Andrwas v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Andrwas v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1996

File number: NSD 1247 of 2018
Judge: RARES J
Date of judgment: 29 November 2018
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 65, 499, 501, 501CA

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

Refugees Convention

Cases cited:

BCR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 248 FCR 456

ETA067 v Republic of Nauru (2018) 360 ALR 228

Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2017) 254 FCR 295

Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 258 CLR 173

Uelese v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015)256 CLR 203

Date of hearing: 29 November 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 70
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms S M Kelly
Solicitor for the Applicant: Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms L A Coleman
Solicitor for the First Respondent: MinterEllison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1247 of 2018
BETWEEN:

ISSA ANDRWAS

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 NOVEMBER 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant have leave to file a further amended originating application for review of a migration decision.

2.The further amended originating application be dismissed.

3.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RARES J:

  1. This is an application to review the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal given on 2 July 2018 not to revoke the decision of a delegate of the Minister made on 9 April 2018, to cancel the applicant’s class BB subclass 155 (five year resident return) visa pursuant to s 501CA(4) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The matter has been very ably argued by counsel on both sides.

  2. The applicant is a citizen of Jordan.  There was no issue before the Tribunal, which heard witnesses and argument over three days, that he failed the character test because he had a substantial criminal record involving numerous offences for which he had been sentenced for terms greater than 1 years’ imprisonment.  He had an extensive criminal history in Australia involving a great number of offences for fraud and deception committed between 2002 and 2016.  He had been convicted and sentenced most recently, on 15 December 2016, on six counts of dishonestly obtaining a financial advantage by deception and related offences, as well as escaping from lawful custody, for which he received a head sentence of three years and three months’ imprisonment with a one year and 10 month non-parole period with conditions.

    The issues

  3. Essentially, the further amended application raised five grounds that the applicant pressed as to…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1996
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Andrwas, appealed against the Tribunal’s decision to uphold the Minister’s decision to cancel his visa. The Tribunal had found that the applicant’s criminal offending and lack of insight and remorse, along with his drug and gambling addictions, indicated a high risk of future reoffending, thus justifying the cancellation of his visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). However, the Tribunal also considered the best interests of the applicant’s minor daughter, who wished for her father to remain in Australia. Despite finding that the best interests of the daughter might be served by revoking the cancellation decision, the Tribunal ultimately concluded that the protection of the Australian community and the expectations of the Australian community outweighed the best interests consideration.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) in weighing the primary and other considerations relevant to the revocation of a mandatory visa cancellation. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the Tribunal had erred in assessing the best interests of the applicant’s minor daughter and whether this consideration had been given adequate weight against the other primary considerations of protection of the Australian community and the expectations of the Australian community.

The court held that the Tribunal had correctly identified and applied the relevant provisions of the Act, including the need to consider both primary and other considerations when deciding whether to revoke a mandatory visa cancellation. It noted that while the Tribunal had accepted that the best interests of the applicant’s daughter might be served by revoking the cancellation, this consideration was ultimately given limited weight due to the applicant’s limited relationship with his daughter, stemming from his extensive periods of incarceration. The court also observed that the applicant’s daughter would turn 18 within a year, which further reduced the weight of this consideration. The court concluded that the Tribunal had correctly balanced the best interests consideration against the other primary considerations and had not erred in upholding the Minister’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa.

The court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and ordered that the applicant pay the first respondent’s costs. The court also granted the applicant leave to file a further amended originating application for review of the migration decision, but noted that the further amended originating application was to be dismissed. The costs order was to be entered in accordance with Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant have leave to file a further amended originating application for review of a migration decision.

