Kemp v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 48 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kemp v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1106

File number: NSD 2236 of 2016
Judge: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 27 July 2018
Catchwords: MIGRATION – where the Assistant Minister determined not to revoke a decision under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) to cancel the applicant’s visa pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Act – where the applicant alleged that the Assistant Minister exercised his discretion in a manner that was legally unreasonable and took into account an irrelevant consideration – where the applicant further alleged that the Assistant Minister denied the applicant procedural fairness – whether the Assistant Minister’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error – application allowed.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501, 501CA
Cases cited:

AZAFQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 243 FCR 451

Commissioner of Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576

Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCATrans 84

Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 351 ALR 61; [2018] HCA 2

Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 250 FCR 309

Kim v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 372

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Tesic (2017) 251 FCR 23

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 71 AAR 369; [2017] FCA 106

Parker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 314

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1465

Tupkovic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 73

Williams v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 226 FCR 112

Date of hearing: 19 April 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 75
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Hughes
Solicitor for the Applicant: Legal Aid
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Knowles
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 2236 of 2016
BETWEEN:

BENJAMIN TE MAU KEMP

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGE:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

27 JULY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be allowed.

2.A writ of certiorari be issued quashing the decision made by the Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection under s 501CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on 27 October 2016.

3.A writ of mandamus be issued requiring the respondent to re-determine, according to law, the applicant’s application that the respondent revoke the cancellation of his Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa.

4.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding as agreed or taxed.

Note:…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Kemp v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Kemp v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, Mr Kemp, sought judicial review of the Assistant Minister's decision not to revoke a decision to cancel his visa. Mr Kemp, a New Zealand citizen with a history of criminal offences, had been residing in Australia for several decades. He was serving a prison sentence for drug supply when his visa was cancelled. The Assistant Minister considered various factors, including Mr Kemp's ties to Australia, his health, and the risk he posed to the community, before deciding not to revoke the cancellation. Mr Kemp challenged the decision, arguing it was unreasonable and denied him procedural fairness.

The court had to determine if the Assistant Minister's decision was affected by jurisdictional error and if Mr Kemp was denied procedural fairness. Mr Kemp argued that the Assistant Minister's reasoning was unreasonable, particularly regarding the risk of him being influenced by others to reoffend, given his physical and mental impairments. He also claimed the Assistant Minister disproportionately weighed the risk to the Australian community, which outweighed other favorable considerations.

The court found that the Assistant Minister's reasoning was not unreasonable. The reference to Mr Kemp's "current situation" in the decision likely pertained to his medical conditions, not his inability to work or risk of destitution. The Assistant Minister's consideration of Mr Kemp's history of offending, combined with his current impairments, provided a rational basis for concluding he might still be susceptible to influence by others. Furthermore, the Assistant Minister's conclusion that the risk to the Australian community was significant was supported by the evidence, including Mr Kemp's criminal history and the nature of his offenses.

The court allowed the application, quashed the Assistant Minister's decision, and ordered a re-determination of Mr Kemp's visa cancellation request. The respondent was also ordered to pay Mr Kemp's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be allowed.

2. A writ of certiorari be issued quashing the decision made by the Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection under s 501CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) on 27 October 2016.

3. A writ of mandamus be issued requiring the respondent to re-determine, according to law, the applicant’s application that the respondent revoke the cancellation of his Class TY Subclass 444 Special Category (Temporary) visa.

4. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the proceeding as agreed or taxed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Following the decision in Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 351 ALR 61; [2018] HCA 2, which upheld the validity of s 501(3A) of the Act, the Court made orders by consent dismissing the FCC Proceeding with costs. The grounds which remain before the Court for determination are the two grounds raised in the Amended Originating Application. BACKGROUND Mr Kemp is a New Zealand citizen. He arrived in Australia in 1993 at the age of 28. He has three siblings, 15 nephews and nieces and 25 cousins in Australia. He has two siblings, seven nephews and nieces and 20 cousins in New Zealand. Mr Kemp says that he has lost contact with his family in New Zealand. From 1993 to 2011 Mr Kemp worked as a shearer at farm stations and undertook general farm duties. His ability to work declined because of the physical demands of the job and his development of “shearer’s back”. After a car crash, although he was in pain, Mr Kemp continued to work. Eventually the pain became too much and he drifted out of the work force. Mr Kemp lost an eye and became indebted. In August 2011 Mr Kemp was arrested for his involvement in the supply of a prohibited drug. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced in the District Court of New South Wales (District Court) to 11 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight years. That sentence was quashed by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal as manifestly excessive and Mr Kemp was resentenced to five years imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years expiring on 18 August 2016. While in prison Mr Kemp suffered a series of serious medical conditions. In 2015 Mr Kemp required brain surgery; in May 2016 he was readmitted to hospital having been found unconscious in his room with froth around his mouth; on 12 July 2016 Mr Kemp had a neurosurgical procedure; and on 13 July 2016 Mr Kemp returned to hospital for an emergency procedure. Post-operatively on 14 July 2016 Mr Kemp had a type of ischemic stroke and a “code blue” period of non-responsiveness which lasted for between 30 seconds and one minute. Documents produced by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (Department) to Mr Kemp in answer to a request made pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) include the following:(1)by email dated 9 May 2016 a community corrections officer of the Long Bay Parole Unit informed the National Character Consideration Centre (NCCC), among other things, that:… [Mr Kemp] suffered a stroke 2-3 months ago and was admitted to Prince of Wales Hospital where they removed absences (sic) on his brain and part of his brain. As a result of this operation his skull was broken to access his brain and it now requires reconstruction, due in the next months. Date unknown at this stage. Inmate wears a helmet all the time to protect his brain, suffers constant seizures and has a lack of feeling in his arms due to nerve damage. He also has cognitive issues and it is unknown what he understands or retains. Not sure whether he would legally be able to consent to anything. …(2)on 10 May 2016 the “A/Nursing Unit Manager” at Long Bay Hospital Aged Care Rehabilitation Unit informed the Department that Mr Kemp “could not survive in the main gaol population or Villawood because of his high medical needs”;(3)by email dated 14 June 2016 the “A/Nursing Unit Manager” at Long Bay Hospital Aged Care Rehabilitation Unit responded to queries raised by the Department as follows:…… What treatment is Mr KEMP receiving and is treatment likely to continue indefinitely?Mr Kemp is admitted at the aged care rehabilitation unit at the long bay hospital for an increased support and monitoring that other facilities i.e. a regular correctional centre would not be able to provide. … He was having seizure like symptoms, treatment and rehabilitation and required treatment at the medical sub-acute unit at the longbay (sic) hospital… Around 09/05/2016 he had a seizure and was sent to the Prince of wales hospital for further investigations and treatment. He had more complications with his health and required a prolonged hospital stay. Until now he remains at the Prince of wales hospital.…Will Mr KEMP require hospitalisation when he is released from prison?Yes he will definitely need a lot of specialist treatment. The cranial reconstruction which has not happened yet will determine how much he can function. Would Mr KEMP comprehend his situation if his visa were to be cancelled?Yes but has memory loss issues and is quite forget full (sic) the last time I have seen him. At present I cannot comment on this due to prolonged stay at the Prince of Wales Hospital. The neurosurgery doctor there might be able to provide you some more info.… Is Mr KEMP competent to make decisions about his own welfare?As he is able to agree and disagree most of the time. The reasoning behind his decisions lacked solid points and could not pinpoint as why he agrees or disagrees. This based from the last time I have seen him. The doctor at POWH might be able to give a much clearer picture of his cognitive state. …

