FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Andrwas v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1996
File number: NSD 1247 of 2018 Judge: RARES J Date of judgment: 29 November 2018 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 65, 499, 501, 501CA
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Refugees Convention
Cases cited: BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 456
ETA067 v Republic of Nauru (2018) 360 ALR 228
Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 295
Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173
Uelese v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015)256 CLR 203
Date of hearing: 29 November 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 70 Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S M Kelly Solicitor for the Applicant: Victoria Legal Aid Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms L A Coleman Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1247 of 2018 BETWEEN: ISSA ANDRWAS
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
29 NOVEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant have leave to file a further amended originating application for review of a migration decision.
2.The further amended originating application be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RARES J:
This is an application to review the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal given on 2 July 2018 not to revoke the decision of a delegate of the Minister made on 9 April 2018, to cancel the applicant’s class BB subclass 155 (five year resident return) visa pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The matter has been very ably argued by counsel on both sides.
The applicant is a citizen of Jordan. There was no issue before the Tribunal, which heard witnesses and argument over three days, that he failed the character test because he had a substantial criminal record involving numerous offences for which he had been sentenced for terms greater than 1 years’ imprisonment. He had an extensive criminal history in Australia involving a great number of offences for fraud and deception committed between 2002 and 2016. He had been convicted and sentenced most recently, on 15 December 2016, on six counts of dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception and related offences, as well as escaping from lawful custody, for which he received a head sentence of three years and three months’ imprisonment with a one year and 10 month non-parole period with conditions.
The issues
Essentially, the further amended application raised five grounds that the applicant pressed as to…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1996
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in weighing the primary and other considerations relevant to the revocation of a mandatory visa cancellation. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Tribunal had erred in assessing the best interests of the applicant’s minor daughter and whether this consideration had been given adequate weight against the other primary considerations of protection of the Australian community and the expectations of the Australian community.
The court held that the Tribunal had correctly identified and applied the relevant provisions of the Act, including the need to consider both primary and other considerations when deciding whether to revoke a mandatory visa cancellation. It noted that while the Tribunal had accepted that the best interests of the applicant’s daughter might be served by revoking the cancellation, this consideration was ultimately given limited weight due to the applicant’s limited relationship with his daughter, stemming from his extensive periods of incarceration. The court also observed that the applicant’s daughter would turn 18 within a year, which further reduced the weight of this consideration. The court concluded that the Tribunal had correctly balanced the best interests consideration against the other primary considerations and had not erred in upholding the Minister’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa.
The court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs. The court also granted the applicant leave to file a further amended originating application for review of the migration decision, but noted that the further amended originating application was to be dismissed. The costs order was to be entered in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The applicant have leave to file a further amended originating application for review of a migration decision.
2. The further amended originating application be dismissed.
3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Here, the relevant considerations in Part C and cl 8(3), provided that both primary and other considerations may weigh in favour of or against whether or not to revoke a mandatory cancellation of a visa, while cl 8(4) provided that primary considerations generally should be given greater weight than other ones and cl 8(5) provided that one or more primary considerations may outweigh other primary considerations. Part C provided that where the discretion to consider revocation was enlivened, the decision-maker had to consider whether to revoke the cancellation “given the specific circumstances of the case” (cl 13(1)) and that in that consideration, there were three primary considerations; namely, first, protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct (the protection consideration), secondly, the best interests of minor children (the best interests consideration), and thirdly, the expectations of the Australian community (the expectations consideration) (cl 13(2)). Each of those primary considerations was elaborated in the remaining provisions of cl 13. Relevantly, cl 13.2(1) provided, in respect of the best interests consideration, that:Decision-makers must make a determination about whether revocation is, or is not, in the best interests of the child. (emphasis added) However, cl 13.2(2) said that the consideration applied only if the child was, or would be, under 18 years of age at the time when the decision to revoke or not revoke the mandatory cancellation decision was expected to be made. Clause 13.2(4) set out a number of factors that had to be considered, where relevant, including: the nature and duration of the relationship between the child and non-citizen; the extent to which the non-citizen was likely to play a positive parental role in the future, taking into account the length of time until the child turned 18; and, the likely effect of any separation of the non-citizen on the child, taking into account the child’s or non-citizen’s ability to maintain contact in other ways. Clause 14 in Part C, headed “Other considerations – revocation requests”, included, in cl 14(1), that other considerations had to be taken into account where relevant, and these included, but were not limited to, first, international non-refoulement obligations, secondly, the strength, nature and duration of ties, thirdly, the impact on Australia’s business interests, and, fourthly, the extent of impediments if the non-citizen were removed. Clause 14.1 dealt with international non-refoulement obligations, noting that these were an obligation not forcibly to return, deport or expel a person to a place where they will be at risk of specific types of harm, and that the Act had reflected Australia’s interpretation of those obligations. It stated that, where relevant, decision-makers needed to follow the tests enunciated in the Act, bearing in mind that s 5 defined such obligations as including non-refoulement obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the 1967 Protocol, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol.