FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| CHV16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 202 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application to review decision of Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the Authority failed to apply s.473DD of the Act lawfully or failed to consider material in a manner constituting jurisdictional error. |
| Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s.25D |
| Applicant: | CHV16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | SYG 2265 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Barnes |
| Hearing date: | 2 October 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 16 October 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 6 February 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Karp |
| Counsel for the Respondents: | Mr Johnson |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | Australian Government Solicitor |
ORDERS
A writ of certiorari shall issue, removing the record of the Immigration Assessment Authority decision made on 25 July 2016 into this Court for the purpose of quashing it.
A writ of mandamus shall issue, requiring the Immigration Assessment Authority to redetermine according to law the review referred to it.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 2265 of 2016
| CHV16 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Background
This is an application for review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (the Authority) dated 25 July 2016 affirming a decision of a delegate of the First Respondent not to grant the Applicant a safe haven enterprise visa (SHEV).
The Applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, arrived in Australia in September 2012. On 17 January 2013 he participated in an entry interview. The only evidence before the court of what occurred in that interview is the signed written record of interview in the Courtbook.
On 3 February 2016 the Applicant applied for a SHEV. He provided an earlier statutory declaration, dated 30 August 2013…
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- Case
- [2020] FCCA 202
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the Immigration Assessment Authority erred in its application of section 473DD of the Act. Specifically, the court was required to determine if the Authority failed to consider whether the new information or the applicant's circumstances satisfied it that exceptional circumstances existed, thereby justifying the consideration of that information. This involved assessing whether the Authority had given adequate consideration to all relevant circumstances in its determination.
The court reasoned that the Authority's approach to section 473DD was flawed. While acknowledging that the Authority is not required to provide reasons for the exercise of its discretion under this section, the court found that in this instance, the Authority had provided reasons which allowed for inferences to be drawn about what it considered material. The Authority's stated reason for not being satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed was the absence of submissions, despite the applicant having made relevant submissions. Crucially, the Authority failed to consider the relevance of a published article, the *Doherty* article, which the applicant contended supported his claims of a real risk of harm upon return. The court found that the Authority did not engage with this information at all, despite it being open to the Authority to see it as supporting the applicant's claims. This failure to consider relevant material, in circumstances where the applicant had presented arguments for exceptional circumstances, constituted a jurisdictional error.
The court found that the Immigration Assessment Authority had committed a jurisdictional error by failing to properly consider the applicant's circumstances and the new information in accordance with section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The application for review was therefore granted.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This approach was approved by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 (2017) 257 FCR 111; [2017] FCAFC 176 at [102] – [104]. Relevantly, the Full Court confirmed at [104] that the broad meaning to be given to “exceptional circumstances… necessarily requires that consideration be given to all the relevant circumstances in determining whether or [not] there are “exceptional circumstances”” (emphasis added and also see CHF17 at [43] – [45]). It is not necessary in this case for the court to be satisfied that there were in fact exceptional circumstances. In essence, what is in issue is whether the Authority erred in the manner in which it applied s.473DD of the Act in failing to consider whether there was anything about the new information or the Applicant’s circumstances which satisfied it that there were exceptional circumstances justifying consideration of the new information (see AQU17 at [15]). The entirety of the Authority’s reasoning in its decision is contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of its reasons. The Authority gave no reason as to why it was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances, other than the fact there were no submissions made to it. This occurred in circumstances where there was no obligation on the Applicant to make submissions or to satisfy the Authority of the matters in s.473DD(a), but where, in fact, he did make relevant submissions. In proceeding in this way, the Authority failed to consider the relevance of the information in the Doherty (which was published after the referral to the Authority) to the Applicant’s claims. It did so in circumstances where it was plain that the Applicant contended that the information in this article supported his claim that he had a real chance or real risk of harm, in particular torture, on return to Sri Lanka. If the Authority had considered the Doherty article, it would have been open to it to see this information as providing support for the Applicant’s claims. However it did not engage in any consideration at all in relation to the relevance and significance of this information. It is the case that it was held in CVS16 that the Authority is not required to provide reasons in respect of the exercise of its discretion under s.473DD of the Act. This court is bound to follow that decision. However while on this approach the Authority would not fall into error simply because of a failure to state its reasons in relation to the discretion in s.473DD (CVS16 at [25] and [29]), that does not mean that any deficiency in the Authority’s express reasoning in relation to the exercise of its discretion under s.473DD is to be seen in light of the fact that it is not required to provide such reasons. In this case the Authority did provide reasons for its decision that it was not satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed to justify considering the information. It is open to the court to draw inferences from such reasons about what the Authority considered material to its reasons and what it did not consider.