Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 33 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 127

Appeal from: Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 106
File number: NSD 324 of 2017
Judges: SIOPIS, GRIFFITHS AND CHARLESWORTH JJ
Date of judgment: 16 August 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia – whether the Court erred in failing to find that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal committed jurisdictional error by not lawfully considering the best interests of the appellant’s daughter – whether the Court erred in failing to find the Tribunal acted in breach of the rules of procedural fairness – appeal dismissed with costs

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to amend notice of appeal to raise grounds not run below – application refused

Legislation:

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 60

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 474, 499, 500, 501

Cases cited:

Bondelmonte v Bondelmonte [2017] HCA 8, (2017) 91 ALJR 402

Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576

Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Gomez v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 105, (2002) 190 ALR 543

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZSRS [2014] FCAFC 16, (2014) 309 ALR 67

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 106

Paerau v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 219 FCR 504

Re the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia; Ex parte Durairajasingham [2000] HCA 1, (2000) 168 ALR 407

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZKMS v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 499

Teoh v Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 49 FCR 409

Uelese v Minister for Immigration (2015) 256 CLR 203

University of Wollongong v Metwally (No 2) [1985] HCA 28, (1985) 60 ALR 68

VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 238 FCR 588

Date of hearing: 2 August 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 67
Counsel for the Appellant: Dr J Lucy
Solicitor for the Appellant: Kinslor Prince Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms R Francois
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Spare Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 324 of 2017
BETWEEN:

ANISH NIGAM

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

SIOPIS, GRIFFITHS AND CHARLESWORTH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

16 AUGUST 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant’s application for leave to file an amended notice of appeal containing paragraph 1(d)(ii) of the draft notice of appeal forming annexure DKB1 to the affidavit of David Kenneth Brooks of 31 July 2017…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 127
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal against the decision of a single judge of the Federal Court, which upheld the refusal of the appellant's visa application by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The appellant argued that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) had committed jurisdictional error by not lawfully considering the best interests of his daughter, J, who has Autism Spectrum Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. He also contended that the Tribunal acted in breach of procedural fairness. The court had to determine whether the AAT erred in its decision-making process regarding the best interests of the child and if procedural fairness was upheld.

The court examined the AAT's application of Direction 65, which outlines the primary considerations for visa decisions, particularly the best interests of minor children. The court found that the AAT correctly identified the relevant factors under Direction 65, including the extent to which the visa applicant is likely to play a positive parental role and any known views of the child. The AAT detailed the evidence it considered, including the daughter's special needs, her mother's capability to care for her, and the appellant's limited history of involvement in his daughter's life due to incarceration. The AAT concluded that while it was not in the daughter's best interests for the appellant's visa to be refused, this consideration was outweighed by other primary considerations.

The court held that the AAT had appropriately exercised its discretion and applied the relevant statutory provisions and principles. The AAT's reasoning demonstrated a detailed consideration of the evidence and a proper application of Direction 65. The court found no jurisdictional error or breach of procedural fairness in the AAT's decision. Additionally, the court dismissed the appellant's application to amend the notice of appeal to include new grounds, finding that the proposed grounds did not meet the criteria for amendment.

The court dismissed the appeal and ordered the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant’s application for leave to file an amended notice of appeal containing paragraph 1(d)(ii) of the draft notice of appeal forming annexure DKB1 to the affidavit of David Kenneth Brooks of 31 July 2017 is refused.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

