ACF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

ACF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

[2016] FCA 982

Appeal from: ACF16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2016] FCCA 1019
File number: NSD 709 of 2016
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 17 August 2016
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 36, 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 425(1)
Cases cited:

AAO15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1291

Commissioner for Australian Capital Territory Revenue v Alphaone Pty Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 576

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI (2009) 111 ALD 15

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99

Randhawa v Minister for Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 52 FCR 437

SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152

SZOOR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 1

SZVAP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 233 FCR 451

Date of hearing: 17 August 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 44
Counsel for the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D McLaren of Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance, save as to costs.

ORDERS

NSD 709 of 2016
BETWEEN:

ACF16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

17 AUGUST 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellant is to pay costs as agreed or assessed.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)

WIGNEY J:

  1. This is an appeal from an unsuccessful application for judicial review of a migration decision in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.  The appellant is a Sri Lankan national who travelled to Australia on a visitor visa in May 2012.  A couple of weeks after arriving he applied for a protection visa, claiming that he feared that he would be harmed if he returned to Sri Lanka.  As will be seen, his main, if not only, fears of harm were said to emanate from the fact that he, or his business, was the victim of extortion in Sri Lanka.  His protection visa application was unsuccessful, as was his review application before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.  His unsuccessful judicial review challenge to the Tribunal’s decision in the Circuit Court is the subject of this appeal.

  2. The appeal raises essentially two questions.  The first is whether the Tribunal failed to comply with its statutory requirement to give the appellant a fair hearing having regard to the way it dealt with certain documents relied on by him in support of his application.  The second is whether the Tribunal’s decision was irrational…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 982
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of ACF16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the appellant contested the Minister's refusal to grant a protection visa, arguing that the decision-making process was flawed and that certain documents were unfairly dismissed. The core issue was whether the Tribunal, in reviewing the delegate's decision, properly considered the appellant's evidence and documents, particularly regarding the appellant's claims of extortion and fear of harm in Sri Lanka. The appellant also argued that the Tribunal failed to question him adequately and that its reasoning was irrational or illogical.

The court considered whether the Tribunal's questioning of the appellant was sufficient and whether the Tribunal's reasoning was illogical. It was determined that the Tribunal had indeed questioned the appellant extensively and had come to the conclusion that the appellant's evidence was not credible, which was a finding that reasonable minds could differ on. The court also found that the Tribunal's reasoning was not irrational or illogical, as the evidence presented could support different conclusions. The principles established in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS were applied, emphasising that not every lapse in logic constitutes jurisdictional error unless the findings or reasoning could not have been made by a reasonable decision-maker.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay costs as agreed or assessed. The decision underscores the importance of credible evidence and reasoned decision-making in protection visa applications, highlighting that not all perceived flaws in the process will lead to a successful appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellant is to pay costs as agreed or assessed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

In March 2013, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused to grant the appellant, ACF16, a protection visa. The delegate expressed doubts about the credibility of the appellant's claims and found that certain documents relied on by the appellant were not genuine. The appellant applied for a review of this decision by the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). The appellant attended a hearing before the Tribunal, where he gave evidence and presented arguments. The appellant's case primarily focused on his claim that he was the victim of extortion in Sri Lanka, which led to his fear of harm if he returned there. He presented a letter from an assistant priest of a Catholic church in Jaffna to support his claim.

