FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Parker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 314
File number: NSD 1953 of 2016 Judge: FLICK J Date of judgment: 29 March 2017 Catchwords: MIGRATION – failure to consider representations made – decisions made personally by Minister
MIGRATION – impermissibility of parsing and analysing a representation with a view to discerning a discrete claim not considered
Legislation: Migration Act1958 (Cth) ss 476, 476A, 501, 501CA
Migration Amendment (Character Cancellation Consequential Provisions) Act 2017 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 8.02
Cases cited: Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 106
Poroa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1313
Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1465
Tickner v Chapman (1995) 57 FCR 451
Tupkovic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 73
Tusitala v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1188
Date of hearing: 21 February 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 41 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr L Karp Solicitor for the Applicant: Kinslor Prince Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Mr T Reilly Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
NSD 1953 of 2016 BETWEEN: KEITH PARKER
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
FLICK J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 MARCH 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The proceeding is dismissed.
2.The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The Applicant, Mr Keith Parker, is a citizen of the United Kingdom. He arrived in Australia when he was 12 years old. He has remained in Australia ever since, a period of time being approximately 48 years.
On 31 August 2015 a delegate of the Minister cancelled Mr Parker’s Class BF transitional (permanent) visa pursuant to s 501(3A) of the Migration Act1958 (Cth) (the “Migration Act”). At the time, Mr Parker was serving a sentence of imprisonment for being in possession of child abuse material and failing to comply with reporting obligations. He had previously been sentenced for four convictions of indecent assault of a minor under the age of 16 years, three convictions of homosexual intercourse with a minor and two convictions of gross acts of indecency.
The Minister has the power to revoke the delegate’s decision pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act. As permitted by that section, representations were made by Mr Parker to the Minister on 8 September 2015. On 16 September 2016 the Minister decided not to revoke the delegate’s decision to cancel his visa.
Mr Parker thereafter sought judicial review of the Minister’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court of…
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- Case
- [2017] FCA 314
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court centred on whether the Minister had erred by not considering the representations made by Mr Parker, and whether the Minister had impermissibly parsed and analysed these representations to discern a discrete claim that was not adequately considered. Specifically, the court had to determine if the Minister's failure to consider Mr Parker's representation about the "privilege" of remaining in Australia constituted a jurisdictional error.
The court reasoned that the Minister's consideration of Mr Parker's representations, particularly those concerning the "privilege" of remaining in Australia, did not distort the decision-making process. The court found that the references to the "privilege" were not determinative of the Minister's decision and did not constitute a jurisdictional error. The court dismissed the grounds of review and concluded that the proceeding should be dismissed, with the applicant to pay the costs of the respondent.
The final orders of the court were that the proceeding be dismissed and that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent. This decision underscores the importance of proper consideration of all relevant representations made during the visa cancellation process under the Migration Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The proceeding is dismissed.
2. The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Respondent.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There is authority in support of the proposition that the Minister may fall into error in taking into account the “privilege” enjoyed by a person of remaining in Australia: Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1465. Collier J there concluded, upon an analysis of the reasons provided by the Minister in that case, that jurisdictional error was exposed. Her Honour concluded (in part) as follows:[53] In his statement of reasons before me, the Minister referred to this “principle” of a “privilege” a number of times. Critically, I note his statement at paragraph 31 where he said, in relation to the issue of protecting the Australian community:I also took into consideration that remaining in Australia is a privilege that Australia confers on non-citizens in the expectation they are law abiding.[54] This statement was complemented by paragraph 55 in the Conclusion to the statement of reasons where the Minister said:I am mindful of the principle that persons who commit serious crimes should expect to forfeit the privilege of remaining in Australia.[55] I do not accept that the statements of the Minister in respect of “privilege” in this case could properly be confined to rhetoric expounding the relevant considerations concerning Mr Tesic’s criminal history and the importance of protecting the Australian community.[56] The fact that the Minister “took into consideration” that remaining in Australia is a privilege that Australia confers on non-citizens indicates that the decision-making process was distorted. The “principle” coloured the Minister’s reasoning process. The Minister approached the decision from that perspective. The decision in Tesic has subsequently been distinguished in Tupkovic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 73 and Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 106. The position adopted on behalf of Mr Parker was that these two grounds could be dealt with together and were only “formally” pressed. The position adopted by the Respondent Minister was that given the grounds were only “formally” pressed, there was no need to deal with them. Whatever be the status of these grounds, they are nevertheless to be rejected. No submission was advanced that on a proper consideration of the Minister’s statement of reasons such reference as was made at paras [28] and [48] to the “privilege” enjoyed by Mr Parker was but a passing reference which played no operative part in his reasoning process or that the Minister did not apply the concept of a “privilege” as a “principle”. But such is the conclusion reached. CONCLUSIONS Neither of the two grounds of review which were pressed have been made out. The remaining two grounds of review which were only “formally” pressed are to be rejected. The proceeding is to be dismissed. Counsel for both the Applicant and the Respondent Minister were in agreement that costs should follow the event.THE ORDERS OF THE COURT ARE: 1.The proceeding is dismissed.2.The Applicant is to pay the costs of the Respondent.