FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
McGuinness v Workplace Eye Protection Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 626
File number: NSD 47 of 2020 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 19 May 2020 Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – application for leave pursuant to s 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to bring proceedings on behalf of a company – where application brought by executor of the estate of a former company shareholder – where certain company dividends alleged to have been paid unlawfully – whether grant of leave is in the best interests of the company – whether there is a serious question to be tried – whether prospective claim is time-barred – leave refused Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Part 2F.1, ss 180, 181, 236, 237, 254T, 1317H, 1317K Cases cited: Carpenter v Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] NSWSC 973; (2004) 51 ACSR 245
Drew v Lynch, in the matter of Mirage 3.4D Pty Limited [2019] FCA 632
Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 442; (2005) 53 ACSR 732
Huang v Wang [2016] NSWCA 164; (2016) 114 ACSR 586
Keenan v Bundaberg Port Authority [2016] FCA 134
Lewski v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] FCAFC 96; 246 FCR 200
Re Gladstone Pacific Nickel Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1235; (2011) 86 ACSR 432Date of hearing: Determined on the papers Date of last submissions: 3 April 2020 (Defendant)
6 April 2020 (Plaintiff)Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 88 Counsel for the Plaintiff: JM Harris Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Jemmeson Fisher Lawyers Counsel for the Defendant: A Harding Solicitor for the Defendant: Glenn R Walters & Co ORDERS
NSD 47 of 2020 BETWEEN: PHILLIP EDWARD MCGUINNESS
Plaintiff
AND: WORKPLACE EYE PROTECTION PTY LTD (ACN 128 607 607)
Defendant
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 MAY 2020
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to bring proceedings pursuant to s 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) be refused.
2.The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the application.
3.The proceeding be listed for a case management hearing on 28 May 2020 at 9:30 am to make further orders for the continuation or finalisation of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GLEESON J:
The plaintiff, Mr McGuinness, seeks leave pursuant to s 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Act) to begin proceedings on behalf of the defendant (company) against the two directors of the company, Cheryl Dunstan and Susan Hantzi, and a former director, Adam Ayash. Specifically, Mr McGuinness seeks leave to bring the proceedings on behalf of the company for compensation pursuant to s 1317H of the Act for breaches of directors duties and for orders replacing the current directors with himself and Cathie Lynch (derivative action).
Section 237 of the Act provides:
(1)A…
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- Case
- [2020] FCA 626
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that while Mr McGuinness was likely acting in good faith as the executor of the estate, he had not provided evidence to support his belief that the company had a good claim with reasonable prospects of success or that the action was in the company's best interests. The court held that the requirement for a serious question to be tried was met at a relatively low threshold, but the application needed to be supported by actual evidence rather than mere indications. The court also concluded that the proposed claims were time-barred under the Act, and thus, there was no serious question to be tried.
Consequently, the court refused the application for leave to bring the derivative action. The court ordered that Mr McGuinness pay the company's costs of the application and scheduled a case management hearing for 28 May 2020 to make further orders regarding the proceeding.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to bring proceedings pursuant to s 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) be refused.
2. The plaintiff pay the defendant’s costs of the application.
3. The proceeding be listed for a case management hearing on 28 May 2020 at 9:30 am to make further orders for the continuation or finalisation of the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There is also an allegation that each of Ms Dunstan and Ms Hantzi contravened s 181(1) of the Act by acting recklessly in voting in favour of the second resolution.CONSIDERATION In Carpenter v Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (in liq) [2004] NSWSC 973; (2004) 51 ACSR 245 (Carpenter (No 1)) at [16], Barrett J explained that the provisions of Part 2F.1 of the Act, which includes s 236 and s 237: ... enable anyone with a particular form of ‘insider’ status described in s 236(1)(a) to seek the court’s assistance in taking over the role of the normal decision makers in relation to a particular proceeding. The court’s function is essentially a screening function. It must assess against specified criteria the litigation proposal the applicant has in mind for the company. If that proposal is found by the court to meet the criteria, it must grant leave enabling the applicant to pursue it for the company. Having regard to the company’s opposition, it is probable that the company itself will not bring the proceedings proposed by Mr McGuinness. Accordingly, s 237(2)(a) is satisfied.Good faith In Re Gladstone Pacific Nickel Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1235; (2011) 86 ACSR 432, Ball J stated (at [58]):The requirement that the applicant be acting in good faith has at least two elements. One is that the applicant must honestly believe that the company has a good claim with reasonable prospects of success. The other is that the claim must not be brought for some collateral purpose as would amount to an abuse of process. In my opinion, the applicant must also honestly believe that it is in the best interests of the company that the action be brought.(citations omitted) There is no suggestion that Mr McGuinness is not is acting in good faith in bringing the application, although there is some issue concerning the identity of the residuary beneficiaries on whose behalf the derivative action would be brought. Mr McGuinness did not verify that he believes that the company has a good claim with reasonable prospects of success based on the draft statement of claim; or that it is in the best interests of the company that the action be brought. Even so, where Mr McGuinness is acting as administrator of the estate, I accept that he is acting in good faith. Accordingly, s 237(2)(b) is satisfied. Serious question to be tried In Keenan v Bundaberg Port Authority [2016] FCA 134 , Reeves J said (at [40]):This criterion has been held to set a “relatively low threshold to surmount” and it has been compared to the standard applicable to the grant of an interlocutory injunction: see Swansson at [25] and Gartner at [46]. It has also been observed that this criterion “does not require the Court to enter into the merits of the proposed derivative action to any great degree”: see Vinciguerra at [147]. Nonetheless, it is clear on the authorities that “the application must be supported by evidence. A mere ‘indication of the evidence’ without actual evidence is insufficient”: see Vinciguerra at [141] and Gaertner at [47].2012 dividend