3. The appellant is to pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Paragraph 11(4) specifies the factors that must be considered, where relevant, in considering the best interests of the child. They relevantly include the extent to which the visa applicant is likely to play a positive parental role in the future [11(4)(b)] and any known views of the child [11(4)(f)].THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The appellant has a daughter. We will refer to her as J. She is presently aged 12. J has been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder with associated language impairment and learning delay. She exhibits behavioural problems, has significant special needs and requires constant care. The Minister’s delegate found that the refusal of the appellant’s visa application was not in J’s best interests. She nonetheless concluded that the interests of J were outweighed by the other primary considerations referred to in [11] of Direction 65. The Tribunal conducted a review of the delegate’s decision pursuant to s 500(1)(b) of the Act. In performing its review function, the Tribunal was bound to comply with Direction 65: s 499(2A) of the Act. In its reasons for affirming the delegate’s decision, the Tribunal said at [79] – [80] of its reasons:79. On balance, I am not satisfied it is in the best interests of [the appellant’s] daughter that his visa not be refused.80. This consideration weighs against a decision that [the appellant’s] visa not be refused. Those statements follow from a detailed consideration of the evidence before the Tribunal, commencing at [50] of its reasons. The Tribunal’s observations and findings are conveniently and correctly summarised at [35] of the reasons of the primary judge as follows:(1)The applicant’s daughter has significant special needs resulting in among other things severe behavioural difficulties (at [52]). The Tribunal considered that ‘[t]he evidence is very clear that Mr Nigam’s daughter requires stability and routine. Any change to her daily activities and patterns causes her great distress.’ (at [53]).(2)The Tribunal found that it was plain, that her mother, Ms B, loves and cares for her daughter very much (at [56]). The Tribunal also accepted that caring for a child with special needs is challenging, that Ms B may need to seek help from others at times and occasionally respite care, and that she feels that she would be assisted by the applicant’s more active participation in their daughter’s upbringing. However, the Tribunal found that ‘[s]he has coped without [Mr Nigam] and alone for a significant period of time and I have no doubt that she can continue to do so’ (Tribunal reasons at [58]).(3)A registered psychologist gave evidence that Mr Nigam’s daughter needs as much support as possible and ideally a direct parental relationship. She opined that ‘… it is in the child’s best interest for Mr Nigam to remain in Australia, if a number of optimal conditions transpired (‘the Optimal Conditions’)’ (emphasis in the original). Ten Optimal Conditions were identified, relating to the extent, constancy and nature of contact between Mr Nigam and his daughter (at [59]).(4)In finding at [60] of its reasons that on balance it was not satisfied that the Optimal Conditions are likely to materialise, the Tribunal looked at a number of factors. These included the extent of contact that Mr Nigam had had with his daughter, acknowledging positive increases in that contact since his incarceration (increased phone contact and a successful home visit), and that he had recently provided increased financial support for his daughter in excess of his required child support payments. While Mr Nigam also gave evidence that he intends to move closer to his daughter and increase his custodial care and/or visitations, the Tribunal found that ‘[t]his, however is currently hypothetical and, as he says, dependent on finances. There is no clear plan at present for Mr Nigam to move closer to [Ms B] and his daughter, nor for them to move closer to Mr Nigam.’ (at [67]). The Tribunal also took into account that:(a)despite Mr Nigam’s evidence that he wished and intended to be involved in his daughter’s schooling and to help her with her learning difficulties, he had not taken steps to contact her teachers;(b)‘[i]t is plain that at the time that he committed the offence [in January 2005], he gave little, if any, consideration to the well-being of his family…’ (at [70]);(c)despite Mr Nigam’s best intentions, ‘his role as a positive parental figure is largely untested. He has spent the majority of her life either incarcerated, on parole or detained. How he would respond to the daily challenges of fatherhood is mostly unknown.’ (at [73]);(d)the applicant’s history of abusive (not physical) conduct towards the mother is also concerning (at [74]);(e)any future criminal or other serious misconduct, whether directly or indirectly involving the mother and his daughter, could have a serious negative impact on his daughter’s stability, routine and well-being (at [75]);(f)whilst Mr Nigam’s daughter may have some difficulties at school, there is no evidence upon which the Tribunal could be satisfied that her difficulties or behaviour will worsen without Mr Nigam’s direct parental involvement (at [76]);(g)the Tribunal did not accept Mr Nigam’s evidence that contacting his daughter from India would be very difficult, finding that his claims are mostly unfounded and unsupported by evidence (at [77]);(h)nor was there any evidence that could support the applicant’s contention that he may not be able to support his daughter financially due to difficulties in finding work in India (at [78]).(5) The Tribunal concluded on this factor that:79. On balance, I am not satisfied it is in the best interests of Mr Nigam’s daughter that his visa not be refused. 