Muirden and Australian National University (Compensation)

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Muirden and Australian National University (Compensation) [2021] AATA 4560 (8 December 2021)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2020/1859

Re:Linda Muirden

APPLICANT

AndAustralian National University

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member Linda Kirk

Date:8 December 2021

Place:Canberra

The Reviewable Decision is set aside and in substitution, the Tribunal finds that the Respondent is liable to pay compensation to the Applicant pursuant to s 14 and s 17 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).

The Tribunal awards the Applicant costs in accordance with s 67(8) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).

.................................[sgd]......................................

Senior Member Linda Kirk

Catchwords

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – condition resulting in deceased’s death – whether condition properly classified as an injury or disease – whether compensation payable for injury resulting in employee’s death – decision set aside.

Legislation

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss 4, 5A-B, 14, 17, 59, 62, 67.

Cases

Australian Postal Corporation v Burch (1998) 156 ALR 483
Baranski v Comcare (2013) FCAFC 31
Comcare v Power (2015) 238 FCR 187
Dover Navigation Co Ltd v Isabella Craig [1940] AC 190
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd v Semlitch [1964] HCA 34

Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska (2000) 200 CLR 286
March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12
May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2015) 233 FCR 397
Migge v Wormald Bros Industries Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 29
Migge v Wormald Bros Industries Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 236
Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May (2016) 257 CLR 468
Prain v Comcare [2016] AATA 459
Repatriation Commission v Law [1980] FCA 92
Repatriation Commission v Law [1981] HCA 57
St Helens Colliery v Hewitson [1924] AC 59
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Bowden [2012] FCA 576
Treloar v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1990) 26 FCR 316

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member Linda Kirk

8 December 2021

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

  1. Linda Muirden (‘the Applicant’) is the wife of the late Andrew Muirden (‘the Deceased’). The Deceased was employed by the Australian National University (‘the Respondent’) as a Night Watchman Grade 3 commencing in a casual role on 2 February 2004 and assuming a permanent full-time position on 16 December 2004.[1]

    [1] Mr Andrew Muirden’s Timesheets from 17 June 2004 to 14 September 2011, 5.

  2. The Deceased died at home on 29 August 2011. A post-mortem concluded that his death was caused by ‘sudden unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP)’.[2]  The Deceased was survived by the Applicant and their four children who were then aged 7, 15, 19 and 22.[3]

    [2] Ibid.

    [3] T6F, 58.

  3. On 15 March 2013 the Applicant completed a Claim for Compensation for a work-related death on 29 August 2011 due to ‘sudden unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP)’. [4] A copy of the Deceased’s death certificate was attached to the claim form.[5]

    [4] T6.

    [5] T6F.

  4. On 31 May 2013, Comcare informed the Applicant by letter of its Determination…

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Details
Case
[2021] AATA 4560
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application for compensation by the Applicant, Muirden, following the death of the Deceased, who was employed by the Respondent, Australian National University. The central dispute revolved around whether the condition that resulted in the Deceased's death was properly classified as an "injury" or a "disease" under the relevant legislation, and consequently, whether compensation was payable. The decision was made by Senior Member Linda Kirk.

The legal issues before the Tribunal were twofold: firstly, to determine the condition that resulted in the Deceased's death, and secondly, to ascertain whether this condition should be classified as an "injury (other than a disease)" or a "disease" for the purposes of the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988* (Cth) (SRC Act). The Applicant asserted that the Deceased's employment, particularly the demanding shift work and alleged pressure to work on rostered days off, contributed to his condition.

The Tribunal considered expert medical evidence regarding the Deceased's death, which was recorded as sudden unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP). While there was no direct proof of an epileptic seizure immediately preceding death, the Tribunal found that the expert medical evidence supported an inference that death was precipitated by an epileptic seizure, applying the principles from *Baranski v Comcare*. The Tribunal concluded that the Deceased suffered an "injury" within the meaning of sections 14 and 17 of the SRC Act, rather than a disease.

Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the reviewable decision and substituted a finding that the Respondent was liable to pay compensation to the Applicant pursuant to sections 14 and 17 of the SRC Act. The Applicant was also awarded costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The Applicant asserted the Senior Member’s professional connection with the Respondent amounted to an interest in the review application, but did not articulate r how it may lead her to determine the matter ‘other than on its legal and factual merits’. Nor did the Applicant explain the connection between this alleged interest and the ‘possibility of departure from impartial decision-making.’ Accordingly, as the two-stage test in Ebner required for apprehended bias is not satisfied in these circumstances, the application for recusal is dismissed.EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIBUNALDeceased’s employment On 16 December 2004 the Deceased became a permanent full-time employee of the Respondent.[9] The Contract of Employment[10] stated the following in relation to his hours of work and leave entitlements:Security Staff – 24 Hour Rotating shift / Extra leaveYour ordinary hours of work are 35 per week and are worked on a 24 hour, 7 day rotating shift basis with specified recreation leave. Your actual hours are determined by your supervisor and you must attend the University during these times except when you are on approved leave or your supervisor has agreed to alternative working arrangements.Staff of the University are entitled to 20 working days Annual Leave for each completed year of service. A staff member employed in areas of the University which close between Boxing Day and New Years Day will be entitled to those days as additional leave.In accordance with clause 35.2.1(b) you will be entitled to an additional 5 days annual leave whilst on rotating shifts.[9] T7, 59 titled: Timeline for Comcare Concerning Andrew Muirden; T7B, page 66 titled: Offer of Appointment to The Australian National University; T4, 18-23 titled: Contract of Employment between The Australian National University and Andrew Muirden.[10] T4, 18-23 titled: Contract of Employment. The Deceased worked a three-week rotation roster as follows:[11]·two days of 8am to 4pm;·seven days of 4pm to midnight;·two days off;·seven days midnight to 8am; and·three days off.[11] Exhibit A2, [3]. According to the Applicant, the Deceased ‘often had to work on his rostered day off especially if it was a public holiday’.[12] He ‘was regularly remade to work his RDOs and Rostered days off so he often worked over 18 days without a break’.[13] When the Deceased commenced his role, he was trained by a senior staff member named Grant Reebeck who advised him that he ‘could not take sick days unless in hospital’ and that ‘leave could not be taken over the Christmas holiday period’.[14] The Deceased ‘abided to [Mr Reebeck’s] rules for 3 years, not a sick day taken and worked every Christmas day and holiday period’.[15][12] Transcript of proceedings, 7 June 2021, 17.[13] Transcript of proceedings, 7 June 2021, 17-18.[14] Ibid.[15] Transcript of proceedings, 7 June 2021, 17-18.Previous episodes and treatment for epilepsy According to a Timeline prepared by the Applicant, the Deceased began experiencing partial seizures in early 2007:[The Deceased] began to have partial seizures upon wakening in January after the holiday period. The seizures were short and undiagnosed. He just had to lie down again and rest after wakening. These seizures occurred usually at the end of midnight-8am shift roster, every 3rd week and worsened each time.[16][16] T7, 59 titled: Timeline for Comcare Concerning Andrew Muirden.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal finds, for the reasons outlined above, that the Deceased suffered an ‘injury’ within the meaning of s 14 and s 17 of the SRC Act. The Respondent is therefore liable to pay compensation to the Applicant for the ‘injury’.DECISION The Reviewable Decision is set aside and in substitution, the Tribunal finds that the Respondent is liable to pay compensation to the Applicant pursuant to s 14 and s 17 of the SRC Act. The Tribunal awards the Applicant costs in accordance with s 67(8) of the SRC Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the alternative, if the Tribunal accepts that the Deceased did suffer an ‘aggravation’ of his pre-existing condition, the Respondent contends that any such ‘aggravation’ was not significantly contributed to by his employment.[143] There is very little, if any, evidence upon which the Tribunal could be positively satisfied that the Deceased was sleep deprived on 29 August 2011, or even if he was that it had any relationship to his employment at ANU.[143] Ibid, [4.13].CONSIDERATION AND REASONS The Tribunal has considered the parties’ submissions, the evidence of the witnesses at the hearing, and all the documentary material before it. The Tribunal is satisfied that the parties had an adequate opportunity to be heard by the Tribunal. 
1)What condition resulted in the Deceased’s death? It is agreed that the Deceased suffered from a chronic illness, namely temporal lobe epilepsy, and that this condition pre-dated his employment with the Respondent. The Coroner’s report records that the Deceased was the victim of sudden unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP). As Professor Chambers explained, many SUDEPs occur in the context of an epileptic seizure. In the Deceased’s case, there is no concrete evidence that he had a seizure prior to his death. There was no witness of a seizure and the autopsy report showed no signs of him having a generalised tonic-clonic seizure.Professor Chamber’s evidence is that SUDEP may also occur in persons with epilepsy without them having a seizure. These persons are presumed to have an arrhythmia. In his opinion the mode of the Deceased’s death was ‘a sudden physiological change or disturbance of the normal physiological state, most likely cardiac arrhythmia.’[144] Dr McColl’s evidence is that there is no proof either way as to whether the Deceased had a seizure when he died, but as he was a person who had ‘quite frequent seizures and was found dead, on the balance of probability those two are very likely to be related.’[145][144] Medical Report of Associate Professor Brian Chambers dated 10 August 2020, 4. [145] Transcript of proceedings, 7 June 2021, 33. Whereas there is no clear proof that the Deceased suffered an epileptic seizure that resulted in SUDEP, the Tribunal finds that the expert medical evidence supports a finding that his death was precipitated by an epileptic seizure. In Baranski v Comcare,[146] the Full Federal Court outlined the circumstances in which an inference may be made about the happening of an event where direct proof of its occurrence is unavailable:[W]here direct proof of an event is not available, it is enough that the circumstances appearing in the evidence give rise to a reasonable and definite inference. The evidence must do more than give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so the choice between them is a mere matter of conjecture. If circumstances are proved in which it is reasonable to find a balance of probabilities in favour of the conclusion sought then, though the conclusion may fall short of certainty, it is not to be regarded as a mere conjecture or surmise. 2) Is this condition properly classified as an ‘injury (other than a disease)’ or a ‘disease’ for the purposes of the Act?[146] [2013) FCAFC 31 at [20].