SZUUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

SZUUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 123

Appeal from: SZUUR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2532
File number: NSD 1311 of 2015
Judge: FARRELL J
Date of judgment: 18 February 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether the appellants were denied procedural fairness in circumstances where the Tribunal proceeded to determine their review application when the appellants failed to attend the scheduled hearing – where the appellants misspelt their street name (omitting the letter ‘r’) in the “Your contact details in Australia” and “Where do you want us to send correspondence about your application” sections of the application for review form lodged with the Tribunal – where the invitation to attend the Tribunal hearing was sent to that address – where the appellants allege that the invitation was sent to the wrong address and that they did not receive it – where the street name was similarly misspelt in documents provided to the Department and the Federal Circuit Court – where the appellants admitted to having received other documents sent to the address with the misspelt street name – whether the appellants were deemed to have received the invitation to attend the Tribunal hearing – consideration of ss 425, 441A and 441C of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 425, 425A, 426A, 441A, 441C
Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77; [2000] FCA 377

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO (2009) 238 CLR 627

SZUUR v Minister for Immigration  & Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2532

Xie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172

Date of hearing: 18 February 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 51
Counsel for the Appellants: The appellants appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Knackstredt
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1311 of 2015
BETWEEN:

SZUUR

First Appellant

SZUUS

Second Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FARRELL J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 FEBRUARY 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs in an amount of $8,290.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 13 October 2015.  The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) made on 25 June 2014: SZUUR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2532 ("SZUUR").  The Tribunal affirmed a decision of…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 123
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involves an appeal by the appellants, citizens of Bangladesh, against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia which dismissed their application for judicial review of the Refugee Review Tribunal's decision to affirm the Minister's refusal to grant them Protection (Class XA) visas. The appellants, a husband and wife, arrived in Australia on a Sponsored Family Visitor visa in May 2013 and subsequently applied for protection visas. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision to refuse their applications on the basis that the husband's claims of persecution in Bangladesh were not credible. The appellants' main contention on appeal is that they did not receive the Tribunal's invitation to attend the hearing because it was sent to an incorrect address they provided in their visa application. The appellants claim that the invitation was addressed to an address with a misspelt street name, which they say is incorrect, and they did not receive it. They argue that the Tribunal should not have proceeded with the hearing in their absence and that they were denied procedural fairness.

