Anees v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Anees v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 67

Appeal from: Anees v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 84
File number: VID 124 of 2019
Judges: BROMBERG, KERR AND ANASTASSIOU JJ
Date of judgment: 17 April 2020
Catchwords: COSTS – appeal allowed on ground not advanced before primary judge – appellant awarded costs of appeal – no general principle that in those circumstances adverse costs order in court below should not be disturbed – order not disturbed having regard to the particular circumstances of the case
Cases cited:

Anees v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 28

Comcare v Lilley [2013] FCAFC 121; 216 FCR 214

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v AusNet Transmission Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 124

Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; 193 CLR 72

Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) [2001] FCA 1865; 115 FCR 229

Uriaere v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 235

Victoria v Sportsbet Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 174

Weti-Safwan v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 173

Date of hearing: 14 November 2019 and 20 December 2019
Date of last submissions: 12 March 2020
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 25
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr Burnside AO QC and Mr Watkins
Solicitor for the Appellant: Carina Ford Immigration Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr N Wood
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent:  The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice

ORDERS

VID 124 of 2019
BETWEEN:

NAUROZE ANEES

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGES:

BROMBERG, KERR AND ANASTASSIOU JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

17 APRIL 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or as taxed.

2.The order made on 8 February 2019 by the primary judge for costs in that proceeding not be disturbed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

  1. On 2 March 2020 this Court made the following orders for the reasons it published as Anees v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 28:

    1.The Appellant have leave to file a Further Amended Notice of Appeal and to rely on an appeal ground particular not advanced before the primary judge.

    2.        The appeal is upheld.

    3.The orders of the primary judge made on 8 February 2019 save for the orders as to costs are set aside, and in lieu thereof the decision of the Second Respondent is quashed and the matter is remitted to the Second Respondent for determination according to law.

    4. In the absence of agreement between the parties on the question of the costs of the appeal and the order as to costs made by the…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCAFC 67
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Anees v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2), the primary concern was the costs associated with an appeal. The appellant, Mr. Anees, sought a review of the costs order made by the primary judge in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was the respondent. The appellant argued that the costs order should be reviewed, particularly in light of his success on the appeal, despite not having advanced certain grounds of appeal before the primary judge.

The court needed to decide whether it was appropriate to disturb the costs order made by the primary judge, particularly given that the appellant had successfully appealed on a ground not advanced before the primary judge. The court also needed to consider the principles regarding the award of costs and whether the conduct of the parties influenced the overall costs order.

The court held that there is no general principle that, in circumstances where an appellant succeeds on a ground not advanced before the primary judge, an adverse costs order in the court below should not be disturbed. The court reasoned that the principles regarding the award of costs are well established, and ordinarily, a successful party is entitled to an award of costs. The court noted that the disaggregation of costs is appropriate only in exceptional cases and that the conduct of the parties can influence the overall costs order, particularly in cases of mixed success. The court concluded that the particular circumstances of the case did not warrant disturbing the costs order made by the primary judge.

The court ordered that the First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or as taxed. The court also ordered that the costs order made by the primary judge on 8 February 2019 not be disturbed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The First Respondent pay the Appellant’s costs of the appeal as agreed or as taxed.

2. The order made on 8 February 2019 by the primary judge for costs in that proceeding not be disturbed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As to the costs of the appeal, Ms Whittemore submits:6.Because of the appellant’s amendment on the first day of the hearing, it was not possible for the Minister fairly to respond on that day. In effect, the appellant’s late application to amend on that day caused the adjournment. The appellant should pay the costs of that day (cf. Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Aulakh [2018] FCAFC 91 at [85]), especially when he was ultimately unsuccessful on the ground of appeal that had up to that point advanced (cf. Parker v Minister for immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 115 at [24]). 7.Put alternatively, but for the late application to amend, the matter clearly would have been heard on one day only. Accordingly, it can be seen that the consequence of the appellant’s late amendment is that the Minister unnecessarily bore costs of appearance at a second day that he would not otherwise have had to. The appellant should bear those costs. Consideration As a preliminary observation, we reject the proposition that the considerations raised on behalf of the Appellant at paragraph 6(b) of his submissions are open to be considered relevant to the exercise of this Court’s discretion to award or not award costs. If a party is otherwise properly liable to pay the other party’s costs, the contingent consequence that that party might have difficulty in meeting their payment and any actions that might be taken in consequence of their non-payment is immaterial to the prior exercise of the Court’s discretion to award, or not award, those costs. The principles regarding the award of costs are well established. Ordinarily, a successful party is entitled to an award of costs in its favour in the absence of special circumstances justifying some other order: see Ruddock v Vadarlis (No 2) [2001] FCA 1865; 115 FCR 229 at [11] per Black CJ and French J; Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; 193 CLR 72 at [67] per McHugh J, at [134] per Kirby J; Victoria v Sportsbet Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 174 at [6]-[7] per Emmett, Kenny and Middleton JJ; and Federal Commissioner of Taxation v AusNet Transmission Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 124 at [10] per Kenny, Edmonds and Greenwood JJ. In respect of the costs of the appeal in this proceeding, the question is the familiar one often arising in cases of mixed success: being whether a successful party’s failure on one issue should affect the overall costs order. The Court’s discretion is always open to be influenced by the conduct of the parties to a proceeding, having regard to their mixed success: see for example Comcare v Lilley [2013] FCAFC 121; 216 FCR 214 per Kerr, Farrell and Mortimer JJ at [113]-[115]. However, the disaggregation of costs is appropriate only in an exceptional case. Ordinarily the Court will not apportion costs where a party has been wholly successful in an appeal, notwithstanding that that success has been established by reason of the Court having granted him or her leave to rely on a ground not pressed in the court below.