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 27 October 2016 the Assistant Minister decided not to revoke the Cancellation Decision.Mr McAleese’s evidence Mr Kemp relied on an affidavit affirmed by his solicitor, Gerard McAleese, on 18 April 2017 which was read subject to the Minster’s objection on the grounds of relevance to two parts of it. The parties agreed that the Minister’s objection would be determined as part of these reasons. To the extent it was not the subject of objection, Mr McAleese gave evidence that he contacted Mr Kemp’s sister, Ellen Kemp, about the way in which Mr Kemp provided his reasons as to why the Cancellation Decision should be revoked. The evidence discloses that:(1)the form, which I infer was the personal circumstances form, was sent to Ms Kemp;(2)Ms Kemp completed the form by speaking with Mr Kemp and his carer over the telephone by:(a)asking Mr Kemp the questions on the form;(b)his carer then explaining what the questions meant to him; and (c)Ms Kemp writing down the answers;(3)the process took about an hour and a half; and(4)Ms Kemp also prepared the statement attached to the form signed by Mr Kemp which commences with the words “it was an honest mistake ...”. Mr McAleese’s evidence puts beyond doubt that Mr Kemp did not complete the form on his own. In fact the Assistant Minister acknowledges in his statement of reasons for the decision under s 501CA of the Act not to exercise his discretion to revoke a mandatory cancellation visa decision under s 501(3A) (Reasons) at [12] that Mr Kemp’s representations have “… in the main … been made on his behalf by his sister, Ellen Kemp, as Mr KEMP is not in a position to do so”. As noted above, the Minister objected to two parts of the affidavit on the grounds of relevance: first, where Ms Kemp describes Mr Kemp’s memory and his ability to understand the questions; and secondly, Ms Kemp’s explanation of why Mr Kemp did not complete the form by himself which exposes her observations about Mr Kemp’s disability. Mr Kemp submitted that those parts of the affidavit were relevant to the circumstances in which the decision was made, relying on Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 250 FCR 309 (Gill) at [74]; and to ground two which alleges a denial of procedural fairness. I would uphold the Minister’s objection to the identified parts of McAleese’s affidavit. They are not relevant to the issues before me for determination. Mr Kemp relies on [74] of Gill where Griffiths and Moshinsky JJ said that the primary judge erred in not taking into account the unchallenged evidence of the appellant’s solicitor relied on in the Court below. That was in circumstances where the criticism of the tribunal was that it had made a finding based on what was described by their Honours as an “erroneous belief, which was entirely unsupported by the evidence”. The evidence before the primary judge, which was not taken into account, was relevant to expose the error on the part of the tribunal. The case before me differs in several respects. The evidence which Mr Kemp seeks to rely on was not before the Assistant Minister and thus, contrary to Mr Kemp’s submission, it does not form part of the relevant circumstances as the question before me is whether the Assistant Minister’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. Further, ground two is not directed towards Mr Kemp’s ability to make meaningful and responsive representations. Rather, it is directed to the question of whether Mr Kemp was denied natural justice because he was not put on notice of the Assistant Minister’s finding that there was a particular risk the applicant might be influenced by others to commit crimes. This evidence can have no bearing on that issue. THE ASSISTANT MINISTER’S DECISION

