Ferreyra & Ors v Brisbane City Council & Anor

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PLANNING & ENVIRONMENT COURT OF  QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Ferreyra & Ors v Brisbane City Council & Anor [2016] QPEC 10

PARTIES:

ARTURO FERREYRA AND STELLA FERRYRA; BEN ANDERSON; GLENN SIM; SAMANTHA JENSEN; BRIDGET BARKER; MARCO FARAONE; JONATHAN COOK; CHRISTINE JENSEN

(Applicants)

v

BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL

(First Respondent)

&

BRIAN E FITZGIBBONS FAMILY TRUST

(Second Respondent)

FILE NO/S:

1149/15

DIVISION:

Planning and Environment Court

PROCEEDING:

Hearing

DELIVERED ON:

3 March 2016

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

22, 23 and 24 February 2016

JUDGE:

Bowskill QC DCJ

ORDER:

1.   The application is dismissed. 

CATCHWORDS:

PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT – Application for declaratory relief in relation to the first respondent’s decision to approve the second respondent’s request to change an existing approval as a “permissible change” – Where the applicants are owners of residential units adjacent to second respondent’s hotel – Where the requested change included construction of acoustic wall near to the boundary - Where the decision was challenged on the basis of jurisdictional error – Whether first respondent failed to take into account relevant considerations in considering whether the requested change resulted in a “substantially different development” under s 367(1)(a) of SPA, namely, the impact of the acoustic wall on availability of natural light, air ventilation and visual amenity – Whether the first respondent’s opinion, for the purposes of s 367(1)(c) of the SPA, that the change was not likely to cause a person to make a properly made submission, was legally unreasonable

Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld), ss 367, 369, 374, 375 and 456

Australian Retailers Association & Ors v Reserve Bank of Australia (2005) 148 FCR 446
Buck v Bavone (1976) 135 CLR 110
Di Marco v Brisbane City Council [2006] QPELR 731
Eschenko v Cummins [2000] QPELR 386
Heritage Properties Pty Ltd v Redland City Council [2010] QPELR 510
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611
Orchard (Oxenford) Developments Pty Ltd v Gold Coast City Council [2015] QPELR 462
Plaintiff M64/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 327 ALR 8
Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144
Westfield Management Ltd v Brisbane City Council & Anor [2003] QPELR 520
Wheldon & Anor v Logan City Council & Anor [2015] QPELR 640

COUNSEL:

D Purcell for the Applicants

T Trotter for the First Respondent

C Hughes QC, with M Williamson, for the Second Respondent

SOLICITORS:

Mills Oakley for the Applicants

Brisbane City Legal Practice for the First Respondent

Dibbs Barker for the Second Respondent

Introduction

  1. This is an application under s 456 of the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) (SPA) seeking declaratory relief and consequential orders in relation to the first respondent Council’s decision, under s 376 of the SPA, to approve the second respondent’s request to change an existing development approval.

  2. The second…

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Details
Case
[2016] QPEC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Ferreyra & Ors v Brisbane City Council & Anor, the applicants sought declaratory relief regarding the Brisbane City Council’s decision to approve a request to change an existing approval as a “permissible change”. The applicants, owners of residential units adjacent to the second respondent’s hotel, contested the change which included the construction of an acoustic wall near the boundary. The applicants argued that the Council’s decision was flawed on several grounds, including a failure to consider relevant factors in determining whether the requested change resulted in a “substantially different development” under s 367(1)(a) of the Sustainable Planning Act, and whether the Council’s opinion that the change was not likely to cause a properly made submission was legally unreasonable.

The court examined the legal issues concerning whether the Council had failed to take into account relevant considerations, specifically the impact of the acoustic wall on natural light, air ventilation, and visual amenity. The court also assessed whether the Council’s opinion about the likelihood of objections was legally unreasonable. In reaching its decision, the court noted the limited role of reviewing a decision on the basis of legal unreasonableness, emphasizing that the court’s role is supervisory and concerned with whether there has been a lawful exercise of power. The court held that if there is a transparent and intelligible justification for the decision, or if it falls within the “area of decisional freedom” of the decision-maker, the court should not overturn the decision simply because it disagrees with the outcome.

