FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Minister for Home Affairs v YZXB [2019] FCA 1134
Review of: Application for Judicial Review: YZXB and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 69 File number: NSD 330 of 2019 Judge: STEWART J Date of judgment: 25 July 2019 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the Tribunal revoked a decision to cancel the applicant’s visa – whether the Tribunal’s assessment and balancing of the primary considerations and other considerations was consistent with Direction 65 – standard of judicial review of reasons of the Tribunal – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 474(2), 476A(1)(b), 499, 500(1)(ba), 501(2), 501(3A), 501CA(4) Cases cited: DKXY v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 495
FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 500
Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259
Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 127; 254 FCR 295
Date of hearing: 22 July 2019 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 50 Counsel for the Applicant: C Lenehan Solicitor for the Applicant: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: C Jackson Solicitor for the First Respondent: South West Legal Migration Services Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 330 of 2019 BETWEEN: MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
Applicant
AND: YZXB
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
STEWART J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 JULY 2019
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The originating application filed on 6 March 2019 is dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
STEWART J:
Introduction
This is an application for the review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The review to this Court is under s 476A(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) of a decision by the Tribunal on review of a “privative clause decision” (see s 474(2)) under s 500(1)(ba). The result is that in order to succeed in reviewing and setting aside the decision of the Tribunal, the applicant must establish jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.
Background
The relevant decision-making history is as follows.
On 19 January 2016, the first respondent’s Class XB Subclass 202 (Global Special Humanitarian) visa was cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Act on the basis that the first respondent had a “substantial criminal record”, having been convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more as referred to in s 501(7)(c) of the Act.
That…
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- Case
- [2019] FCA 1134
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key legal issue before the court was whether the AAT's assessment and balancing of the primary considerations and other factors in its decision were consistent with Direction 65. The first respondent argued that the AAT had erred in its evaluation of the risk to the Australian community, suggesting that the risk was more than minimal and that the primary consideration should have outweighed the others. The Minister for Home Affairs, on the other hand, contended that the AAT's decision was reasonable and that there was no jurisdictional error in its assessment.
The court held that the AAT's assessment and balancing of the various considerations were consistent with Direction 65. The court emphasised that the reasons of the AAT should be read as a whole and given a beneficial construction, avoiding over-critical scrutiny. The Tribunal had properly recognised the seriousness of the offence but also concluded that the risk of reoffending was minimal. This finding, according to the court, was decisive in favour of revoking the visa cancellation. The court found that the AAT had not made any jurisdictional error in its decision-making process and dismissed the application for judicial review.
The Federal Court dismissed the application for judicial review and ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed. This ruling confirms the AAT's authority in balancing various considerations when revoking a visa cancellation, provided its reasoning is consistent with the relevant legal framework.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The originating application filed on 6 March 2019 is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The first respondent also submitted that the passages of FYBR and Nigam relied on by the Minister both allow for the possibility of the primary consideration in question weighing either way, depending on the circumstances of the particular case.Consideration The starting point of the analysis must necessarily be to properly understand the Tribunal’s reasoning. In that regard, the reasons must be read and understood as a whole. Moreover, in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259, Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ (at 271-272) identified a number of propositions of the Full Court of this Court in previous cases favouring an approach that a decision-maker’s reasons are entitled to a “beneficial construction”. These included that a court should not be “concerned with looseness in the language … nor with unhappy phrasing” of the reasons of an administrative decision-maker and “the reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.” The Court then stated the following:These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. [The] … court must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. In the same case, Kirby J (at 291-293) gave an expanded analysis of the importance of not reading the reasons of the decision-maker over critically. In the critical paragraph, being paragraph [69], of its reasons the Tribunal was not in any express way identifying the question that it sought to answer. Nor was it construing, or setting out a conclusion on the construction of, Direction 65. In my view, the Tribunal was expressing a conclusion on the task required of it, namely to balance the various competing considerations, including the primary considerations identified by Direction 65, to reach an evaluative judgement. The Tribunal was doing what Perry J in FYBR at [37] identified as being necessary, namely balancing the various considerations against each other. It was not expressing a normative conclusion with regard to the construction of the primary consideration at issue. This is revealed by the fact that it had earlier in its reasons considered each of the primary and other considerations and that paragraph [69] is preceded by the heading “Conclusion”. What paragraph [69] does is to draw together an ultimate conclusion based on the preceding discussion – which recognises the seriousness of the offence (at paragraphs [43] and [49]) and that the protection of the Australian community is of primary importance (at paragraph [52]). Understood in this way, the reasons as a whole are to be read as saying that the Tribunal’s findings with regard to the minimal risk of reoffending or committing other offences ultimately weigh in the first respondent’s favour in the sense that they are decisive – because of them the relevant primary consideration carries little weight and is outweighed by the considerations in favour of revocation. The latter considerations were identified earlier in the reasons as the best interests of a minor child and the first respondent’s ties to Australia, and possibly also the difficulties that he may face in re-establishing himself in Iraq.