Minister for Home Affairs v YZXB

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Minister for Home Affairs v YZXB [2019] FCA 1134

Review of: Application for Judicial Review: YZXB and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 69
File number: NSD 330 of 2019
Judge: STEWART J
Date of judgment: 25 July 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – where the Tribunal revoked a decision to cancel the applicant’s visa – whether the Tribunal’s assessment and balancing of the primary considerations and other considerations was consistent with Direction 65 – standard of judicial review of reasons of the Tribunal – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed  
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 474(2), 476A(1)(b), 499, 500(1)(ba), 501(2), 501(3A), 501CA(4)
Cases cited:

DKXY v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 495

FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 500

Goundar v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1203

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259

Nigam v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 127; 254 FCR 295

Oluwafemi v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1389

Omar v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 279

Date of hearing: 22 July 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 50
Counsel for the Applicant: C Lenehan
Solicitor for the Applicant: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: C Jackson
Solicitor for the First Respondent: South West Legal Migration Services
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 330 of 2019
BETWEEN:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Applicant

AND:

YZXB

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

STEWART J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JULY 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The originating application filed on 6 March 2019 is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

STEWART J:

Introduction

  1. This is an application for the review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The review to this Court is under s 476A(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) of a decision by the Tribunal on review of a “privative clause decision” (see s 474(2)) under s 500(1)(ba). The result is that in order to succeed in reviewing and setting aside the decision of the Tribunal, the applicant must establish jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.

    Background

  2. The relevant decision-making history is as follows. 

  3. On 19 January 2016, the first respondent’s Class XB Subclass 202 (Global Special Humanitarian) visa was cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Act on the basis that the first respondent had a “substantial criminal record”, having been convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months or more as referred to in s 501(7)(c) of the Act.

  4. That…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1134
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Federal Court of Australia was called upon to review a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that had revoked a decision to cancel the visa of the first respondent. The visa had been cancelled due to the first respondent’s conviction of aggravated sexual assault, a crime which had led to a mandatory cancellation of his visa. The AAT had considered various factors in deciding to revoke the visa cancellation, including the seriousness of the offence and the risk of reoffending. The primary consideration under Direction 65, which is to protect the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct, was central to the decision.

The key legal issue before the court was whether the AAT's assessment and balancing of the primary considerations and other factors in its decision were consistent with Direction 65. The first respondent argued that the AAT had erred in its evaluation of the risk to the Australian community, suggesting that the risk was more than minimal and that the primary consideration should have outweighed the others. The Minister for Home Affairs, on the other hand, contended that the AAT's decision was reasonable and that there was no jurisdictional error in its assessment.

The court held that the AAT's assessment and balancing of the various considerations were consistent with Direction 65. The court emphasised that the reasons of the AAT should be read as a whole and given a beneficial construction, avoiding over-critical scrutiny. The Tribunal had properly recognised the seriousness of the offence but also concluded that the risk of reoffending was minimal. This finding, according to the court, was decisive in favour of revoking the visa cancellation. The court found that the AAT had not made any jurisdictional error in its decision-making process and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The Federal Court dismissed the application for judicial review and ordered that the applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed. This ruling confirms the AAT's authority in balancing various considerations when revoking a visa cancellation, provided its reasoning is consistent with the relevant legal framework.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The originating application filed on 6 March 2019 is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent, as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In May 2015, a jury of the New South Wales District Court found the first respondent guilty of one count of aggravated sexual assault. In October 2015, the first respondent was convicted and sentenced on that finding to three years imprisonment with an 18 month non-parole period. That is the conviction and sentence that led to the mandatory cancellation of his visa as referred to.The decision of the Tribunal The Tribunal identified that the original cancellation decision could be revoked under s 501CA(4) if it, standing in the shoes of the Minister, was satisfied that the first respondent passes the s 501 character test (s 501CA(4)(b)(i)), or there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked (s 501CA(4)(b)(ii)), and that such a decision involves an assessment and evaluation of the factors for and against revoking the cancellation. The Tribunal also identified that its determination had to be carried out in accordance with any written directions under the Act (s 499(2A)). It recognised that in considering a request for revocation of a mandatory s 501(3A) cancellation, the Tribunal had to comply with Direction 65. Direction 65 identifies three “primary considerations” to be taken into account, namely (1) protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct, (2) the best interests of minor children in Australia, and (3) the expectations of the Australian community. This case turns on the primary consideration of the protection of the Australian community. The Tribunal recognised that the first respondent’s offending involved a sexual crime and is accordingly identified by paragraph 13.1.1(a) of Direction 65 as very serious. The Tribunal stated that it regards the offending as serious. The Tribunal also recognised that the court’s sentence of imprisonment for three years is a reflection of the objective seriousness of the offence (as per paragraph 13.1.1(c) of Direction 65). It stated that in its view the offending was, however, at the lower end of the scale of seriousness for offences of the type in question. With regard to the primary consideration of risk to the Australian community, the Tribunal stated as follows:50. Paragraph 13.1.2 of Direction 65 prescribes that the Australian community’s tolerance for any risk of future harm becomes lower as the seriousness of the potential harm increases. The nature of the harm of this type of sexual offending deliberately perpetrated upon a vulnerable victim if the Applicant were to reoffend in the future is particularly serious.51.As to the risk of reoffending, the sentencing judge considered that the Applicant had a moderate to low risk of reoffending based upon a pre-sentence report provided to the Court (referred to above).52.Having regard to the guidance in paragraphs 13.1.2(1) and (2) of Direction 65, the Tribunal considers that the protection of the Australian community is of primary importance. However, as discussed above, the Tribunal concludes that at this time, the Applicant is of minimal risk of committing any offence and the relevant risk is, at most, minimal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The first respondent also submitted that the passages of FYBR and Nigam relied on by the Minister both allow for the possibility of the primary consideration in question weighing either way, depending on the circumstances of the particular case.Consideration The starting point of the analysis must necessarily be to properly understand the Tribunal’s reasoning. In that regard, the reasons must be read and understood as a whole. Moreover, in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang [1996] HCA 6; 185 CLR 259, Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ (at 271-272) identified a number of propositions of the Full Court of this Court in previous cases favouring an approach that a decision-maker’s reasons are entitled to a “beneficial construction”. These included that a court should not be “concerned with looseness in the language … nor with unhappy phrasing” of the reasons of an administrative decision-maker and “the reasons for the decision under review are not to be construed minutely and finely with an eye keenly attuned to the perception of error.” The Court then stated the following:These propositions are well settled. They recognise the reality that the reasons of an administrative decision-maker are meant to inform and not to be scrutinised upon over-zealous judicial review by seeking to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed. [The] … court must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision. In the same case, Kirby J (at 291-293) gave an expanded analysis of the importance of not reading the reasons of the decision-maker over critically. In the critical paragraph, being paragraph [69], of its reasons the Tribunal was not in any express way identifying the question that it sought to answer. Nor was it construing, or setting out a conclusion on the construction of, Direction 65. In my view, the Tribunal was expressing a conclusion on the task required of it, namely to balance the various competing considerations, including the primary considerations identified by Direction 65, to reach an evaluative judgement. The Tribunal was doing what Perry J in FYBR at [37] identified as being necessary, namely balancing the various considerations against each other. It was not expressing a normative conclusion with regard to the construction of the primary consideration at issue. This is revealed by the fact that it had earlier in its reasons considered each of the primary and other considerations and that paragraph [69] is preceded by the heading “Conclusion”. What paragraph [69] does is to draw together an ultimate conclusion based on the preceding discussion – which recognises the seriousness of the offence (at paragraphs [43] and [49]) and that the protection of the Australian community is of primary importance (at paragraph [52]). Understood in this way, the reasons as a whole are to be read as saying that the Tribunal’s findings with regard to the minimal risk of reoffending or committing other offences ultimately weigh in the first respondent’s favour in the sense that they are decisive – because of them the relevant primary consideration carries little weight and is outweighed by the considerations in favour of revocation. The latter considerations were identified earlier in the reasons as the best interests of a minor child and the first respondent’s ties to Australia, and possibly also the difficulties that he may face in re-establishing himself in Iraq.