The court found that the Council’s decision, while possibly controversial, was within its discretionary authority. The court determined that the Council had considered relevant factors and did not fail to take into account any consideration it was bound to consider under the statute. The court also held that the Council’s opinion about the likelihood of objections was not legally unreasonable, as it was within the Council’s area of decisional freedom. The application was therefore dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

That last point was also emphasised by Wigney J at [92]:“The critical point is that, in reviewing a decision on the ground of legal unreasonableness, the Court’s role is strictly supervisory. It is concerned with determining whether there has been a lawful exercise of power having regard, in particular, to the terms, scope and purpose of the statute conferring the power. In circumstances where reasonable minds might differ about the outcome of, or justification for, the exercise of power, or where the outcome falls within the range of legally and factually justifiable outcomes, the exercise of power is not legally unreasonable simply because the Court disagrees, even emphatically, with the outcome or justification. If there is an evident, transparent and intelligible justification for the decision (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [76], [105]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44]-[45]), or if the decision is within the “area of decisional freedom” of the decision-maker (Li at [28], [66], [105]; Singh at [44]), it would be an error for the Court to overturn the decision simply on the basis that it would have decided the matter differently.”[95][95]Emphasis added. See also Bon Accord Pty Ltd v Brisbane City Council [2010] QPELR 23 at [112]-[113] per Rackemann J. Justice Wigney’s observations in this regard are redolent of the following comment made by Gummow J in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [137], after referring to the passage from Buck v Bavone referred to at paragraph [72] above:“… where the criterion of which the authority is required to be satisfied turns upon factual matters upon which reasonable minds could reasonably differ, it will be very difficult to show that no reasonable decision-maker could have arrived at the decision in question. It may be otherwise if the evidence which establishes or denies, or, with other matters, goes to establish or to deny, that the necessary criterion has been met was all one way.” The town planning experts (Mr Buckley, Mr Kay and Mr Lyons) identify, at [19] of their joint expert report (JER) (exhibit 1), that they have been asked to express an opinion “on the reasonableness of the decision, to issue the permissible change to the 2011 approval”. In the context of this proceeding, that puts the question too broadly. The ground of review relied upon, in so far as reasonableness is concerned is that the opinion formed by the decision-maker, for the purposes of s 367(1)(c), that the change would not be likely to cause a person to make a properly made submission objecting to the proposed change, was legally unreasonable. In any event, it is possible to discern from the experts’ evidence their opinion about that narrower point. The key point made by Mr Buckley and Mr Kay is that, in considering this issue, as part of the broader consideration of a permissible change request, context is crucial.[96] In the JER, the relevant context, they said, includes:(a)the nature and type of the approval sought to be changed;(b)the physical location and land use context;[97] (c)“[t]he development potential of the fringe bar land, in particular this ‘open’ bar area which we consider includes a clear ability to develop a podium structure up to 3 storeys. Such a podium could be built to any common boundary”;[98](d)“[t]he fact the fringe bar is subject to the Liquor Act which puts obligations on licensees to limit and control noise disturbance”.[99][96] JER (exhibit 1) at [33] and [61]; Mr Buckley at T 2-62.40-.46; T 2-63.25-.40.[97] JER (exhibit 1) at [33].[98]JER (exhibit 1) at [34], also [56]; Mr Kay’s oral evidence at T 2-39.38-.41; T 2-40.31 (“you wouldn’t have anything but clear expectation that the Fringe Bar could be built to the side boundary”); T 2-44.41. [99] JER (exhibit 1) at [34].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As Weinberg J observed in Australian Retailers Association & Ors v Reserve Bank of Australia (2005) 148 FCR 446 at [522]:“The authorities make it clear that failure to take into account a relevant consideration can only be made out as a ground of review if the decision-maker fails to take into account a consideration that he or she is bound to take into account in making that decision. Whether a decision-maker is bound to take a particular matter into account is determined by the construction of the statute conferring the discretion. If the relevant factors are not expressly identified in the statute, they must be determined by implication from its subject matter, scope and purpose …”[83][83]Referring, inter alia, to Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 39-40. Emphasis added. In Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40-41, Mason J emphasised the limited role of the court in reviewing the exercise of an administrative discretion. The function of the court “is not to substitute its own opinion or decision on matters which Parliament has left to the judgment of the local authority but to decide whether the local authority in reaching its decision has acted in accordance with the statutory provisions”.[84] As Mason J said at 41, “[i]t follows that, in the absence of any statutory indication of the weight to be given to various considerations, it is generally for the decision-maker and not the court to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the matters which are required to be taken into account in exercising the statutory power”.[84]Sean Investments Pty Ltd v MacKellar (1981) 38 ALR 363 at 375 per Deane J. See also Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 at [132]-[134] per Gummow J. Reflecting this principle, in Australian Retailers Association at [525], Weinberg J adopted the following observation, made by Hely J in Elias v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (2002) 123 FCR 499 at [57]:“As long as the decision-maker considers those things that the legislation requires to be taken into account and ignores any prohibited consideration, the grounds of failing to take into account a relevant consideration, or taking into account an irrelevant consideration, will not be available. Nor are those grounds available where the essence of the complaint is that the decision-maker paid either too little or too much attention to a relevant factor…” In considering this ground, it is necessary to understand precisely what it is that the applicants contend was not taken into account. In the applicants’ summary of position at [1], reference is made to a failure to take into consideration “[t]he new impacts or the severity of known impacts introduced as a result of the change”, more particularly, the loss of natural light and visual amenity, as identified by Mr Callan Bennett in the memorandum referred to above.[85][85] See also applicants’ written submissions at [37].