Decision

Reasons for decision

I would uphold the Minister’s objection to the identified parts of McAleese’s affidavit. They are not relevant to the issues before me for determination. Mr Kemp relies on [74] of Gill where Griffiths and Moshinsky JJ said that the primary judge erred in not taking into account the unchallenged evidence of the appellant’s solicitor relied on in the Court below. That was in circumstances where the criticism of the tribunal was that it had made a finding based on what was described by their Honours as an “erroneous belief, which was entirely unsupported by the evidence”. The evidence before the primary judge, which was not taken into account, was relevant to expose the error on the part of the tribunal. The case before me differs in several respects. The evidence which Mr Kemp seeks to rely on was not before the Assistant Minister and thus, contrary to Mr Kemp’s submission, it does not form part of the relevant circumstances as the question before me is whether the Assistant Minister’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error. Further, ground two is not directed towards Mr Kemp’s ability to make meaningful and responsive representations. Rather, it is directed to the question of whether Mr Kemp was denied natural justice because he was not put on notice of the Assistant Minister’s finding that there was a particular risk the applicant might be influenced by others to commit crimes. This evidence can have no bearing on that issue. THE ASSISTANT MINISTER’S DECISION The Assistant Minister noted that the Visa was cancelled under s 501(3A). A delegate was satisfied that Mr Kemp did not pass the character test because of the operation of s 501(6)(a) of the Act on the basis of s 501(7)(c) because he was serving a term of imprisonment on a full-time basis for the offence of supply of a prohibited drug not less than the commercial quantity. After referring to the history of Mr Kemp’s conviction and sentencing, the Assistant Minister noted that Mr Kemp accepted that he did not satisfy the character test and did not dispute the information in the National Police Certificate dated 11 August 2016 concerning his criminal convictions. Accordingly, the Assistant Minister was not satisfied that the applicant passed the character test as defined by s 501 of the Act with the result that s 501CA(4)(b)(i) of the Act was not met. The Assistant Minister then turned to consider whether he was satisfied that there was another reason why the decision to cancel the Visa should be revoked pursuant to s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) of the Act. The Assistant Minister considered the following matters:(1)the best interests of minor children, noting that Mr Kemp listed that he had 15 nieces and nephews residing in Australia and that, although their ages were unknown, it was possible that some of them were minors. The Assistant Minister also referred to letters of support in which the authors had referred to their children’s relationship or proposed relationship with Mr Kemp. The Assistant Minister concluded that it was in the best interests of Mr Kemp’s minor nieces and nephews and his friends’ minor children for the Cancellation Decision to be revoked;(2)the strength, nature and duration of Mr Kemp’s ties to Australia. The Assistant Minister noted that Mr Kemp had expressed a strong desire to remain in Australia to be close to his family and that Mr Kemp’s sister described her close relationship with Mr Kemp, the positive impact he had had on her life, that he had a home in Australia with her and that she would care for and support him. The Assistant Minister observed that if the Cancellation Decision was not revoked, Mr Kemp’s family in Australia would experience emotional hardship. At [27] of the Reasons the Assistant Minister acknowledged that Mr Kemp had made a positive contribution to the Australian community through his previous employment and at [30] of the Reasons said that he had “given more weight to this consideration as Mr KEMP has spent at least some 18 years contributing positively to the community through his employment as a shearer and general farm hand”. The Assistant Minister found that Mr Kemp had been making a positive contribution to the community;(3)the difficulties that Mr Kemp would face if returned to New Zealand. The Assistant Minster referred to Mr Kemp’s “serious medical conditions” and noted that his current functional status was poor and that he requires assistance with mobility and care and an extensive medication regime. At [35] of the Reasons the Assistant Minister accepted that Mr Kemp’s current medical conditions were “relevant factors that would make his settlement in the (sic) New Zealand extremely difficult”. The Assistant Minister also noted that Mr Kemp had lost contact with his family in New Zealand and that his brother and sister who remain there “are not in a position to be able to help and assist” him. At [41] of the Reasons the Assistant Minister accepted that “non revocation of the decision to cancel Mr KEMP’s visa will result in emotional, financial and significant practical hardship for Mr KEMP” and noted that his absence from New Zealand of some 23 years would also cause him some hardship, at least in the short term, requiring a period of readjustment. Notwithstanding the initial hardship, the Assistant Minister found that the similarities between New Zealand and Australia, together with support services available there, would assist to some extent, in reducing the hardship that Mr Kemp would endure upon his return;(4)protecting the Australian community. The Assistant Minister noted that remaining in Australia is a privilege conferred on non-citizens in the expectation that they are law abiding. The Assistant Minister then considered Mr Kemp’s criminal conduct. He referred to Mr Kemp’s convictions, had regard to the circumstances of his offending by reference to the sentencing remarks of the District Court and the judgment of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal and referred to his prior criminal history, noting that he had “relatively minor antecedents in Australia” and a history of criminal offences in New Zealand prior to his arrival in Australia. The Assistant Minister found at [54] of the Reasons that “Mr KEMP’s drugs convictions, especially supply a prohibited drug not less than the commercial quantity, are serious having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offending and the dispositions imposed”; and(5)the risk to the Australian community. The Assistant Minister observed that at the time of committing the offences Mr Kemp’s situation “could hardly have been much worse”; Mr Kemp had demonstrated remorse for his offending; entered pleas of guilty, indicating that he was prepared to accept responsibility for his offending; was a model prisoner; “states that he has learned his lesson”; is adamant that there is no likelihood that he will re-offend after being in jail for five years; and said “being away from his family for so long has impacted his life”. The Assistant Minister also considered Mr Kemp’s criminal history in New Zealand and Australia, noting at [67] of the Reasons that “he continued to offend over a long period of time, albeit at a relatively minor level, despite sanctions such as fines, periodic detention and short terms of imprisonment”, a factor which caused him some concern. The Assistant Minister then said at [70]-[72] of the Reasons:70.The available evidence, in particular the medical reports suggest it is unlikely Mr KEMP would reoffend given his physical and mental impairments. Further Mr KEMP has a supportive and established social network. He is remorseful, and has been of satisfactory behaviour in custody and detention. I have considered the support from his sister, family and friends is a protective factor which may serve to reduce his likelihood of re-offending. I have also considered that prior to his offence Mr KEMP only had a minor criminal history and has served his first significant custodial sentence which will have a salutary effect upon him. Taking into consideration all of the aforementioned factors, I find that Mr KEMP poses a low risk of re-offending.71.I am unable to come to a conclusion that he poses no risk of offending, notwithstanding his current ailments, because his rehabilitation is yet to be tested in the community. He does have a history of reoffending, albeit on a relevantly minor scale, but when this is considered with his current situation and his previous remarks about his co-offender ‘abusing his trust’, it is possible that others may seek to take advantage of Mr KEMP and that he may be susceptible to their influence despite the pro social supports that he now enjoys.72.I find that if Mr KEMP were to re-offend by offences including the supply of drugs and in particular the supply of drugs not being less than a commercial quantity, the effect upon individuals and the potential harm to the Australian community would be significant.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