The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal acted within its power to determine the review under s 426A of the Migration Act where the appellants allege that the invitation to attend the Tribunal hearing was sent to the wrong address and that they did not receive it. The court considered whether s 441C of the Migration Act, which operates as a deeming provision that the recipient of a document from the Tribunal is "taken to have received it" by operation of law, applied in these circumstances. The appellants did not challenge the evidence that the Tribunal sent the invitation to the address they provided, which was misspelt. The court held that the appellants were deemed to have received the invitation to attend the hearing under s 441C, and the Tribunal was not required to take further action to enable their appearance before it. The court also noted that the appellants had received other documents addressed to the same misspelt address, indicating that the address was not entirely incorrect.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the Minister's costs of $8,290. The court found that the primary judge did not err in his decision and that it would not have been appropriate to grant leave to permit new grounds of appeal to be advanced. The court held that the legislative purpose of the deeming provision in s 441C was to achieve administrative certainty, and the appellants could not circumvent the legislative scheme by providing inexact addresses.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs in an amount of $8,290.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 13 October 2015. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) made on 25 June 2014: SZUUR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2532 ("SZUUR"). The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister made on 6 December 2013 to refuse the grant of Protection (Class XA) visas to the appellants. BACKGROUND The appellants are citizens of Bangladesh. They are a husband and wife and I will refer to them that way when it is necessary to distinguish between them. The appellants arrived in Australia on 18 May 2013 on a Sponsored Family Visitor (UL 679) visa, sponsored by the husband's sister. The visas expired on 18 July 2013. On 16 July 2013, the husband lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (now the Department of Immigration and Border Protection). The appellants say that the husband’s address in response to question 16 (“information about residence”) on page 2 of the husband's visa application form, was misspelled by omitting the letter “r” in an “art” letter combination in the street name (which I will refer to as the “incorrect address”). He specified his postal address as being the same as the residential address. The appellants say the address was correctly spelled in response to question 67 (the “declaration” section) on page 14 of their visa applications forms and I will refer to it as the “correct address”. The wife lodged an application for a protection visa as a member of the husband’s family unit on the same day. She did not advance any claims for protection of her own. The wife's postal address effectively relied on the residential address specified in her husband's application. The address which appeared in the “declaration” section of the wife’s visa application form was the one which the appellants say is correctly spelled. The husband set out his claims in a two page statement filed with his application. He claims to fear persecution if he is returned to Bangladesh because of his longstanding involvement with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”). He claims to have been involved with the student and youth wings of the BNP and to have attended meetings, demonstrations and other party activities, including canvassing votes for the BNP candidate in the 2008 elections. As a result of his involvement with the BNP he was subject to threats of physical violence by the Awami League. He says that in February 2009, Awami League “goons” came to his home and attacked his brother who was hospitalised for two days. He was not home at the time. The husband claims to have been elected as an executive member of the Fatullah Thana BNP in 2010, after which he gradually became known as an activist. In December 2011, while he was at a BNP procession, he was attacked by members of the Awami League and was hospitalised for seven days. He also claims that after the procession, false charges were laid against him by the Bangladeshi police.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The appellants say that they did not receive either of the Tribunal’s letters dated in April 2014. In the proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court, the appellants admitted that they did receive letters addressed to the incorrect address from (1) the Department (one inviting the husband to attend an interview with the delegate and another informing him that his visa application had been refused), (2) the Tribunal (one dated 25 December 2014 advising the husband that the applications for review of the delegate’s decision had been received and the other dated 25 June 2014 advising the appellants that the Tribunal had affirmed the delegate’s decision) and (3) the Minister’s solicitors (enclosing a copy of the court book for the Federal Circuit Court proceedings).TRIBUNAL DECISION The Decision Record indicates that the appellants did not appear at the hearing on 24 June 2014 and that the Tribunal decided to make its decision on the review pursuant to s 426A of the Migration Act without taking any further action to enable the appellants to appear before it. The Decision Record states that the Tribunal listened to the recording of the husband's interview with the delegate on 29 November 2013 but as the husband did not attend the hearing and had not provided documents or evidence in support of his application, that the Tribunal was left with claims that were “untested by the Tribunal and stated in general terms”. The Tribunal found that there was not sufficient information to be satisfied that his claims were credible: Decision Record at [6], [11] and [18]. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the husband was involved in the BNP. He did not provide any letters of support from the BNP in Australia or in Bangladesh or any medical evidence to support his claim that he had been hospitalised following an attack at a BNP Procession in December 2011; the Tribunal would have asked him why he did not provide this evidence when it appeared to be readily available. While the husband had provided some limited information about the BNP, the Tribunal was unable to test his knowledge of the BNP or the elections in 2001 and 2008 or to ask him whether he had been involved with the BNP while he was in Australia and if not, why he had not been in contact: Decision Record at [12]-[13]. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the husband was attacked or threatened by the Awami League. The husband did not provide any evidence in support of his claim that Awami League “goons” had attended his house in February 2009 and attacked his brother. The Tribunal queried the nature of his relationship with his brother, since the husband had filed a Remaining Relative visa application in 2005 which indicated that he was not in contact with this brother who lived in India; this is a matter on which the Tribunal would have asked questions had the husband attended the hearing. The Tribunal also expressed concern regarding the eight month delay between the alleged attack in December 2011 and when the husband applied for a Sponsored Family Visa in August 2012. As the husband had lived at the same address and worked for the same employer from March 2009 until he came to Australia in May 2013, the Tribunal also had reservations about his claim that he had been able to avoid being attacked by the Awmai League because he had been “careful”: Decision Record at [14], [15] and [17].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister opposed the grant of leave to the appellants to raise the grounds of appeal insofar as they extend beyond the ground raised in the application before the Federal Circuit Court, namely, whether the Tribunal acted within its power to determine the review under s 426A of the Migration Act where the appellants allege that the invitation to attend the Tribunal hearing was sent to the wrong address and that they did not receive it. The force of the appellants’ written submissions support the view that the appellants did not intend to go beyond the issues considered by the Federal Circuit Court and that the form of the grounds of appeal to this Court are intended to express emphatic disagreement with the decision of the Tribunal. In any event, I am not satisfied that it would have been appropriate to grant leave to permit new grounds of appeal to be advanced since it is difficult to see how the primary judge could have erred in relation to matters which he was not called upon to decide.CONSIDERATION What follows relies significantly on the Minister’s written submissions.Was s 441C engaged? Sections 425 and 425A of the Migration Act require the Tribunal to invite an applicant for a protection visa to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in connection with the decision under review. For that purpose, the Tribunal must give notice of the day, time and place at which the applicant is scheduled to appear. The combined effect of ss 441A(1) and (4) is that one method by which the invitation may be given to the applicant is by the Tribunal sending the invitation within 3 working days of the date it bears by prepaid post to the “last address for service provided to the Tribunal by the recipient in connection with the review”. It is deemed to have been received 7 working days after the date of the document: s 441C(4)(a). Section 441C(4) operates as a deeming provision by which the recipient of a document from the Tribunal is “taken to have received it” by operation of law. It does not create a rebuttable presumption of fact: Xie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172 at [13]-[14] per Spender, Keifel and Dowsett JJ. The legislative purpose of this scheme is to achieve administrative certainty. The decision has clearly been taken by the legislators that that objective should override the injustice which may occur because a particular visa applicant, sometimes entirely without fault on that person’s part, does not in fact receive a notice in a timely way or in some cases at all: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77; [2000] FCA 377 at [32] per O’Connor and Mansfield JJ. The appellants did not challenge the evidence which was accepted by the primary judge that the letter of 22 April 2014 was despatched by prepaid post to the incorrect address: see SZUUR at [44]. The incorrect address was the address specified by the husband as his residential and postal address in the visa protection application and in the application to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. I do not consider that the primary judge erred when he said that, even if it could be established that the Form 1022 referred to at [10(3)] above had been lodged with the Tribunal on 24 March 2014, it did not supersede these notifications of address because no change of address was specified in that form: see SZUUR at [84]. I also agree that this matter calls for a practical approach: the only address provided to the Tribunal for communication with the appellants was the incorrect address. It would be an absurd result if, through no fault of the Tribunal, an applicant for review could circumvent the legislative scheme by the simple expedient of providing inexact addresses.