The matter originated when the delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refused the appellant's application for a protection visa in March 2013. The appellant sought a review of this decision by the Tribunal under Section 425(1) of the Act. The Tribunal invited the appellant to attend a hearing, where he provided evidence and arguments. Following the hearing, the Tribunal upheld the delegate's decision. The appellant then appealed the Tribunal's decision to a higher court. The appeal was heard and subsequently dismissed.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In March 2013, a delegate of the first respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, refused to grant the appellant a protection visa. The only point of relevance to note for the purposes of the appeal is that the delegate expressed doubts about the credibility of some of the appellant’s claims and, more significantly, found that various documents relied on by the appellant were not genuine. As will be seen, the appellant’s claim concerning an unfair hearing hinges on the way that the Tribunal dealt with some documents.THE TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS AND DECISION The appellant applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s adverse decision. Section 425(1) of the Act required the Tribunal to invite the appellant to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the delegate’s decision, being the decision under review. In due course the appellant was invited to attend, and did attend, a hearing before the Tribunal at which he gave evidence and presented arguments. The appellant, it appears, gave the Tribunal a fairly detailed account of his life in Sri Lanka from 2007 until his departure in May 2012. That account is detailed in the Tribunal’s reasons. It is unnecessary to repeat it. As events transpired, the appellant’s case that he feared that he would suffer harm if he returned to Sri Lanka turned out to focus almost exclusively on the claim that he was the victim of extortion in Sri Lanka. He feared harm at the hands of the extortionists. In simple terms, the appellant’s evidence was that he operated a business with three other partners in the northern part of Sri Lanka. Two of those partners did not have any real involvement in the running of the business. As a result of the success of the business, the appellant was approached by supporters of the Sri Lankan army or a paramilitary group who demanded that he pay them a sum of money. They said that payment was necessary to allow the business to operate. If he did not pay he would be abducted or arrested. The appellant said that he could not afford to pay the full amount of the money, so he negotiated to pay by instalments. After paying the first instalment, the appellant left Sri Lanka. After the appellant left Sri Lanka to come to Australia in May 2012, the same men approached the appellant’s parents, who still lived in Sri Lanka, in an apparent attempt to find the appellant. They also approached and threatened his business partner. On the appellant’s account, this was because the appellant had not paid them all of the money they had demanded from him. The appellant’s evidence was that he feared being harmed by the extortionists should he return to Sri Lanka because he had not paid the balance of the funds. The appellant relied on a letter that purported to be from an assistant priest of a Catholic church in Jaffna. The letter stated that the appellant “belongs to our Church” and that “[a]s he [the appellant] has involved in doing business over here, it is rather difficult for him to return to his country [sic]”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the appellant’s general assertion that the Tribunal did not question him in depth, or otherwise did not properly consider his case, has no merit and is rejected. A fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons reveals that the Tribunal questioned the appellant at length about his claims and evidence. Unfortunately for the appellant, that very questioning led the Tribunal to find that the appellant’s evidence concerning the extortion was false.Ground 2 – irrational or illogical reasoning The second ground of appeal has even less merit than the first. The primary judge was correct to reject the appellant’s contention that the Tribunal’s reasoning in [30] and [31] was in any sense irrational or illogical. It is unnecessary to deal at length with the relevant principles in relation to irrationality or illogicality as a ground for judicial review of administrative decisions. The significant point to note is that, as was made clear by Crennan and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 647-648 [130]-[131], not every lapse of logic in the decision-making process will result in jurisdictional error. If particular findings or reasoning on the way to the decision-maker’s ultimate conclusion and decision are challenged on the basis of illogicality or irrationality, jurisdictional error will not be made out unless it is shown that the findings could not have been made, or the reasoning could not have been employed, by a reasonable or rational decision-maker. At 648 [131] their Honours said: What was involved here was an issue of jurisdictional fact upon which different minds might reach different conclusions. The complaint of illogicality or irrationality was said to lie in the process of reasoning. But, the test for illogicality or irrationality must be to ask whether logical or rational or reasonable minds might adopt different reasoning or might differ in any decision or finding to be made on evidence upon which the decision is based. If probative evidence can give rise to different processes of reasoning and if logical or rational or reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions to be drawn from that evidence, a decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical or irrational or unreasonable, simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion. Crennan and Bell JJ found that the impugned finding or reasoning by the Tribunal was not illogical or irrational because on the probative evidence before the Tribunal a logical or rational decision-maker could have come to the same conclusion. Heydon J, who was the other member of the majority in SZMDS, also found that the Tribunal’s reasoning was not illogical because it was a matter about which reasonable minds might differ: the “difference was one of degree, impression and empirical judgment” (at 632 [78]). For a decision to be vitiated for jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, generally “extreme” illogicality or irrationality must be shown, “measured against the standard that it is not enough for the question of fact to be one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions”: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99 at 137 [148]. A decision cannot be said by a reviewing court to be illogical, irrational or unreasonable simply because one conclusion has been preferred to another possible conclusion: SZOOR v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 1 (at 22-23 [84] per McKerracher J, Reeves J agreeing at 27 [113]).