80. This consideration weighs against a decision that Mr Nigam’s visa not be refused.THE JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Paragraph 6.3 of Direction 65 contains broadly stated principles. Informed by those principles, the decision-maker must take into account the primary and other considerations specified in (relevantly) Part B. The primary considerations are specified in [11]:11 Primary considerations – visa applicants(1)In deciding whether to refuse a non-citizen’s visa, the following are primary considerations:a)Protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct;b) The best interests of minor children in Australia;c) Expectations of the Australian Community. Paragraph 8(4) provides that primary considerations should generally be given more weight than other considerations. Subparagraph 11.2(1) provides:11.2 Best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision(1)Decision-makers must make a determination about whether refusal is, or is not, in the best interests of the child. Paragraph 11(4) specifies the factors that must be considered, where relevant, in considering the best interests of the child. They relevantly include the extent to which the visa applicant is likely to play a positive parental role in the future [11(4)(b)] and any known views of the child [11(4)(f)].THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION The appellant has a daughter. We will refer to her as J. She is presently aged 12. J has been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder with associated language impairment and learning delay. She exhibits behavioural problems, has significant special needs and requires constant care. The Minister’s delegate found that the refusal of the appellant’s visa application was not in J’s best interests. She nonetheless concluded that the interests of J were outweighed by the other primary considerations referred to in [11] of Direction 65. The Tribunal conducted a review of the delegate’s decision pursuant to s 500(1)(b) of the Act. In performing its review function, the Tribunal was bound to comply with Direction 65: s 499(2A) of the Act. In its reasons for affirming the delegate’s decision, the Tribunal said at [79] – [80] of its reasons:79. On balance, I am not satisfied it is in the best interests of [the appellant’s] daughter that his visa not be refused.80. This consideration weighs against a decision that [the appellant’s] visa not be refused. Those statements follow from a detailed consideration of the evidence before the Tribunal, commencing at [50] of its reasons. The Tribunal’s observations and findings are conveniently and correctly summarised at [35] of the reasons of the primary judge as follows:(1)The applicant’s daughter has significant special needs resulting in among other things severe behavioural difficulties (at [52]). The Tribunal considered that ‘[t]he evidence is very clear that Mr Nigam’s daughter requires stability and routine. Any change to her daily activities and patterns causes her great distress.’ (at [53]).(2)The Tribunal found that it was plain, that her mother, Ms B, loves and cares for her daughter very much (at [56]). The Tribunal also accepted that caring for a child with special needs is challenging, that Ms B may need to seek help from others at times and occasionally respite care, and that she feels that she would be assisted by the applicant’s more active participation in their daughter’s upbringing. However, the Tribunal found that ‘[s]he has coped without [Mr Nigam] and alone for a significant period of time and I have no doubt that she can continue to do so’ (Tribunal reasons at [58]).(3)A registered psychologist gave evidence that Mr Nigam’s daughter needs as much support as possible and ideally a direct parental relationship. She opined that ‘… it is in the child’s best interest for Mr Nigam to remain in Australia, if a number of optimal conditions transpired (‘the Optimal Conditions’)’ (emphasis in the original). Ten Optimal Conditions were identified, relating to the extent, constancy and nature of contact between Mr Nigam and his daughter (at [59]).(4)In finding at [60] of its reasons that on balance it was not satisfied that the Optimal Conditions are likely to materialise, the Tribunal looked at a number of factors. These included the extent of contact that Mr Nigam had had with his daughter, acknowledging positive increases in that contact since his incarceration (increased phone contact and a successful home visit), and that he had recently provided increased financial support for his daughter in excess of his required child support payments. While Mr Nigam also gave evidence that he intends to move closer to his daughter and increase his custodial care and/or visitations, the Tribunal found that ‘[t]his, however is currently hypothetical and, as he says, dependent on finances. There is no clear plan at present for Mr Nigam to move closer to [Ms B] and his daughter, nor for them to move closer to Mr Nigam.’ (at [67]). The Tribunal also took into account that:(a)despite Mr Nigam’s evidence that he wished and intended to be involved in his daughter’s schooling and to help her with her learning difficulties, he had not taken steps to contact her teachers;(b)‘[i]t is plain that at the time that he committed the offence [in January 2005], he gave little, if any, consideration to the well-being of his family…’ (at [70]);(c)despite Mr Nigam’s best intentions, ‘his role as a positive parental figure is largely untested. He has spent the majority of her life either incarcerated, on parole or detained. How he would respond to the daily challenges of fatherhood is mostly unknown.’ (at [73]);(d)the applicant’s history of abusive (not physical) conduct towards the mother is also concerning (at [74]);(e)any future criminal or other serious misconduct, whether directly or indirectly involving the mother and his daughter, could have a serious negative impact on his daughter’s stability, routine and well-being (at [75]);(f)whilst Mr Nigam’s daughter may have some difficulties at school, there is no evidence upon which the Tribunal could be satisfied that her difficulties or behaviour will worsen without Mr Nigam’s direct parental involvement (at [76]);(g)the Tribunal did not accept Mr Nigam’s evidence that contacting his daughter from India would be very difficult, finding that his claims are mostly unfounded and unsupported by evidence (at [77]);(h)nor was there any evidence that could support the applicant’s contention that he may not be able to support his daughter financially due to difficulties in finding work in India (at [78]).(5) The Tribunal concluded on this factor that:79. On balance, I am not satisfied it is in the best interests of Mr Nigam’s daughter that his visa not be refused. 80. This consideration weighs against a decision that Mr Nigam’s visa not be refused.THE JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS