FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
ALS16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1290
Appeal from: ALS16 v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2018] FCCA 345 File number: NSD 298 of 2018 Judge: DERRINGTON J Date of judgment: 24 August 2018 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Tribunal finding appellant lacked credibility – credibility finding overwhelming other supporting evidence – new grounds sought to be advanced on appeal – no error by the Federal Circuit Court Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Cases cited: AAO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1291
ACF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 982
ADF15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1099
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNCR [2011] FCA 369
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW (2010) 183 FCR 575
Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 73
Randhawa v Minister for Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437
SZOVP v Minister for Immigration & Anor (No.2) [2011] FMCA 442
Date of hearing: 22 August 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 49 Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Solicitor for the Respondents: Ms Lucchese of Sparke Helmore ORDERS
NSD 298 of 2018 BETWEEN: ALS16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
DERRINGTON J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 AUGUST 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DERRINGTON J:
Introduction
This is an appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court (FCC) of 5 February 2018. That Court dismissed an application made to it pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act) on 3 March 2016 seeking a review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) made on 5 February 2016. The Tribunal had affirmed a decision of the Minister’s delegate to refuse to grant to the appellant a protection visa.
The application for review to the FCC was directed to alleged non-compliance with the requirements of ss 424A and 425 of the Migration Act in the conduct of the hearings before the Tribunal. The learned FCC judge dealt with the several grounds in a careful and methodical way and determined that the Tribunal committed no jurisdictional error, or any other error, in reaching the conclusions which it did.
Background
The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who made an application for a protection visa on 2 September 2013. He claimed he feared he would suffer harm from Muslim fundamentalists were he to be returned to Bangladesh on the basis that he had…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1290
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue was whether the Tribunal had erred in its consideration of the appellant's credibility and the weight given to his evidence. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had failed to properly consider his claims, but the FCC found no jurisdictional error or other fault in the Tribunal's decision. The FCC held that the Tribunal had properly assessed the appellant's credibility and found that his evidence was inconsistent and unreliable.
The court reasoned that the Tribunal had meticulously examined the appellant's evidence and had substantial grounds for doubting his credibility. The inconsistencies in his testimony, particularly regarding the timing and nature of the harm he claimed to have suffered, undermined his case. The court also noted that the appellant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for these inconsistencies. The FCC concluded that the Tribunal's findings were well-supported and that the appellant's appeal lacked merit.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs. The court emphasized that the appellant had not shown that the Tribunal's decision was flawed or that new grounds for appeal had sufficient merit to warrant consideration. The principles regarding the introduction of new grounds on appeal were reiterated, underscoring the importance of settling substantial issues at the trial level.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The approach taken in these reasons is to consider each of the general assertions in the Notice of Appeal and in the outline of submissions and distil from them the best arguments which might be advanced on the Appellant’s behalf and then ascertain whether those arguments have any merit.Consideration It can be immediately noticed that the grounds of appeal seek to assert the existence of errors in the decision of the learned primary judge in relation to matters which were not agitated before him. In particular, the appellant now alleges the existence of a constructive failure by the Tribunal to consider his claims. This is an attempt to raise on appeal a new ground which was not considered by the primary judge and in respect of which it cannot be said that the primary judge erred. The principles concerning the raising of new grounds on appeal were recently identified by the Full Court in Murad v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 73 (Murad) (per Griffiths, Mortimer and Perry JJ) where their Honours said:19 The general principles guiding the decision whether or not to permit a ground to be raised on appeal which was not run below are well settled. They are reflected in the following observations of the Full Court in VUAX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158; 238 FCR 588 at [46]-[48] (and which were recently reaffirmed in substance by Flick and Rangiah JJ in Sun v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 52; 243 FCR 220 at [89]-[90]):46 In our view, the application for leave to rely upon the sole ground of appeal now raised should be refused. Leave to argue a ground of appeal not raised before the primary judge should only be granted if it is expedient in the interests of justice to do so: O'Brien v Komesaroff (1982) 150 CLR 310; H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs; and Branir Pty Ltd v Owston Nominees (No 2) Pty Ltd (2001) 117 FCR 424 at [20]-[24] and [38].47 In Coulton v Holcombe (1986) 162 CLR 1, Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ observed, in their joint judgment, at 7:It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish.48 The practice of raising arguments for the first time before the Full Court has been particularly prevalent in appeals relating to migration matters. The Court may grant leave if some point that was not taken below, but which clearly has merit, is advanced, and there is no real prejudice to the respondent in permitting it to be agitated. Where, however, there is no adequate explanation for the failure to take the point, and it seems to be of doubtful merit, leave should generally be refused. In our view, the proposed ground of appeal has no merit. There is no justification, therefore, for permitting it to be raised for the first time before this Court.