GCR24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship
[2025] FedCFamC2G 1157
•23 July 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
GCR24 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1157
File number: PEG 303 of 2024 Judgment of: JUDGE LADHAMS Date of judgment: 23 July 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirming a decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa – whether the Tribunal erred by failing to consider whether the applicant will face mental stress, depression and abuse from Malaysia’s unemployment and high living cost – whether the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s claim or an integer of his claim and made an unreasonable decision – where the applicant seeks a second chance to provide more details – no jurisdictional error established – application dismissed. Legislation: Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) Sch 2
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 36, 424A, 425, 425A, 426A, 476, 477
Cases cited: BDY18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 273 FCR 170; [2020] FCAFC 24
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21; [2022] FCAFC 3
LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321; [2024] HCA 12
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158; [2016] FCAFC 28
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263
NAVX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 287
Vo v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 108
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 56 Date of hearing: 17 July 2025 Place: Perth Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms A Ismailjee Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
PEG 303 of 2024 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: GCR24
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LADHAMS
DATE OF ORDER:
23 JULY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $6,500.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LADHAMS:
INTRODUCTION
The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia who applied for a protection visa in Australia. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a protection visa and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) affirmed the delegate’s decision on 9 August 2024. The applicant seeks judicial review of the Tribunal decision in the Court’s jurisdiction under s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)[1] (Migration Act).
[1] Significant amendments have been made to the Migration Act following the commencement of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth). Unless otherwise stated, all references to the Migration Act in this judgment are references to the provisions of the Migration Act in effect at the relevant time of the events described in this judgment. All references to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal are to the Tribunal as it existed at the time the applicant’s matter was before it for review.
For the reasons explained below, the applicant has not established that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error. The application for judicial review is therefore dismissed.
VISA APPLICATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
On 25 July 2018 the applicant applied for a protection visa. The applicant claimed that he left Malaysia because living in Malaysia is very hard due to lack of employment and the expensive cost of living, and because he ‘hate[s] the government’. The applicant claimed that if he were to return to Malaysia he will be financially harmed by the economy by the mistakes of the ruling government.
On 20 December 2018 a delegate of the Minister refused to grant the applicant a protection visa and the applicant applied to the Tribunal for merits review of the delegate’s decision on 7 January 2019.
The Tribunal sent an email to the applicant on 12 April 2024 requesting that he complete a pre-hearing information form. The applicant completed this form and returned it to the Tribunal on 17 April 2024.
On 28 June 2024 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant inviting him to attend a hearing before the Tribunal on 15 July 2024. The Tribunal indicated in the hearing invitation that it had considered the material before it but was unable to make a favourable decision on this information alone.
The applicant did not attend the hearing on 15 July 2024. An officer of the Tribunal telephoned the applicant who advised he was busy and therefore could not attend the hearing.
On 18 July 2024 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant to invite him to a rescheduled hearing on 24 July 2024, again indicating that it was not able to make a favourable decision on the information provided.
On 22 July 2024 the applicant sent an email to the Tribunal attaching a response to the hearing invitation indicating that he would not participate in the hearing and consenting to the Tribunal making a decision on the papers. On the same day the Tribunal wrote to the applicant to confirm that the hearing scheduled for 24 July 2024 had been cancelled and the Tribunal would notify the applicant once a decision has been made.
On 9 August 2024 the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
SUMMARY OF THE TRIBUNAL DECISION
The Tribunal found that the essence of the applicant’s protection claims comprised a claim based on employment or financial circumstances and a claim of dissatisfaction with the government of Malaysia. The Tribunal accepted that these issues may be related to the extent that the applicant may consider the government as the cause of his economic or financial troubles.
In relation to the claim that the applicant left Malaysia to see if he can make any difference in his life, the Tribunal found that this is not sufficient for Australia to owe him protection obligations in accordance with the Migration Act. The Tribunal accepted that the applicant seeks a better life and accepted that working as a taxi driver in Malaysia might not match the applicant’s aspirations. However, based on the evidence before it, the Tribunal rejected the proposition that the totality of the evidence suggested that the applicant faced serious harm of a kind amounting to persecution. Giving the applicant the benefit of the doubt, the Tribunal accepted that living in Malaysia might have been very hard and accepted that there may be competition for jobs and the cost of living may be expensive. However, having regard to country information published by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Tribunal found that the evidence before it did not in any way suggest the applicant was destitute or otherwise unable to subsist. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant has suffered serious harm in the past in Malaysia.
In relation to the applicant’s claim that he was unemployed from January 2017 until he departed from Malaysia a few months later, the Tribunal considered that there was no evidence before it to suggest that the applicant suffered serious harm as a result of this unemployment, and no evidence relating to whether the unemployment was involuntary. Additionally, the Tribunal found no credible evidence to suggest the applicant could not return to his country and find employment within a reasonable time of returning.
The Tribunal accepted the absence of past harm was not determinative of the risk of future harm. However, the Tribunal found no evidence to suggest the applicant would not be able to find some form of paid employment in Malaysia and found no evidence that the applicant would face significant economic hardship that would threaten his capacity to subsist. The Tribunal found that the evidence before it did not credibly suggest the applicant would be denied access to basic services where the denial would threaten his capacity to subsist, and the Tribunal rejected the proposition that the evidence before it suggested the applicant faced a real chance of being denied the capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind that would threaten his capacity to subsist. For those reasons, the Tribunal rejected the assertion that the applicant faced a real chance of serious harm due to employment issues or due to the financial or economic circumstances he may face now or in the reasonably foreseeable future if he returns to Malaysia.
The Tribunal found the applicant’s claims to have left Malaysia due to a ‘political factor’ and because he hates the government to be vague and generalised. The Tribunal found the statements did not provide any basis to conclude that there were substantial grounds for concluding that the applicant faced a real chance of harm in Malaysia. The Tribunal could not justify extending the benefit of doubt on such a vague and ungeneralised claim. The Tribunal also noted that country information assessed that individuals are generally not a risk of violence on the ground of their political affiliations in Malaysia.
Based on the findings of fact summarised above, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant met the refugee criterion in s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act or the complementary protection criterion in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act.
JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION
The applicant filed an application for judicial review on 14 August 2024. The application was made within 35 days of the Tribunal decision as required by s 477(1) of the Migration Act.
Grounds of application
The applicant raises three grounds in his application (reproduced without alteration):
1. I believe that the case officer made a jurisdiction error by saying that I did not face a real risk of significant faced harm from discrimination and harassment in Malaysia because of economic down and political factors. If I return to Malaysia, I will facing mental stress and depression abused by Malaysia unemployment and high living cost. The threat is real and significant, which would cause a fatal influence on me. Therefore, I would like to apply for protection in Australia. However, the case officer failed to investigate the applicant's claims by misconstruing the details as set out in s36(2)(a), s36(2C), s36(3), s5H(1) of the Act and Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994. The officer erroneously construed the existence of the risk of life or significant harm to the applicants upon their return to Malaysia.
2. I believe that the AAT case officer made a jurisdiction error by affirming the decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The AAT case officer failed to consider my claim or integer of a claim and made an unreasonable decision.
3. I seek for my claims to be given a second chance for me to provide more details to straighter my claims but not just to concern.
Pursuant to an Order made by a Registrar of this Court on 14 October 2024, the applicant was required to file and serve 28 days before the hearing written submissions, any amended application with proper particulars of the grounds of application and any additional evidence on which the applicant seeks to rely. The applicant did not file any documents in accordance with this Order.
At the hearing, I explained to the applicant the role of the Court and the Court’s focus on whether the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error. I then referred the applicant to the grounds in his application. I asked the applicant whether he prepared the grounds himself and he indicated that an agent prepared the grounds for him and he did not know the content of the grounds. The grounds were interpreted for the applicant’s benefit by the interpreter who was engaged by the Court to assist the applicant at the hearing. After the grounds were interpreted, I explained to the applicant that:
(a)I proposed to treat the reference to ‘case officer’ as a reference to the Tribunal, noting that the Court cannot review the delegate’s decision;
(b)I understood ground 1 to assert jurisdictional errors on the basis that the Tribunal failed to consider claims that the applicant will face mental stress and depression due to unemployment and high living costs in Malaysia and that the Tribunal failed to investigate or consider claims raised by the applicant because it misconstrued certain provisions of the Migration Act;
(c)I consider ground 2 to assert jurisdictional errors on the basis that the Tribunal failed to consider a claim or an integer of the claim raised by the applicant, and made a decision that was unreasonable;
(d)if the applicant wished to rely on ground 2, he might need to give further information to the Court to enable the Court to properly understand the ground, such as identifying the claim or integer that he believes was not considered and explaining why he thinks the decision was unreasonable; and
(e)ground 3 appears to be a request to provide further information about the applicant’s claims, but does not assert any jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision and this Court cannot consider for itself whether the applicant meets the requirements for the grant of a protection visa.
The applicant amended ground 1 orally at the hearing. This amendment is discussed in the consideration of the ground later in this judgment. The applicant initially indicated that he wished to ‘ignore’ grounds 2 and 3, but after I stood the matter down to give the applicant an opportunity to consider what he wished to say to the Court, he subsequently indicated that he continued to rely on grounds 2 and 3.
Evidence before the Court
The evidence before the Court comprises:
(a)the court book filed on behalf of the Minister on 25 October 2024 (exhibit 1);
(b)an affidavit of the applicant filed with his judicial review application annexing a copy of the Tribunal decision; and
(c)an affidavit of service of Benjamin Mayne filed on behalf of the Minister on 11 July 2025.
CONSIDERATION OF THE APPLICATION
The role of the Court in judicial review proceedings
The role of the Court in this judicial review proceeding is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the Tribunal decision by reference to the applicant’s complaints about that decision: Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21; [2022] FCAFC 3 (Djokovic) at [17]. The Court does not consider the merits of the Tribunal decision: Djokovic at [17]; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6 at [31].
The Court can only grant relief to the applicant if he establishes that the Tribunal decision is affected by jurisdictional error. Jurisdictional error was explained by the High Court in LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2024) 280 CLR 321; [2024] HCA 12, where the Court said at [2]-[3] (footnotes omitted):
2.Jurisdictional error can refer to breach of an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of decision-making authority which results in a decision made in the purported exercise of that authority lacking the legal force attributed to exercise of that authority by statute. …
3.Because an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of decision-making authority can take many different forms, and because breach can occur in many different circumstances, the categories of jurisdictional error are not closed. … Jurisdictional error on the part of a statutory decision-maker in making a decision can include: misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness.
Disagreement with a decision, even emphatic disagreement, does not of itself give rise to jurisdictional error: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; [1999] HCA 21 at [40].
Ground 1
At the hearing, the applicant indicated that he wished to amend ground 1 to rely only on the following part of the ground:
If I return to Malaysia, I will facing mental stress and depression abused by Malaysia unemployment and high living cost. The threat is real and significant, which would cause a fatal influence on me.
Read naturally, the ground now appears to be inviting the Court to engage in impermissible merits review and to consider the applicant’s claims for protection. I asked the applicant at the hearing whether he was asserting that the Tribunal erred by failing to consider these things, and he responded in the affirmative. I invited him to explain to me where, in the evidence before the Tribunal, he raised these issues, noting that the Tribunal was only required to consider claims that the applicant expressly articulated, or which clearly emerged on the material before the Tribunal. The applicant responded that he wants to apply for a protection due to the poor economy.
In conducting the review, the Tribunal was required to consider claims that were expressly articulated by the applicant, and claims which were not expressly articulated, but which clearly emerged from the material before the Tribunal: NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (No 2) (2004) 144 FCR 1; [2004] FCAFC 263 at [58], [60]-[61]. The Tribunal was not required to consider claims which were not expressly articulated and which did not clearly emerge from the material before it.
The only articulation of the applicant’s claims that was before the Tribunal was that in his application for a protection visa and in his pre-hearing information form provided to the Tribunal.
In his protection visa application, in explaining why he left Malaysia, the applicant wrote (reproduced without alteration):
i left malaysia, i had live in malaysia when i was young till now i decided to go out from the country and see if i can make any difference in my life. while living in Malaysia is very hard because we dont have much employment while the cost of living is expensive. but most of all, i hate the government so much.
In explaining what he believes will happen if he returns to Malaysia, the applicant wrote (reproduced without alteration):
FINANCIALLY HARMED BY THE ECONOMY BY THE MISTAKES OF RULING GOVERNMENT.
In his pre-hearing information form, the applicant gave the following information about his claims for protection and the reasons he is afraid to return to his home country:
-They left Malaysia due to economic and political factors.
-They wanted to make a difference in their life as there are limited employment opportunities in Malaysia and the cost of living is high.
-They may not be harmed if they return to Malaysia.
As identified by Counsel for the Minister in her oral submissions at the hearing, the claims in the pre-hearing information form are identical to the delegate’s summary of the applicant’s claims for protection, as set out in the delegate’s decision record.
The applicant did not refer anywhere in his claims for protection or in his pre-hearing information form to facing mental stress and depression. There was therefore no claim before the Tribunal that the applicant would face harm on the basis of mental stress or depression and the Tribunal was not required to consider such a claim.
To the extent that ground 1 refers to high unemployment and living costs, the Tribunal clearly considered these claims. The Tribunal accepted that living in Malaysia may have been hard for the applicant and that there may have been competition for jobs and the cost of living may have been expensive. However, the Tribunal also considered country information that referred to Malaysia’s strong economic performance over the past few decades, which had led to a significant reduction in poverty, and that the unemployment rate in 2023 was 3.4%. On the basis of this information, and that the evidence before it did not suggest that the applicant was destitute or otherwise unable to subsist, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had suffered serious harm in the past and it considered there was no credible evidence to suggest that the applicant would be unable to find employment within a reasonable time of returning to Malaysia. The Tribunal rejected the applicant’s claim that he may face serious harm in the reasonably foreseeable future due to financial or economic circumstances because there was no evidence that he would not be able to find some form of paid employment in Malaysia, there was no evidence he would face significant economic hardship that would threaten his capacity to subsist, the Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant would be denied access to basic services where the denial threatens his capacity to subsist, and the Tribunal rejected the proposition that the applicant faced a real chance of being denied a capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind which would threaten his capacity to subsist.
The applicant has not established that the Tribunal failed to consider the matters referred to in the part of ground 1 that he relies upon. The ground therefore fails.
Ground 2
By ground 2, the applicant asserts that the Tribunal failed to consider a claim or an integer with his claim, or made a decision that was unreasonable.
The applicant’s submissions in relation to this ground were, with respect, confusing. At the start of the hearing the applicant indicated he did not rely on the ground. Following a short break in the hearing, the applicant indicated he did rely on the ground. In the course of his submissions, I asked him to tell me what claim or part of his claim the Tribunal did not consider and why he considered the Tribunal decision to be unreasonable. I initially understood the applicant to say that he does not think he has the right to point out the error of the Tribunal. After seeking clarification of this submission, I understood the applicant to submit that the Tribunal has not made a mistake. He then appeared to suggest that he does not rely on ground 2 and then further indicated that he wants to understand ground 2 clearly. At this point, I again explained to the applicant the manner in which the Court understood ground 2, as summarised at [20(c)] above. The applicant then indicated he had no further comment in relation to ground 2.
Given the lack of clarity as to whether ground 2 is pressed or not, out of an abundance of caution, I proceed on the basis that the ground is pressed.
This ground largely overlaps with ground 1. Again, the only articulation of the applicant’s claims is that set out in his application for a protection visa and that set out in his pre-hearing information form he provided to the Tribunal.
In ground 1, I found that the Tribunal considered the claims advanced by the applicant in relation to his financial and economic circumstances. The same findings and reasoning extends to ground 2 to the extent that the ground might be seen to relate to the applicant’s economic and financial claims. I also observe for the purposes of ground 2 that the Tribunal considered the applicant’s claims based on his hatred of the government, but found the applicant’s statements in this regard were too vague and general to justify giving him the benefit of the doubt and further found that country information suggested that individuals are not generally at risk of violence on the ground of their political affiliation.
I accept the Minister’s submission that the Tribunal engaged with the applicant’s claims that were before it. The applicant has not established that the Tribunal failed to consider a claim or integer of a claim that he raised.
The applicant has also asserted that the Tribunal decision was unreasonable, but he has not articulated any basis on which the decision is unreasonable save for the failure to consider his claims, which I have rejected. In this regard, to the extent that the unreasonableness asserted by the applicant was intended to be the type of unreasonableness that involves a conclusion after the identification of a recognised species of error in the decision-making process (in this case, the failure to consider a claim), it is not established: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158; [2016] FCAFC 28 at [60], citing Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332; [2013] HCA 18.
I have also considered whether the applicant’s ground may be an assertion of unreasonableness in the Tribunal’s fact-finding. Having regard to the principles regarding unreasonableness in fact-finding articulated in cases such as BDY18 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 273 FCR 170; [2020] FCAFC 24 at [30] and Vo v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 108 at [43], there is no basis for finding that the Tribunal’s decision in this matter was unreasonable. The Tribunal carefully considered the evidence before it and made findings that were open to it on that evidence. I accept the Minister’s submission that the Tribunal’s conclusions were supported by a logical and rational basis and were not unreasonable.
Ground 3
Ground 3 appears to be either a request for the Court to consider the applicant’s claims for protection and to give him a further opportunity to adduce evidence for this purpose, or alternatively, a request to be afforded another chance before the Tribunal. In either case, the ground does not assert any error in the Tribunal decision and does not establish jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision.
As I explained to the applicant at the hearing, the Court cannot consider for itself whether he meets the requirements for the grant of a protection visa. The Court has no jurisdiction to address the factual merits of the Tribunal decision. It is therefore not appropriate for the Court to consider the applicant’s claims for protection or to give him any opportunity to adduce evidence about his claims for protection for the purpose of inviting the Court to consider those claims.
I also explained to the applicant at the hearing that:
(a)if I find that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error, I could set aside the Tribunal decision and require the Administrative Review Tribunal to make a new decision according to law; and
(b)if I find that the Tribunal did not make a jurisdictional error, I would dismiss his application to the Court.
It is only appropriate for the Court to grant relief to the applicant if he establishes that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error. The applicant in this case has not established jurisdictional error in the Tribunal decision. I therefore cannot give him a further opportunity to present his claims to the Tribunal.
Procedural fairness considerations
The applicant did not assert any jurisdictional error on the basis that he was denied procedural fairness. Notwithstanding this, the Minister addressed procedural fairness considerations in his written submissions and Counsel for the Minister also addressed procedural fairness in her oral submissions to the Court. I therefore briefly address the procedural fairness considerations in this judgment.
I accept the Minister’s submission that the Tribunal complied with its procedural fairness obligations in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Migration Act.
The Tribunal in this matter invited the applicant to attend a hearing to give evidence and present arguments in relation to the issues arising in the review, as required by s 425 of the Migration Act. I have reviewed the notice of the invitation to attend a hearing and I am satisfied that it complies with the formal requirements set out in s 425A of the Migration Act.
When the applicant failed to attend the hearing scheduled for 15 July 2024, the Tribunal exercised its discretion in s 426A(2) of the Migration Act and invited the applicant to a rescheduled hearing. The applicant then completed a response to the hearing invitation in which he indicated that he would not participate in the hearing and consented to the Tribunal making a decision on the papers without taking further steps to allow him to appear. This consent was given in circumstances where the Tribunal had twice sent to the applicant an invitation to attend a hearing that indicated it could not make a decision in his favour on the basis of the materials before it. Upon the applicant consenting to the Tribunal deciding the review without him appearing before it, the Tribunal was no longer required to invite the applicant to attend a hearing and the applicant was no longer entitled to appear before the Tribunal: see s 425(2)(b) and (3) of the Migration Act. As submitted by the Minister, the inevitable consequence of the applicant consenting to a decision being made on the papers was that the Tribunal affirmed the delegate’s decision: see NAVX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 287 at [5].
I also accept the Minister’s submission that there was no information the Tribunal was required to put to the applicant for comment under s 424A of the Migration Act. The information relied on by the Tribunal was information that the applicant provided to the Department, to the Tribunal in the pre-hearing information form and country information. This information all fell within the exceptions to s 424A contained in s 424A(3)(a), (b) and (ba) of the Migration Act.
There is therefore no basis for finding that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error by denying the applicant procedural fairness.
CONCLUSION
As the applicant has not established that the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error in this matter, his application for judicial review must be dismissed.
At the hearing, Counsel for the Minister indicated that if the Minister is successful in this matter, the Minister would seek an order that the applicant pay the Minister’s costs in the amount of $6,500. This amount is below the scale amount in Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) and, having regard to the work performed on behalf of the Minister in this matter, I am satisfied it is an appropriate amount.
I certify that the preceding fifty-six (56) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Ladhams. Associate:
Dated: 23 July 2025
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