FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SZUUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 123
Appeal from: SZUUR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2532 File number: NSD 1311 of 2015 Judge: FARRELL J Date of judgment: 18 February 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – whether the appellants were denied procedural fairness in circumstances where the Tribunal proceeded to determine their review application when the appellants failed to attend the scheduled hearing – where the appellants misspelt their street name (omitting the letter ‘r’) in the “Your contact details in Australia” and “Where do you want us to send correspondence about your application” sections of the application for review form lodged with the Tribunal – where the invitation to attend the Tribunal hearing was sent to that address – where the appellants allege that the invitation was sent to the wrong address and that they did not receive it – where the street name was similarly misspelt in documents provided to the Department and the Federal Circuit Court – where the appellants admitted to having received other documents sent to the address with the misspelt street name – whether the appellants were deemed to have received the invitation to attend the Tribunal hearing – consideration of ss 425, 441A and 441C of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2), 425, 425A, 426A, 441A, 441C Cases cited: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77; [2000] FCA 377
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIZO (2009) 238 CLR 627
SZUUR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2532
Xie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172
Date of hearing: 18 February 2016 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 51 Counsel for the Appellants: The appellants appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Knackstredt Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent submitted save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1311 of 2015 BETWEEN: SZUUR
First Appellant
SZUUS
Second Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FARRELL J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 FEBRUARY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs in an amount of $8,290.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia delivered on 13 October 2015. The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) made on 25 June 2014: SZUUR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCCA 2532 ("SZUUR"). The Tribunal affirmed a decision of…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 123
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal acted within its power to determine the review under s 426A of the Migration Act where the appellants allege that the invitation to attend the Tribunal hearing was sent to the wrong address and that they did not receive it. The court considered whether s 441C of the Migration Act, which operates as a deeming provision that the recipient of a document from the Tribunal is "taken to have received it" by operation of law, applied in these circumstances. The appellants did not challenge the evidence that the Tribunal sent the invitation to the address they provided, which was misspelt. The court held that the appellants were deemed to have received the invitation to attend the hearing under s 441C, and the Tribunal was not required to take further action to enable their appearance before it. The court also noted that the appellants had received other documents addressed to the same misspelt address, indicating that the address was not entirely incorrect.
The appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the Minister's costs of $8,290. The court found that the primary judge did not err in his decision and that it would not have been appropriate to grant leave to permit new grounds of appeal to be advanced. The court held that the legislative purpose of the deeming provision in s 441C was to achieve administrative certainty, and the appellants could not circumvent the legislative scheme by providing inexact addresses.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs in an amount of $8,290.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Minister opposed the grant of leave to the appellants to raise the grounds of appeal insofar as they extend beyond the ground raised in the application before the Federal Circuit Court, namely, whether the Tribunal acted within its power to determine the review under s 426A of the Migration Act where the appellants allege that the invitation to attend the Tribunal hearing was sent to the wrong address and that they did not receive it. The force of the appellants’ written submissions support the view that the appellants did not intend to go beyond the issues considered by the Federal Circuit Court and that the form of the grounds of appeal to this Court are intended to express emphatic disagreement with the decision of the Tribunal. In any event, I am not satisfied that it would have been appropriate to grant leave to permit new grounds of appeal to be advanced since it is difficult to see how the primary judge could have erred in relation to matters which he was not called upon to decide.CONSIDERATION What follows relies significantly on the Minister’s written submissions.Was s 441C engaged? Sections 425 and 425A of the Migration Act require the Tribunal to invite an applicant for a protection visa to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in connection with the decision under review. For that purpose, the Tribunal must give notice of the day, time and place at which the applicant is scheduled to appear. The combined effect of ss 441A(1) and (4) is that one method by which the invitation may be given to the applicant is by the Tribunal sending the invitation within 3 working days of the date it bears by prepaid post to the “last address for service provided to the Tribunal by the recipient in connection with the review”. It is deemed to have been received 7 working days after the date of the document: s 441C(4)(a). Section 441C(4) operates as a deeming provision by which the recipient of a document from the Tribunal is “taken to have received it” by operation of law. It does not create a rebuttable presumption of fact: Xie v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 172 at [13]-[14] per Spender, Keifel and Dowsett JJ. The legislative purpose of this scheme is to achieve administrative certainty. The decision has clearly been taken by the legislators that that objective should override the injustice which may occur because a particular visa applicant, sometimes entirely without fault on that person’s part, does not in fact receive a notice in a timely way or in some cases at all: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 77; [2000] FCA 377 at [32] per O’Connor and Mansfield JJ. The appellants did not challenge the evidence which was accepted by the primary judge that the letter of 22 April 2014 was despatched by prepaid post to the incorrect address: see SZUUR at [44]. The incorrect address was the address specified by the husband as his residential and postal address in the visa protection application and in the application to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. I do not consider that the primary judge erred when he said that, even if it could be established that the Form 1022 referred to at [10(3)] above had been lodged with the Tribunal on 24 March 2014, it did not supersede these notifications of address because no change of address was specified in that form: see SZUUR at [84]. I also agree that this matter calls for a practical approach: the only address provided to the Tribunal for communication with the appellants was the incorrect address. It would be an absurd result if, through no fault of the Tribunal, an applicant for review could circumvent the legislative scheme by the simple expedient of providing inexact addresses.