At [76] their Honours observed that:76… Even where some reasons have been provided, as is the case here, it may nevertheless not be possible for a court to comprehend how the decision was arrived at. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.Consideration Mr Kemp raises two issues in relation to [71] and [82] of the Reasons. First, he says that the reasoning at [71] of the Reasons, that he might be susceptible to the influence of others, lacked an intelligible justification because there is no explanation of how Mr Kemp, who the Assistant Minister accepts has physical and mental impairments, could be influenced by others. Secondly, he says that the Assistant Minister gave a disproportionate weight to the risk of harm to the Australian community by finding at [82] of the Reasons that it was so significant that it outweighed all of the other favourable considerations. At [82] of the Reasons the Assistant Minister states his conclusion that Mr Kemp represents an unacceptable risk of harm to the Australian community and that protection of the Australian community outweighed the other considerations set out in the Reasons. The finding at [71] of the Reasons (set out at [20(5)] above) was a step in the reasoning that led to that conclusion. Before making his findings at [71] of the Reasons the Assistant Minister made the following express findings about Mr Kemp: ·at the time of offending, Mr Kemp’s situation could hardly have been worse in that he was without employment, without accommodation and was living in his car with his dogs;·he had demonstrated remorse for his offending; ·he was prepared to accept responsibility for his offending and had developed some insight;·he was a model prisoner who was reported to be well-behaved and had “nil incidents”; ·he had made gains in his rehabilitation; ·he has a supportive and established family and a pro-social network in Australia and is motivated to lead a law abiding life;·his failure to declare his criminal history to the Department in 2011 on his incoming passenger card was an oversight; and ·given his physical and mental impairments, it was unlikely that Mr Kemp would re-offend and that he posed a low risk of re-offending. A review of [71] of the Reasons demonstrates that the Assistant Minister engaged in the following reasoning:·first, he noted that he was unable to reach a conclusion that Mr Kemp posed no risk of offending, notwithstanding his medical conditions, because his rehabilitation was yet to be tested in the community; and·next he noted that Mr Kemp has a history of offending and that, while on a minor scale, when considered with Mr Kemp’s “current situation” and his previous remarks about his co-offender “abusing his trust”, it is possible that others may seek to take advantage of Mr Kemp and that he may be susceptible to their influence. In my opinion, the reference to Mr Kemp’s “current situation” referred to by the Assistant Minister in this context can only be to his medical conditions, that is, his physical and mental impairments which are described in detail at [33] and referred to at [70] of the Reasons. I do not accept the Minister’s submission that the words “current situation” also comprehend the fact that he is unable to work and remains at risk of being destitute. That Mr Kemp is unable to work may be a consequence of his physical and mental impairments but there is nothing in the Reasons to suggest that the risk he may become destitute is part of, or relevant to, his “current situation”. This is particularly so given the finding at [70] of the Reasons that Mr Kemp has a “supportive and established social network”.