FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| BDF17 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 2095 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Immigration Assessment Authority – temporary protection visa – whether the Immigration Assessment Authority failed to consider the applicant’s ‘new information’ – consideration of ‘exceptional circumstances’ – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s.25D Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.65, 473CC(2)(a), 473DB, 473CA, 473CB, 473DD, 473EA Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth) Privacy Act 1998 (Cth) |
| Applicant: | BDF17 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | MLG 546 of 2017 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Mercuri |
| Hearing date: | 23 April 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 23 April 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 5 September 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the applicant: | Ms G Costello |
| Solicitors for the applicant: | Barefoot Immigration & Legal Services |
| Counsel for the respondents: | Mr N Wood |
| Solicitors for the respondents: | DLA Piper |
ORDERS
The applicant’s application for judicial review filed on 20 March 2017, amended on 27 March 2018 and further amended on 30 April 2018 be dismissed.
The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of the proceeding in a sum to be fixed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLG 546 of 2017
| BDF17 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION |
First respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application for judicial review of a decision made by the second respondent, the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the IAA”) on 10 March 2017 pursuant to section 473CC(2)(a) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”). In that decision, the IAA affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first…
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 2095
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was the interpretation of "credible personal information" as it pertains to section 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether the mere presence of personal identifiers, such as names, within documents constituted "personal information" for the purposes of this section, and if so, whether that information was sufficiently linked to the applicant's claim to have affected the IAA's assessment. The Minister argued that for section 473DD(b)(ii) to be engaged, the personal information must have a direct bearing on the applicant's claim, and that the names in the documents did not meet this threshold.
Judge Mercuri reasoned that while the definition of "personal information" is broad, it must be read in the context of section 473DD(b)(ii). The Court drew an analogy to the case of *SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia* [2015] FCA 224, which dealt with a similar issue under section 424A of the Act. The Court held that the mere identification of individuals within general information, such as country information, does not automatically render that information "credible personal information" for the purposes of section 473DD(b)(ii). A link between the personal information and the applicant's claim is required. In this instance, the Court found that the relevance of the documents stemmed from the factual content (the kidnapping of employees and police) rather than the identities of the individuals involved. Therefore, the Court concluded that the information did not constitute "personal information" as contemplated by section 473DD(b)(ii). The Court also noted that the IAA's own reasoning indicated it viewed the information as "country information" rather than "credible personal information."
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister conceded that the broad definition of ‘personal information’ has to be addressed. However, it was submitted that to engage section 473DD (b)(ii) of the Act, the IAA needed to be satisfied that the documents contained “credible personal information which may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claim.”[43] Counsel for the Minister then questioned whether it could be said that the personal information in those documents; that is, the names of the individuals, could have affected the IAAs consideration of the applicant’s claims. [43] Transcript page 18. If not, it was submitted that section 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act has not been engaged. It was also submitted on behalf of the Minister that if a different view were taken, most ‘country information’ which contains the name of a politician, other individual or, indeed in the case of an article, the name of the journalist, would arguably contain personal information and engage section 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act. There is some force to this argument. By loose analogy, the Minister referred the court to SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224 (“SZTSU”) in which Mortimer J considered a claim that there had been a breach of the tribunal’s obligations under section 424A of the Act. The case involved the tribunal’s reliance upon an article concerning an Indo-Fijian man and his views and experiences of the situation in Fiji for Indo-Fijians following the coup in 2006. The question was whether the article could properly be characterised as information “specifically about … another person” within the meaning of that phrase in section 424A(3)(a) of the Act. In accepting the Minister’s submissions in that case, Mortimer J said:Just because it is an opinion about a country situation expressed by an identifiable individual does not take it outside the exclusion, in my opinion.[44][44] SZTSU v Federal Circuit Court of Australia [2015] FCA 224 at [10]. Although the decision in SZTSU relates to a different provision, it is nonetheless relevant. The mere fact that general information about a particular situation identifies individuals does not, in my view, bring that general information within the meaning of the term ‘credible personal information’ for the purposes of section 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act. The broad definition of the term ‘personal information’ must be read in the context of section 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act, such that there must be a link between the personal information and the applicant. In this case, the articles were relevant to the applicant’s claim, not because of the identity of the people who were kidnapped, but rather because of the fact that some TRO employees and police were kidnapped. That is not ‘personal information’ for the purposes of section 473DD(b)(ii) of the Act. In any event, if I am wrong on that interpretation, I find that a fair reading of the IAA’s reasons leads to the conclusion that the IAA formed the view that it was not ‘credible personal information’ but rather fell within the concept of ‘country information’. Its reference to the ‘four pieces of country information’ in paragraph 5 of the decision record is consistent with this view.