Muirden and Australian National University (Compensation) [2021] AATA 4560 (8 December 2021)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2020/1859
Re:Linda Muirden
APPLICANT
AndAustralian National University
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member Linda Kirk
Date:8 December 2021
Place:Canberra
The Reviewable Decision is set aside and in substitution, the Tribunal finds that the Respondent is liable to pay compensation to the Applicant pursuant to s 14 and s 17 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).
The Tribunal awards the Applicant costs in accordance with s 67(8) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth).
.................................[sgd]......................................
Senior Member Linda Kirk
Catchwords
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – condition resulting in deceased’s death – whether condition properly classified as an injury or disease – whether compensation payable for injury resulting in employee’s death – decision set aside.
Legislation
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ss 4, 5A-B, 14, 17, 59, 62, 67.
Cases
Australian Postal Corporation v Burch (1998) 156 ALR 483
Baranski v Comcare (2013) FCAFC 31
Comcare v Power (2015) 238 FCR 187
Dover Navigation Co Ltd v Isabella Craig [1940] AC 190
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337
Federal Broom Co Pty Ltd v Semlitch [1964] HCA 34Kennedy Cleaning Services Pty Ltd v Petkoska (2000) 200 CLR 286
March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 12
May v Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission (2015) 233 FCR 397
Migge v Wormald Bros Industries Ltd [1972] 2 NSWLR 29
Migge v Wormald Bros Industries Ltd (1973) 47 ALJR 236
Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission v May (2016) 257 CLR 468
Prain v Comcare [2016] AATA 459
Repatriation Commission v Law [1980] FCA 92
Repatriation Commission v Law [1981] HCA 57
St Helens Colliery v Hewitson [1924] AC 59
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Bowden [2012] FCA 576
Treloar v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1990) 26 FCR 316REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member Linda Kirk
8 December 2021
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
Linda Muirden (‘the Applicant’) is the wife of the late Andrew Muirden (‘the Deceased’). The Deceased was employed by the Australian National University (‘the Respondent’) as a Night Watchman Grade 3 commencing in a casual role on 2 February 2004 and assuming a permanent full-time position on 16 December 2004.[1]
[1] Mr Andrew Muirden’s Timesheets from 17 June 2004 to 14 September 2011, 5.
The Deceased died at home on 29 August 2011. A post-mortem concluded that his death was caused by ‘sudden unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP)’.[2] The Deceased was survived by the Applicant and their four children who were then aged 7, 15, 19 and 22.[3]
[2] Ibid.
[3] T6F, 58.
On 15 March 2013 the Applicant completed a Claim for Compensation for a work-related death on 29 August 2011 due to ‘sudden unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP)’. [4] A copy of the Deceased’s death certificate was attached to the claim form.[5]
[4] T6.
[5] T6F.
On 31 May 2013, Comcare informed the Applicant by letter of its Determination…
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- Case
- [2021] AATA 4560
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Tribunal were twofold: firstly, to determine the condition that resulted in the Deceased's death, and secondly, to ascertain whether this condition should be classified as an "injury (other than a disease)" or a "disease" for the purposes of the *Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988* (Cth) (SRC Act). The Applicant asserted that the Deceased's employment, particularly the demanding shift work and alleged pressure to work on rostered days off, contributed to his condition.
The Tribunal considered expert medical evidence regarding the Deceased's death, which was recorded as sudden unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP). While there was no direct proof of an epileptic seizure immediately preceding death, the Tribunal found that the expert medical evidence supported an inference that death was precipitated by an epileptic seizure, applying the principles from *Baranski v Comcare*. The Tribunal concluded that the Deceased suffered an "injury" within the meaning of sections 14 and 17 of the SRC Act, rather than a disease.
Consequently, the Tribunal set aside the reviewable decision and substituted a finding that the Respondent was liable to pay compensation to the Applicant pursuant to sections 14 and 17 of the SRC Act. The Applicant was also awarded costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the alternative, if the Tribunal accepts that the Deceased did suffer an ‘aggravation’ of his pre-existing condition, the Respondent contends that any such ‘aggravation’ was not significantly contributed to by his employment.[143] There is very little, if any, evidence upon which the Tribunal could be positively satisfied that the Deceased was sleep deprived on 29 August 2011, or even if he was that it had any relationship to his employment at ANU.[143] Ibid, [4.13].CONSIDERATION AND REASONS The Tribunal has considered the parties’ submissions, the evidence of the witnesses at the hearing, and all the documentary material before it. The Tribunal is satisfied that the parties had an adequate opportunity to be heard by the Tribunal. 1)What condition resulted in the Deceased’s death? It is agreed that the Deceased suffered from a chronic illness, namely temporal lobe epilepsy, and that this condition pre-dated his employment with the Respondent. The Coroner’s report records that the Deceased was the victim of sudden unexpected death in epilepsy (SUDEP). As Professor Chambers explained, many SUDEPs occur in the context of an epileptic seizure. In the Deceased’s case, there is no concrete evidence that he had a seizure prior to his death. There was no witness of a seizure and the autopsy report showed no signs of him having a generalised tonic-clonic seizure.Professor Chamber’s evidence is that SUDEP may also occur in persons with epilepsy without them having a seizure. These persons are presumed to have an arrhythmia. In his opinion the mode of the Deceased’s death was ‘a sudden physiological change or disturbance of the normal physiological state, most likely cardiac arrhythmia.’[144] Dr McColl’s evidence is that there is no proof either way as to whether the Deceased had a seizure when he died, but as he was a person who had ‘quite frequent seizures and was found dead, on the balance of probability those two are very likely to be related.’[145][144] Medical Report of Associate Professor Brian Chambers dated 10 August 2020, 4. [145] Transcript of proceedings, 7 June 2021, 33. Whereas there is no clear proof that the Deceased suffered an epileptic seizure that resulted in SUDEP, the Tribunal finds that the expert medical evidence supports a finding that his death was precipitated by an epileptic seizure. In Baranski v Comcare,[146] the Full Federal Court outlined the circumstances in which an inference may be made about the happening of an event where direct proof of its occurrence is unavailable:[W]here direct proof of an event is not available, it is enough that the circumstances appearing in the evidence give rise to a reasonable and definite inference. The evidence must do more than give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees of probability so the choice between them is a mere matter of conjecture. If circumstances are proved in which it is reasonable to find a balance of probabilities in favour of the conclusion sought then, though the conclusion may fall short of certainty, it is not to be regarded as a mere conjecture or surmise. 2) Is this condition properly classified as an ‘injury (other than a disease)’ or a ‘disease’ for the purposes of the Act?[146] [2013) FCAFC 31 at [20].