 26 Counsel for the Plaintiff: JM Harris Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Jemmeson Fisher Lawyers Counsel for the Defendant: A Harding Solicitor for the Defendant: Glenn R Walters & Co ORDERS
NSD 47 of 2020 BETWEEN: PHILLIP EDWARD MCGUINNESS
Plaintiff
AND: WORKPLACE EYE PROTECTION PTY LTD (ACN 128 607 607)
Defendant
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JUNE 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The plaintiff pay 50% of the defendant’s costs of the proceeding from 24 March 2020 on an indemnity basis.
2.Otherwise, the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding on a party/party basis.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GLEESON J:
The defendant (Workplace) now seeks a special costs order, following the dismissal of the proceeding (McGuinness v Workplace Eye Protection Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 626), in the following terms:
(1)The plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding (except to the extent those costs are already covered by order 2 made on 19 May 2020), including the reserved costs of 5 March 2020.
(2)The costs the subject of order 2 made on 19 May 2020, and the costs in order (1) above, are to be assessed:
a. before 11:00 am on 4 March 2020 – on a party party basis;
b. after 11:00 am on 4 March 2020 – on an indemnity basis.
Proposed order (1) above is sought on the basis that the costs order made on 19 May 2020 was limited to the claim for relief in prayer 1 of the originating process. Now that the whole of the proceeding has been dismissed, Workplace seeks its costs of the whole proceeding.
Proposed order (2) above is based on an offer to compromise made by Workplace, said to have been unreasonably rejected by the plaintiff, Mr McGuinness, and…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 872
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether Mr McGuinness's decision to reject Workplace's settlement offer was unreasonable under the relevant procedural rules. The court examined whether Mr McGuinness was justified in waiting until Workplace filed its evidence before deciding on the offer. It concluded that Mr McGuinness should have considered the offer upon receipt, in line with the procedural rules, to avoid potential consequences for the estate if his refusal was deemed unreasonable. However, the court held that Mr McGuinness's refusal was not unreasonable because the offer was to settle the entire proceeding.
The court's reasoning focused on the procedural rules governing offers of compromise, which mandate that such offers be considered regardless of the stage of the evidence in the proceedings. It highlighted that Mr McGuinness's claim had significant weaknesses, particularly concerning the burden of proof on him to establish that the proposed derivative claim was in the company's best interests. The settlement offer letter provided detailed reasons for Workplace's position, including documentary evidence, which made the key issues apparent to Mr McGuinness even before Workplace filed its evidence. While the court found that Mr McGuinness's refusal was not unreasonable, it noted that his claims regarding the January 2014 and May 2014 dividends lacked merit, which was brought to his attention in the settlement offer.
The final orders of the court were that Mr McGuinness pay 50% of Workplace's costs from 24 March 2020 on an indemnity basis, and otherwise pay Workplace's costs on a party/party basis. The court reasoned that this outcome was in the interests of justice, given the lack of merit in certain aspects of Mr McGuinness's claims.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The plaintiff pay 50% of the defendant’s costs of the proceeding from 24 March 2020 on an indemnity basis.
2. Otherwise, the plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding on a party/party basis.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Workplace argued that Mr McGuinness’ submission that it was not unreasonable for him to reject the offer of compromise because Workplace had not yet filed and served its evidence is without merit for the following reasons:(1)Rule 25.14 operates on an offer of compromise at all stages of a proceeding, “whatever the state of the evidence when it is served”: Visscher v Teekay Shipping (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCAFC 19 at [7].(2)Mr McGuinness’ claim failed in large part because of his failure to discharge the onus on him of establishing that the proposed derivative claim raised a serious question to be tried and was in the best interests of the company. The Court held that Mr McGuinness had failed to adduce evidence of various matters important to his claim, including that Mr McGuinness did not verify that he believed the proposed claim for relief in relation to the 2012 dividend to be in the best interests of the company and it was not obvious he had considered that question; and there was no evidence of inquiries about the proposed defendants’ capacity to pay any compensation that might be ordered. (3)In the offer, Workplace advised Mr McGuinness of the key weaknesses of his claims and provided supporting documentary evidence. Hence, Mr McGuinness was aware of Workplace’s position on these issues, and of the key evidence supporting Workplace’s contentions, notwithstanding that Workplace had not yet served its affidavits.CONSIDERATION Mr McGuinness’s claim concerned three dividends declared, respectively, in 2012, January 2014 and May 2014. The claims regarding the May 2014 dividend added nothing of substance to Mr McGuinness’ case and, accordingly, the case was principally concerned with the first two dividends. The settlement offer letter raised some of the matters which were the reasons for the dismissal of the proceeding (for example, s 1317K), but not all of them (for example, the proposed statement of claim did not articulate a serious question to be tried). The settlement offer letter alleged, in relation to both the 7 June 2012 and 8 January 2014 dividends, that no loss or damage was suffered and therefore there was no basis for compensation. The settlement offer letter also raised matters that were ultimately not reasons for the dismissal of the proceeding (for example, that Ms Dunstan and Ms Hantzi were not directors of the company when the 2012 dividend was declared). In NMFM Property Pty Ltd and Ors v Citibank Ltd (No 2) [2001] FCA 480; (2001) 109 FCR 77, Lindgren J explained the significance of conveying to the offeree the unreasonableness of not accepting the offer, at [87] and [88]:[87]No doubt where a party puts with sufficient particularity to the opposing party the reasons why the latter must fail, yet the latter does not recognise the inevitable, this will be a factor pointing to an award of indemnity costs ...[88]The requirements of “sufficient particularity” and “inevitability of failure” are important. In their absence, it would be open to parties to put their respective cases to the opposing party urging it to recognise the merit of what is put in the hope that if it ultimately finds favour with the Court, an award of indemnity costs will follow. If this were correct, one might ask rhetorically, “Why write a letter as distinct from simply relying on the pleadings?” ...