FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BCD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 592
Appeal from: BCD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1914 File number(s): NSD 1765 of 2017 Judge(s): FARRELL J Date of judgment: 30 April 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirmed delegate’s decision to refuse to grant the appellant a Protection (Class XA) visa – where Tribunal made credibility findings adverse to appellant – whether Tribunal failed to consider claim based on imputed membership of the social group “journalists and media professionals in Sri Lanka” or be subject to generalised harm as a perceived journalist or media professional – whether Tribunal failed to invite appellant to address the issue of whether he would pursue politics upon return to Sri Lanka in breach of s 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – appeal dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 425 Cases cited: Abebe v The Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; 197 CLR 510
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; 236 FCR 593
BCD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1914
Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 26; 197 ALR 389
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Applicant A125 of 2003 [2007] FCAFC 162; 163 FCR 285
Minister forImmigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SCAR [2003] FCAFC 126; 128 FCR 553
NABE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (No 2) [2004] FCAFC 263; 144 FCR 1
NAVK v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1695
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63; 228 CLR 152
Hathaway JC and Foster M, The Law of Refugee Status (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2014)
Date of hearing: 6 March 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 54 Counsel for the Appellant: Mr R Chia Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted to any order of the Court save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1765 of 2017 BETWEEN: BCD16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FARRELL J
DATE OF ORDER:
30 APRIL 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
FARRELL J
This is an appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA), see: BCD16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCCA 1914. The primary judge dismissed with costs the appellant's application for…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 592
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the Tribunal had failed to consider the appellant's claim based on imputed membership of the social group "journalists and media professionals in Sri Lanka." The court noted that the Tribunal had fairly detailed and expressly addressed the appellant's claims, and it was not a case where some extra claim arose which would not require "creative activity" on the part of the Tribunal to discern. The court also considered whether the Tribunal had failed to invite the appellant to address the issue of whether he would pursue politics upon return to Sri Lanka. The court found that the appellant did not ever claim that he would work as a journalist in Sri Lanka and on the Tribunal's findings there was no risk of harm to the appellant for any reason in Sri Lanka.
The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. The Minister submitted that the appellant had not claimed to have worked as a journalist in Sri Lanka after 2007, and the Tribunal had rejected the appellant's claim that he worked as an unpaid assistant to his brother as a journalist in Sri Lanka in the period from 2002-2007. The court found that if the appellant wished to argue that he feared harm in Sri Lanka as a perceived journalist or media professional, he had to articulate that claim before the Tribunal. The appellant's claims were fairly detailed and expressly addressed by the Tribunal, and it was not a case where some extra claim arose which would not require "creative activity" on the part of the Tribunal to discern.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant must pay the first respondent's costs as agreed or taxed. Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant must pay the first respondent’s costs as agreed or taxed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister submitted that:(1)Contrary to the appellant’s submissions, the appellant did not claim to have worked as a journalist in Sri Lanka after 2007. To the extent that he claimed to have worked as a journalist in Sri Lanka in the period from 2002-2007, he explained at the Tribunal hearing that he worked as an unpaid assistant to his brother, and that claim was rejected by the Tribunal as noted by the primary judge at J[22].(2)The primary judge was correct to say that if the appellant wished to argue that he feared harm in Sri Lanka as a perceived journalist or media professional, he had to articulate that claim before the Tribunal. Such an unarticulated claim does not “squarely arise” from the facts of his activities in Australia with an online community radio station in 2009 and 2010 as found by the Tribunal. The appellant’s claims were fairly detailed and expressly addressed by the Tribunal; it is not a case where some extra claim arose which would not require “creative activity” on the part of the Tribunal to discern.(3)The Tribunal’s findings do not suggest that the appellant had any profile as a journalist or media professional in Sri Lanka.(4)The appellant did not ever claim that he would work as a journalist in Sri Lanka and on the Tribunal’s findings there was no risk of harm to the appellant for any reason in Sri Lanka.Consideration It is important first to note that Dranichnikov is not a case about unarticulated claims. It is a case where the majority of the High Court found that a Tribunal constructively failed to exercise its jurisdiction because it failed to deal with the claim expressly made by Mr Dranichnikov and facts accepted by the Tribunal as explained by Gummow and Callinan JJ at [27]-[28]:27The Tribunal failed to decide the first question. It decided another question, whether Mr Dranichnikov’s membership of a social group, name, of “businessmen in Russia” was a reason for his persecution and relevantly nothing more. The Tribunal should have decided the matter which was put to it, whether Mr Dranichnikov was a member of a social group consisting of entrepreneurs and businessmen who publicly criticised law enforcement authorities for failing to take action against crime and criminals.28.It seems to us that had that question been addressed it would in all likelihood have permitted of one only answer, an affirmative one. This is so because the Tribunal accepted Mr Dranichnikov as a witness of credit, and therefore the correctness of his account of his activities, and their climax, the violent assault that he suffered. As the Full Court observed in NABE at [58], [63] and [68]: A judgment that the Tribunal has failed to consider a claim not expressly advanced is not lightly to be made. The claim must emerge clearly from the materials before the Tribunal. It will not depend for its exposure on constructive or creative activity by the Tribunal. Every case must be considered according to its own circumstances.