FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
ASX19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1352
File number: MLG 505 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK Date of judgment: 25 August 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – protection (class XA) (subclass 866) visa – judicial review – review of decision of the (then) Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) – where Minister’s delegate refused to grant applicant a visa – where Tribunal affirmed delegate’s decision – whether Tribunal’s decision was illogical, irrational or unreasonable – Tribunal’s decision attended by jurisdictional error – writ of certiorari issued – writ of mandamus issued Legislation: Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36(2)(a), 36(2)(aa), 91R(1)(a), 91R(1)(b), 91R(1)(c), 359A, 424A
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) sch 2, div 2, pt 1, item 3
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2, cl 866.221(2)
Cases cited: Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184, 236 FCR 593
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3, 289 FCR 21
LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12, 280 CLR 321
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28, 240 FCR 158
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Sabharwal [2018] FCAFC 160
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11, 237 FCR 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18, 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] HCA 39
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16, 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB [2004] HCA 32
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1, 231 FCR 437
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 92 Date of last submission/s: 2 July 2025 Date of hearing: 18 June 2025 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A Krohn Solicitors for the Applicant: Wotton Kearney Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr K Sypott Solicitors for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Counsel for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 505 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: ASX19
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GOSTENCNIK
DATE OF ORDER:
25 AUGUST 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A writ of certiorari issue to quash the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) made on 12 February 2019 in Case No 1622049.
2.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the second respondent requiring it to determine, according to law, the application for review made to the AAT in Case No 1622049.
3.The first respondent pay the applicant’s costs fixed in the sum of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read ASX19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 1352
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues the court had to decide included whether the Tribunal failed to consider relevant considerations, including the applicant's claims and material questions of fact, whether the Tribunal erred in interpreting or applying the law, whether there was a reasonable apprehension that the Tribunal was biased or did not have an open mind, and whether the Tribunal's decision was otherwise legally unreasonable.
The court found that the Tribunal's decision was indeed affected by jurisdictional error. The Tribunal failed to consider or properly consider several material facts, including the applicant's claims of rape and violence by her husband, her claims of attempted suicide, and the allegation that she had fabricated her claims for protection. The Tribunal also erred in rejecting corroborative documents without making inquiries about their authenticity and in not giving the applicant the opportunity to know that her marriage was an issue on the review. Additionally, the Tribunal's findings were not based on a logically probative basis and were otherwise legally unreasonable. The court quashed the Tribunal's decision and remitted the review application to the Minister for determination according to law.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal similarly found that there was no real risk that the applicant would suffer significant harm upon return to Papua New Guinea: Decision at [71]. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not satisfy the refugee criterion in ss 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act, and the decision under review was affirmed. CONSIDERATION By her further amended application the applicant sets out four grounds contending the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error as follows:1.The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) fell into jurisdictional error in that it did not consider or failed to properly consider relevant considerations including claims, integers of claims and material questions of fact squarely arising on the review by the Tribunal. ParticularsApplicant’s claims to have suffered rape and violence by her husband (a) A letter from a psychologist, dated 2 October 2017 and marked as handed to the Tribunal at hearing on 11 October 2018, stated that the Applicant was raped at the age of 14 (sic) by the man to whom she was shortly afterwards married. Although the Tribunal said it had carefully considered this letter (CB 189, Decision [23]), the Tribunal made no enquiry about this of the Applicant at the Tribunal hearing and made no finding on whether the Applicant had been raped at a young age by the man to whom she was later married. (b) Further, the Applicant claimed to have been married at fifteen years of age to the husband whom she said was later violent to her. (Statement in support of application for protection visa, CB 30, [1].) (c) In the circumstances set out in Particulars (a) and (b), the question whether she had been raped was relevant to the assessment of her credibility and to the assessment of her claims about her marriage and the history of violence in her marriage. Claims to have attempted suicide three times (d)The Applicant claimed in her application for the visa that on three occasions, because of her misery in her marriage, she attempted suicide (Statement in support of application for protection visa, CB 30, [4]), but the Tribunal made no finding about these claims. (Cf. CB 189, Decision [23]) Whether the Applicant’s children could support her and would be willing to do so(e) The Tribunal found that the Applicant’s children could support her and that she could live with them, if she were to return to her country but not live with Sebastian (CB 196, [61]) The Tribunal did not properly consider as required by law if they could and would be willing to support and house her, over 7 years since she left them without notice in Papua New Guinea.Letter accusing Applicant of fabricating her claims for protection (f) There was an allegation in writing that the Applicant had fabricated her claims. The Tribunal in a letter dated 9 November 2018 (“the letter”) put this to the Applicant for comment:“It said that you paid someone to tell you how to be a refugee that you are claiming your husband was violent towards you and your children and seeking protection on those grounds. The source states that your husband left you for another woman, that you have tattoos on your hand and a badly broken nose.” (CB 175) (g)The Applicant’s then representative replied on 23 November 2018 and submitted that no adverse weight should be put on the letter; “Given these matters, we respectfully submit that a negative inference in relation to the applicant’s credibility should not be drawn from the dob-in, especially given it is anonymous and the person who made the dob-in may have done so to be vindictive to our client. “ (CB 180)(h) Despite the circumstances set out in Particulars (f) and (g) to this Ground, the Tribunal made no finding about the letter or its contents. It neither said that it had ignored the contents of the letter, nor did it make a finding about which (if any) parts of the letter it accepted as truthful or reliable, including the letter’s reference to the Applicant’s “husband” which reference supported her claim to be married, but these were material questions arising on the review by the Tribunal.2.The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in that it erred in interpreting or applying the law. ParticularsNot making findings (a) Further or in the alternative to the Particulars to Ground 1, the Tribunal did not make findings on material questions of fact necessary to its review under sections 412 and 414 of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) of the decision by the Minister’s delegate. Not making inquiries about corroborative documents (b) The Tribunal had a copy of a medical report from a hospital (CB 79-81, noted by the delegate at CB 105), and of a report to a police station (CB 81, noted by the delegate at CB105), both in Papua New Guinea. The Tribunal rejected them as non-genuine documents of no weight, without any inquiry of the apparent authors. (CB 194, [45]-[49]) (c) The Tribunal did not make inquiries under section 424A of the Act about the authenticity of the ostensibly corroborative documents mentioned in Particular (b) to this Ground, but it rejected them as non-genuine documents and deserving no weight, because of internal inconsistencies and because of information about the prevalence of fraudulent documents in Papua New Guinea.Doubt about finding – “real chance” (d) The Tribunal said, “Even if [the Applicant] could not cohabit with Sebastian on return…” (CB 196, Decision [61]), which suggests that this was a material question of fact in the Tribunal’s mind, and indicates an element of doubt by the Tribunal about its earlier finding that, “I find that the applicant can return to Port Moresby and live there. I find that she could return either to live with Sebastian and resume their relationship – there being no information before me that he would harm her…” (CB 196, [60]) (e) The finding by the Tribunal that the Applicant was not owed protection, despite the element of doubt in the Tribunal’s findings set out in Particular (d) to this Ground, shows that the Tribunal was not correctly interpreting or applying the terms “well-founded fear”, “real chance” and “real risk” in sections 5H, 5J, 36(2)(a) and 36(2)(aa) of the Act. (f) In breach of section 425 of the Act, the Tribunal did not give the Applicant the opportunity to know that it was an issue on the review whether she had ever been married to the man she said was her husband.3. The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in that there was a reasonable apprehension that it was biased or did not have an open mind. Particulars(a)Further or in the alternative to Particulars (f), (g) and (h) to Ground 1, and by reason of the matters set out in those Particulars, there was a reasonable apprehension that the Tribunal was biased or did not have an open mind. 4. The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in that it did not have a logically probative basis for findings or was otherwise legally unreasonable.ParticularsRejection of corroborative evidence and claims without making inquiries (a) Further or in the alternative to Particulars (b) and (c) to Ground 2, the Tribunal was legally unreasonable to have rejected the corroborative documents referred to in those particulars as non-genuine and of no weight, and the claims which they ostensibly supported, without making inquiries of the ostensible authors or issuing authorities. (CB 79-81; 194, [45]-[49])Rejection of claim to have been married to the man the Applicant claimed (b) The Tribunal’s finding that, “The applicant has been in a relationship with Sebastian Mambu from at least 2000, when the applicant, I find, had a child ... with Sebastian Mambu. I find that the applicant was in a relationship with Sebastian from 2000 until at least 2014…” (CB 195, [52]) was based on the paternity of the child. This was not a logical foundation for the proposition that the Applicant was never married to another man, not (sic) that she had not continued cohabiting with her husband up to 2013. (CB 195, [52])Rejection of claim to have been assaulted (c) Further or in the alternative to particulars (a) to (d) to Ground 1, the Tribunal rejected the claim that the Applicant had been assaulted by her husband, (CB 195, [52]) on the basis of its findings on the Applicant’s general credibility, and about the documents, the relationship with Sebastian and the paternity of her children, but without any discrete consideration of the circumstantial claims of the assaults (described by the Tribunal at CB 195 [52]) and injuries, and the three attempts at suicide. Finding that the Applicant’s children could support her(d) Further or in the alternative to Particular (e) to Ground 1, the Tribunal referred to no evidence for its finding that the Applicant’s children could support her and that she could live with them, if she were to return to her country but not live with Sebastian. (CB 196, [61]) The Tribunal did not properly consider if they would be willing to support and house her, over 7 years since she left them without notice in Papua New Guinea. (e) Further or in the alternative to Particular (e) to Ground 1 and particular (d) to this Ground, there was no reference by the Tribunal to any evidence for its finding that the support of the Applicant’s children would allow her to return and live in reasonable safety, (CB 197, [66]) despite the level of risk noted by the Tribunal in Port Moresby, especially to a single woman. (CB 196, [64]).