2. The further amended originating application be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal found that the applicant’s behaviour had demonstrated a lack of insight and remorse into his criminal offending and gave it little comfort when considering his risk of future reoffending. It found that he had had many “serious wake-up calls”, through multiple periods of incarceration and previous warnings about the cancellation of his visa, but had continued to reoffend, often while on bail for previous offences. The Tribunal was not convinced that the applicant had adequately addressed his drug and gambling addictions which were the main contributing factors to his offending behaviour and concluded that for all of the reasons it had expressed (at [62]):…the risk to the Australian community weighs heavily in favour of a decision that the applicant’s visa be cancelled. (emphasis added) Turning secondly to the best interests consideration, the Tribunal set out cl 13.2 of Direction 65 that required it to make a determination as to whether the cancellation was or was not in the best interests of minor children. It referred to the evidence in support of non-revocation given by the applicant’s ex-wife and by his 16-year-old daughter and his 20-year-old son, both of whom were Australian citizens. Both his children gave evidence that they wished the applicant to remain. The Tribunal correctly noted that, for the purposes of the best interests consideration, it could only have regard to the interests of his 16-year-old daughter and proceeded to evaluate the various impacts on her which cancellation might have, including assessing his ex-wife’s and son’s evidence about those impacts. Crucially, the Tribunal said at [71]-[72]:Having regard to the evidence, I accept that the best interests of the applicant’s daughter may be served by the cancellation decision being revoked. This would allow for the possibility of face-to-face contact with her father during the remainder of her minor years and would allow him to be physically present in her life during the period that she transitions into womanhood. However, I give this consideration limited weight because the applicant has had a limited relationship with his daughter over the years. This is predominantly due to the fact that the applicant has spent a significant amount of her life in prison or detention. Another reason why this consideration should be given less weight is because the applicant’s daughter will be turning 18 in just over a year, limiting the extent to which the applicant will play a parental role in the future.On balance, I consider that this primary consideration is not outweighed by the other primary considerations such as the expectations and protection of the Australian community. (emphasis added) The positive decision issue arises because of the expression at the beginning of [71] of its reasons that the Tribunal accepted “the best interests of the applicant’s daughter may be served by the cancellation decision being revoked” (emphasis added). The applicant argued in his written submissions that at [72], the Tribunal had treated the best interests consideration as outweighing the others. However, in the course of argument, his counsel accepted that there was a typographical error in [72] so that it should be understood to have said that the best interests consideration did not outweigh the other two primary considerations.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Here, the relevant considerations in Part C and cl 8(3), provided that both primary and other considerations may weigh in favour of or against whether or not to revoke a mandatory cancellation of a visa, while cl 8(4) provided that primary considerations generally should be given greater weight than other ones and cl 8(5) provided that one or more primary considerations may outweigh other primary considerations. Part C provided that where the discretion to consider revocation was enlivened, the decision-maker had to consider whether to revoke the cancellation “given the specific circumstances of the case” (cl 13(1)) and that in that consideration, there were three primary considerations; namely, first, protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct (the protection consideration), secondly, the best interests of minor children (the best interests consideration), and thirdly, the expectations of the Australian community (the expectations consideration) (cl 13(2)). Each of those primary considerations was elaborated in the remaining provisions of cl 13. Relevantly, cl 13.2(1) provided, in respect of the best interests consideration, that:Decision-makers must make a determination about whether revocation is, or is not, in the best interests of the child. (emphasis added) However, cl 13.2(2) said that the consideration applied only if the child was, or would be, under 18 years of age at the time when the decision to revoke or not revoke the mandatory cancellation decision was expected to be made. Clause 13.2(4) set out a number of factors that had to be considered, where relevant, including: the nature and duration of the relationship between the child and non-citizen; the extent to which the non-citizen was likely to play a positive parental role in the future, taking into account the length of time until the child turned 18; and, the likely effect of any separation of the non-citizen on the child, taking into account the child’s or non-citizen’s ability to maintain contact in other ways. Clause 14 in Part C, headed “Other considerations – revocation requests”, included, in cl 14(1), that other considerations had to be taken into account where relevant, and these included, but were not limited to, first, international non-refoulement obligations, secondly, the strength, nature and duration of ties, thirdly, the impact on Australia’s business interests, and, fourthly, the extent of impediments if the non-citizen were removed. Clause 14.1 dealt with international non-refoulement obligations, noting that these were an obligation not forcibly to return, deport or expel a person to a place where they will be at risk of specific types of harm, and that the Act had reflected Australia’s interpretation of those obligations. It stated that, where relevant, decision-makers needed to follow the tests enunciated in the Act, bearing in mind that s 5 defined such obligations as including non-refoulement obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the 1967 Protocol, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol.