Parker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Parker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2017] FCAFC 115

Appeal from: Parker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 314
File number: NSD 580 of 2017
Judges: SIOPIS, GRIFFITHS AND CHARLESWORTH JJ
Date of judgment: 4 August 2017
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Minister’s decision under s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 refusing to revoke visa cancellation decision on character grounds – whether primary judge erred in not finding that the Minister failed to engage in an “active intellectual process” in respect of representations relating to the appellant’s mother’s needs and adequate care

Held: grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal dismissed; grounds 3 and 4 of the appeal stood over pending outcome of proceedings in the High Court concerning Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection No B36 of 2017; ground 5 stood over pending outcome of Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection No S31 of 2017  

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501, 501CA

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 2.52

Cases cited:

Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; 236 FCR 593

Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107

Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection No S31 of 2017

Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Tesic [2017] FCAFC 93

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

Parker v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 314

Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection No B36 of 2017

Tickner v Chapman [1995] FCAFC 1726; 57 FCR 451

Date of hearing: 2 August 2017
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 24
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr L Karp
Solicitor for the Appellant: Kinslor Prince Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr T Reilly
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

NSD 580 of 2017
BETWEEN:

KEITH PARKER

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGES:

SIOPIS, GRIFFITHS AND CHARLESWORTH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

4 AUGUST 2017

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appellant has leave to file and rely upon the further amended notice of appeal dated 1 August 2017. 

2.Grounds 3 and 4 of the further amended notice of appeal are stood over for mention on a date to be fixed, not sooner than seven days after:

(a)the decision of the High Court of Australia concerning the application for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Tesic [2017] FCAFC 93; or

(b)the determination of the appeal by the High Court of Australia if special leave to appeal is granted.

3.Grounds 1 and 2 of the further amended notice of appeal are dismissed. 

4.The appellant is to…

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Details
Case
[2017] FCAFC 115
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, Parker appealed against the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection’s refusal to revoke a visa cancellation decision on character grounds. The appellant, a non-citizen, was in detention and sought revocation of the cancellation decision on the basis that he was the sole carer of his mother who was wheelchair-bound and had dementia. The appellant claimed that removal from Australia would have a detrimental effect on his mother’s health and wellbeing. The primary judge dismissed the appeal, finding that the Minister had properly considered the appellant’s submissions and representations.

The court considered whether the primary judge erred in not finding that the Minister failed to engage in an "active intellectual process" in respect of the representations relating to the appellant’s mother’s needs and adequate care. The appellant submitted that the primary judge should have found that the Minister failed to properly consider the appellant’s submissions and representations. The court found that the primary judge did not err in his consideration of the Minister’s decision. The court found that the primary judge had correctly identified the relevant considerations and appropriately applied the relevant legal principles.

The court dismissed grounds 1 and 2 of the appeal, which challenged the primary judge’s determination that the Minister’s decision was not legally flawed. The court stood over grounds 3 and 4 of the appeal pending the outcome of proceedings in the High Court concerning Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection No B36 of 2017. The court also stood over ground 5 of the appeal pending the outcome of Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection No S31 of 2017. Final orders must await the determination of the proceedings in the High Court of Australia in Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection No B36 of 2017 and in Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection No S31 of 2017, whichever is the later.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appellant has leave to file and rely upon the further amended notice of appeal dated 1 August 2017.

2. Grounds 3 and 4 of the further amended notice of appeal are stood over for mention on a date to be fixed, not sooner than seven days after:

(a) the decision of the High Court of Australia concerning the application for special leave to appeal against the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Tesic [2017] FCAFC 93; or

(b) the determination of the appeal by the High Court of Australia if special leave to appeal is granted.

3. Grounds 1 and 2 of the further amended notice of appeal are dismissed.

4. The appellant is to pay the respondent’s costs of, and incidental to, grounds 1 and 2 of the further amended notice of appeal.

NOTE:

Final orders must await the determination of the proceedings in the High Court of Australia in Tesic v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection No B36 of 2017 and in Falzon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection No S31 of 2017, whichever is the later.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The following matters of relevance to grounds 1 and 2 should be noted in this material, which was before the Minister when he decided not to revoke the visa cancellation decision:(a)In his request for revocation dated 8 September 2015, the appellant said that he was the sole carer of his father (then aged 87), who was totally blind, and his mother (then aged 84) who was wheelchair bound. Both his parents lived in the appellant’s home. He said that while he had been in Long Bay gaol for the previous four months, his parents had received meals on wheels and homecare. (b)In an email dated 11 December 2015, the appellant said that his mother was “wheel chair bound and almost house bound as well, had to turn to care and meals on wheels this was not really good enough as my parents needed twenty-four seven care” (sic). (c)In an email dated 7 December 2015, the appellant said that his father had passed away and that his mother was now in need of his help, in circumstances where she has “full on signs of dementia and wheel chair bound which only be getting worse and I need to get home to look after my mum please” (sic).(d)The appellant forwarded a solicitor’s character reference dated 20 November 2015, in which the solicitor, who said he had known the appellant for over 25 years, referred to the recent death of the appellant’s father and the deteriorating health of his mother. The solicitor said that if the appellant were removed from Australia this would have a considerable effect on both he and his mother. He said that the appellant’s mother relied upon the appellant to provide housing for her.(e)In a character reference dated 27 November 2015 from the appellant’s eldest brother (David), it was stated that the death of their father had put huge pressure on David and his sister “to provide adequate care for mum as Keith has been providing for the last four to five years and the deteriorating health of mum, and the recent death of dad and with the possibility of never seeing one of her sons again is takeing (sic) a huge toll on her… if Keith is unable to remain living in his home of Australia”. (f)In an email dated 11 December 2015, the appellant wrote stating that this would likely be his mother’s last Christmas as she was in poor health and had dementia. (g)The appellant sent further emails on 17 and 29 December 2015. In the first, he expressed his hope that he would be able to return home before Christmas [100] and in the second he wrote that his mother was home alone in his house “scared out of her wits” and that he was his mother’s fulltime carer and would never leave her alone. (h)In an undated letter, the appellant’s mother said that the appellant had been her carer for a few years and that she would be lost without him. She said that if he was removed from Australia she knew she would never see him again and that because she did not have long to live he should be allowed to come home to her. (i)Other references were provided by third parties referring to the appellant as a caring son who had looked after his mother and father.(j)In a letter dated 9 February 2016, a doctor who apparently had knowledge of the appellant’s mother’s health, wrote and confirmed that she suffered from “multiple medical conditions and is unwell to travel” and that “she would benefit from a home visit from her son”. The letter was addressed to the Villawood Detention Centre. (k)In an email dated 9 June 2016, the appellant emailed the Department and said that he had to get home to look after his mother. He said that his sister was their mother’s “sole carer at this moment they both live in my house I am still paying the bills other wise my mum would have to reside into a nursing home which she does not want to do” (sic). He said that he and his sister would share the task of looking after their mother if he were released. He also repeated that his mother was “in need of constant care 24/7”.(l)In an email dated 24 August 2016, the appellant’s aunt, who wrote from overseas, said that she had been told that the appellant’s mother was to be placed in a home, initially for six weeks, and that she expected that she would “absolutely hate this” and that she missed the appellant being around as her carer. The primary judge’s reasons for judgment summarised

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established